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Abstract
Three experiments in Britain's tropical empire Were 
begun in 1874* The forts on the Gold Coast were added 
to the island of Lagos to form a crown colony which was ' 
given legislative power in the Gold Coast Protectorate, 
the first Residents were appointed in the Malay States 
and the Fiji Islands were annexed. As it has been sugg­
ested that these developments formed part of a new forward 
colonial policy inaugurated by Disraeli, and since the 
three experiments were sometimes mentioned together, an 
examination of the background of the changes and a con­
sideration of their place in the history of British policy 
may be useful.
Local events in each area reached a crisis during 
Gladstone's first ministry;.at a time when changes in 
personnel gave the Colonial Office a different bias.
The separatist Sir Frederic Rogers gave way as" Permanent 
Under-secretary in 1871 to Robert Herbert, a former Premier 
of Queensland; Lord Kimberley, a conscientious Colonial 
Secretary, who gave close attention to the local crises, 
took office in 1870, and Edward Knatchbull-Hugessen, who 
becamie Parliamentary Under-secretary in 1871, showed him­
self to be an eager expansionist. Between 1870 and 1873 
they conducted a careful reappraisal of Britain's role in 
the three tropical rpgions, and between February and August 
187 3 Kimberley decided to intervene in the Gold Coast 
against Ashanti invaders, he suggested the appointment 
of Residents in Malaya, and he urged Gladstone to annex 
Fiji.
As the Liberal Government fell in February 1874 before 
future policy had been determined, the final decisions 
fell to Lord Carnarvon, Disraeli's Colonial Secretary.
He decided to follow Kimberley's policy in each case, 
but he announced strictly limited aims. Instead of 
initiating a period of colonial expansion he saw him­
self conducting three experiments in the administration 
of tropical dependencies.
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iIntroduction#
Three experiments were launched in 1874, which were significant in the
history of the British empire in the tropics. In West Africa the tiny settlement
of Lagos was added to the forts on the Gold Coast to form a new crown colony,
which was given legislative power in the vague Gold Coast Protectorate, In the
Malay States the first Residents were appointed# The annexation of Fiji gave
Britain her first possession in the South Pacific outside the Australasian
colonies#* In the press, in Parliament and in the private letters of Cabinet
Ministers these experiments were often mentioned together, and the purpose of
the present thesis is to enquire whether they formed part of a comprehensive
new departure in British policy#
Gladstone's first ministry resigned in February 1874, and in the General
Election which followed Disraeli triumphed# But although the experiments were
inaugurated by Lord Carnarvon, his Secretary of State for Colonies, they did
2
not, as has been suggested, form a part of a new policy of colonial expansion#
Carnarvon said it was "impossible to appropriate every territory and every island",
and he pleaded for "some breathing time before we are required to act on a large 
3scale#*.." The experiments were really the result of a re-appraisal of Britain's
role in the three areas conducted by the Colonial Office under Lord Kimberley,
the Colonial Secretary in Gladstone's Government from July 1870 until February
1874. The peculiar internal circumstances of the three areas had raised the
general question of British intervention, and while Kimberley was reluctant to
move and wanted the prevent the extension of British responsibilities, Edward
1# Except Pitcairn, settled by the Bounty mutineers in 1790, whose decendents 
were moved to Norfolk Island in 1856.
2# E.G. C.E.Carrington, The British Overseas (1950) p#534: "when the forward
policy was fairly launched by Disraeli in 1874..*."
3. To a New Guinea deputation. The Times. 3.v. 1875 reporting a meeting of 
29.iv.1875.
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Knatchbull-Hugessen, the Parliamentary Under-secretary for Colonial Affairs from 
January 1871 to February 1874* who was an avowed •imperialist’ within the 
Liberal camp* urged him to intervene, and insisted that withdrawal would be 
politically dangerous* Thus between February and July 1873 Kimberley decided 
to attempt firmer administration on the Cold Coast and to intervene with force 
against Ashanti, he adopted the proposal for the appointment of Residents in 
Malaya, and he urged Gladstone to annex Fiji. The experiments launched by the 
Conservative Government were really decisions to pursue policies which had been 
worked out by their Liberal predecessors. They were the culmination of a period 
of tentative innovation rather then the beginning of a forward movement.
Although the experiments were not part of a comprehensive scheme of expansion, 
and Carnarvon insisted that each case had been judged on its merits, the decisions 
of 1873 and 1874 represent major landmarks in the development of the Gold Coast, 
in the assumption of British control in Malaya and in the Pacific islands* If 
this was not generally realised at the time, there were a few who began to ask 
where such experiments might end. Lord Blachford, who as Sir Frederic Rogers, 
the Permanent Under-secretary of the Colonial Office, 1860 to 1871, had tried to 
ward off the assumption of new responsibilities in the tropics, displayed a 
prophetic awareness, when he wrote in 1875s "we have Sue* with Egypt in the 
distance - Perak with Siam in the distance - Fiji with Oceania in the distance, 
and Ashanti with Central Africa in the distance".^
Looking at the three experiments together he realised that they were all 
part of the same problem. This thesis will attempt to define that problem and 
will examine the backgrounds to the three experiments. And as each area has
1. Blachford to Taylor 9-xii*1875. Quoted in G.E.Marindin, Lord Blachford's 
Letters (1896) p.36$.
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recently received separate detailed treatment from historians,^- some justification
of the present approach is necessary* C.D.Cowan in his at present unpublished
Origins of British Political Control in Malaya 1867-1878 (1956) traced the growth
from scratch, as it were, of Colonial Office thinking on Malaya after the Straits
Settlements were transferred from India Office supervision in 1867# He revealed
the role played by Kimberley, a much trusted lieutenant of Gladstone’s, who still
2
awaits a biographer, and he noticed how the mention of Germany seemed to play 
a crucial part in the Malayan decision* He realised that Kimberley appeared to 
be doing similar things in Vest Africa and the South Pacific, but in specialist 
work on Malaya there was neither time nor space to investigate- then. The present 
study follows Dr* Cowan's suggestion of taking the three areas together and 
seeing if any connecting links join Kimberley’s policies*
What are the links? Firstly, there is the co-incidental one of time. Roughly 
between the 1850*'s and the 1870's the very diverse social and political 
institutions of the Gold Coast, the Malay States and Fiji seemed to reach a
1* West Africa: J.D.Hargreaves, nThe French occupation of the Mellacourie, 1865-67** 
Sierra Leone Studies. No.9 (Dec*1957) p.3 ft "The First Phase of the Partition 
of West Africa", read to the Anglo-American Historian's Conference, London 
1957. F.Wolfson, British Relations with the Gold Coast 1845-1880 (PhD.thesis 
London 1950). K.O.Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta. 1850-1885. 
(1956)* S.O.Biobaku, The Egba and their Neighbours 1842-1872 (1957)*' C.J* 
Gertzal, Imperial Policy towards the British Settlements in West Africa. 
1860-1875 (B.Litt. thaaia Oxford 1953).
Malaya: C.D.Cowan, The Origins of British Political Control in Malaya 1867-1878 
(PhD. thesis London 1956). K.Thio. British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 
1880-1909 (PhD. thesis London 1956). V.G.Kiernen, "Britain, Siam, Malaya 
1875-1885"* Journal of Modem History. March 1956.
South Pacific: E.Drus, "The Colonial Office and the Annexation of Fiji", Trans. 
of the Royal Hist. Soc. 4th series, XXXII (l950), J.D.Legge, Britain in x 
Fi.ii. 1858-1880 (l958). G.C.Henderson, History of Government in Fiji. 1760- 
1875 ( 2 vols*of typescript dated 1941. Microfilm copy in the School of 
Oriental ft African Studies, London). O.Pamaby, "Aspects of British Policy 
in the Pacific: the 1872 Pacific Islanders Protection Act", Historical 
Studies Australia ft New Zealand .vol. 8 (Nov 1957) p*54. A.Ross, New Zealand 
Aspirations in the Pacific (PhD* thesis Cambridge 1949). B.C.Gordon, The 
Australasian Frontier in New Guinea 1870-1885 (1951)
2. The fullest account is in the Introduction by E.Drus to Kimberley's "Journal 
of Events during the Gladstone Ministry. 1868-1874", Camden Miscellany, vol.
XXI, Royal Historical Society, 1958.
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a stage which made certain people demand British intervention. Diverse though 
they were, the three areas had certain superficial features in common, which 
were more apparent to contemporary Englishmen than they are to-day. The power of 
local authority was weakened by rivalries, immigration, economic penetration, or 
European interference. Englishmen, authorised or not, had intervened to mitigate 
disorders. Domestic slavery, or customs which were stigmatised as slavery, 
existed, and could still rouse the moral ardour of the House of Commons. Thus, 
by coincidence, Kimberley faced similar situations, and in the summer of 1873, he 
made similar decisions, for each area.
Secondly, there is the link provided by Downing Street. Decisions were made 
by the same men in the Cabinet or the Colonial Office, and policy had to fit the 
common factors of foreign policy or the scrutiny of the Treasury. Although 
Carnarvon said that each case was judged on its merits, it was inevitable that 
officials handling papers from different areas sometimes on the same day, would, 
see the similarities of their problems. Rogers liked to find precedents from the 
entire empire when considering a new policy, Knatchbull-Hugessen referred to Fiji 
in his arguments on Lagos, Gladstone hoped the Ashanti war would warn people off 
Fiji, Carnarvon announced the annexation of Fiji in the same letter in which he 
sought Disraeli’s permission to go ahead with the abolition of slavery on the 
.Gold Coast, Derby thought the Fiji, Malayan and Gold Coast policies would offset 
the possible loss of the Gambia, and Fiji cropped up in the discussions about 
consular jurisdiction in the Niger Delta and relations with the Orange Free State.
I
Thirdly, there is a link though local officials. Two Royal Engineer officers,
in particular, play a considerable part in the discussion. Sir Harry Ord* and
Sir Andrew Clarke, the first two colonial governors of the Straits Settlements
(1867-1875) had both been previously to the Gold Coast and had played a nart in
1. His name was Harry St. George Ord, not Orde (as some authors have called him) 
nor Sir Henry, as in The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Ill, p.46.
the making of policy there. In Singapore they had a crucial role in the
assumption of British control in the Malay States. (Sir) John Pope-fTennessy, who
was Govemor^in-Chief of the West African Settlements at the outbreak of the
Ashanti war in 1872, had formerly governed Labuan. A minor official, Sir William
Hackett began as Queens Advocate in the Gold Coast in 1861, and later acted as
Lieut-Governor. In 1869 he went as Recorder to Penang, and later acted as Chief
Justice of the Straits; in 1875 he became the Chief Justice of Fiji. (Sir) John
Glover R.N. had two separate roles: at Iagos between 1861 and 1870 as governor,
and as a commander in the Ashanti war 1873-74*
Fourthly, there is the often baseless, but nevertheless important link of
public opinion. Parliamentary debates oroduced many cross references between
West Africa, the Straits and Fiji* The Missionary Societies, Anti-Slave and
Aborigines Protection societies, with their wide experience of treating the 
*
world as their oyster, several times sent deputations to the Colonial Secretary
to discuss a cluster of problems ranging from West Africa to flew Guinea, from
Zanzibar to the South Seas. Colonial newspapers delighted in giving the Colonial
Office a consistency which it never had. Thus the decision to send the Ashanti
Expedition in 1875 gave Singapore newspapers a hope that a strong policy might
be attempted in the Malay States.^ Australian newspapers also suggested that
recalcitrant Fijians or Papuans might be treated like the Ashantis, and a Governor
of Victoria made great play of a literary similarity when he compared the flew
Guinea question in 1874 with the *old Guinea1 troubles of 1872.
Finally, historians have also noticed the apparent links. Carrington says
Kimberley Minitiated forward moves in West Africa, Malaya and Fiji which his Tory
2
successor completed". Khaplund, after a very superficial glance at the three 
areas, said "Britain took control of new lands and added to her burdens. The
1. Cowan, Origins. p.225, fn.9.
2. Carrington, British Overseas, p.554*
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onward march of empire could not be halted".^ " H.L.Hall spends most of bis
2
chapter on "Native Policy" dealing with West Africa and Fiji. And following
Disraeli's accusation in the 1874 election, the text-books suggest that an Anglo-
Dutch treaty of 1871 provided for the transfer to Britain of the Dutch Gold Coast
forts in return for Britain's renunciation of her objections to Dutch expansion
in Sumatra. This link had some substance, but the 'treaty' was in fact three
separate treaties, with quite different origins, which were submitted to the
Dutch States-General together to facilitate their passage. As it was "the Sumatra
Treaty was the gilding to induce the Dutch to swallow the Gold Coast pill", but
4
the States-^eneral, at first, "took the pill and rejected the gilding". link,
pill and gilding require further examination.
The links, however, were scarcely noticed by contemporaries. A few, like
Kimberley, Rogers and Carnarvon, realised that the process of expansion, once
begun, would be difficult to check, but some sense of proportion may be gained
by noticing the only occasion where the author has found the Gold Coast, Malaya
and Fiji mentioned togther is State Papers, though not in private papers. 'Hiis
was the case of the Malay Chieftains' swords. After the Perak war of 1875 the
governor of the Straits Settlements suggested that loyal Malay chiefs might
receive an inscribed silver-handled sword from the Queen, on the pattern of
swords presented in West Africa after the Ashanti war of 1873-74* The swords
were duly inscribed, when it was discovered that the loyalty of the chiefs was
less deserving of reward. Carnarvon was rather annoyed, but since the Fijian
chiefs had just suppressed a cannibal rising, he said, "I suppose we cannot
5
utilise the swords in Fiji".
1. P.Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy. (1927) p.W7.
2. H.L.Hall, The Colonial Office (1937) pp.190-220.
3. R.C.K.Ensor, England 1870-19X4. (1936) p.27. D.G.E.Hall, A History of South- 
East Asia (1955) pp.474-5.
4. Meoo. by (Sir) Percy Anderson of the P.O., printed 2B.1.1874. Copy in CO/ 
273/77. ■
5. Min. by Carnarvon 25.xi.1877 on Anson to Carnarvon 29.ix. 1877. C0/27V91.
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The links, then, are often coincidental and tenuous. But a case can be made 
for the value of this, as it were, •horizontal* approach to the history, over a 
short period, of the three areas. No new method of research or interpretation 
has been made, but the close emphasis placed on the timing of decisions in 
London has yielded helpful results. By carefully notin# the dates of arrival 
and registration of despatches, of the dates of minutes and annotations, and in 
some cases of the dates of interviews with men-on-the-spot, the author has been 
able to make up, in some measure, for the somewhat informal system of filing used 
by the Colonial Office. A few examples will illustrate this. When Fiji was 
still foreign territory and therefore the responsibility of the Foreign Office, 
the Colonial Office began a Fiji file in 1860. but most of the Fiji correspond­
ence is buried in the files for New South Vales, Victoria, New Zealand and the 
other Australian colonies, while some is hidden among the African business in 
the ubiquitous 'Slave Trade* series. After 1866 the West African Settlements 
were unified under one Governor at Freetown through whom correspondence was 
supposed to pass. Fortunately, separate files were maintained in the Colonial 
Office, but since discussions were liable to overlap, it is necessary to examine 
all the files to get a complete picture. For example, much of the discussion 
over the exchange of the Gambia to France is in the Sierra Leone files, a 
suggestion relating to Dutch Elmina on the Gold Coast is found only in the Gambia 
file, and as the West African coast was momentarily viewed as a whole in 1874-76 
the vital documents might be anywhere in the Foreign or Colonial Office files. 
Similarly, matters relating to the Nalay States were scattered about the single 
Straits Settlements file until 1888.^ Thus, it is only when notice is paid to 
the dates when papers from, say, both Kedah and Kelantan were received, and it is
1. In 1888 reports from Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan were filed serwrately,
and in 1897, after the creatiai of the Federated Fa lay States, a separate
"Native States" correspondence was opened.
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realised that they are considered on the same day and regarded as the same
problem, that it is possible to trace the growth of a general trend of policy
towards the Malay States.^
There is nothing new in the present method, but concentration on it has been
fruitful* Moreover, it has enabled the author to uncover evidence which the
specialist, covering a longer period, in one area might miss. The Fiji specialist
looking for the basis of the British attitude towards what were called "native
stat^" would be unlikely to look at the African correspondence. The Gold Coast
specialist might overlook memoirs relating to Penang, where a conversation
recorded there throws light on Gold Coast events. Malayan experts have assumed
that India provided the analogies to the Malay States, whereas the Colonial
Office brought an entirely new bias to policy. Thus, while this thesis is
essentially an exercise in interpretation rather than a charting of virgin soil,
it is based on the original documents, and same new material has, in fact, been
2used for the first time.
However, in the author's opinion, the greatest value of examining the three
separate, but related, parts of the larger problem, is that an attempt can be
made to get behind that phrase in the despatches which hides a multitude of sins:
"the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government". Both in the nineteenth century and
to-day the process of policy making in London has been severely criticised.
Recently a Nigerian historian, writing of the British Government's difficulty in
pursuing "a consistent and well-conceived Colonial policy" in West Africa in the
1840's, lays the blame on the "out-dated, clumsy machinery of government in
3
Britain which made swift consistent action so difficult". Cardwell complained
1. This is not a criticism of the C.O., which doubtless had good reasons for its 
methods, but a statement of the researcher's difficulties.
2. The Braboume Diaries; Commodore Good enough* 8 Private Journal: and Andrew 
Clarke's Report to the War Office on West Africa, 1864.
3* Dike, Trade & Politics, p.86.
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about the same thing during the controversy over sending the Ashanti expedition 
in 1873# when he grumbled to Gladstone about "our form of government, which 
seldom very clearly defined responsibilities...."^ Here,then, is an appropriate 
starting point. An examination must be made of the Colonial Office and of the 
forces which moulded its policies.
1. Cardwell to Gladstone 19.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 4A120/l35.
Chapter 1
THE COIONIAL OFFICE Iff 1870 - THE »COLONIAL QUESTIOTT AND THE FRONTIER PROBLEM.
About the year 1870 the Colonial Office was forced to pay more attention 
to West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific. By 1876, it was clear that the 
new responsibilities it had acquired in those areas would provide increasing 
business for many years. But it would be wrong to assume that the policies 
which comprised this change were made in the Colonial Office. However able the 
Secretary of State might have been, and however expert was his permanent staff, 
the forces which moulded British policy came as such from the outside of the 
office as from within. The Colonial Office was only the focal point where 
ideas from mazy sources were reconciled; at one extreme stood the officers who 
faced the mundane tasks of administration in the tropics, at the other there 
was public opinion, vague, unpredictable, and usually in reality the opinion 
of the few enthusiasts who were interested. In this chapter the springs of 
British policy will be examined.
Who, then, was responsible for policy making regarding West Africa, Malaya 
and the South Pacific in the 1870's ? Obviously In an examination of this kind 
the careers, personalities and prejudices of the political and permanent heads 
of the Colonial Office will be of interest. But before discussing the Colonial 
Office of 1870, a word is necessary about five other important sources of 
influence on policy : (l) The Prime Minister, Cabinet and the Queen, (2) other 
government departments, (3) Parliament, (4) Pressure groups and individuals, 
and (5) Colonial governors, officials and special commissioners.
Theoretically, the Cabinet was the final authority for decisions and 
accountable to Parliament for them. Gladstone's carefully preserved Cabinet 
notes prove that the Gold Coast and Fiji (but not apparently Malaya) were
frequently discussed in the Cabinet. Gladstone often intervened to demand 
information of Kimberley when affairs in the three areas looked dangerous 
politically, or became expensive. Records of Disraeli's Cabinets sere not 
found, but in Derby’s 'Bill of Pare' for the autumn of 1874 Fiji and the 
Gold Coast were the only colonial subjects included,1 and it is known that 
the Cabinet prepared itself for a dangerous Gold Coast debate in July 1874.
As a result .of this debate either Disraeli or the Cabinet persuaded Carnarvon 
to abolish domestic slavery on the Gold Coast. The Queen had a large corres­
pondence with her Ministers, and demanded to be 'in the know1, especially 
during military operations. She was particularly fussy about instructions to 
Governors and Commanders, and sent messages to the troops after battles. 4 ^
Tet really, since these were essentially fringe problems, the Prime 
Minister, Cabinet and Quean played a small part in the three experiments.
The biggest decision with which this thesis is concerned was the Ashanti
expedition. Tet the decision to send it, made in July 1873, and the appointment
August
of Volseley to lead it, made in -September, were largely taken behind Gladstone's
back without Cabinet discussion. It was not until a month later that the Prime
2
Minister attempted to assert any authority in the matter. He was extremely
hasy about all three areas, and admitted this to Kimberley. He told Commodore
5
Goodenough he was never quite certain which was which of Tahiti and Hawaii, 
Fiji, however, was Gladstone's beta noire. He had first opposed its annexation 
in 1859 and he continued to do so until his friend Sir Arthur Gordon accepted 
the governorship. He avoided annexation in 1873 by sending the Ooodenough- 
Iayard Commission to report on the demand for it, which was his only successful
1. Derby to Disraeli 13.x.1074. Private. Disraeli Papers, XII.
2. See below pp. u5'-ix$\
3. Goodenough1s Journal, I, 18.vi.1873.
I
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postponement of a decision in the three areas* Similarly, Disraeli, vith the 
exception of slavery on the (told Coast, took little interest in the three cases 
and matters were completely left in Carnarvon's hands* The Queen's political 
interventions were without influence and Kimberley was rather cynical about Her 
Kajesty, but her interference in matters of patronage received more attention*^ 
Other government departments had an interesting role to play and they were 
probably responsible for most of the charges levied against the cumbersome 
nature of the policy making process* Inter-departmental wrangles caused most 
of the delays. Other sources of trouble were problems where departmental 
responsibilities were ill-defined, as in the South Pacific. The Treasury and 
the War Office were the departments which tended to frustrate the Colonial 
Office, while the Foreign Office sometimes tried to initiate policies in which 
the Colonial Office was the laggard.
The Foreign Office took a 'progressive' view of policy in these areas*
With such basic assumptions as British interests and trade, the mission to 
suppress slavery, and the exigencies of European diplomacy in mind, one gets 
the impression that the Foreign Office - even before the period of great 
rivalry in the 1880's - was intent on carving out 'spheres of influence', to 
divide up the world among 'civilised' powers to facilitate international 
affairs, to avoid friction, provided an 'open door' for trade was maintained* 
The Colonial Office, which had to face the problems of administration, often 
took a more cautious view* Thus it was the Foreign Office which urged the 
occupation of Lagos in 1861 against the wishes of the Colonial Secretary*
In two cases of attempted spheres of influence the Foreign Office had a wide
- .............  —  —     I ■ ■ I II II | ..|| ,
1* After Gladstone'8 ministers were sworn in at Windsor in 1868, Kimberley wrote 
in his Journal (p. 1) "What a preposterous relic of medieval Royalty this 
kneeling & hand-kissing is !"• Another comment on the Queen's foibles was, 
"How Childish!". On the matter of patronage, see correspondence with Gen* 
Biddulpb over Capt* Speedy in the Kimberley Papers*
conception which the Colonial Office in one case lamely followed, and in the
other actually frustrated. These concerned the partition of South-east Asia 
and West Africa.
In the former case the Foreign Office considered in the early 1860's that
the policy of objecting to Dutch expansion in Sumatra was fruitless, and that
Dutch sway in the island might well have advantages if it were accompanied by
the suppression of piracy and commercial concessions. But when in 1866 the Foreign
Office approached the Colonial Office the latter was found to be too busy with
its new dependency, the Straits Settlements which was about to be transferred
from India. Only when Governor Ord took a personal interest in the matter did the
Colonial Office offer any help.* Similarly, in the case of the Siamese tributary
States, the Colonial Office had to learn something from the Foreign Offico# The
i
latter department encouraged the Siamese hold over its tributaries to the north 
and south because international matters could then be conveniently handled through 
Bangkok. But in 1868 Governor Ord at Singapore demanded direct access to the 
Siamese tributaries in the Malay Peninsula, and he had to be reminded by the 
British representative at Bangkok that special treatment for Britain in the 
southern tributaries might lead to special treatment for the French in the Laos 
States to the north. So a compromise was worked out between the two departments.
In the case of Vest Africa the French government suggested, in 1866, that 
the isolated and comparatively worthless British settlement of The Gambia should 
be Sx changed for the equally useless French posts east of Sierra Leone. The 
Foreign Office welcomed a scheme, which might have resulted, later in the century, 
in a neat partition of the Vest African interior. But Kimberley, very shaken 
by a deputation in his first week at the Colonial Office, refused reluctantly,
1. See below pp. tsi-i&l.
2. See below pp. 14-7-'S’0-
but firmly, to allow the Gambia exchange to take place. The same thing happened 
in 1876, when it was the Colonial Office which dropped the matter which the 
Foreign Office was keen to complete.
Over the South Pacific the Foreign Office seemed unaccountably slack. In 
October 1871, in the hope of avoiding annexation, the Cabinet decided to accord 
de facto recognition to a new government in Fiji, but for some reason the Foreign 
Office never told the British Consul of this decision. Perhaps it was Granville's 
fault. Kimberley, who admired Granville's political gifts, did not approve of 
his "slipshod way of doing business.•• His great fault is that he lives from
hand to mouth, and trusts too much to the chapter of accidents. He seems never
to give himself the trouble to reason any matter out completely, and he is
singularly Ignorant of the details of questions he has to deal with. This
1laziness makes him^an Indifferent departmental Minister". Rogers, incidentally,
2
thought it made him an ideal Minister.
The Colonial Office suspected that laziness also had something to do with
the Var Office's attitude to Colonial policy. Problems of imperial defence
loomed large in discussions of colonial policy in this period. But it did not
concern the three areas under review - although Singapore's strategic value
was realised, and Fiji's was claimed. In 1861 the Select Committee on Imperial
defence had largely turned into a discussion of the relationship of the imperial
government to the self-governing colonies. The period 1868-73 was important
4
in this context as the period of the withdrawal of the imperial garrisons.
Tet the Var Office could be a bane to the Colonial Office where troops had to
1. Kimberley's Journal, p. 31.
2. Rogers to Miss Rogers 20.xii.1868. Marindin, letters, p. 275.
3. C.V.de Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics,
1848 - 72,(1929) pp. 211-212.
4. P.Knaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy,(1927) pp. 125-30.
be paid for out of crown colony revenues. or when reinforcements were not
forthcoming in an emergency*
A battle royal took place in 1868-72 over the number of English troops to be
stationed in the Straits* When the question resolved itself into one about
sentries the Horse Guards appeared in very poor light. War Office establishments
appeared to require 1.074 men to man thirty-one sentry posts, and 150 English
artillerymen would require 150 Indian troops, who in turn would have to become
300 if they were also to guard themselves J After a conference to resolve the
question of Singapore’s defences Rogers decided that the War Office’s "single idea
was. what sentries were necessary, and how many men were necessary to give these
sentries five nights in bed out of six".* Finally, the War Office agreed to allow
do
English troops to sentry duty provided they travelled in omnibuses! Rogers came
to the conclusion that
"the British army is not so comprised as to be available for the necessities 
of tropical dependencies. A body of British troops cannot be used without 
a body of coloured troops to attend upon them and the British army contains 
no coloured troops (with the unavailable exception of the Ceylon Rifles) who 
can be stationed in the East... the WO and HG do not seem^adapted to the 
exigencies of an Empire having tropical possessions".
The detachment of Royal Engineers sent to Fiji was more of a liability than an
asset, as it required the colonial revenue to pay for equipment which it would
take away with it. In 1876 the commander of the detachment refused to move against
a cannibal tribe until reinforcements arrived from India or the Cape, so Sir
Arthur Gordon ran his "little war" with Fijian forces under their chiefs, supervised
3
by his A.D.C. and Private Secretary. Similarly in 1873 Kimberley found the War 
Office reluctant to send reinforcements to the Gold Coast in the early stages of 
the Ashanti invasion.
1. Rogers to lady Rogers 9.viii.l868. Marindin. Letters, p. 274.
2. Min. by Rogers 17 .xi.1870 on Ord to Kimberley 6.ix.l870. C0/273/3°.
3* Gordon to Carnarvon l8.xi.1876. A«H.Gordon. Fiji : Records of Private and 
Public Life. 1875-80. II. p. 224.
Watters improved, however, during Gladstone's ministry, when Cardwell and
officers like Wolseley left the War Office in a more eager frame of mind* The
younger officers rushed to volunteer for the Ashanti campaign, and both it and
the Perak campaign of 1875 were waged with forces (both roughly a Brigade in
-strength) far in excess of requirements* De Kiewiet has suggested that the
eagerness of the post-Cardwell generation "is not unrelated to the more vigorous
departures of British policy1*.^
The Admiralty's attitude to the tropics was similar to the War Office's,
Service in West Africa was especially unpopular, and while the Admiralty was
2
glad to borrow colonial steamers for service in the Niger, it was reluctant to
3
provide ships for the colonial authorities in the Gambia, There were frequent
wrangles between the West African governors and naval officers. Tn 1860 the
4
Commodore refused a Foreign Office request to escort traders up the Niger, and 
Sir Arthur Kennedy complained that with a government comprising over a thousand 
miles of coast he was surely entitled to better cooperation from the Squadron 
than he received. Rogers agreed he was "very much left in the lurch by the 
Admiralty",^
The influence of the Treasury is difficult to plot precisely. More
comprehensive study is required since the Treasury's explicit role in the three
areas was small; but its general influence was great. As de Kiewiet says "It is
hardly an exaggeration to say that the Treasury and the exigencies of the British
6
budget have made as much colonial history as the Colonial Office itself". The
1. C.V.de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa. (1937) p. 47.
2. Ad. to CO. 23.ii.1871. CO/267/313.
3. Ad. to CO. 5.1X.1872. C0/87/103.
4* Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 174.
5. Min. by Rogers on Kennedy to Granville 4.vii.l870. CO/267/306.
6. de Kiewiet, op. cit. pp. R-9.
8The colonies had to pay for themselves; grants in aid were exceptional, and this
rigidity was sometimes a source of frustration, not only to the man on the spot,
but also to the Colonial Office. An under secretary once said,
"the real source of the darkness and confusion which pervade all these 
African finances has been the arbitrary way in which, with no reason 
assigned, the Treasury has for some years overruled by its sheer will 
every successive attempt from this office to^look the affairs in the 
face and make some reasonable settlement"•
It is argued that Treasury Control was but an extension of Parliament’s
2
control over the nation's expenditure. Following this view, and noting that on
the surface relations between the two departments seemed cordial enough, one could
state that the Treasury merely exercised a wise discretion over public expenditure.
let there was more to it. Sir John Wood points to the crux of the problem when he
says that the Treasury in Gladstone's era was interested in "regularity and
3
prudent administration" rather than "policy"* The Foreign and Colonial Offices
4
(which after all were not major spending departments like the Admiralty and War
1. Min. by Elliot 20.xii.1864 on Pine to Cardwell 13.xi.1864. CO/96/65.
2* J.Wood, 'Treasury Control', Political Quarterly. Oct-Dec 1954, xxv, 4, p 370-81.
3. Ibid p. 377. ___
4. Statement of Expenditure, 1870-71. Accounts and Papers. 1871, XXXVII, pp. 44-48.
Services
Army C 14,085,400
Havy 9,767,171
Abyssinia Exped. of 1868 300,000
Credit: war in Europe 2.000.000
26,152,571
Foreign Office
Office 77,814
Embassies 73,970
Diplomatic service 294,919
Consular service 275,520
Slave Trade 5.747
727,970
Colonial Office
Office 34,933
Grants in aid 71,624
Orange R.Terr. & St. Helena 6,019
Emigration 14,545
Coolie emigration 1,260
Treasury chest. 18,393
146,774
Office) were interested in questions of policy which often had a world-pvide
scope, while the Treasury was interested in scrutinizing the details of
expenditure* Thus to the former an argument over the cost of an additional clerk
in a consulate was infuriating, when to the latter it was all in a day's work*
The Colonial Office could certainly not be accused of extravagance* When new
colonies like the Straits Settlements (1867) and Fiji (1S74) came under its view
financial considerations were the major preoccupation of the officials in Downing
Street, and when Gordon was reluctant to reduce expenditure in Fiji Carnarvon
said he "must be told in the plainest - though of course in very civil - terms
that he must carry out the proposed reductions",* Lowe, as Chancellor of the
Exchequer, once wrote to Kimberley : "I am always most anxious to meet your wishes
2
because I believe you are really anxious for economy".
Yet the Treasury was regarded as the bogey of Whitehall, and was universally
unpopular among civil servants. Possibly its permaryt staff were to blame; Herbert
3claimed that the Lords of the Treasury never saw a Colonial Office letter, and
the Treasury clerks often received higher salaries than the rest of the civil
service and were said to constitute "the worst dressed and most high-spirited
4department of State," The cocmonest complaint was of the discourteous tone of
5
Treasury letters. "What a preremptory letter from one office to another" was a
typical comment by the head of a Colonial Office department.^ One of the
Treasury's most bitter critics was Knatchbull-Hugessen - himself a former Junior 
7
Lord. He lambasted the "petty parsimonious spirit", the "blundering stupidity"
1. Min. by Carnarvon on Gordon to Carnarvon 14.1.1877. C0/83/l3,
2. Lowe to Kimberley 30*x. 1872. Kimberley Papers, PC/A/l3•
3* Hall, Colonial office, p.269.
4* Wood, 02. cit. p. 375.
5. W.A.Baillie Hamilton, 'Fourty-four years at the Colonial Office', Nineteenth 
Century (l9o9), pp. 610-12.
6. Min. by Harrow on Treas. to CO. 31.1.1871. CO/267/313.
7. See below p3.$. He had little Treasury work; his duties were those of Assistant 
Whip.
and "miserable pettyfogging proceedings" of his former office.^ When Governor
FCeate died a few weeks after arriving in Vest Africa Kimberley suggested that his
widow might be repaid the £175 stamp duty paid on his commission, but the Treasury
regretted that there were no funds for such repayments, Knatchbull-Hugessen said
"It is this niggardly, parsimonious treatment of public servants - not always
accompanied by the courtesy of language which might soften the weight of the blow
2
which discredits the department which controls the finances of this country",
Kimberley usually gave way in such small matters, but he disliked "their silly 
3
petulancy"•
Only two cases of Treasury discourtesy and parsimony, with which one could
find fault, appear in this account. Both concern the South Pacific - the area
over which the government departments appeared to find most scop© for disclaiming
responsibilities. Firstly, it was largely Treasury delays which caused an attempt
to provide the British Consul in Fiji with magisterial powers between 1866 and 1869
to be dropped. One letter from the Foreign Office dated 6 November 1866 was not
4answered by the Treasury until 25 January 1868, When the attempt was revived in
1871 the Foreign Office was driven to the shift of getting Treasury approval for a
gaoler and constable to assist the Consul, and waiting until the scheme had started
5
before letting the Treasury know that Clerks would also be required. The second, 
more serious,case occurred over the South Sea Island labour traffic. In 1862 a 
Bill to empower Colonial Governors to sub-poena witnesses from outside the colonies 
was dropped because the Treasury objected to the expense. After blatant cases of 
kidnapping and growing public anger the Colonial Office re-opened the matter of 
legislation. The Treasury now tried to get the Australasian colonies to pay for
1. Hall, Colonial Office, pp. 35-55*
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 18.vi. 1873 on Treas. to CO. 12.vi.1873. CO/323/314.
3. win. by Kimberley l.ii.1871 on Treas. to CO. 31.i.1871. CO/267/313.
4. FO/58/124 pp. 69 A 91.
5. See below p.
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the costs of prosecutions in their courts, which caused Rogers to exclaim : "This
seems to me governing an Empire in the spirit of a subordinate department of the
inland Revenue office".^ This time Kimberley took the matter to the Cabinet and
the Treasury decision was reversed.
In fairness to the Treasury it should be said that the impetus for economy carae
from Parliament. In 1874 Gladstone still tried to resist the annexation of "Fiji
as he saw 'disagreeable and distorted phantoms stalking* across the House of
2
Commons, 'new tfotes in the Estimates'. But one can sympathise with Carnarvon's
lament, when a matter seemed settled and the Treasury reopened it on the grounds
of expense, that "at a time when every moment of my available leisure is engrossed
by a severe pressure of the most important business I should be obliged to carry
3
on a controversy with the Treasury on a matter of the smallest detail".
Although it was behind the Treasury's contribution. Parliament exercised its 
own influence on policy. By questions, requests for the presentation of correspond­
ence, or by moving resolutions or motions of censure, the members of both Fouses 
could embarrass the Colonial Office. In a few cases they directly influenced policy 
in this way, and parliamentary interest in the colonies generally increased in this 
period. Fiji in particular provided some lively debates. Here Bod els en's
distinction between the maintainance of empire and colonial expansion must be
4-
remembered, for while much of the renewed interest in colonies in the 1870's
concerned the former, parliamentarians often made no distinction. Gladstone, for
instance, disliked the new interest in the old colonies as much as he abhorred the
idea of new responsibilities in the tropics. Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote in 1871 :
"I made a speech which I supposed was successful - as it was much cheered. 
Gladstone, however, is not fond of speeches in favour of our Colonial 
Empire, and remarked that I had spoken 'an excellent bit of Bunkum'. Not
1. Min. by Rogers 2.i. 1871 on Treas. to CO. 30.xii.1870. C0/20l/560.
2. 3rd Series Hansard, vol. ccxxi, col. 1287.
3. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 36.
4 C. A. G o o le J s € , n , Sludt 'es m Mrc4 "Viet > r  i o. n. I m p e r i a l i s m  ( ^ 3 -4 - )  pp. l -8 .
very encouraging 2 Of late years there has been a cry, by no ipeans just, 
that ’the liberals would like to give up the Colonies*, which cry I set 
myself to disprove wherever and whenever I can... But if sentiments of 
loyalty to the Colonial Connection are termed-’Bunkum' by the Liberal 
Prime Minister the task will be difficult”»
Here again the question was one concerning the old colonies, but Knatchbull—
Hugessen had a part in the making of policy for the three tropical areas, and his
speech in the Fiji debate in 1872, which should have defended the government's
policy, was hailed by the opposition as a concession of their point. Gladstone
himself had to state the government's case.
The period when colonial debates emptied the House was drawing to a close.>
The three areas under discussion provided some dangerous political weapons in the
late 1860's and early 1870's. Palmerston (over the Gold Coast in 1864), Gladstone
(over Fiji in 1872 and 1873) and Disraeli (over the Gold Coast in 1874) required
all their debating skill to overcome the hostility of the House, and the vote on
Fiji in 1873 went against the government. In certain cases parliamentary agitation
was responsible for immediate decisions. The day after the Fiji debate of 1872
2
the Colonial Office urged a new Fiji policy on the Foreign Office. Lord Stanley
of Alderley's motion of censure in the House of Lords on the Malay States policy
in May 1874 forced Carnarvon to make some decision. The Commons debate on
»
slavery in July 1874 was responsible for the decision to abolish domestic slavery
in the Colony and Protectorate, and fear of a hostile parliament was one of the
4reasons for dropping the Gambia exchange with France in 1876.
Parliament, therefore, played am important role in the experiments of 1874, in 
a few cases almost a vital one. But the influence of Parliament was really the 
work of a group of enthusiasts. In the House of Lords it was the Duke of 
Manchester, Lord Stanley of Alderley, the third Earl Grey, the rcarquis of Normanby
1. Braboume Diary, vol. IV 1870-73. p. 558.
2. See below P-L^l 3. See below
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and the Earl of Belmore. In the Bouse of Commons the leading zealots were men 
like Sir Charles Adderley, Arthur Kinnaird, Admiral Wingfield, Admiral Erskine, 
Baillie Cochrane, Robert McFie, Robert Torrens, Evelyn Ashley, Adolphus Young 
and Robert Fowler. By far the most successful of them, in terms of nuisance value, 
was Alderman (later Sir William) McArthur, Liberal member for Lambeth.
The son of a Methodist parson from Donegal, McArthur became a successful 
woollen draper in Londonderry, and transferred his headquarters to London in the 
1850's, when business with his brother’s firm in Sydney increased. Be was a leading 
Wesleyan and a member of the Aborigines Protection Society. His brother Alexander 
was prominent in Australian Methodism and politics and it was his marriage to the 
daughter of W.BiBoyce, president of the Australian Methodist Conference and later 
ueneral Secretary of the Methodist Missionary Society in London, which brought 
William McArthur into missionary circles.^ This persistent Alderman caused a 
West Africa debate in 1871 and he embarrassed the Colonial Office and the government 
twice in 1873. In February he called for the publication of Gold Coast correspond­
ence and asked what instructions had been sent to a new Administrator - before the
i
Colonial Office had even written them. On this occasion Knatchbull-Hugessen
2managed to persuade him to postpone his motion for a fortnight. Tn June the
Cabinet' decided to send the Goodenough-Layard Commission to Fiji in order to avert
another McArthur motion, but this time he refused to give way even to Kimberley's 
3 .
entreaty. He: was the prime mover in the Commons agitation on Fiji, where the 
Methodist missionaries were prominent. In fact when McArthur, a Liberal, moved the 
motion in 1874 supporting the Disraeli government's action in Fiji, Gladstone 
viciously attacked the Alderman's "sadly deluded philanthropy" and the constitution­
al singularity of his motion.
1. T.McCullagh, Sir William McArthur. KCMG. A Biography. (1898) pp. 66-67.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 18.ii.1873 on Question received 14.ii.1873. C0/96/lG4.
3. Kimberley to Gladstone 11 & 12.vi.1873. Private. Gladstone Papers, Add.wS3. 
44225/49 & 53.
The clue, then, to Parliament's influence lies in the efforts of the zealots, 
in addition to these, sometimes in alliance with them, were other individuals 
and pressure groups. Through Parliament, through deputations and through publicity 
or simply by letters, they sometimes played an important part. Each parliamentary 
enthusiast usually had expert advice. McArthur spoke for the Wesleyans, Kinnaird 
for the Scottish Presbyterians, Stanley of Alder ley for the Straits Settlements 
Association and for Sir Benson Maxwell, former Chief Justice in Singapore. Adderley, 
one suspects, was the spokesman for (Sir) John Pope-TTennessy, a former Tory F.P., 
who was Governor-in-Chief in West Africa 1872-73^
The pressure groups represented two main groups of interests, economic and 
humanitarian, but any one interest would usually deploy the arguments of the 
other. Thus, the agitation for the annexation of Fiji waged by the Fiji Committee, 
the Anti-Slave and Aboriginies Protection Societies, and the Wesleyans, although 
fairly attributable to humanitarian motives, was also backed by commercial, 
strategic and even chauvinistic arguments. The Straits Settlements Association, 
founded in 1868 really to foster the financial and commercial interests in Singapore 
announced itself as a constitutionalist body to defend the independence of the 
Supreme Court and to fight prejudicial legislation. Because it was found to be 
politically inconvenient to fit the question of the exchange of the Gambia to 
France in the 1875 parliamentary session, another pressure group, the Gambia 
Committee, was able to mobilise opposition so that the proposal was never put
to the new parliament. This committee was the usual mixture of missionary,
2
humanitarian, merchant and 'Imperialist1 elements. Motives were doubtless mixed; 
•Commerce, Christianity and Civilization' was the battle cry of a whole host of
1. When Adderley asked the CO. to lay before parliament P-Hennessy's proposal for 
uniting Labuan and the Straits Settlements, the head of the eastern department 
wondered how Adderley knew about it. "Mr. Hennessy told him" wrote Herbert on 
Question received 16.ii.1872. CO/l44/39. See other evidence below p.
2. Royal Colonial institute to FO. 12.i.1876. F0/27/2227.
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specialised interests and there is probably truth in de Kiewiet’s version of an 
old jibe at the humanitarians : "they say Christ; they mean Christ, but they also 
mean cotton".^
How effective were the pressure groups in infliancing policy ? What did the
Colonial Office think about them ? Beside McArthur’s comparative success can be
placed the cool reception often given to economic interests., A leading Gold Coast
firm wanted the government to leave the coast in 1874 but as they were accused of
selling arms to the Ashantis they were discredited. Some of the Gambia merchants
who fought the proposed cession with France were regarded by the Colonial Office 
2
as a watchdog. The Straits Settlements Association, however, so persistently 
attacked Governor Ord that after two years the Permanent Under-secretary of the
Colonial Office decided that the "time has arrived when the Association may be
3
relieved of the supervision of the Cols Office", and in 1872 he wanted to "rebel
against the tyranny" of the endless flood of letters from the Editor of the West 
4
African herald. The New Guinea Association of 1875» in spite of ’a varnish of
5
piety’ was regarded as little Mbetter than a filibustering expedition".
Established socifkies were usually well known in the Colonial Office and were
treated accordingly, rhe Missionary Societies met with patience and respect, but
the Anti-Slavery Society was known to pass on a good number of baseless charges.
The reception given to financial interests varied from the great respect shown to
Mr. Seymour Clarke, Chairman of the Great Northern Railway, who represented tin and
telegraph interests in South-east Asia,^ to Herbert’s comment on a proposal about
7
land purchases in Papua - "Scoundrels", On the whole the Colonial Office attitude
1. de Kiewiet, Colonial Policy. P. 243.
2. Min. by Kimberley 26.v. 1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 21.v. 1872. CO/87^102,
3. See below p.
4. Min. by Herbert 30.V.1872 on Fitzgerald to Kimberley 25.V.1872. CO/l47/26.
5. Carnarvon to Cairns 30.x. 1875. Private (copy). Carnarvon Papers PRO.30/6/6 p. 32.
6. See below p.^3 7. See below p. 273
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at this time to commercial ventures in undeveloped tropical lands was : go at
your own risk; do not expect the protection of British officials 1
Two cases where non-parliamentary activity by pressure groups played a
noticeable role in the formation of policy may be cited. In one, the Kidnapping
Act of 1872, it was attended by great publicity; in the other, the decision to
intervene in the Malay States in 1873, it was very much behind the scenes, firstly,
in December 1871 the news of Bishop Patteson's murder in the South Seas opened the
gates to floods of publicity about kidnapping, and as the news came after a
particularly frustrating year of departmental responsibility-dodging, perhaps it
is not simply coincidence that in less than a month after the news the Cabinet had
decided to meet the kidnapping problem with imperial legislation. In the second
case, one might almost say that the Colonial Office was blackmailed into intervening
in Malaya. Between 1868 and 1873 Seymour Clarke in London, and V.H.W.Read in
Singapore and London, bombarded the Colonial Office with proposals relating to tin
concessions in Selangor and a telegraph extension from Burma to Australia via the
Malay archipelago. On the whole Clarke's prominence in the City ensured that they
had a patient hearing, but the Colonial Office was always non-committal. Vhat
Clarke wanted was a statement which would assure the City that investments in the
Malay States would be secure; better still would have been British intervention to
keep order. Early in July 1873 Kimberley (quite independently of Clarke's
interests) had made up his mind that the civil war in Perak called for some
intervention. He was still uncertain what form it should take, when, from the
blue as it were, Clarke produced, on 15 July, a letter from Singapore hinting that 
»
the ruler of Selangor might request a German protectorate. It is most unlikely 
that this was anything more than a threat cooked-up in Singapore, probably by 
Clarke’s brother-in-law, Read; but it had its desired effect. Kimberley now 
viewed the matter with great urgency. British paramountcy in the Peninsula seemed 
threatened, and after a careful study of past relations with the Malay States
17
during July and August 1873 Kimberley produced his famous suggestion of the 
Residents,^ This is sufficient proof that the letters from cranks, committees and 
commercial houses, filed always last in the Colonial Office papers, deserve the 
careful attention of the resercher who seeks the springs of British policy,
A final word is necessary on the role in policy making of the local officiAls- 
governors, minor officers and special commissioners. Their influence in this 
period can scarcely be overestimated, Pinal decisions, of course, always lay with 
the home government, its authority based on Parliament. Governors could always be 
censured and even recalled, but once in office the Governor in fact exercised the 
widest discretion. The most notorious case of a governor at cross-jwrposes with 
the Secretary of State was over Sir William Jervois's policy in Perak in 1875. He 
launched his scheme! before reporting to Carnarvon, and when things vent wrong he 
ordered a Brigade into action before fully explaining himself to London. And this 
was at a time when the telegraph was open to Singapore - although it is true that 
it broke down at a crucial moment. lie was severely censured and most of his policy 
was reversed, but his spirited defence amounted almost to a personal insult to 
Carnarvon. Tet after all this he vas no’t recalled nor was his promotion jeopardised.
Almost all the governors in West Africa and the Straits had an important 
influence on policy between 1870 and 1874. Their usual technique was to exceed 
their instructions and report a fait accompli. which was usually approved. Sir 
Andrew Clarke's Pangkor Engagement in Perak was the most outstanding case.
Similarly, Commodore Goodenough, sent out to Fiji to investigate the demands for 
annexation, fulfilled his job by accepting the preliminary cession of the islands - 
the news of which reached London two months before the Report supporting it.
Captain Strahan, Governor of the new Gold Coast Colony in 1874, when asked to
1. See below p.
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report on the possibility of abolishing slavery, replied with a proposal, which,
in anticipation of approval, he had already begun to implement* Even a minor
officer could have a far reaching influence. The 'Resident idea* for Malaya
received its greatest advocacy from a temporary Lieut-Oovemor of Penang, who was
borrowed from Ceylon while others were on leave, and who turned up in London during
the period when Kimberley changed his mind about intervention. In Fiji British
naval officers intervened to keep the peace in 1873 to the extent that they were
described as a 'virtual protectorate'
Colonial governors who were ex-M.P.'s presented another problem. The suspicion
of Pope-Hennessy's collusion with Adderley has been mentioned, and wherever he
went this mercurial Irishman was the champion of the underdog; in labuan it was
the Chinese, in West Africa the Africans, in Barbados the negroes, in Hong Kong
the Chinese again and in Mauritius the French, Sir James Fergus sen, another ex-
Tory M.P. and a former Under-secretary in the India Office, missed active political
life as Governor of New Zealand, 1873-75* * and he infuriated the Colonial Office
by his encouragement of (Sir) Julius Vogel's plans for expansion in the Pacific,
Sir Arthur Gordon had been private secretary to his father Aberdeen when he was
Prime Minister, was an M.P. 1854-57 and private secretary to Gladstone in the
Ionian Islands. His colonial governorships satisfied an amVtion for greatness
2
rather than strictly material ends, thus in Fiji, 1875-80, he demanded immense 
freedom of action, which Carnarvon on the whole gave him. At the same time he 
was a regular correspondent of Gladstone, who had opposed Carnarvon's decision to 
annex the islands.
Thus, although the influence of certain governors became a 1 ft tie too over­
powering, one is tempted to say that on the whole the Colonial Office spent as
1. Goodenough's Journal, I, 28.ix.1873.
2. In 1876 he said he would not be tempted out of England again except to 1. An 
Indian Presidency, 2. Ceylon, 3. the Gov-Oeneralship of Canada, or 4. the 
suggested Gov-Generalship of the vr.Indies. Gordon to Carnarvon 8.xi*1876. 
Private. PRO.30/6/39 p. 100.
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much time convincing themselves of the wisdom of a particular governor’s policy 
and defending it, as it did in thinking ahead and instructing the governors what 
to do.
Kany diverse forces, then, focussed on the department which provides .the main
t
material for this thesis. From 1798 to 1876 the empire was administered from
precarious premises, now demolished, which closed the St, James’s Hark end of
Downing Street. Number Fourteen was the address, but there were encroachments into
1
available spare rooms in Downing Street, The entire establishment in 1870 
consisted of sixty-seven including messengers, and the burden of administering 
the far-flung Victorian empire was borne by the Secretary of State, two Under­
secretaries, one Assistant Under-secretary, the Legal Adviser and about a dozen
2 3
departmental clerks. Office hours were noon to 5.30 pm. A member of the staff
who joined just before the period of this discussion recorded his disappointment :
"I had pictured the Colonial Office to myself as a dignified abode of 
mystery, excitement, and la haute politioue. where I should be entrusted 
with weighty secrets, and where in plain English, I should be able to 
’fancy myself* as an active participator in seme of the most important 
and delicate affairs of State. Instead of this, I found myself in a sleepy 
humdrum office, where important work was no doubt done, but simply because 
it had got to be done;»where there seemed no enthusiasm, no esprit de corps, 
and no encouragement for individual exertion. And, what to my foolish 
imagination seemed worst of all, I very soon began to realise that the 
Colonial Office did not occupy the position in the eyes of the world that 
even I was able to feel it ought to have... The colonies were simply a bore. 
They were there somehow, and they had got to be maintained, but at as little 
expense and with as little trouble as possible. They might now and then 
provide a subject for abstract discussion, and might even come in usefpl 
occasionally for political purposes; but they were not recognised as 
constituting an important factor^in the life of the nation* and they just 
had to take their chance”.
1. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 48. W.A.Baillie Hamilton, ’Forty-four years at the 
Colonial Office’, pp.599-602.
2. J.Bramston, ’The Colonial Office from Within’, Empire Review. April 1U01, p.?8^. 
In 1870 the Legal Adviser became a second Assistant Under-secretary end in 7^ 74 
a third was added.
3# Baillie Hamilton, 0£. cit. p. 601.
4* Ibid. pp. 603-4*
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It is quite true that politically colonial affairs had tended to become fringe
matters which only occasionally reached the headlines, as in the case of the
Ashanti War in 1873# The Permanent Under-secretary once said of a governor who
was worried about reports of parliamentary debates in which he was criticised, that
the governor had forgotten "no vone reads that part of the proceedings because it
relates to a colony".^ But Baillie Hamilton said that 1870*8 were the'beginning
of a new era1, and he dates this from Herbert's appointment as Permanent Under-
2
secretary in 1871* The present writer would suggest that other leading
personalities had as large a role; therefore a word is indicated on the personalitiei
in the Colonial Office in the early 1870's.
As Secretary of State for Colonies from July 1870 to February 1878 Kimberley
and Carnarvon both held comparatively long tenures of an office notorious for its
5
birds of passage. In 1855 alone there had been four changes. Both were among
the really great public men of their day; they were both, for instance, to turn
down the Viceroyalty, and they were both Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Kimberley is
4
now emerging from undeserved, but understandable, obscurity, while Carnarvon has
5
received his due from de Kiewiet and is well-known by Hardinge'e biography. But
1. Min. by Herbert 31.i.1878 on Cordon to Carnarvon 30.xi.1877. C0/83/l4.
2. Baillie Hamilton, op. cit. p. 604.
3. The only other long tenures in 75 years were Henry Dundas (1795-1801) Lord 
Bathurst (1812-27) Stanley, fourteenth Earl of Derby (1841-45) the third rarl 
Grey(l846-52) and the Duke of Newcastle(l859-64).
4. E.Drus's edition of his Journal. Camden Miscellany Vol.XXI (1958) and her *The 
Colonial Office and the annexation of Fiji*. Trans, of the R.Hist. Soc. 4th. ser. 
XXXII (1950) pp. 5)8-110. C.D.Cowan, The Origins of British Political Control
in Malaya. 1867 to 1878. (FhD thesis London 1956). E.Thio. British Policy in 
the Malay Peninsula. 1880-1909 (PhD thesis London 1956). B.Hamilton, Barbados 
and the Confederation Question, 1871-1885.(1956). A.Ross, Hew Zealand 
asperations in the Pacific, (PhD thesis Cambridge 1949). The Brabourne Journal, 
see bibliography.
5. C.W.de Kiewiet, Imperial Factor in South Africa (1937). A.H.Hardinge, The Fourth 
Earl of Carnarvon (1925). _
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neither of them belonged to the normal run of aristocratic party men. Carnarvon 
resigned twice, in 1867 and 1878, over disagreement with Disraeli's policy, and 
Kimberley was a believer in "that tacit understanding between the leaders on both 
s^ides which has much more to do with the smooth working of our complex political 
system than the superficial observers, who only see the outside of public affairs,
imagine".^ Carnarvon believed that colonial affairs should be above party
 ^ *
conflict and nithing will be found to distinguish between Kimberley's and
Carnarvon's policies in the three areas. They had the confidence of their 
respective Prime Ministers in this period. Gladstone and Kimberley appear 
especially close; their letters display a deep trust and Kimberley was nearly 
always able to get his way. Gladstone might rush in and demand what was happening, 
but his understanding of the problems of the three areas was imperfect - and he 
admitted it. Carnarvon had been estranged from Disraeli over the Reform Act (the 
cause of his resignation in 1867) but in 1874 Disraeli seemed to tumble over 
himself in flattering Carnarvon and placed complete trust in him over policy in 
the three areas. These problems, said the Prime Minister, "will only give you 
fresh opportunities for distinguishing yourself'". By 1876 Disraeli had begun to 
change his mind and wrote, "while all the Government are attacked in the metro-
4
politan papers for their blundering etc little Carnarvon, who feeds the Radical 
press, is always spared, and really he is the only one who has made mistakes, and
4
committed a series of blunders". Two years later he regretted the South African
5
policy when each day brought "a new blunder of Twitters".
Both Kimberley and Carnarvon were experienced in office, and each had had some
1. Kimberley's Journal p. 1*
2. After W.E.Forster's famous address in Edinburgh on 'Our Colonial Empire', on
5.xi.l875, Carnarvon wrote : "it gives me the sort of assurance that the time 
has come when colonial policy may be very greatly, at least, taken out of the 
category of party questions.". Carnarvon to Forster 3.xii.l875. PRO.*50/6/4? p.?14
3. Disraeli to Carnarvon 12.iv.1874* Private, PR0.30/6/11 p.8.
4. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 26.iv. 1876 quoted in Buckle, Life of Disraeli. V, p.476
5. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 27. ix.1878, Ibid. VI, p. 420.
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previous experience of West African, South-east Asian and Fiji problems. But as
Kimberley saw them from a Foreign Office viewpoint and Carnarvon from the Colonial
Office, the former was more sensitive (though not always farseeing) in diplomatic
matters, while the latter was more aware of moral responsibilities, Neither were
particularly good public speakers, Kimberley's performances in the Lords were
dull; he despised oratory, although he admired those who could sway the "cold
critical audience" of the upper House,^ Carnarvon's speeches have an attractive
modesty of style and one writer claimed that ''As a debater he is exceedingly ready,
quick and courteous. He. possesses, too, the power, •• of summing up the general
2results of a discussion with equal cogency and completeness". Nevertheless, he
3
was often rather vague on the details of his subject, Kimberley apparently never
4
entertained visitors from the empire, while Carnarvon was particularly good both
5
at hospitality and receiving deputations, Kimberley could pen an incisive 
despatch; Carnarvon’s tended to be rather rambling and informal in contrast,
Gordon, although a Liberal, liked the latter, and wrote "never having been a 
Governor yourself, you are perhaps hardly aware how much pleasure you can give by 
a few civil words'',^
%
Kimberley was forty-four when he went to the Colonial Office on 6 Ju3y 1B70.
A diplomatic career had been widened by a few years as Under-secretary in the
1, M.E,Grant-Duff, Notes from a Diary 1886-1888, I, pp, 130-1,
2, T.H.S.Escott, Pillars of the Bnpire. (l879), P» 22,
3, See 3 Hansard, ccvii, col, 3S3, when he talks about a non-existent 'Resident* 
at Kumasi; and where he tells a deputation that the new High Commissioner in 
the Western Pacific would be "commander of these tribes". The Times, 3,v,1^ 76,
4, Escott, Pillars, p, 173.
5, Ibid, p. 22,
6, Gordon to Carnarvon 28,viii.l876, Private, PRO,30/6/39 p. 96,
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India Office and tvo years as Lord-Lieutenant.^ " He entered Gladstone’s first
i
Cabinet* a *nev man ’* as Lord Privy Seal* where Knatchbull-flukessen said he was
2
"a very good* hardworking man in an idle place". He was subsequently in all
3
Gladstone’s Cabinets and fulfilled his life-time's ambition when he became
A
Foreign Secretary in Rosebery’s government in 1894# Although a great talker* he
5
was a poor public speaker* and this combined with his "being entirely destitute of
vanity"^ kept him fro© becoming a popular figure. A journalist called him "a
7
statesman of a peculiarly solid and trustworthy type" * and he was regarded as "a
0
most powerful member in every Cabinet in which he sat".
As an administrator Kimberley was outstanding. The few comments which survive 
from contemporaries who. knew him in office are well supported by his handling of
q
the three questions under review. Goodenough found him "well up in his subject" , 
and Wolseley regarded him as a ’strong' Colonial Secretary.^ Dufferin thought he 
was "one of the ablest" of public raed^ i and Kilbracken* his private secretary in
1. John Wodehouse, third Baron Wodehouse* first Karl of Kimberley. B. 7.i.1826;
Eton 1838; took a first in classics at Oxford in 1847; first spoke in the Lords 
1850. Under-secretary in the Foreign Office Dec. 1852 until 1856. British Envoy 
at St. Petersburg 1856-58. Under-secretary in the Foreign Office 1859-61; 
resigned when Russell became a peer. In December 1863 he went as special envoy 
to Denmark in the Schleswig-Holstein Question. In April 1864 he became Under­
secretary in the India Office, and in November he became Lord-Lieutenant of 
Ireland, where he remained until June 1866. In Gladstone’s first ministry he 
was Lord Privy Seal, and Colonial Secretary from July 1870. In the second 
ministry he was Colonial Secretary and went to the India Office in December 18R2, 
where he returned in the third and fourth ministries. He was foreign Secretary 
March 1894 - June 1895* and was also for two periods leader of the House of 
Lords. The most complete account is the Introduction by E.Drus to his Journal* 
op. cit. pp. vii-xii.
2, Brabourne Diary vol. Ill 1867-69* p. 448. 3. Tbid. p. 544.
4. G.Wolseley. A Soldier’s Life. II* p. 271. A.Godley, Reminiscences of Lord
Kilbracken (l93l) p. 158..
5. E.Drus, op. cit. p. viii.
6. Dufferin*8 view quoted in A.Iyall, Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava. 1*23.
7. Escott* Pillars, p. 174.
8. Godley, loc. cit.
9# Goodenough’s Journal* I* 10.vi.1873.
10. Wolseley* A Soldier's Life, II, p. 271.
11. Iyall* Dufferin. I* pp. 23-4.
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the India Office, rated him a good second best,after Gladstone of officials he had
known.* In Khatchbull-Hugessen's 'order of talent' of the Liberal Cabinet he
placed Kimberley fourth after Gladstone, Love and Granville; and beside Chichester
2Fortescue, who some expected to be Colonial Secretary instead, Bruce said 
Kimberley was like "a whale to a sprat". Early in 1871 Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote : 
"as things look now, Kimberley stands a good chance of being one day Prime Minister? 
But when he told Kimberley this the latter said he would be satisfied with the 
Foreign Office.
4
There was, however, a rather cynical side to Kimberley's personality. Sir 
Arthur Gordon, who disliked him, once said Kimberley was "the sort of man to not
5
do a thing, all the more because he is asked to do it". But Gordon was qpite
wrong in his belief that Kimberley "never cared to give his full attention to
Colonial matters".^ Kilbracken's remembrance of shrewd, businesslike application
to official work, and courageous self-confidence once his mind was made up, will be
evident in this thesis. Nearly all the important documents from the three areas
were seem by Kimberley and he often drafted the important despatches. His grasp of
detail is well illustrated by his brilliant summaries of issues where he was only
7
consulted at a late hour. He was particularly strict if documents were delayed
8in reaching him. The present writer is led to the view that Kimberley's
1. Godley, Reminiscences, p. 157.
2* O.W.Hewett, Strawberry Fair. A Biography of Lady Waldegrave, 1821-1879 (1^ 56) 
pp. 210-13.
3. Braboume Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 526.
4. A good example on Sir Arthur Kennedy's report on peace achieved in the rivers 
north of Sierra Leone : "The millenium has commenced at Sierra Leone. In time 
it may perhaps extend to civilized nations, but it seems rather far off in 
Europe and America", Min, 16.iv,1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 23.iii.1871. 
CO/267/310.
5. Gordon, Fiji Records. IV p. 316.
6. Gordon to Selboume 28.viii.1874 quoted in J.K.Chapman, The Career of Arthur 
Hamilton Gordon, to 1875. (PhD thesis London 1954). p. 446.
7. See his letters to Gladstone on the Siak Treaty and the Malay States policy, 
below pp. A*6-a.oi.
See Min. 5.ix.l873 on Harley to Kimberley 31.iii.1873 . C0/87/l04,
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conscientious application to business, and his sensitivity to diplomatic 
implications, played a major part in the working out of the three experiments.
By September 1873# however, after his decisions in the three areas, he was 
extremely weary of office.^
Carnarvon who took over on 21 February 1874 had served his official
2apprenticeship in the Colonial Office* There as Under-secretary at the age of
twenty-six he had made his mark as a "very able, clear-headed, cool and remarkably
3
good and quick writer"• Lord Stanley was impressed and wanted to take him to the
India Board, but he stayed at the Colonial Office, and when Bulwer Lytton was ill,
and Merivale, the Permanent Under-secretary, was away, Carnarvon virtually ran the 
4
Office. In this way he met the three problems he had to decide on in 1874: the 
question of the annexation of Fiji, the problem of administration on the Gold 
Coast and expansionism in South-^ast Asia. At this early stage he formed the 
opinion that one of the political chiefs in the Office should see "all that is 
done*, which practice he tried to carry out in 1874#
His private secretary recalled that at 10 am. he would find Carnarvon "at a
5
large table with a mass of correspondence he had already read". He was apparently
g
slow to give his confidence, but once it was given, he proved a warm friend, He 
seems to have been more ambitious than Kimberley, and Rogers felt he had "a wish
1. Kimberley to Gladstone 22.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers, 44225/105#
2. Henry Howard Kolyneaux Herbert. B. 24.vi.1831. Visited Turkey as a child; went 
to Eton 1844 and Christ Church, Oxford 1849, where he took a first. In 1852 he 
toured the Middle-east; in 1854 he made his first speech in the Lords; in 1886, 
at the conclusion of the war, he toured the Crimean battlefields. TTnder-eec. 
at the Colonial Office Feb. 1858-Jan.l859. High Steward of Oxford University, 
1859. Travelled in the Mediterranean in 1860. Colonial Sec. June 1866 till he 
resigned over the Reform Bill in March 1867; and also from Feb. 1874 until he 
resigned in Jan. 1878 over Disraeli's eastern policy. Lord-Lieut. of Ireland, 
1885-6. Visited the Cape and Australia 1887-8 and declined Rhodes's o*Ter of the 
Chairmanship of the British South Africa Co. Died 1890.
3.Merivale's view quoted in Hardinge, I, p. 113. 4# Ibid. p. 130#
5.Sir Herbert Jekyll quoted in Hardinge, III, p.317.
6.Rogers's view, Marindin, Letters, p.263. Jekyll's view, Hardinge, III, p.321.
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to shine before the public and to distinguish himself in the ordinary sense of the
word. His failing was rather too much self-consciousness, and a disposition to be
1
caught in showy s c h e m e s O n e  suspects too that he was more headstrong than
Kimberley. Jekyll said he was inflexible* once his mind was made up (his
resignations testify to that) and that "chicanery and subterfuge were hateful to 
2
him". He would not have been able to handle Gladstone as well as Kimberley did,
3
and he was also a lesser light in the Cabinet. That Carnarvon was a "hard worker"
4
and "never spared himself" is evident from the large private, semi-official, 
correspondence he encouraged with governors, and from his careful memoranda and 
summaries of deputations, reports, speeches and even quite secondary reading.
Thus, Carnarvon’s diligence certainly played an important part in policy making*
Of the Parliamentary Under-secretaries only one was of any consequence. William 
Monsell (later Lord Emly) was quite insignificant from 1868 to 1870; Rogers had 
no confidence in his ability to represent the Colonial Office in the Commons.
James Lowther, under-secretary in 1874, was more distinguished as a sportsman.^
His greatest contribution in the Colonial Office was the repetition of Herbert's 
minutes in rather more artless and rumbustious (and more readable) form. It is 
unlikely that he was much help to Carnarvon, whose moral responsibilities for
7
indigenous peoples must have fitted into his idea of "negrophilist claptrap". His
contrast to Carnarvon is well illustrated by his description of Gordon's system
of administration in Fiji - possibly the most creative of the three experiments -
8
as "the administration of the pretentious Prig who represents HM in that Colony".
1. Marindin, Letters, p. 263. 2.' Jekyll in Hardinge, III, p. 321.
3. Selboume to Gordon 6.ix.l874, Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p.3.
4. Jekyll in Hardinge, III, p.319,
5. Marindin, Letters, p. 278.
6. R.Lucas (in DNB, Supp. II, vol. 2, p.483) says by 1888 Lowther vas "a rare 
survival of old toryism".
7. Min. by Lowther 26.iii.1877 on F0. to CO. 10.iii.1877. C0/Wl5.
8. Min. b y  Lowther l.ii.1878 on Cordon to Carnarvon TO.xi.1877. C0/RT/l4.
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Knatchbull-Hugessen (1870-1874) was altogether different. Hia long, argumentative, 
closely written minutes - at first done in pencil and then inked over - often 
covered pages of foolscap, and have attracted the attention of historians. His 
position in Gladstone's government, and his contribution to policy is of great 
interest. "The daily life of an WP and subordinate member of Gladstone's 
- Government, 1868 to 74 was no sinecure” he said.*
Knatchbull-Hugessen was a parliamentary wag, as those who suffered his puns 
on the Colonial Office files had cause to know. When Vanity Fair produced his 
hilarious cartoon in 1870 he was called "a promising apprentice... an adept in
2
the genial and jovial intercourse which does so much to hold parties together”.
He published several volumes of fairy tales while serving in Gladstone's
government, which apparently did not advance the apprentice's prospects of
promotion. He wrote for a time (1866 to 1868) for The Owl, a rather daring
4
gossip sheet, which, although it was "good natured and never vulgar", probably 
also did not help his reputation, Gladstone said he was "a good fellow, a clever
fellow, a very good speaker, but he... has never earned a reputation as a hard
5 6worker". Carnarvon complained of "egotistical vanity".
By 1870 he was a disappointed political careerist and he went to the Colonial
Office in January 1871 with "a painful feeling upon my mind that I had not been
1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73* p. 481.
2. Vanity Fair, ll.vi.1870 p. 331.
3. Brabourne Diary, VI 1880-81, p. 927. "I have been told that he (Gladstone^
considers my writing Fairy tales for children as 'frivolous', but, if so, it
shows a marvellous want of knowledge of human nature on his part: these books 
never interrupted work... They have often been written as a kind of relaxation 
to a brain hard—worked with Public and other serious business".
4. Ibid. II 1866-69, p. 353%
5. Gladstone to Granville 24.x.1873 (copy) Gladstone Papers 44545/3.
6. Carnarvon to Northcote 20.iii.la77 (copy) Pro.30/6/7 p. 192.
28
well treated".^ As a friend of Palmerston he had obtained his first office as a
2
Junior Lord of the Treasury in 1859# But the duties were only those of assistant
Whip in the Commons, so every few years Knatchbull-Hugessen threatened to resign.
Although Gladstone gave him some responsibilities in the Treasury in 1865, and
Russell gave him the Ohder-secretaryship at the Home Office in 1866, where he
returned in 1868, he felt very aggrieved that many others were promoted over his
head. His diary contains many discussions of his disappointed prospects. Bright's
resignation from the Board of Trade in December 1870 excited his hopes again, and
he told Gladstone that it was time he was given the responsibility for a department
in the Commons. But the Colonial Under-secretaxyship was accepted grudgingly as
3
it was not coupled with a Privy Councillorship, and he wrote in his diary "one
reason for my acceptance being my friendship for, and good opinion of, Kimberley,
4
with whom I think I am sure to do well". Later he wrote: "During the whole of my
5
tenure of office under Kimberley, no two men could get on better". Kimberley is 
strangely silent about Knatchbull-Hugessen, but their relationship seems to have 
been cordial enough. When,however, Knatchbull-Hugessen, dropped from Gladstone's 
second ministry and given a peerage in 1880, then attacked the government which 
elevated him in his first session, Kimberley was very annoyed,^ The first Lord 
Brabourne later became a Conservative as a result of Gladstone's South African and 
Egyptian policies.
Beside Kimberley and Carnarvon,Knatchbull-Hugessen was an ordinary politician 
and was altogether of lesser stature. Tet he had had plenty of experience as a 
junior minister, and he was a Director of the South Eastern Railway in the
1. Brabourne Diary, 17 1870-73* p. 516. 2. Ibid. I 1857-65, P. 46.
3. Correspondence in Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 506-16 and Gladstone Papers
441x1/24-46.
4. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 519.
5. Ibid. p. 583.
6. Ibid. VI 1880-81, p. 948.
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expansive days of Edward Watkin. Although he showed no evidence of colonial
interests before 1871, he represented the Colonial Office well in the Commons.*
Inside the office Kimberley seemed to disregard Knatchbull-Hngessen's lengthy
advice; in fact in the crucial summer of 1873 he had practically ceased to give it.
Tet one thing stands out. Knatchbull-Hugessen stated, more clearly and
persistently (almost passionately) than any one else the British dilemma in
West Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific. Briefly his thesis was
this: Britain was involved, one way or another, in these places. She had not
pursued a consistent policy in the past, still worse, she had never made it clear
to Africans, Malays or Fijians what her real intentions were. Complete withdrawal,
or the assumption of further responsibilities coupled with a consistent policy,
were the only alternatives for the future. But instead of solution, there was
stalemate, "since the Policy of HM Gov^ would not allow for extension & Public
2
Opinion certainly would not permit its abandonment". Knatchbull-Kugespsen's point
3
was this: "It is idle for us to halt between two opinions". Time and again
i
between 1871 and 1873 this theme appeared on the minute papers relating to the
three areas, sometimes at great length, sometimes with glacial brevity. Without
acknowledging it Kimberley really came to hold Knatchbull-Hugessen's view. In 1873
4he admitted that in West Africa, for example, "we have fallen between two stools".
Thus the persistence of Knatchbull-Hugessen has a part to play in the new attitude
of the Colonial Office.
It is difficult to generalise about the role of the permanent staff. As they
often appear as defenders of governors who have incurred the displeasure of the
5
Secretary of State, their independent influence on policy may be questioned. The
1. S.Childers, Life and Correspondence of H.C.E.Childers. (l90l) I, pp. 211-2.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 12.1.1873 on Goldsworthy to Kimberley 4.1.1873. C0/l47/29.
3. Min. 6.viii.l872 on Simpson to Pope-Hennessy 15.vi, 1872. C0/87/l02.
4. Min. by Kimberley 23.ix.1873 on Cooper to Administrator-i-C. 29.vii.1873.C0/87/l01
5. See their attitude to Clarke's and Jervois's plans in Malaya, below pp. dix.
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general attitude and prejudices of the Permanent Under-secretary, however, were
probably important. The nineteenth century Colonial Office, in its Permanent
Under-secretaries, was served by some of the greatest civil servants of the day.
Prom 1836 to 1892 the post was held by only four men - Sir James Stephen (1856-47),
Herman Merivale (1847-59)# Sir Frederic Rogers (1859-71) and (Sir) Robert Herbert
(1871-92). Almost as influential in the period before the 1870*8 were Sir Henry
Taylor and (Sir) Frederick Elliot. The period covered by this thesis was that of
the transfer from Rogers to Herbert, and as Baillie Hamilton went so far as to
date the new era from this event, a vord must be devoted to each.
Rogers was by training a lawyer and a scholar. After Eton and Oxford and a
call to the Bar in 1831, he became a Fellow of Oriel in 1840. He was a Liberal and
1 2a High Churchman,being a close friend of both Gladstone and Uewraan. In his early 
years he was for a while a leader writer on the Times. and in 1844, at the age of 
thirty-three, he received his first official appointment from Gladstone as 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. He joined the Colonial Office in 1859 and when
3
he retired in 1871 some claimed "he probably had no equal among civil servants".
Kilbracken said he was "a man of extra-ordinary intellectual power, possessing an
immense knowledge of a great variety of subjects; a delightful companion, and, with
4
all this, modest and humble to a fault". This modesty was not so evident in his
official work. Knatchbull-Hugessen said "He scarcely ever wrote a despatch...
5without administering a snub to some unhappy Colony", and in 1869 George 
Higinbotham,a former Chief Justice of Victoria, proposed, in a celebrated speech, 
that the Government of Victoria should by-pass the Colonial Office and 
communicate direct with the British government. Australians imagined, he said,
1. J.Korley, Gladstone. I, pp. 54# 59 & 307.
2. A.Godley, Reminiscences. p. 74.
3. Ibid. loc. cit.
4. Ibid.
5. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73# P» 669*
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that they were self-governing, but really they were governed "by a person named
Rogers. He is the Chief Clerk in the Colonial Office",^ Rogers’s lengthy,
scarcely legible, minutes show the cold analysis of a legal mind, and even when
he had nothing to suggest he still took a few pages of foolscap to say so,
let Rogers only plays a part in the three experiments by his absence. He va3
a colonial separatist, convinced that the great colonies of settlement were
destined for independence, ’J'he only "moral difficulty" in this for him was the
question of "the protection of coloured races, who are always exterminated by the
Anglo-Saxons in temperate climates, and yet are incapable of receiving more than
2an illusory share in the Government", This was the very problem which occurred
in the areas under discussion and to meet them Rogers had no ready-made philosophy.
It is evident, however, from his comments before retirement that while he preferred
places near British colonies to fall under Britain rather than to others, he
generally opposed further responsibilities in the tropics. Several years after
Carnarvon fiad inaugurated the three experiments Rogers wrote, "I still look with
a certain distrust on our accessions of responsibility in West Africa, Hiji, and 
3
the S t r a i t s . T h e  major trend of Rogers’s period was the development of 
responsible government in the colonies of settlement. He was unprepared for the 
new tropical empire which is the subject of the present thesis; this would have 
increased his "moral difficulties",
Robert Herbert's experience was quite different and made him more adaptable in 
face of new problems. He was at Eton and Oxford with Carnarvon his cousin, and 
after a brilliant Oxford career, where he took a first in classics and gained an 
All Souls fellowship, he became Gladstone's secretary in 1855. In 1858 he vent to 
Queensland with his friend John Brains ton where they were respectively Colonial
1, E.EJIorris, A Memoir of George Hipinbotham. (1895)* p* 183*
2, Autobiographical fragment written about 1885. Harindin, Letters, p. 295,
3, Ibid, p. 380, Blatchford to Taylor 28.v, 1877, It is difficult to agree with 
Knaplund (Gladstone’s Imperial Policy p. 134) that Rogers like V-Rugessen "lent 
a willing ear to requests for new annexations".
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Secretary and Private Secretary to the governor* With the grant of responsible 
government in 1860 Herbert sat in the Legislative Council and he was the first 
Prime Minister* Returning home in 1867 he spent two years at the Board of Trade 
and joined the Colonial Office in 1870 as Assistant Under-eecretary. He succeeded 
Rogers in 1871*
As he was the first Permanent Under-secretary with experience of the empire 
east of Sues, Knatchbull-Hugessen said that with regard to the colonies of
settlement Herbert did nas much good as his predecessor did harm"** His experience
*
also made him more flexible than Rogers on questions of expansion in the tropics.
He cannot simply be dubbed an expansionist, but particularly in the case of Hew
Guinea his first hand knowledge of Queensland made him eager for annexation. He
fully accepted the experiments of 1874 elsewhere; after Sir Andrew Clarke's
attempted settlements in Perak and Selangor he wrote, "We are now obliged to
interfere frequently on the [Malayan! C o a s t . a n d  after the Ashanti War was
over he was "not at all sure that the annexation of the whole [Gold CoastJ
3
Protectorate" might not be necessary. He was also a keen supporter of the West
4
African mail subsidy. This colonial experience and interest combined with 
flexibility of outlook, imperturbable resolution, and great personal charm made
Herbert an important force within the Office. |0np.contemporary called him "the
v  • c
ideal colleague" to whom "the hill Difficulty does not exist"; another .wrote,
"officially he does not know the meaning of the words hurry or 
discomposure. Tidings of colonial revolution might arrive without 
causing him visible excitement and would simply suggest themselves 
as incidents - all coming-in a days work - each to be dealt with 
in its proper turn".
His contribution to the discussion under review was large, especially in South
1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 670.
2. Min. by Herbert 2.V.1874 on Clarke to Kimberley 24.ii.1874. CO/273/7%
3. Min. by Herbert 17.iv. 1874 on Fitzgerald to Carnarvon 13.iv. 1874. C0/Q6/114'.
4. See long minute, 23.x.1872 on Treas. to CO. 22.x.1872. CO/267/318.
5. M•£.Grant-Duff» Notes from a Diary 1873-1881. II, p. 337.
6. Escott, Pillars, p. 121.
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Pacific matters. In this his flexibility played an important part in the search 
for a means to stabilize the British frontiers.
Apart from the Under-secretaries the only other influential members of the 
Colonial Office staff were the principal clerks of the geographical departments, 
the so called Reads of Departments. They, and a few others, were sometimes 
influential in specific cases where their specialised researches produced well 
founded conclusions. The internal organisation of the office underwent a 
significant change at this time,H>ut the individuals most worthy of note were 
Charles Cox (Eastern department), William Deal try (Australian) , Sir George 
Barrow (African till he retired in 1072), and two rising young clerks in the 
African department, Augustus Hemming and Edward Fairfield. Two examples of
researches which probably weighed heavily with Carnarvon were Fairfield's Cold
3 4Coast memoranda of 1074# and the New Guinea Memorandum of 1075 by William Malcolm,
the recently appointed third Assistant Under-secretary. It was only in 1072 that
5
minute writing was not restricted to the senior level of the office. Hemming
recalled that in the heyday of Rogers and Taylor "the idea of a youngster fresh
*
from a public school or university, or even a Board school, presuming to spoil
1. With the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the India Office in 1867, and 
the Federation of Canada at the same time, it was possible to regroup the four 
geographic depts. (West Indies, North American, Mediterranean & African and 
Australian & Eastern) as follows:- West Indies, North American & Australia?, 
African and Mediterranean, and Eastern. When Taylor, who had long handled West 
Indian business retired in 1872, Herbert organised the office into two depts. 
only (apart from a big 'General* dept, for financial, legal, parliamentary 
business etc.) :- V/est Indian <k Eastern, and North American, Australian,African 
& Mediterranean. In 1874 the work was again split into three:- West Indian 4: 
Eastern, North American & Australian, and African & Mediterranean. In 1879 under 
Hicks-Beach it was split into four again:- Eastern, West Indian, North American
& Australian, and African & Mediterranean. The most important trends of the 
period were (l) the emergance of the separate Eastern dept., (2) the decline in 
the size of the V/est Indian dept., and (3) the increase in the African work.
2. He was very good at clipping Australian newspapers.
3. See below p.
4. See below p.
5. Hall, Colonial Office, p. 19.
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official paper and waste official time by the expression of his crude and undigested 
•views* and 'suggestions"* was anathema.^
In short, "the stagnant waters of the Colonial Office began to be stirred up by
ft
an occasional breath of life" in the early 1870's, not simply by Herbert's advent, 
but by a combination of Kimberley's conscientiousness, Knatchbull-Hugessen's 
persistence, Carnarvon's diligence, Herbert's flexibility, the detailed researches 
of up-and-coraing clerks like Fairfield, as well as the urgency of certain crises 
on the frontiers of empire.
♦
The policy making process has now been surveyed, and the basic political, 
departmental and personal influences which will be observed at work in the discussior 
have been introduced. A final word is now necessary about five general 
characteristics of the period whidh may add a further perspective.
First, the universal method of policy making by 'inquiry and report' requires 
notice. The favourite, and obvious, technique of delay or of satisfying a sincere 
lack of knowledge, was to commission a governor or a special commissioner to 
Inquire and report. This is why, in the three areas, the governors and commission- 
< ers have such importance. Their importance was heightened by the almost as 
universal habit of exceeding or prejudging instructions. In the three important 
cases of officers commissioned .to report in 1873, Wolseley in the Gold Coast,
I
Clarke in Malaya, and Goodenough in Fiji, these officers did exactly this.
Secondly, because of the remoteness of the areas, and because Downing Street 
depended largely for its information on governors' despatches, the selectiveness of 
a governor's information (or even a delay in the mails) caused a heightened sense 
of crisis. Events in the Malay States in particular were kept from the Colonial 
Office by Ord, Clarke and Jervois. When a bundle of news arrived from an area at
1. A.W.L.Hemming, 'The Colonial Office and the Crown Colonies', Empire Review, 
vol. XI, No. 66, July 1906, p. 503.
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infrequent intervals it gave a sense of crisis which someone, say in Singapore, 
would not feel. Similarly, officials nearer the scene of troubles were prone to 
panic. Australian politicians liked to draw the attention of Whitehall to ’anarchy' 
or 'imminent foreign intervention' in Fiji. And most of the militaiy interventions 
of the period, in Selangor (l87l), the Gold Coast and Ashanti (1873-74) and Perak 
(1875) were in much greater force than sober military appreciation rai^t have 
indicated. The exception was Gordon's 'Little War* in Fiji, where he deliberately 
avoided the appearance of "a war between whites and natives".^
Thirdly, the Colonial Office can be caught in pursuit of red herrings. In 1871 
and 1872, for instance, when the situation on the west coast of Malaya was really 
becoming anarchic, the Colonial Office staff expended a lot of nervous energy over 
Governor Ord's relations with the Maharaja of Johore, the one ruler with whom Britain
had fairly satisfactory relations in Malaya. The governor erred; but on the side of
2
too great a cordiality. Similarly, the problems in West Africa were formidable,
yet relations with Liberia, and much fun at its expense, seem to have taken an
unwarrantable amount of the Colonial Office's penmanship.
Fourthly, an attitude of racial self-confidence was very evident in this period.
The political units of the three areas were, to contemporaries, "native States",
usually 'uncivilized'and 'barbarous' States. The Colonial Office usually drew the
line at 'native', and Herbert was to rebuke Sir Julian Pauncefote, the Assistant
4
Under-secretary, for his 'planter' attitude to the West Indian negroes. But Cabinet
5
members would have serious discussions on what to do with "these Coast niggers", and 
Wolseley regarded the West Africans as "so many monkeys".^ The favourite word for
1. Memo. Jan. 1877 quoted in A.H.Gordon, Story of a Little War.(1877) p. xiv.
2. See below p, in - H4--
3. E.g. "Liberia is a helpless & hopeless place". Min. by K-Hugessen 13.v. 1871 on 
Kennedy to Kimberley 14.iv.1871. CO/267/310.
A. B-Hamilton. Barbados and the Confederation Question.1871-1885 (1956) p. 20.
5. Halifax to KiSberl^ 2l7xii.lffT3. ^52.
6. Wolseley to his wiffe 27.ix. 1873, G.Arthur, The Letters of Lord and Tady wolseley.
p. 10.
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Malays was 1 children*; Fijians were ’cannibals*. Even Sir Arthur Gordon, whose
policy towards the Fijians was remarkably benevolent, told the settlers : "My
sympathy for the coloured races is strong; but my sympathy for my own race is
stronger".^ His remark that the Maharaja of Johore was "the first native I have
2
ever seen who does not look ridiculous in European costume" is particularly 
revealing. The typical view gaining ground among local officials was stated by
Thomas braddell: "the inate superiority of the ordinary Englishman in his sense of
\
honour and justice, is sufficient to dominate the inferior character of the Malay"♦
Even in the matter of justice the attitude crept in. Knatchbull-Rugessen wrote:
"of course all men are equal before the law - or nearly all - but it is a mistake
to suppose that you can treat Chinese as if they were English... I am all for 
4
whipping". On the question of juries in Sierra Leone Kimberley wrote, "A jury of
Englishmen is a tolerable institution - a jury of Irishmen often intolerable - a
5
jury of blacks I should say always intolerable".
Finally, the Colonial Office attitude to Germany requires comment. A change
seemed to take place for a while after the Franco-Prussian War. In the years
before and immediately after the foundation of the German Empire, Bismarck
deliberately discouraged schemes for colonial expansion. "I will have no colonies", 
6
he said in 1871. But this did not prevent German residents abroad, traders, 
missionaries and naval leaders from producing schemes, thus Bismarck refused an 
offer of Fiji in 1869* and ordered the Consul in Samoa to cultivate good relations 
with the Americans there. But in spite of the official German attitude, British 
traders, missionaries, and local officals became increasingly suspicious of German 
intentions. When the warship Hertha reached Singapore in February 1870 with
1. Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p. 183. 2. Tbid. p. 104.
3. CO/809/l p. 246.
4. Min. by K-Hugessen on despatch received 10.vi.1872. C0/?73/57.
5. Min. by Kimberley 19.xi.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 19.x.1871. CO/267/312.
6. M.E.Townshend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism (l92l) p. 18.
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instructions from the Crown Prince of Prussia to survey Blair harbour , in the mouth 
of the Endau River, the northern boundary of Johore, it spurred Sir Harry Ord to 
renew his demands for British intervention in the Malay States** The Hertha was
2supposed to be en route for Samoa where Theodore Weber was planning* a German colony, 
but the outbreak of war with Prance in July 1870 caused the ship^ recall. After
the war German warships were soon on the scene again in the Pacific to "look after
3
German interests". The Nymphe called at Melbourne in December 1871, at FLji in
March 1872, and took Weber (who was Consul in Samoa and Manager for Godeffroy) to
Pago Pago harbour in Samoa only to find that a U.S. officer had signed a treaty
4gaining exclusive rights in the harbour just over a week before. Thus rumours 
began to fly again, and in 1873 an L.M.S. missionary claimed that Germany had
5
designs on New Guinea where two German missionaries had started work in 1885.
In face of all the rumours and scares the Colonial Office was unperturbed, but
about the summer of 1872 Knatchbull-Rugessen began to get anxious about Germany in
the Pacific, and Herbert took the same view under Carnarvon, even after specific
denials were made in Berlin, Rogers had not been in the least worried about Germany,
In 1867 he said a German colony in New Guinea would be "a very good thing for the
Australians",^ In 1870 he thought that if Fiji could be reduced into "Berlin order
7
it would be useful", and his attitude to the rumour that a North German harbour
Q
was sought in Malaya was- "let her by all means". At this stage Herbert thought
that the entry of the North German Confederation into the Pacific would help to keep
9the balance of naval power there, but by 1875 he was advocating a policy of quietly
1. Ord to Kimberley 3.ix.l870. CO/273/39.
2. S.Mastennan, Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa 1845-1884 (1934) P. 67.
3. Consul March to FO. 27.iii.1872. F0/58/l31 p. 94.
4. G.H.Ryden, Tha Foreign Policy of the ffnited States In relation to Samoa
5. Townshend, op, cit, p. 35 pp. 62-71.
6. Min. by Rogers 3,viii.l867 on Young to Buckingham 31.v. 1867. C0/20l/542.
7. Rogers to Hammond 4,ii,1870. FO/58/119 p.206.
8. Min. by Rogers 20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.vii.1870. CO/273/42.
9. Memo, by Herbert lO.v.1870. C0/20l/562,
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acquiring 'paramountcy* in the Pacific to the exclusion of the U.S.A., Germany and
France.^ It is difficult to see when Khatchbull-Hugessen'a aggressive attitude
began. In January 1871. when he heard a rumour that Germany might acquire Liberia,
2where her merchants had been established since 1849. he thought the acquisition
3"would probably be a general benefit" • But in July 1872 he spoke of the dangers
4
to Australia of a German Fiji. Kimberley's attitude is also difficult to assess.
In 1872, in face of the Samoa rumours, he was content to let Germany have "this
5
questionable luxury", but the suggestion of a German protectorate in Selangor in 
1873 prompted him to urgent action where he felt Britain's position as 'paramount 
power' in the Malay Peninsula was challenged.^
It is impossible to generalize from these isolated comments, and after the 
annexation of Fiji, and official German denial of ambitions in Samoa and Mew Guinea
i
Carnarvon was satisfied. What is certain is that privately many Germans were
planning colonies, and that publicly some British traders and missionaries, and
many Australians, were worried. The extent to which these suggestions and rumours
were ventilated is vividly illustrated by a conversation in 1874 between Thakombau,
the self-styled 'King of Fiji*, and Commodore Goodenough's messengers only five
days before the chiefs decided to cede the islands to Britain:
"King Is it true that the German man of war is at Melbourne.[Marshall] Moore, 
[Interpreter) Probably. King Is she larger than Pearl [Goodenough's flagship] 
Moore Don't know. King Have the French many ships of war. [Lieut.] Olive [rmJ 
At least 20. King I thought they were all destroyed in the war... Have the 
Germans many ships. Olive Yes pretty well. King Why are they building so 
many? Olive Cannot say, perhaps they are looking out for fresh colonies. King 
They had better go to Tonga and annex the Tongan Islands. How Germany is 
growing. It was only a small place a short time ago... How many ships-of- 
war has England? Olive About 200. King with loud ejaculation Good! Good!
How is it that England is so great and^strong. Olive Because she is rich 
and wise and good. King True! True!"
1. See below p. 3H. r 2. Townshend, op. cit. p. 37.
3.- Min, 27,i.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 2e.Tii.lP70. C<57267/377.
4. Min. 22.vii.1872 on FO. to CO. 22.vii.1872. C0/201/571.
5. Min. by Kimberley 12.iv.1872 on V.H.Weld (extract) 25.rii.1871. C0/?0l/572,
6. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix.1873. Private. Gladstone Papers 44225/lCPi«
7. Goodenough's Journal, III, 14.iii.1874,
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A picture has been attempted of the Colonial Office and the forces which
influenced its policies. Before watching these forces at work in formulating
policy in the three areas, it is necessary to ask - What were its major problems?
And it is important to emphasise that the 'Colonial Question* as it was spoken of
in the parly 1870's had nothing to do with the problems discussed in this thesis.
It was, briefly, the problem of the relationship of England to her self-governing
colonies; the theme which has been examined by Bodelsen.* Most of the colonies of
settlement had been given responsible government. Canadian Federation went further,
2
and many saw it as a logical step towards complete independence. Others recoiled 
from this eventuality, and out of the debate the Imperial Federation movement grew. 
Part of the discussion revolved around the widely held, but not particularly
3
accurate, view that Gladstone and the Liberals wanted to get rid of the colonies.
Disraeli'8 Crystal Palace speech was probably des’igned to associate the
Conservatives with the opposite trend, which, however, they were not really
responsible for creating. But this question lies outside the scope of this thesis.
The view to be advanced here is that the three experiments of 1873-74 were part
of another problem, which was in many ways as big as the usual 'colonial question'
of the same period. In terms of military interventions, economic development,
administrative systems, even moral considerations, the modem history of the
Gold Coast and Nigeria, Malaya and the British possessions in the South Pacific
have raised problems quite as big as the unsolved riddle of the relations with
Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. This other problem of the 1870's
was essentially a 'frontier' one - a frontier which was already familiar in somewhat
similar form from experience in India, New Zealand and South Africa. "Both in
*
India and South Africa it was frontier disturbance which led the British Government
■ I —  - -  - I........................   . I. ■ . 1  "  ■ ■■ ■■ M L  '■ ■ ■'     I. ! . .
1. Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, (n*-*-).
2. A.Mills, 'Our Colonial Policy', Contemporary Review. June 1869, p. 238.
3# Gladstone's views are discussed by Khaplund, Gladstone and Britain's Imperial 
Policy.
40
to make the attempt to check the disturbance, and thus by an inevitable process
to control new areas".^ In these areas, as well as in Vest Africa, Malaya and
the South Pacific, the frontier of British political influence, missionary activity,
trading and even administrative assistance, stretched beyond the frontier of
sovereignty. In trying to stabilize and make safe the narrower frontier the three
experiments discussed here were bom.
The ’frontier' theme has its dangers. The frontier discussed here is not the
frontier of American historiography; it is not the receding area of free land and
the westward march of settlement, which in 1893 could "explain American development"
2for Turner, The abundance of free land for settlement combined with the 
insignificant Amerindian population ha3 little relation to the areas of the three 
experiments; although it is interesting to note that Gladstone*s studies, in the 
1840's, of American and colonial history and problems led him to a view similar to
3
Turner's notion of the frontier as a democratizing environment, Nor is de Kiewiet's
application of Turner to South Africa quite relevant. He explains why himself-
"The Indians of North America were hunters before they were cultivators; the Bantu
races were above all else graziers and cultivators. They wanted the land in which
4the farmers settled". Thus the South African frontier included a more important
African element than Turner's frontier involved Indians, while of the three areas
under discussion only Fiji had the white settler problem. Nor, again, is the
Indian frontier a correct parellel. "What I call a frontier." wrote Sir Alfred
Lyall in 1891, "is the utmost political boundary projected as one might say beyond
5
the administrative boundary". Lyall's frontier bears the closest comparison with
►
the areas of the three experiments, but he was thinking more in terms of military
1. de Kiewiet, Colonial Policy, p, 154.
2. F.J.Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History', Report of the 
American Historical Association for 1893, p, 199#
3. Knaplund, Gladstone and Imperial Policy, p. 60-61,
4. de Kiewiet, oj>. cit. p. 113-114.
5. A.lyall, 'Frontiers and Protectorates', Nineteenth Century, clxxiv, August 1891, 
p. 31,
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protection along a frontier stretching from the Trucial Coast to British Burma,
»
The frontier of this thesis wa3 a vague zone, adjacent (or merely nearby in the 
case of the Pacific Islands) to areas of British territory. Within the zone British 
missionary activities or trade or treaty relations or military intervention or 
protection or administration had developed. By 1873 events within this zone in 
the three areas had developed to an extent th«t the security of the British 
settlements close by was said to be threatened. In West Africa the dangers arose 
from British interference in the rivalries of the African States, in Malaya it was 
piracy and civil war, in the South Pacific it was rumoured European intervention. 
Thus, the decison which faced the Colonial Office in 1873 in these areas was similar 
to the one which had to be fAced in South Africa and India. The frontier needed 
stabilizing, and the alternatives presented were: further annexations or complete 
withdrawal. The argument to be maintained here is that, except i^  the case of Fiji# 
neither suggestion was followed. Instead a vague, middle-of-the-way notion of 
'peramountcy* was conceived.
This frontier problem is one which was more evident in the 1880's and after in 
the familier period of the international scramble. By then leading statesmen were 
aware of the problem, whereas few were in the early 1870's. As has been emphasised, 
writers on the 'colonial question' concerned themselves with relations with the 
colonies of settlement. Certain writers, however, did show an awareness of the 
frontier which forms the subject of this thesis. Three are worth noting.
Charles Dilke's Greater Britain (1868) was mainly concerned with the English- 
speaking world, and concentrated on proving his race theory that "the dearer ones# 
are on the whole likely, to destroy the cheaper peoples",^ But Dilke spared a word 
for what he called 'dependencies*.
1, C.Dilke, Greater Britain (1868) II, p. 405.
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"Whether, indeed, dependencies pay or do not pay their actual cost their 
retention stands on a wholly different footing than that of colonies.
Were we to leave Australia or the Cape, we should continue to be the 
chief customers of these countries t were we to leave India or Ceylon, 
they would have no customers at all; for falling into anarchy they would 
cease at once to export their goods to us and to consume our manufactures...
Our dependencies still form a nursei*y of statesmen and of warriors, and that 
we should irresistibly fall Into natural sluggishness of thought, were it 
not for the world-wide interests given us by the necessity of governing 
and educating the inhabitants of so vast an empire as our own... The 
possession of India offers to ourselves that element of vastness of 
dominion which, in this age, is needed to secure width of thought and 
nobility of purpose; but to the English race our possession of India, 
of the coasts of Africa, and of the ports of China offer the possibility  ^
of planting free institutions among the dark skinned races Of the world".
In the year after Dilke's publication Arthur Mills, in an article devoted 
mainly to the usual ’colonial problan', showed himself to be aware of the problems 
in West Africa and elsewhere. But he made it clear that he considered that "the 
administrative blunders we may have committed in our attempts to govern coloured 
races, however serious may have been their consequences, stand apart from the
2
category of problems presented by the everyday phases of our colonial policy".
This basic distinction made Mills criticised the attempt of the third Earl Cray to
transplant English institutions in the Gold Coast, which had recently received
3
publicity in the 1865 Select Committee on West Africa. He lambasted the idea of 
England playing Lady Bountiful to aboriginal races, "a petting and patronising 
policy"; and he characterised treaty making in frontier zones as "a mere diplomatic 
pastime carried on between the Queen’s representatives and a set of tattoed and 
feathered Chieftains".
Thirdly, in 1870, Herman Merivale produced his famous essay defining the usual 
’colonial question’, in which he expressed the growing feeling of the time that 
’something ought to be done’. He , too, showed that, like Dilke and Mills, he 
was aware of the other problem. He mentioned the refusal to annex Pi .11 in 1861,
1. Ibid. pp. 394-406.
2. A.Mills, 'Our Colonial Policy', Contemporary Review. June 1869, p* 232. 
3• Discussed below p. 6a.- iAr.
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and he noted the special problems of New Zealand and South Africa. He recalled
that the government of India "holds dependencies in the Malay Peninsula",* and he
ended the essay with a very coherent view of the frontier zone in Asia.
"I will finish with a few hasty glances at another great field of national 
development - almost an empire, in all hut in name - with which our connection 
seems as yet in its infancy. By actual possession here and there; by quasi­
territorial dominion, under treaties, in other places; by great superiority 
of general commerce and the carrying trade everywhere, we have acquired an 
immense political influence inwall that division of the world which lies 
between India and Japan...."
Merivale’ saw clearly a type of frontier zone such as this thesis will examine in
Vest Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific. Merivale also noted, what
has been discussed above, that there were conflicts of departmental responsibility
in London. He suggested a single resident ’Minister* or *Governor General* should
co-ordinate British policy in the zone* It would be fair to say that Merivale*s
was the most mature realisation of this sort of frontier problem in the early
1870*8, although he did not isolate the particular areas discussed here. One of
the first people to realise in a general way what what happening on the frontier
in the tropics was probably Rogers, who several times after 1874 referred in one
breath to the expanding frontier in Vest Africa, Malaya and the f>outh Pacific.
The theme, then, is defined, arfid the participators have been introduced. It is 
now necessary to examine in detail the course of events in each area and to trace 
the development of British policy. The background of each local problem has been 
treated separately, and it has often been necessary to turn back roughly to the 
185o *s to present a clear picture. British policy in each area will be dealt with 
in separate chapters up to the decision to intervene in 1873. The actual interven­
tions will be treated in one chapter. Here,only the inauguration of the new policy
1. H.Merivale, 'The Colonial Question', Fortnightly Review, new ser. vol. 7, 1870, 
P* 175» 2. Ibid. Ioc. cit.
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will be discussed; its development lies outside the scope of this thesis. Thus, 
Sir Arthur Gordon’s remarkable government in Fiji, the Resident System in Falaya, 
the development of the District Commissioners in the Gold Coast, the expansion of
i
the Lagos protectorate and the work of the Western Pacific High Commission will be 
discussed only in so far as their origins are found in the policies of 1874#
i
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Chapter 2v
THE BRITISH WEST AFRICAN SETTLEMENTS AND THE FATE OF THE 1865 POLICY.
1865 to 1873.
The 1865 policy.
In 1865 a parliamentary Select Committee considered the diverse and scattered 
British interests in West Africa and attempted to provide a unified policy for them. 
The committee was requested by Sir Charles Adderley after Palmerston's government 
had been bitterly criticised for its action during the Ashanti invasion of the 
Gold Coast Protectorate in 1863. At the same time Capt. (later Lieut-General Sir 
Andrew) Clarke, R.E.,. wrote a strong criticism of Britain's position in West Africa, 
which the War Office passed to Cardwell, the Colonial Secretary, who considered 
sending Clarke back to gather material for the Select Committee.^ Cardwell sent 
Instead another Engineer officer, Col.(later Major-General Sir Harry) Ord, the 
Governor of Bermuda, who had first visited the Gold Coast in 1850, and since I855 
had been the Colonial Office's 'expert' on the area.
Thus the Colonial Office had two conflicting reports before it as it faced 
Aidderley's committee; Clarke wanted a reduction of responsibilities, hut the 
optimistic Ord was reluctant to give anything up. The purpose of the present 
chapter is to discuss how these two conflicting opinions were reconciled in the 
1865 committee's report, and how this policy was soon rejected by the Colonial 
Office.
Along the two thousand mile West African coast, which had a history of 
European intercourse dating from the fifteenth century, Great Britain possessed, in
1865» four tiny scattered settlements, and what has been called an 'informal
2dependency' in the Niger Delta. In 1866 the traveller took fourteen days from
1. Lord de Grey to Clarke, quoted in R.H.Vetch, Life of Lieut-General Sir Andrew 
Clarke (1905) p. 83.
2. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 204.
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Liverpool to reach The Gambia, the nearest settlement to England. Here the town
of Bathust had been settled on an island at the mouth of th® river in 1816.* Sierra
Leone, the colony with the longest continuous existence, had been founded in 1787
by philanthropists as a settlement for freed slaves, and during the middle of the
nineteenth century it was considered the hub of the British settlements. On the
2
Gold Coast a series of coastal forts had been taken over by the Crown in 1843.
3Furthest east was the island of Lagos and its outposts, ceded to the Crown in 1861. 
British sovereignty was confined to these minute coastal possessions whose trade 
was by no means great.^
* 5
While the Colonial Office administered these settlements, the decline of the 
trans-atlantic slave trade had in no way diminished the Foreign Office's interest 
in West Africa. Since the abolition Act of 1807 and the formation of the Squadron 
in 1810, the Foreign Office had vigorously clamped down in the slave trade emanating 
chiefly from the delta region. But Lander's discovery of the mouth of the Hirer in 
1830 converted the river into ”an arm of the Atlantic Ocean” It thus became the
1. McCarthy's Island, 150 miles up-river, was purchased in 1820.
2. Ord found five forts occupied in 1864- Dixcove, Cape Coast Castle, Anomabu, 
Winneba and Fort James, Accra.
Palma, to the east, and Badagry, to the w°st,, were annexed in 1863.
1860 1861 , 1862 1863 1864 1865.
Gambia Imp. £73»138 109,581 . 99,825 172,865 135,777 128,808.
Exp. 109*137 136,837 154,443 141,673 148,167 138,693.
S.Leone Imp. 172,726 168,070 144,269 209,106 190,141 368,545.
Exp. 304,394 213,204 268,814. 205,893 201,808 237,240.
G.Coast Imp. 112,454 162,970 145,160 76,955 no Blue Books.
Exp. 110,457 145,819 102,086 53,764
Lagos Imp. no figures 171,138 120,796 114,284
Exp. 158,341 166,903 175,636
Value of trade 1860-65 from Fairfield's Memo 21.1.1874 in Confidential Print,
African 40, C0/806/3 p. 4. Ord's report of 1865* quoting the 1863 figures rave 
a very misleading picture because of the Ashanti war.
5. The Senegal & The Gambia were governed between 1766 & 1783 as the Colony of 
Senegambia, on the American model, but after the Treaty of Versailles the 
Gambia was entrusted to the Committee of Merchants. See E.C.Martin, The 
British West African Settlements, 1750-1821 (1927), pp. 57-102.
6. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 18*
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most fruitful centre for 'legitimate trading', and the foundation in 1849 of the
consulate of the Bights of Benin and Biafra gave the Foreign Office a political
0
stake in Vest Africa no less important than the vague Gold Coast Protectorate. A
Nigerian historian has written: "in the half-century following 1830 Britain
established and maintained an 'informal' or commercial empire over the Delta states...
But British reluctance to annex the Delta formally was no evidence of her
unwillingness to control the area politically".*
No effort was made to define the respective spheres of Colonial and Foreign
2
Offices and at legos where they overlapped Rogers expected confusion. But a tacit
arrangement emerged. The Foreign Office looked after relations with the ^iger
States and in 1871 they rejected an offer of the Oovernor-in-Chief of the settlements
3
to mediate in the Oil Rivers war. The Colonial Office was left soltiy responsible
for relations with the States adjacent to the settlements and treaties were not
4
usually sent to the Foreign Office.
The bitter dilemma of British policy in Vest Africa was clearly stated in
5
Clarke's report to the War Office. While the Colonial Office governed expensively
6
defended establishments, the greatest trade was with the Niger Delta, where, before
7
the rise of JaJa of Opobo in 1870, it was estimated at £1 million a year. Clarke 
wanted drastic economies in the settlements as he did not believe that other 
European Powers would touch them or that the Africans were likely to attack them.
The latter, he said, were more interested in their own wars and one State was not 
worth defending as against another.
1. Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 203.
2. Fin. by Rogers 8.ix.l863 on FO. to CO. 5.ix.l863. CO/l47/5» Cf. C.B.Adderley,
A Review of 'The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration* by Earl 
Grey. 1853. and of subsequent colonial history <1869;p. 21^ .
3. FO. to CO. ll.xi.1871 (draft) F0/84/l347.
4. Meade to Enfield 5.1.1872. F0/84/l360.
5. Printed June 1864. WO/33/13/1387.
6. Ord's rough figures for expenditure of the settlements:- Civil - £12,000,
Military - £130,000, Naval - £157,000.
7* Memo, by Charles Livingstone 8.xii.l871. F0/84/l343#
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The frontier problem in West Africa arose from the gradual extension of British 
influence. Relations with African States which began with treaties of commerce and 
friendship had come to assume, said Clarke, the "form and title of a territorial 
protectorate** which involved "the extension of quasi-British authority and 
Jurisdiction over countless tribes still affecting to retain their independence",
i
The Africans were given a false sense of security, yet there was no adequate
administration. The worst aspect of this for Clarke was the fact that "No obligation
or responsibility is acknowledged on the part of the natives to England: while she
assumes on the other hand, the serious one of identifying herself with their
quarrels, and in reality frequently has to guard them against the vaults of their
1
own inter-tribal feuds'*. Outside Sierra Leone, he said, trading factories alone 
were needed:
"Lawful commerce will best be promoted by confining the operation of English 
influence and interference to that exercised by a Consul or mercantile agent, 
and not by endeavouring to force by military power and the machinery of a 
colonial government, our institutions£and laws upon a people to whom they 
are neither suited nor applicable".
n
He thought the British West African settlements were a costly and profitless 
experiment".
Ord disagreed and his report was much more optimistic. "So far", he said, "as
the suppression of the slave trade and the encouragement of commerce are concerned,
it may be said that the settlements attain the principal objects for which they are 
3
maintained". He re-iterated the familiar argument that British settlements were
more effective than the Wavy in suppressing the slave trade, and he claimed that 
*
there had been some real achievements: the abolition of human sacrifice, the
mitigation of oppressive elements in African law, and a gradual improvement in the
lot of domestic slaves. He disagreed with Clarke's contention that factories alone
were needed; this system proved inadequate at Lagos between 1851 and 1861. As for
1. Clarke report p. 43. 2. Ibid. p. 77.
3. urd's report, Accounts and Papers. 1865, XXXVII, p. 314.
50
the argument that the greatest trade was outside the settlements, in the Oil Rivers,
he begged the question by saying that the palm oil producing areas being near
navigable rivers made trade easier than elsewhere in West Africa.^ Instead of
*
Clarke's system of consulates Ord supported the idea of a grouping or federation 
under Sierra Leone, where there would be a Govemor-in-Chief who would treat the 
Gambia, Gold Coast and Lagos as he might a group of lesser West Indian islands.
Both Ord and Clarke were questioned by the Adderley committee, which began its 
hearings on 9 Karch 1865 and considered its report on 22 June, Both their opinions 
were in fact accepted; like Clarke the committee severely criticised the various 
extensions of territory which had taken place and it advised retrenchment, but the
general conclusions followed Ord, The committee was unable to recommend withdrawal
2immediately from any of the settlements, but in the interests of economy and unity
of policy it was decided that the settlements would have a single Governor-in-Chief,
Future policy, however, was largely contained in Cardwell, the Colonial
Secretary's, amendments to the final report. Its core is contained in the
following often-quoted words (of which Cardwell's additions are in brackets):
"that all further extensions of territory or assumption of government, or 
new treaties offering any protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient; 
and that the object of our policy should be fto encourage in the natives the
exercise of those qualities which may render it possible for us more and
more to transfer to them the administration of all the Governments with a 
view to our ultimate withdrawl from all, except, probably, Sierra Leone"!]
•
Yet, even in the next paragraph the committee, prompted again by Cardwell, allowed 
a measure of local discretion, which, in a short time, would be used significantly 
both at Lagos and the Gold Coast. H
[r'Thi3 policy of non-extension admits of no exception as regards new 
settlements, but cannot amount to an absolute prohibition of measures 
which in peculiar cases, may be necessary for the more efficient and  ^
economical administration of the settlements we already possess"Q
1. Ibid. p. 317.
2. The only settlement actually abandoned was Bulama Island, which was awarded by 
arbitrators appointed by the President of the U.S.A., to Portugal in 1870.
3. Reports from committees. 1865, V, p.3.
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This compromise policy1 of Adderley's and Cardwell's guided loadstone's
2
government in 1868. until his retirement in December 1868 (Sir) Frederick Elliot
constantly reminded his political chiefs of the 1865 committee's policy, and among
his last official acts were the preparation of memoranda which were used to brief
3
Granville on the application of this policy to the Gold Coast. Both at the 
Colonial Office, 1868-70, and the Foreign Office, 1870-73, Granville resolutely 
tried to apply the policy, both Kimberley and Khatchbull-Hugessen studied the 
1865 report and they tried to apply its recommendations to the settlements, but 
they found they could not. Granville was a little more successful in applying it 
in the Niger Delta, but even here he permitted the British Consul to mediate in 
the Bonny-Opobo War and he granted the Consul extra-territorial jurisdiction in 
1872.
The failure of the 1865 policy has prompted Dike to say that "within a decade
of the adoption of these resolutions by Parliament the logic of facts drove the
British Government towards a vigorous policy of economic and political expansion
4not only on the coast*, but in the West African interior". This generalisation
based on Nigerian experience, cannot be accepted for West Africa as a whole, as
there is little evidence of this 'vigorous policy* in the hinterland in the early
187o's. Even in the Delta Granville was determined to maintain the status quo
and he refused to intervene in the struggle for power and the palm oil trade
5
between Bonny and Opobo in 1871, a struggle which cut British trade with the 
Delta by half.** When British traders attempted to bypass the Delta middlemen
1. For a preliminary discussion of the political division among members of the 
committee, see J.D.Hargreaves, Review of Dike's Trade and Politics in Sierra
Leone Studies, No. 6, Jan. 1856, p. 127.
2. Assistant Dnder-secretary from Way 1849 to December 1868, who had the general 
supervision of the African dept. K.C.W.G., 1869#
3. See his minute 2.xii.l868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 7.xi,1868. CO/96/77.
4. Dike, op. cit. p. 181.
5. Granville to Livingstone 25.1.1871 (draft). F0/84/1343.
6. Min. by Wylde 8.11.1873 on Livingstone to Granville 7.1.1873. F0/84/l377.
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<
States and to *tap* the oil trade themselves, the Foreign Office in the early
1870,s insisted on retaining the former mode of trade through the middlemen brokers
"according to the established custom of the oil rivers"
however, it is certainly true that by 1873-4 the idea of withdrawal from West
Africa was all but abandoned. In the Colonial Office Knatchbull-Rugessen and
African experts like Fairfield and Hemming maintained there was a duty to remain,
in lengthy arguments which will be analysed in this chapter. In the foreign Office, 
2
William Wylde,who consistently urged an agressive policy, is worth quoting. When
the Colonial Office told merchants in 1872 that if they traded outside the British
settlements on the Gold Coast they did so at their own risk, he wrote,
"We have a valuable and increasing trade on the African coast. In some of 
the Kivers there are British manufactured goods to the value of between 
£200,000 and £300,000 and to give out publicly that we. are not prepared 
to protect those goods and the British traders would I humbly submit be a 
great error. We have spent some millions of money in the suppression of 
the Slave Trade, and as a consequence of that suppression legitimate trade 
has sprung up not only at places which used formerly to be the greatest 
slave marts, but at innumerable other parts of the Afm Coast where vessels 
a few years since never dreamt of touching.
But this trade exists and has been developed only on the understanding 
on the part of the natives that we are prepared as we have hltfogfoe done 
to protect it, and to exact reparation where outrages are committed on 
British subjects and their property. We keep a Consul on the Coast and 
a Squadron also for the protection of British interests, and if they are ~ 
not to afford a general protection to British subjects of what use are they?*^
When the Treasury questioned the value of sending presents to encourage the Frair
of Nupe to protect traders in the Niger in 1873, Vylde defended them with the
words,
"We have been at some expense in opening up the Niger Trade, and it would 
be a pity now to run the risk of undoing all that we have done on the West 
Coast of Africa, by refusing to send the King a few Presents.
We have probably done more within the last 20 years to open up Africa
1. Derby to Hartley 21.v.1874 (draft). FO/B4/14OI.
2. William henry Wylde became a supernumerary clerk in the FO. in lfH9. Re went 
with his father, Col. Wylde, on a mission to Spain and Portugal, 1846-7, and 
became an assistant clerk in the office in 1859. In 1865 was on the Slave Trade 
instructions Commission and was appointed head of the Commercial and Consular 
dept, of the FO. This was often called the ’SlaveDept.* and dealt with the 
African and Polynesian business. In 1872 he conducted an inquiry into consular 
establishments. Retired 1880.
3. Win. by Wylde 8.v.1872 on CO. to FO. 2.v.1872. F0/84/l^60.
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to European traders than had been achieved in the century previous, and 
it would be bad policy now for the sake of a few pounds to risk the  ^
closing of one of the principal high ways into the interior of Africa”.
He also supported armed intervention against Brass in 1876 when Niger traders
had been attacked.
"Some years ago the Traders on the Afh Coast were given to understand that 
if they chose to establish themselves up the Rivers where the natives were 
hostile they must do so on their own responsibility and that they must take 
the consequences and not expect to be protected by our Cruisers. But where 
there is money to make our merchants will be certain to intrude themselves, 
and it is all very well to say that they will not be protected, but the fact 
is that if they establish a lucrative trade Public Opinion in this Country 
practically compels us to protect them, and a great outcry takes place if 
our Traders are attacked and murdered or their goods pillaged and no redress 
is obtained... We can hardly therefore allow these Brass Piratesgto put a 
stop to the navigation of a great River like the Niger...."
Thus, in both Foreign and Colonial Offices ambitious voices were heard.
As yet they were not those of the decisive policy makers; both Granville and 
Kimberley were reluctant to move in West Africa. But in spite of their reluctance 
and the Treasury's parsimony, Gladstone's government was unable to stabilize the 
frontier in .West Africa. The frontier of 'influence' and 'protection', and in the 
Gold Coast 'jurisdiction', had already passed beyond the frontier of British 
sovereignty and the 1865 policy did not check this trend.
The Gold Coast Protectorate before 1865.
The type of frontier problem which Kimberley was to face is vividly illustrated 
by the case of the Gold Coast. No aspect of the frontier in West Africa was vaguer 
than the zone of responsibility here, and no problem baffled the 1865 committee so 
much. The Ashanti invasion of 1863 was the main reason for the committee, but after 
all their discussions its members decided that the Protectorate was "not defined 
by treaty, but only implied....", and that the limits of British territory (i.e. the
forts) were "wholly indefinite and uncertain". This settlement had the smallest
1. Min. by Wylde 28.iii.1873 on CO. to FO. 22.iii.1873. F0/84/l382.
2. Min. by Wylde 12.viii.1876 on W.A.McKellar to Derby 27.vi.1876. F0/84/l455.
3. Reports from Committee. 1865» V, p. 10.
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trade of allf but its Influence stretched the farthest* A digression is therefore 
necessary to discover the origins of this system before discussing the 186*5 view 
of it, because it was a protectorate ignored by the international lawyers, but as 
Miss Wolfs on says it was "a new departure in Colonial policy”
Hie British trading settlements on the Cold Coast became involved in African 
politics because of Ashanti expansion. By the late eighteenth century the inland
4
Ashanti nation had grown into a powerful empire which increasingly dominated the
States around the coastal forts. After Ashanti defeated Fante in 1806 the British,
Dutch and Danish merchants recognized Ashanti suzerainty over the coastal peoples,
and even their right of rent for the ground on which the forts were built. Ashanti
expansion was partly economic since they sought an outlet to the sea, and as the
British had no influence in Africa, and merely wanted to trade, there was no basic
hostility to Ashanti. The Asantehene, the 'King of Ashanti*, said in 1806, ”1 took
the English for my friends, because X saw their object was trade only, and they
2
did not care for the people”.
But the merchants could not stand by as in 1806 while their African neighbours
were ravaged; hence the terms of BowdichVs Treaty (1817) which provided for peace
between Ashanti and "all nations of Africa residing under the protection of the
3
Company’s Forts”. Although Ord, in 1865, thought this was the foundation of the
Protectorate, the British merchants more likely simply undertook the exercise
influence over the tribes immediately adjacent to their forts so as to keep the
4peace with Ashanti. For a short time there was a British Resident at Xumasi, and 
when the Crown took over the British forts in 1821 a peaceful policy was intended 
towards adjacent African states. But the inevitable frictions, fed by the aggessive 
policy of the local officials, led to more fighting which culminated in the decisive
1. F. Wolfs on, British Relations with the Gold Coast 1845-1880 (PhD thesis London 
(1950> p. 4.
2. W.E.F.Ward, A History of the Cold Coast (1948) p. 148.
3. J.J.Crooks, Records Relating to the Cold Coast from 1750 to 1874 (1825) p. 118.
4. Memo, by E.Fairfield, 24.iii.1874, Confidential Print, Gold Coast 49. co/806/llp.5
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defeat of Ashanti at Dodowa in 1826 by a coalition of British, Danes and most of 
the coastal states. After this the British government tried to abandon the coast, 
removing the garrison in 1828, but the merchants managed to prevent a withdrawal. 
The real foundation of the Protectorate was laid by George Maclean, who headed
Treaty, signed with Ashanti, Fante and ten other chiefs, Ashanti gave up her
suzerainty over the coastal peoples and the claim for rent for the British forts.
Henceforth the ground on which the forts stood was regarded as British territory.
The Asantehene renounced his rights to tribute from his former subjects states on
2
the coast; these in turn undertook not to molest Ashanti traders, 't’hus a sort of 
British paramountcy, personified by Maclean, was recognised, which apparently implied 
that the Fante would be aided against Ashanti. British sovereignty was confined to 
the few coastal forts, which were interspersed between those of the Netherlands and
Under Maclean’s remarkable personal influence the "Protectorate took shape. A man
of great courage with a high sense of moral rectitude, he came to exercise a wide
3
jurisdiction in the Gold Coast states. In spite of adverse criticisms and talk of
1. The government of the forts was vested in a London committee of three merchants 
and Parliament granted f4000 annually, Maclean was appointed Lieut, in the 
Royal African Corps in 1826 and went to the G.C. in Oct. 1827 as secretary to 
Lieut-Gov. Lumley. Under the merchant government his official position was 
President of the Council at Cape Coast, but he styled himself ’Governor of His 
Britannick Majesties Settlements on the G.C.'
2* Text in Crooks, Records, pp. 262-4.
3, A contemporary account of Maclean is B.Cru shank, Eighteen*Years of the Gold 
Coast of Africa (1853), I, pp. 170-5* Sim \r work had been begun by John 
Jackson, a merchant who headed the govt, temporarily before Maclean arrived. 
See J.D.Fage, ’The Administration of George Maclean on the Cold Coast 1830-44', 
Trans, of the G.C. and Togoland Hist. Soc. vol. I, (1952-55) p. 11?.
4, Maclean married L.E.Landor, the poetess, who died suddenly at Cape Coast. 
Cruifcshank, I, pp. 223-231 discusses the controversy surrounding this.
the government under a* committee of merchants from 1829 to 1843.* By his 1831
Denmark.
4
scandal, Forster's Select Committee in 1842 endorsed his "useful though irregular
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1
Jurisdiction" among the African coastal states. However, since this influence and
jurisdiction were extra-legal, steps were taken to regularize it. Firstly, at home
the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts and the Gold Coast Order in Council were intended,
ostensibly, to provide for jurisdiction over British subjects outside British
territory, provided the local sover^n agreed.^ But it is suggested that it was
also intended to regularise, for Downing Street's satisfaction, the activities of
3
the Crown offifcial who would inherit Maclean's jurisdiction over Africans.
Secondly, on the coast itself, the forts were put under Crown government again and
were attached administratively to Sierra Leone, and Maclean continued to exercise
his African Jurisdiction, now as a Crown official styled 'Judicial Assessor and
Assistant to the wative Sovereigns and Chiefs of the Country adiacent to the Gold
Coast'. Mis rule was legalised, from an African point of view, by the famous Bond
of 1844 under the terms of which he continued the task of "moulding the customs of
4
the country to the general principles of British law".
1. Reports from Committees. 1842, XI, p.4* One definition of Kacleanh protectorate 
runs: "a sort of irregular civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Coast tribes 
by their tacit consent and acquiescence gradually grew up, extending in course 
of time over a much larger area than the local limits of the merchant government 
in London". J.M.Sarbah, 'Maclean and the Gold Coast Judicial Assessors', Journal
of the Africa Society, vol. 9, No. xxxvi (July 1910 ) p. 349.
2. See paper on Civil & Judicial Constitution of the British West African 
settlements. A & P. 1854-55,XXXVII, pp. 375-466.
(a) 6 Viet. c.13. An'act to enable HM to provide for the Government of Her 
settlements on the Coast of Africa and in the Falkland Islands.
(b) 6 4 7 Viet. c. 94. An act to remove doubts as to the exercise of Power and
jurisdiction by HM within divers countries and places out of HM's dominion
and to render the same more effectual.
(c) Order in Council, 3.ix.l844, appointing Cape Coast Castle a place for trials 
under (b).
3. G.E.Hetcalfe, 'After Maclean', Trans of G.C. & T.Hist. Soc. I, p. 185. Similarly, 
Fage, o£. cit.p. 110 suggests that although the Committee of Merchants were 
instructed in 1828 only to administer law to residents of the British territory, 
it was accepted that there might be 'influence' over nearby tribes.
4. Text of Bond in Crooks, Records .p. 296. But see wetcalfe, op. clt. p. 384 for 
the result of the new government in which executive and judicial powers were 
separated, thus weakening Maclean's hand. For a discussion of the legal aspect 
see A.II.Allott, 'Native Tribunals in the Gold Coast 1844-1929', Journal of 
African Law, vol. I, No. 3 (1957) pp. 163-168.
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Although the Colonial Office was suspicious of the new protectorate, the third 
iiarl Urey, Colonial Secretary 1846-52, made a bold attempt to develop it and 
attempted a remarkable experiment in African administration. In 1850 the Gold 
Coast forts were made a separate government and two years later a 'Legislative 
Assembly1 produced the so-called Poll Tax Ordinance to provide a revenue based on 
a poll tax of one shilling. Grey, who was one of the few politicians of the period 
to give serious thought to the administration of indigenous peoples in British 
territories, hailed the Assembly, which consisted of the Governor, his Council and 
most of the Fante chiefs, as a 'rude negro Parliament', He wanted "to train the 
inhabitants of this part of Africa in the arts of civilization, until they grow
2
into a nation capable of protecting themselves and managing their own affairs",
3
But the Poll Tax was not well received, and in 1855 Palmerston sent Major
4Harry Ord to investigate. This was Ord's second visit to the Coast and he
produced a modest programme of development for the Gold Coast, Reporting in Way 
5
1856 he proposed the retention of Grey's experiment with some modifications and
1, Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration (1853),
II, p. 284.
2, Ibid. p. 287.
3, Wolfson, Relations, p. 40-41.
4, Harry St. George Ord. B. 1819; commissioned in R.E. 1837; served at Chatham, 
Woolwich and Ireland; in the West Indies 1840-45; and at home 1845—54, ending up 
as Adjutant of the R.E. Depot at Chatham. Visited West Africa and Ascension Is. 
Dec. 1849 - Sept. 1850 inspecting military and naval works. During the Crimean 
War he was Brigade-Major of the British force under Brig-Gen. Harry .Tones, which 
took part in the Baltic campaign of 1854. At the seige of Bomarsund Ord 
volunteered for regimental duties in addition to staff work and he gained a 
Brevet Majority and a mention in despatches. Although he returned to regimental 
duty, he spent most of the rest of his life in Colonial service. In 1855-56 he 
reported on the Gold Coast; in 1856 he went to The Hague to negotiate over the 
Gold Coast; in 1857 he went to Paris and The Hague for the same purpose. He was 
Lieut-Gov. of Dominica 1857-58 and was then seconded to the Colonial Service. 
Governor of Bermuda 1861-67 (during which time h® visited West Africa before the 
1865 committee); Governor of the Straits Settlements 1867-73, and Governor of 
Western Australia 1877—79. For his early career see WO/25/3913/111 and London 
Gazette, l.ix.1854 p. 2699.
5, Ord to Labouchere 15.v.1856. CO/96/4O.
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suggested applying the Poll Tax revenue to public works and technical education, 
with the chiefs empowered to criticise expenditure. He wanted to win the confidence
k
of the Africans by tolerating domestic slavery and by recognising the African 
merchants as a middle class. He also insisted that increased revenue from import 
duties was impossible unless similar arrangements were made by the Dutch whose forts, 
interspersed between the British ones, were customs free.
Ord, then, did not advise the Colonial Office to end the Protectorate, The 
problem of maintaining the influence gained by Maclean,without annexing more 
territory or the continuance of the £4000 annual grant, remained. But as Palmerston 
believed that settlements, by encouraging commerce, were the best means of ending 
the slave trade,^ no attempt was made to abolish the Protectorate. To tackle the
2revenue problem Ord made the first of his unsuccessful negotiations with the Dutch.
The difficulties of administration on the Coast were soon high-lighted by the 
horror-struck reports of Sir Benjamin Pine about domestic slavery. Within the forts, 
which were oritish territory, this was not permitted, but in the Protectorate States 
it was an essential part of the social system. Particularly horrified by the
practice of 'pawning* children, Pine wrote,in 1857, a harsh indictment of Maclean's
5system. But the Colonial uffice was undismayed and Pine soon changed his mind.
"This is i]ot the time for England to abandon any hold she has on the coast of Africa"
4said the Colonial Secretary. Yet, although after Ord's report, the government 
decided to maintain the forts, no positive policy was produced for the Protectorate. 
Lord Stanley was told in 1858 that it was "one of the most serious problems now
1. See his draft of Ord's instructions 31.x.1855. CO/96/37.
2. See below p.
3. Pine to Labouchere 10.x.1857. CO/96/41*
4. Ibid. Min. by Labouchere 23.xii.1857* See Metcalfe (op. clt. op. 18&-1R9) for 
the dilemma behind these brave words. "In Justice, an^  now in taxation, they 
assumed two of the basic functions of government; in both spheres they had passed 
beyond the stage of mere advice. But they vere still not prepared to rule or to 
accept fully and frankly the final responsibilities of police and defence...."
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pending",^ " but, fearful of adding new burdens to the home taxpayer, he too made no 
2
decision.
Carnarvon was the first politician after Grey to give serious thought to the
Gold Coast. As parliamentary Under-secretary in 1858 he urged a defirfte policy and
supplied the raison dfetre for it. England had a moral responsibility, he said, to
spread Christianity and civilization "thus repairing the actions and policies of 
3
former times". There was no question of acquiring sovereignty, but he thought
withdrawal from the forts would be immoral as Britain held the balance of power
between Ashanti and tlie coastal States.
"We have established ourselves in that country and have undoubtedly effected 
it for good, also probably for evil. So we are hardly at liberty then to 
throw down the principle of good and evil to them to make their choice...^
because we find the task... is a more severe one than we expected."
Bulwer Lytton accepted this, but *noney and a good governor were still wanting. As
Parliament obviously would not produce the former, the second, unsuccessful, effort
was made to get the Dutch either to sell their forts or, to levy equal duties, and
as for a governor, Ord, then the Lieut-Govemor of Dominica, was suggested. He
knew the area and seemed convinced that the Protectorate could be administered
successfully. One imagines that Ord would have cherished the job, and although in
1861 he became Governor of Bermuda, he was still used in Gold Coast matters. In
I860 he went to The Hague again to discuss the equalisation of customs duties, but
for a second time the talks failed.
So even after Ord’s 1856 plan, and Carnarvon's admission of moral responsibility
in 1858, no decision was taken on the Protectorate. A novel scheme of administration
had been bom of the merchants* intervention against Ashanti and developed by Waclean,
Grey, Palmerston and Ord had made contributions, but in the 1860's the future of the
1. Min. by*Merivale 5.iii.l858 on FO. to CO. l.iii.1858. CO/96/44.
2. Ibid. Min. by Stanley 7.iii.l858.
3* Ibid. Memo, on the Gold Coast by Carnarvon ll.xi.1858.
4. Ibid.
experiment still hung in the balance. Plot until the fierce light of parliamentary 
disapproval was directed on the Gold Coast was the Colonial Office forced into 
making some decision. The cause of this was the Ashanti invasion of 186*5•
British intervention in Gold Coast politics had been caused by Ashanti expansion; 
Maclean's Protectorate was the result of Ashanti recognition of the independence of 
the coast’States in the 1831 Treaty. Maclean in his lifetime commanded the respect 
which caused Ashanti and the coast States to settle their troubles through him. But 
the very ambiguity of the British position in the Protectorate caused constant 
frictions in subsequent years. On occasions the Ashantis took the law into their 
own hands and entered Assin to recover their subjects. Because of these tensions, 
the Protectorate States were in constant dread of the Ashantis and came to regard 
the British as their protectors. The two chief causes of friction were interference 
with Ashanti traders by States like Akim and Assim which were in a position of 
raiddle-men: and the sheltering of runaways from Ashanti in the Protectorate or
the British forts. Both these motives lay behind the Ashanti invasion of Assin and
\ 1 
Akim in March 1863.
Governor Richard Pine believed that the dread of the Ashantis should be
decisively removed by an expedition to Kumasi. The Colonial Office refused to
sanction this, and an ineffectual military effort in the Protectorate adversely
^ffected British prestige. When, in December 1863» the Colonial Office finally
1. In 1862 two fugitives - a slave boy, and an old man called Janin (who had found a
gold nugget and not handed it over to the Asantehene according to law) - took
refuge at Cape Coast Castle. Ashanti demanded their surrender and Pine, believing 
the Asantehene would kill them, refused. Ward argues (History p. 20$) that if 
| the Asantehene swore to spare the runaways, he would keep his word.
The invasion began in March 1863, and after months of inconclusive 
manoevering by the local garrison Pine advocated his march to ^umasi. Permission
was finally granted in Dec. 1863 and over 600 men of the West India Regt. came
as reinforcements. But losses from disease were so great that the attack was 
called off.
See Ward pp. 205-213. W.W.Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti 
(1915 ) 505-529. F.Fuller, A Vanished Pvnastv-Ash'anti (192l) 91-97. Wolfson, 
Relations. 63-^ 67. A.B.Ellis, History of the Gold Coast of West Africa (1893) 
224-235.
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agreed to Pine's expedition a regular battalion it sent out arrived too late, and
a local force which waited on the Pra never entered Ashanti territory. So many men
died of disease the expedition was forced to retire.
Palmerston's government was bitterly attacked in Parliament. Sir John Pakington
raised the matter in the Commons on 20 May 1864 and a few days later Cardwell, the
Colonial Secretary * cancel led further operations.^ *!he Government narrowly missed
a defeat on 17 June on a motion of censure brought by Vice-Admiral Sir John Hay, whose
brother had perished on the Coast. Although Palmerston ended the debate in
characteristic vein - Mif England takes under protection tribes of men... the honour
of the country may... require... some steps... to make that protection not an empty
2
word but a reality** - the House was not charmed and his gallant words were belied 
by his government's subsequent policy. For the whole fiasco had two results. Firstly, 
the government solved the Ashanti embarrassment by deciding in 1864 never again to 
intervene to assist the Protectorate States against Ashanti. Secondly, Adderley'e 
1865 committee enunciated a policy of reduction of responsibilities in the Protector­
ate.
Ashanti relations had long been a source of friction. Thus after the motion of
censure Cardwell told the Governor that in the event of another Ashanti invasion the
coastal States would have to defend themselves, as British troops would not be used
in the deadly climate, British efforts were to be confined to urging the chiefs to
3unite in their own defence,and to advising and arming them. This policy was 
consistently followed by the British government, if not be the local officials, for 
nine years.
Adderley’s committee then made the first serious attempt to define the 
Protectorate. The Colonial Office rather shaken by the events of 1863-4 and having
1. Cardwell to Administrator 23.V.1864 A & P. 1864, XLI, p. 157.
2. 3 Hansard clxxv, col. 2017,
3. Cardwell to Pine 23.vi.1864. A & P« 1873, XLIX, p. 864-5.
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already adopted a policy of non-intervention against Ashanti, maintained before the 
committee that there was no legal obligation to protect the coastal States. They 
were not, said Elliot,
"bound by any treaty or record; whether they were morally bound, or what 
should be the extent of any obligation of the kind is a difficult question 
... the case seems the same as that of a relation with a minor European 
power which shows great deference to the wishes of ^England; and which 
England may be proportionately inclined to help".
The most important witness for the Gold Coast was Ord, whose interrogation by Lord
Alfred Churchill and Lord Stanley produced the core of the British position.
Ord maintained that there was no legal obligation to protect the coast States
but there was a moral one. The only possible legal ground was the Poll Tax Ordinance
for if the Africans paid taxes they might be entitled to more protection than was
written into the 1831 Treaty. But, as he had written in his report, they were not
paying the tax, thus "fortunately the conduct of the natives has relieved us from
all embarSssment". This disposed of, there remained only the I831 Treaty itself, of
which Ord had written:
"The closer the matter is investigated the more probable does it apnear 
“that Mr. Maclean contemplated using influence which the term ’British 
protection’ would necessarily give him both over the natives and the 
Ashantees, to preserve the former as far as hiSgineans allowed him, from 
the aggressions or oppressions of the latter".
>
Stanley wanted to know whether Britain could stand aloof if Ashanti overran the 
Protectorate but left the British territory untouched and announced no quarrel with 
the British. Ord said such an eventuality was unlikely since the coast States had 
gained their independence through British intervention and the Ashantis regarded 
Britain and the coast States as • identified ’• Bat if it did happen Ord did not 
think they would be morally justified in standing aside.
Most of the other witnesses supported the Protectorate in one way or another.
1. Reports from Committees. 1865» V, pp. 25-6*
2. A & P. 1865» XXXVII, p. 306.
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Sir Benjamin Pine pointed out that ever changing governors failed to apply a 
consistent policy, while the powers of the chiefs were undermined. Fe believed in 
African self-government and advocated,
”accustoming the people to manage their own affairs so that within a given 
time, it might be half a century, and it might be a century, we should 
be free to a great extent, and they might manage their ^own affairs... I 
should begin by... making them drain their towns.”
As has been taentioned, the committee, prompted largely by Cardwell, optimistically 
advised a combination of Ord's and Pine's ideas - non-extension of territory, non­
interference, retrenchment, training for self-government. Unable to get rid of the 
Protectorate, it established that there was no obligation to protect it.
Cardwell's 1864 Ashanti policy, and the Adderley committee's 1865 Protectorate 
policy prevailed in London until 1873 when Knatchbull-Hugessen questioned it, and 
Kimberley, in a new set of circumstances, found himself forced to intervene in 
another Ashanti war. Meanwhile the 'escape clause* of the report was soon used to 
extend British territory. In 1867, Ord's negotiations with the Butch finally bore 
fruit and both nations agreed to partition the coast-line at the Sweet Fiver. Prom 
that moment things never went right for the Dutch in Vest Africa, and in 1872 they 
finally gave up their settlements to Britain. This in^rn exacerbated Britain's 
troubles with Ashanti, who since the eighteenth century had possessed the rent 'Notes’ 
for the Butch fort of Elmina and who were longstanding allies of the Butch. In 1873 
the 1865 policy was abandoned? in the following year Ashanti was invaded and the
1. Reports from Committees, 1865, V, p. 148. Wylde, for the Foreign Office, said
the influenc^hcquired on the Cold Coast was a valuable deterrent to the slave 
trade. The Rev. Schrenck, of the Basle Mission., said if the British quit he 
would look to the French for protection. Henry Barnes, a Fante merchant , said 
nwe would rather the English did not go away”. The only really critical voices 
were the R.N. men, who disliked service on the coast, and Capt. (Sir) Andrew 
Clarke (see below p. ixi. ) who said Mwith such a poverty-stricken machinery you 
cannot expect to obtain any effectual results”.
For a contemporary African view of the self-government clause see J.A.B.Horton, 
West African Countries,/and Peoples (1868). "This is indeed a grand conception, 
which if developed if7fact, will immortalise the name of Britain....” p. 69.
He suggested creating two African States - the Kingdom of Fante and the Republic 
of Accra.
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Protectorate was "annexed administratively" to a new Gold Coast Colony.^
The problem of the British frontier in Vest Africa is vividly illustrated by 
this account of the Gold Coast Protectorate; the frontier of influence went far 
beyond the frontier of sovereignty. The same problem faced Kimberley, in differing 
degrees, as he considered all the West African settlements. But in three cases9
where he might have applied the 1865 policy he rejected it. Firstly, when he took 
office in July 1870, negotiations were well advanced for the cession of the Gambia 
to France, which he stopped. Secondly, although he rejected proposals for the 
actual expansion of Lagos in 1871, he decided, after a serious discussion of 
Britain's role at Lagos in 1872 and 1873, that withdrawal as recommended in 1865 
would be impossible. Thirdly, early in 1873 he decided that Britain would remain on 
the Gold Coast, would forget the 1865 resolution about self government, and he was 
considering a new policy of governing through the chiefs as agents of British policy 
at the very moment when the Ashanti invasion was announced. This caused him finally 
to throw aside the 1865 policy and to recommend intervention. In September 1873 he 
wrote:
"when we tried to get rid of [the Gambia] with what a clamour we were met.
One good thing may come out of the Ashantee War that some definite policy 
must be agreed upon by Parliament as regards these African Settlements. The 
report of 1865 is neithe^one thing or the other: and as usual we have fallen 
between two stools".
It is necessary now to examine the backgrounds of the Gambia, Lagos and Gold Coast 
discussions and to examine the role played by Knatchbull-Hugessen first, and then 
by Kimberley and others, in the rejection of the policy of 1865,
The Gambia 1865-1873.
Discussion of the Gambia question will be brief as it was a might-have-been.
1. See below p. Ivi-lot.
2. Min. by Kimberley 23.ix.1873 on Cooper to Administrator-i-C. 29.vii.1873. C0/87/l05
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The British settlement was an inconvenience to French development in Senegal and in
1863 and 1864 the Ministry of Marine and Colonies in Paris contemplated acquiring it*^
Governor Faidherbe suggested to Napoleon III in July 1863 that the posts on the Ivory
Coast and at the Gaboon should be offered to Britain in return for the Gambia. Late
in 1865# no doubt encouraged by the report of the 1865 committee, the French
2
Ambassador canvassed Clarendon in London, and in March 1866 the French proposed
3
formally an exchange of their posts at Grand Bassam, Assini and Dabou for the Gambia*
In 1863 they had already abandoned their short-lived •protectorate* at Porto Novo,
near Lagos* The Colonial Office merely referred the offer to the Governor-in-Chief.
In 1867 the French revised their offer and suggested that the Gaboon might be a better
exchange for the Gambia. They pressed for an answer in May 1868 and as Adderley was
then Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial Office he insisted that here was a
4
chance to. inplenent the 1865 policy, but Buckingham decided against it.
The plan was revived again in 1869 under Gladstone^ government and since Oranvill*
as Colonial Secretary was determined, at first, to apply the 1866 policy, and Sir
Arthur Kennedy, the Governor, wanted to get rid of the Gambia, the moment was ripe
for negotiations. But no one wanted Grand Bassam, Assini and Dabou* A possible way
out was suggested by Rogers. The Colonial Office was by then becoming convinced that
5
Elmina, the chief Dutch fort on the Gold Coast, would have to be acquired, but
although the IXitch government was willing the King was opposed. Why not let the
Dutch have the French posts, which were vest of Elmina, sa-?d Rogers, then Britain
could have Elmina. Granville liked this idea, but Kennedy opposed it as he was
1* The genesis of the idea in France is discussed by R.Catala, *Ia Question de 1* 
exchange de la Gambie Britannique contre les comptoirs francais du Gold de Guine 
de 1866 & 1876*, Revue dfhistoire des Colonies (1948) t.xxxv, pp. 114-118*
2. Ibid. p. 121. See Hemming Memo. 8.x. 1874 on Grant to Carnarvon 6.x.1874. C0/267/*5<
3. Memo, by Hemming 20*ii. 1875 on Kortright to Carnarvon 6.xi,1875. C0/87/107.
4* Mins, by Adderley (llth) and Buckingham 13.v. 1868 on F0. to CO. 5.v. 1868. CO/87/00.
5. Granville to Clarendon 16.x.1869. Private (copy). Granville Papers ^O.BO/pQ/BBp.fil
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more concerned over French activity north of Sierra Leone.
The trade of the Hellacourie and Fouricaria divers, some 60 miles north of
k
Freetown, had largely been built up by Sierra Leone merchants but as trade expanded 
in the 1860's French merchants took an increasing share, and in December 1864 some 
Bordeaux merchants asked the French government to protect French commerce from the 
extension of British customs and port dues. While the 1865 committee sat in London 
war broke out over the succession to the Moriah chiefdom, north of the Mallacourie, 
and commissioners from Sierra leone who tried to make peace suggested placing 
British custeras officers or a Resident Agent on the Mellacourie. The Colonial 
Office refused, and this gave French officers the chance, without authority from 
home, to take the law into their own hands. Pinet-Laprade, the new Governor of 
Senegal, was determined to see the French established in the Mellacourie, and 
between 1865 and 1867 he made treaties with both sides in the Moriah succession 
dispute by which French 'protectorate and suzerainty* were established. A blockhouse 
manned by 25 soldiers was built on the south bank of the Mellaccurie at Benty and 
French anchorage dues were collected,^
Kennedy suggested in 1869 that the French should give up this new position in 
return for the Gambia. He proposed in fact, a partition of the West African coast 
at the line of the River Dfembia, which would thus permit British influence in the
i
territory between Sierra Leone and the lies de Los, and would remove British claims 
2north of this. Granville and Clarendon agreed and in February 1870 the proposal
3
was put to the French, who were naturally prepared to accept it as a basis for 
negotiations • As early as 1866 they had decided in Paris that the Gambia was more 
imprlant than the Kellacourie* ^
1. J.D.Hargreaves, 'The French occupation of the Mellaccurie 1865-67'. Sierra Leone 
Studies. (Dec. 1957), No. 9, pp. 51- 15. Catala, o£. cit. pp. 116-7.
2. Kennedy to Granville 29.iv. 1869. A & P. 1870, L, p. 545.
3. Ibid.p. 550. Clarendon to Lyons 11.ii.1870.
4. Hargreaves, op. cit. p. 15.
In January 1870, however, the first of a series of objections,which ultimately
wrecked the scheme, reached Downing Street, While the government thought the
exchange would soon be settled, and the Governor of Senegal visited Kennedy at
Bathurst, opposition in England suddenly mounted. The merchant houses,^ the
Manchester and Bristol Chambers of Commerce, and petitioners from the Gambia
bombarded the Colonial office with letters. There was a question in the Commons on
10 June, and Gladstone, caught off his guard, had to admit that a colony could not
2
be ceded without Parliament's consent.
This meant that Kimberley took office in the midst of the controversy and he
faced a difficult decision during his first days at the Colonial Office, On 14 July
1870, only a week after seeing his first Gambia file, he received a deputation of
Gambia merchants and agreed to consider their estimates of expected financial losses
3
if the cession took $lace, next day there were debates in both Houses and although
Granville made a good case for the cession in the Lords, the Commons took the
4
opportunity to criticise the government's colonial policy generally. Luckily for 
Kimberley there were two excuses for hedging. The Lav Officers decided an Act would
5
be necessary for the transfer and there was no time to fit the bill into the session. 
Negotiations were suspended on the out-break of the Fran co-Prussian War and Kimberley 
never allowed them to be resumed under him.
Clearly the agitation he faced during his first days of office made a deep 
impression. Therefore he decided at once that while negotiations might be resumed
1. Brown at Quin, Forster & Smith, and Thomas Chown.
2. 3 Hansard, cci, col. 1842,
3* There appears to be no record of this interview, but the date is certain from 
Edmund Wodehouse to Pieade 13.vii.1870 (copy in Granville Papers PRO.30/29/55 
p. 178) and from nonsell's statement in the Commons. Hints of what passed can 
only be gleaned from minutes by Kimberley*( on 17.vii.1870 on Brown to Kimberley 
12.vii.1870 and 4,viii,1870 on Chown to Kimberley 30.vii.1870. CO/87/98 *) and 
from Monsell's speech, 3 Hansard, cciii, col. 366,
4. Ibid. cols. 339, 351-67.
5. Min. by Kimberley 16.vii.1870 on LO. to CO. 13.vii.1870. C0/8?/98a.
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after the war, Britain would reserve her right to consider objections, and before 
the next French overtures were made he had decided to stay on +he Gambia. He made 
the decision in March 1871 when the question of abandoning McCarthy’s Island, which
X
had been recommended by the 1865 committee, was raised; and when in May 1871 he
learnt of the renewal of the Marabout-Soninki War he even decided to retain the 
2
island. When the French broached the question of the cession again in August 1871
Kimberley regretted that,
"it should be necessary to break off a negotiation, which had been conducted 
in a most friendly spirit between the two governments... but that so much 
opposition has been manifested in the Gambia settlement to the proposed 
cession, that I have come to the conclusion that^it would not be desirable 
to proceed any further with the negotiations".
The French tried again in May 1873, but they met with the same polite refusal from 
4Kimberley,
As early as 1870, then, Kimberley decided that the 1865 policy would not do for
the Gambia, In the following years he considered how best he could provide for the
security of the settlement. There was a wrangle with the Admiralty over the use of
gunboats in the river, and in the middle of 1872 Knatchbull-Hugessen urged a more
forceful policy on the Gambia. Traders, he said, should either be told they would
get no protection, or force should be paraded regularly; "It is idle for us to halt
5
between two opinions". This was a theme repeated often by Knatchbull-Fugessen about
West Africa, and it was an opinion Kimberley also came to hold.
Although the Gambia exchange question was revived in 1874 after the Ashanti War,
1. Min.by Kimberley 2.iii.l871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 9.ii.l871. Cfi/87/99*
2* Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 10.v. 1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 11.iv. 1871. See .T.M. 
Gray, History of the Gambia (1940J pp. 388-394, 416-430, 444-455 for details of 
the long drawn out struggle between the Muslim Marabouts and the pagan SoninVi 
chiefs of the Gambia. The first outbreak was in 1852. Successive oeace treaties 
were patched up by the governors, but the basic rivalry was not removed. In 1872 
trouble flared up near McCarthy's Island. In 1873 the Soninkis were driven from 
their towns in British Combo \ on the peninsula south of Bathurst»and there was 
fear that the war would be carried into the British settlement.
3. Min. by Kimberley 20.viii.1870 on F0. to CO. 14.viii.1871. C0/87/l01.
4. Min. by Kimberley 31*v.l873 on F0. to CO. 23.v.l87^. C0/87/l06.
5. Min. by K-Hugessen 6.viii.l872 on Simpson to P-Hennessy 15.vi. 1872. C0/87/l02.
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when Disraeli's government wanted to add Grand Bassam and Assini to the Gold Coast 
as part of the policy of achieving ' parsnountcy • in the area for fiscal reasons # 
opposition again flared up, and the matter was dropped in 1876#^
The Lagos Settlement to 1873*
At Lagos the 1865 policy was steadily ignored by Commander Glover R.N.
Originally an anti-slave station, the minute British colony at Lagos had inevitably
2
become involved in the politics of the adjacent Yoruba country, and by 1871
Kimberley was confronted with proposals from Glover, the Administrator, for
annexations on the mainland# Although he had supported the annexation of Iagos
3when he was at the Foreign Office in 1861, Kimberley rejected Glover's proposals.
But by 1873 he had definitely decided that withdrawal was out of the question. The 
arguments in London over Lagos clearly exposed the inadequacy of the 1865 policy, 
which Knatchbull-Hugessen,. in particular, wanted reversed# It is now necessary 
to trace the stages of this argument.
British influence both at Lagos and in the Niger Delta dated from Palmerston's 
Foreign Secretaryship# Realising that the gunboat rule of the Squadron was not 
adequate to suppress the slave trade, he appointed the first resident officer in the 
area# The choice was significant. For just as Maclean had developed the Gold 
Coast Protectorate without authority from home, so John Beecroft, the Consul for the 
Bights in 1849# "succeeded in making British rule familiar to the native states under 
his consular jurisdiction... in time Africans came to look upon the British Consul
4
as facto Governor of the Bights of Benin and Biafra", While Beecroft was the
1. See below p#
2# For the origin of the rivalry between the Yoruba towns of Ibadan and Abeokuta 
see S.Johnson, History of the Yorubas (1921)p.200-293. and S.O.Biobaku, The Fgba 
and their Neighbours. 1842-1872 (1957) jr chapters 1 ft 2#
5. Memo, by Wodehouse 22.i.1861. F0/84/ll41*
4, Dike, Trade and Politics, p. 128. The Consulate was at Fernando Po until 1872 
when it was moved to Old Calabar.
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official representative in vast consular area from Dahomey to the Cameroons, British
influence of a different kind emanated from the Egba town of Abeokuta, where
missionaries were established after 1842.^ These missionaries, who were particularly
fearful of attacks from Dahomey, combined with Beecroft to establish British
influence at Lagos in 1852. In December 1851, King Kosoko of Lagos, who had refused
to make a slave trade treaty, fired on a British ship flying a flag of truce,
therfore Lagos wa3 attacked, Kosoko exiled, and a treaty was made with the restored 
2
king, Akitoye. But co-operation between the missionaries at Abeokuta and the 
Consul at Lagos was not always cordial, and after the consular district was split 
in 1853* the Consul for the Bight of Benin stationed at Logos, tended to allow the 
immediate interests of the port to dominate his policy. As the Egba historian 
Biobaku writes:
"The Consul (as well as the traders) favoured the diffusion of British 
influence throughout the area and was inclined to take trade necessities 
as his guide. The missionaries, on the other hand, would have no truck 
with notorious slaving chiefs and tended to look upon Abeokuta^as the 
centre from which civilizing -influence should radiate".
Thus relations between the two centres of British influence, Lagos and 
Abeokuta, were strained. Meanwhile, the coastal States became involved in the 
Ijaye War (1860-65) during which a section at Ibadan tried to organise an alliance
1. The Rev. Thomas Birch Freeman (bom in England son of an African father and an 
English mother) a Wesleyan missionary on the Cold Coast, visited Abeokuta on 11 
December 1842. He was convinced that shodeke, the remarkable personality who led 
the Egba, was a liberal ruler and he saw Abeokuta as a centre from which
* civilization might be spread to the region. Shortly after,Henry Townshend, a 
C.M.S. teacher from Sierra Leone arrived (4 Jan. 1843) after some freed Yorubas 
from Sierra Leone who had immigrated to Abeokuta had requested an Anglican 
missionaiy. Biobaku, The Fgba. pp. 27-8,
2. Akitoye had a<jtonitted British traders to Lagos in 1845 and agreed to abolish the 
slave trade. After being deposed by Kosoko, leader of the slaving interest, he 
fled to Abeokuta. In 1848 Townshend, the Anglican teacher, took a petition from 
Abeokuta to England professing hatred of the slave trade, of which Lagos was said 
to be the centre, and requesting protection of trade on the lagoon. Palmerston 
interviewed Townshend and the C.M.S., who requested a British Agent at Abeokuta 
and a gunboat on the lagoon. In Jan. 1851 Beecroft visited Abeokuta and agreed 
to restore Akitoye as King of Lagos. Ibid p, 43#
3. Ibid. p. 51.
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with Kosoko and Dahomey to purge British influence from Yorubaland*^ This placed 
Abeokuta in a perilous position and the Egba turned to Lagos for help* But the 
Consul had no power; HWe have all the responsibilities of possession without the
power which would enable us fully to carry out our views #H wrote Brand who wanted
2
to annex the whole area* Another suggestion was the appointment of African Agents
on the mainland supported by a force of consular guards. Consul H.Foote placed
resident Vice-consuls at Lagos and Badagry and he bombarded Porto Novo when the King
obstructed the palm oil trade.
*
Finally, in view of tho difficulties of the Lagos consulate the foreign Office
3
decided to annex the island in 1861. But although the first governor had strict 
instructions not to interfere with the mainland, he found that to make Lagos 
economically viable he was led into a policy of expansion. To provide revenue for 
the colony he brought Palma and Badagry within its customs boundary as historic 
appendages of Lagos. When the Egba invaded the Ijebu country to pay off a score 
against the town of ^ akun, where Ibadan obtained arms during the I.laye War, Governor 
Freeman decided the Egba were the obstacles to peace in Yorubaland. Thus hostility 
to Abeokuta became the basis of the policy of the Lagos government.
The most persistent exponent of this policy was Commander Glover ,^ vho acted as
1. Ibid. pp. 64-78.
2. V/.H.Scotter, International Hivalry in the Bights of Benin and Biafra. 1815-85. 
(PhD thesis London 1933) p. 88.
3. Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary, was opposed, but the Foreign Office prevailed, 
and the cession took place on 6 August 1861.
4. Later Capt. Sir John Glover. B. 1829, son of a clergyman, who, as an officer had 
fought against Ashanti in the Pod ova campaign in 1826. Joined the navy aged 12; 
survey work in the Levant 1841-50; stationed at the Cape 1950; China Station and 
promoted Lieut, in 1851. Took part in land operations during the Burma War 1852- 
53, and was in the Baltic campaign during the Crimean War 1854-5. Surveyor to 
BaikiVs Niger Expedition, 1857-61 and surveyed the Lagos lagoon and part of the 
Niger; he also made the overland journey from Raba to lagos and back via Ibadan 
and Abeokuta. In 1863 he was O.A.G. at Lagos when Freeman was ill. TYotnotod 
Comdr. in 1864 and returned to Lagos as Colonial Secretary, where ha became Lieut- 
Goveraor when Freeman finally left. In 1866 he returned to Lagos for a second 
tour as Administrator under the centralised !-est African Settlements.
For his expedition up the Volta in 1870 see belov pp.i&x-ioj, and for his 
part in the Ashanti VJar, 1873-4 below pp. zqe- 3<n.
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governor between Kay and November 1863, and was appointed Governor in 1864# vith 
certain intervals Glover ruled Lagos until 1872. He was a forceful personality, 
an efficient administrator and above all was well acquainted with the Nigerian 
region. He had worked with Baikie to open up the interior of the Niger country 
and was particularly interested in the overland route from Lagos to the Lokoja 
station which would bypass the rival city States of the Delta. At Lagos he saw 
himself as the arbiter of Yorubaland.
The details of his policy at Lagos are difficult to unravel and the Colonial 
Office did not understand them, but it was based on a bias towards Ibadan; opposition 
to Abeokuta, which resulted in an attempt to achieve trade routes to Ibadan, Oyo and 
ultimately the Niger, which could not be obstructed by the States in the immediate 
vicinity of Lagos.^
Ha declared a British protectorate over Pokra, Ado and Okeodan on the mainland
2
based on ’flimsy mandates from the people*, and he placed a Resident Agent at 
Okeodan. Me proposed that the Egba and Ibadans should evacuate their armed camps at
Makun and Ipara respectively, and that Ikorodu and Ijebu should renew an alliance
»
so that, through them, he could open a safe road to Ibadan (no. 3). He attempted to
come to terms with the Egba, and on a visit to their camp at ^akun he suggested a
British Agent for Abeokuta. Y/hen Ikorodu raided Makun he left the Egba to retaliate,
and shortly after the roads to Lagos were reopened. But when the Egba discovered
arms were again passing to Ibadan they closed them again, thus annoying Glover who
3
resumed the policy of hostility to Abeokuta. On 29 March 1865 Glover sent an
1. Described in Glover to Kimberley 7.xi.l872. C0/l47/26. See map oooosite p. 73.
2. Biobaku, The Egba. p. 74#
3# Ibid. p. 75. Glover*© personal feelings about the Egba are still obscure. Pope- 
Hennessy said Bishop Crowther once told him that Glover had a 'personal hatred of 
the Egba due to some personal slight'. (P-Hennessy to Kimberley 15#ix. 1872 
C0/l47/24)# Glover claimed he had a narrow escape with his life in Abeokuta in 
1858; others said he 'lost his luggage* there. Ibid. Min. by Hales 15#ix.lB72, 
and Lady E.Glover and Sir Richard Temple, Life of Sir John Hawley Glover (1897)
pp. 80—81.
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ultimatum to the Egba to raise their seige of Ikorodu, and when they refused, he 
landed troops who put the Egba to flight** Shortly after this Ord Yisited Lagos to 
prepare his report for the 1865 committee, and on the whole he endorsed Clover's 
policy.^
At the end of 1865 Glover vent home on leave* But he returned as Administrator 
under the unified West African government in November 1866 and immediately resumed 
his shadow boxing with the Egba. While he was in England an internal crisis at
Abeokuta had enabled some of the 'Saro', the educated freed Yoruba immigrants r^ora
» *
Sierra Leone, to form the Egba United Board of Management. In June 1867 they placed
a customs house on the River Ogun, so Glover retaliated by moving troops into Ebute
Metta. This was followed by the expulsion of the missionaries from Abeokuta, but
the Colonial Office ordered Glover not to interfere.
Glover always denied that he had an expansionist policy, but in the years of
great uncertainty from 1868 to 1871 he was certainly ambitious for the success of
Iagos. The trouble on the hinterland was caused partly by internal dissension at
Abeokuta and partly by the rivalry of the Egba and Ibadans over trade routes to
Lagos. This in turn effected the trade of Lagos about which high hopes were
entertained. Kennedy believed that the campaign of Sir Samuel Baker in the Upper
4
Nile would divert trade from the Sudan to Lagos; Kimberley's first taste of Glover,
1. Biobaku, The Egba. p. 75» "Undoubtedly, Glover manoevered the Egba into the 
position where he could take the step of armed intervention which he had 
premeditated as the best means of ending the interior war".
2. A ft P. 1865» XXXVII, pp. 308-312. Ord noticed Glover's Ibadan bias and realised 
his policy might harm the Egba. Ord said a decision was necessary over the area 
of beach between Lagos and Palma since territory without a 'recognised protector' 
was unknow there. As for Glover's so-called protectorate over Pokra, Ado and 
Okeodan, Ord said it was "a protection which is not, however, understood by 
either party to involve the responsibilities which have been supposed to apply 
to it in the Gold Coast".
The 1865 committee's conclusion on Lagos was that "an indefinite territory, 
including all these places, is understood to be more or less under British 
Government, bounded only on the left of the Ogun by the lagoon, and on the right 
without any frontier". The Committee suggested a British Commandant at Lagos 
until an African government could be restored; then a Consul would suffice. 
(Reports from Committees. 1865, V, 11 ft 15). Ord and Glover were lifelong 
friends, and they were together at Homburgh when Ord died in 1884.
3. Biobaku, oj>. cit. p. 79 4. Kennedy to Kimberley 4.x.1870. C0/l47/l8.
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who was on leave at tha and of 1870, came in the shape of a proposal of a mission
to the Emir of Nupe with a view to trying to divert the Nile traffic to the Niger*
Kimberley*s reply was a distinct enunciation of the 1865 policy.*
When he returned to Lagos in 1871 01 over found war likely on the mainland. In
his absence anti-British elements had met at Igbessa, so Glover recalled Lagoa
people from this town and posted Hausas on the frontier. The Colonial Office
2
approved his action. Glover was uncertain of the real trouble, but he was sure
3that Ibadan and Abeokuta were about to go to war9 as/believed the Torubas of Oyo 
and‘Ibadan wanted to break the Egba position of monopolising middlemen of the trade 
to Lagos by opening a road to thp lagoon via Ijebu Ode (no. 4). As Lagos would 
benefit by such a route Glover requested instructions in case he was asked to 
mediate.^
In July 1871 he tried to settle the rivalries of Yorubaland by a conference. 
Because of their geographical position the Egba were able to close most of the 
routes to Lagos from Oyo and Ibadan. Of seven possible routes only two were open 
(nos. 2 and 2a)9 and these ran through Abeokuta. Glover's policy was to achieve 
alternative routes to break the Egba monopoly, especially one in the east via Makun 
and Ilesha (no. 5)* Kimberley thought this was a wise policy, but as the roads 
were still closed in October 1871, Glover became convinced that war was inevitable 
and began to garrison his frontiers. Since Porto Novo was a last slave market where 
the Egba could exchange slaves he decided that this town would be the key to the 
war.^ His suggestion of the annexation of Porto Novo reached the Colonial Office in 
December 1871, but Kennedy, the Governor in Chief, did not support it.
1. Glover to Kimberley 21.xii.1870 and Kimberley to Kennedy ^.1.1871. C0/l47/lo.
2. Glover to Kennedy 18.iii.1871. C0/l47/20.
3. Ibid. Clover to Kennedy 20.iii.1871. Biobaku, The Egba. p. 87 says it was really 
a matter of a possible civil war at Abeokuta following a constitutional crisis.
4. Glover to Kennedy 25.iii.1871. C0/147/20.
5. Maps and plans in PRO. HR.389 (l).
6. Glover to Kennedy 18.V.1871. CO/l47/21.
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The Colonial Office was divided on the Porto Novo question. Herbert felt
Glover might be right. Knatchbull-Hugessen said he was probably right from the
Lagos viewpoint, but wondered: "would not the general confidence in us be diminished
and night not the consequence be our implication in native wars and embarrassments
from which our whole policy has been to keep ourselves clear".* Although he gave due
weight to Glover*s views for pacifying Yorubaland, Knatchbull-Hugessen thought there
had been stronger reasons for annexing Fiji, which had been refused in 1862.
Kimberley was adamant: "I am altogether against Captain Clover’s proposal. On
similar grounds of philanthropy we might be called upon to annex Dahomey, Ashantea,
Abbeokuta - for anything I see (except the difficulty of the enterprise) the greater 
2
part of Africa". Kimberley reminded Glover in January 1872 that he was not to annex
Porto Novo; in fact after reading the Lagos estimates in the following month he
3
thought of removing Glover.
After his annexation plan was rejected Glover proceeded to blockade Porto Novo 
by placing the steamer Eyo Honesty on the lagoon. Replying to Kimberley’s warning, 
he suggested, as an alternative, the appointment of a British Resident there. Until 
British influence was established at Porto Novo, he insisted that the roads to the 
interior would be unsafe; that a war with the Egba and Ijebu was the only other 
alternative. When this view reached London in March 1872, Herbert supported the
4
idea of a Resident at Porto Novo, provided the steamer was withdrawn, and Knatchbull- 
Hugessen agreed; although he realised that this would mean reversing their policy. 
Before a decision was made the question was referred to (Sir) John Pope-Hennessy, the
1. Ibid. Mins by Herbert (6th) and K-Hugeseen 9.xii.l871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 
15.xi.1871.
2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley ll.xii.1871. On a suggestion of acquiring territory in 
the Cameroons, Kimberley wrote, "I am not prepared to extend British sovereignty 
in W. Africa".
3. Min. by Kimberley 8.ii.l871 on Glover to Kimberley 17.x.1871. C0/l47/2^. In 
Glover’s favour one should remember that he was very short of officials.
4. Min. by Herbert 5.iii.l871 on Glover to Kennedy 3.ii.l872. C0/l47/23.
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new temporary Governor-in-Chief, but Kimberley’s attitude was still quite firms
"It is necessary to be very cautious in extending our ’influence*. Africa 
is a large continent, and our extension may be limitless, if we are to 
provide for the peace of the interior, and occupy the coast wherever 
’influence* is wanted to prevent disorder..• there is an infinite field 
for further ’development* East of Lagos. The Brass, Calabar, & Bonny 
rivers are far from being in perfect order and Oko Jumbo v Jah Jah [at 
Bonny] is a litigation whichapt. Glover- would no doubt think it right 
to terminate preremptorily1*.
The Colonial Office decided to curb Glover’s expansionism and Pope-Hennessy 
warned him accordingly. But in April 1872, just as a serious attempt to implement 
the 1865 policy seemed likely, Khatchbull-tiugessen expressed serious misgivings:
”1 cannot but feel that after all we have done on the W.African Coast, there 
is an inconsistency and something akin to withdrawal from former policy, if 
we permit the Increase of human sacrifice and murders in the immediate p 
vicinity of a British colony without an effort to prevent the same".
If British policy was only to retain small .settlements then Glover was possibly too
T
energetic, but a clear statement of policy should be made to the Egba.
In February 1872 Samuel Crowther, Bishop of the Niger, a Toruba educated at 
Sierra Leone, passed through Abeokuta and represented the Egba viewpoint to the 
Colonial Office. The Egba claimed that Lagos was becoming a refuge for their slaves, 
that Glover rigidly enforced an arms embargo which had been applied because of the
4
war in the Oil Rivers, and that he stationed troops on the mainland at Ebute Metta, 
Thus by April 1872 both Governor Pope-Hennessy, who was now at the Gold Coast, and 
the Colonial Office, were exasperated with Glover. In spite of all their insistence 
on a passive policy he kept the steamer at Porto Novo, he sent (Sir) Roger 
Goldsworthy, the acting Collector of Customs and a man with Indian experience, on 
a road opening mission to Oyo and Ibadan; he intended to lead an expedition to open 
this route at Ode, and he sent J.O.Payne, the Sheriff of Lagos, on a similar mission
1. Ibid.Win, by Kimberley 5*iii*1872 on draft for P-Heimessy 9#iii«1872.
2. Ibid .Min, by K-Hugessen 3,iv.l872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 5.iii*1872.
3. Ibid.Min, by K-Hugessen 4.iv,1872 on Clover to Kendall 17.ii.1872.
4. Crowther to Kimberley 6.ii.l872 and C.M.S. to Kimberley ?0.iii.l872. CO/l47/25«
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to Ijebu Ode, In Hay 1872 Kimberley was about to take ♦’very decided steps" with 
Gloverbut the latter was finally restrained by the Lagos merchants and Pope- 
Hennessy*
The merchants opposed Glover's ordinance to empower him to close the roads and
a
2
prohibit trade to and from Lagos, and Pope-Hennessy disallowed it* The Governor
found trade at Lagos virtually at a standstill when he arrived on 24 April 1872;
Glover was at odds with the English merchants, but he was supported by many of the
inhabitants. Lagos itself presented a very favourable contrast to Freetown and
Cape Coast, and Pope-Hennessy had tp pay tribute to Glover's internal administration.
But he decided that the stoppage of the Yoruba trade was the result of Glover*s 
3
Egba policy. The Colonial Office attitude to Glover at this time was summarised 
by Herbert: Glover had "done well in his home administration, but... pursued too 
’spirited* and interfering a policy in Foreign Affairs".
His new superior, Pope-Hennessy, was one of the most controversial colonial
i ■
governors in the later years of the nineteenth century* As an Irish Tory M.P. he
was veil known in the House of Commons 1859-66, and he had only missed office in
4Derby’s government because he lost his seat. Disraeli suggested him as Governor of
the Straits Settlements but the job went to Sir Harry Ord. Between 1867 and 1869 he
administered the government at Labuan. Wherever he went he quarelled with
subordinates; at Labuan he suspended his father-in-law (the future Sir Hugh Tow,
Resident in Perak) from office. His personality has prompted one historian to
suppose that the Colonial Office "developed a tradition of giving any particularly
sticky or static colony a dose of this warm hearted, vigorous and cantankerous
Governor".^ These qualities vere to be important in West Africa, for both at Lagos
1. Min. by Kimberley 15.v.1872 on P-Hennessy to Glover 16.iv.1872 (copy). C0/l47/23.
2m Ibid. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 18.iv. 1872.
3* Ibid. .P-Hennessy to Kimberley 27.iv.1872.
4. Memo, by Salisbury in Carnarvon Papers. PRO. 30/6/10.
5. A.H.A.Anson. About Myself and Others (1920) p. 313.
6* B.Hamilton, Barbados and the Confederation Question (1956) p. 46.
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and the Gold Coast Hennessy had serious personal differences*
At Lagos on the strength of a few days experience he completely reversed 
Glover’s E&ba policy and Glover came home.^ The blockade was withdrawn from Porto 
Hovo and Pope-Hennessy assured the Egba that he did not intend to interfere with
them* He ' had to go to the Gold Coast suddenly on 30 April because of a murder
2
at Elmina, but he returned to Iagos as soon as he could and early in June he 
received a reply from Abeokuta, which contained accusations against Glover# To this 
Pope-Hennessy simply re-iterated his statement* that Britain did not wish to interfere 
This caused the Colonial Office to have its first serious doubts about Pope- 
Hennessy. They felt the accusations against Glover should not have been left un­
answered, and that Glover also deserved a hearing# Kimberley said Pope-Rennessy 
"has made a great mistake in disavowing his predecessor in writing to the Egbas.
This will give an impression of weakness and dissension on the part of the British
3
authorities which cannot fail to do harm"# But the Governor continued to disavow 
Glover. Assured of the ’cordial sincerity* of the shifty King Docemo, he announced
his complete confidence in the Lagos people’s loyalty, so by the end of July 1072
the Colonial Office feared there was something wrong. As ever, Knatchbull-Hugessen
was the first to sense trouble. "It is too much as if he had been quite ready to
sacrifice Captain Glover to his own desire to acquire pojxilarity and influence with
the native tribes and their ’friends’ in Lagos. It may turn out that he has been
4
made a fool of by these people after all"# In August 1872 Kimberley agreed; "Mr.
1. Barrow of the Africa dept, wrote, 11 July 1872, that Glover told him, "having 
been made to feel I was not wanted - indeed I could not remain - I asked for 
leave of absence"# In Nov. 1872 Glover gave his version of what P-Hennessy had 
said to him: "Capt. Glover, I want neither to hear nor read anything, I know all, 
and have heard all# Merchants, missionaries and natives have both written and 
spoken, and I must tell you, you kno*t nothing of the country the place or 
people# It is not the slave question. It is you and your aggressive policy". 
Glover to Kimberley,* London, 7.xi.l872# C0/l47/26. For Pope-Hennessy’s version 
see his despatch dated 30*xii#1872# C0/l47/24.
2. See below p. <n
3# Kin. by Kimberley 14#vii#1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 15.vi#1872. CO/l47/23*
4. Kin. by K-Hugessen 25*vii.l872 on Glover to Kimberley 18.vii.1872. CO/l47/26.
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Hennessy has I fear been bamboozled, and It will be fortunate If we escape serious
/
trouble". Pope-Hennessy*s Egba policy might be right, but Kimberley disliked his
methods.
There was much unpleasantness in the aftermath of Glover's dismissal and the
reversal of his policy, especially when the new policy did not work. Therefore,
while further evidence of Glover's 'intermeddling' came to light and the result of
Pope-Hennessy's policy was awaited with growing doubt, a serious review of British
aims took place in London. At the end of 1872 and early in 1873 serious thought
was given to Britain's role at Lagos and this co-incided with a similar re-appraisal
2
of the British position in the Gold Coast Protectorate.
Herbert said they would never get to the bottom of the Glover-Hennessy 
controversy and he thought that
"the moral appears to be that our administrators should distinctly understand 
that they are not sent to the coast to 'open roads* and create trade, but, 
pursuing an impartial and non-interferent policy, simply to maintain order 
and good government within .those settlements for which this country is 
responsiblf. If trade flourishes... well and good; if not, we cannot have
gentlemen of limited capacity and experience pressing what they or their
interested advisers suppose to be a spirited and intelligent policy away 
in the interior. If, for the sake of the English merchants we are not 
allowed to retire from the coast, at least^let us stick to the coast 
proper and to our own boundaries on it".
Knatchbull-Hugessen heartily disagreed with this and said that a lot o** good could
be done by "timely and judicious missions", but Kimberley took the s*rae attitude to
the Toruba country as the Foreign Office took to the Niger Delta; he said they
should recognise the middlemen position of the States adjacent to Lagos as a'custom
of the whole country' and should not interfere. He wanted friendly relations with
all African States; "when we endeavour to feel our way to direct intercourse with
tribes further in the interior we should do so with much caution and not att«npt to
4
force such intercourse by coercive measures".
1* Min. by Kimberley 6.viii.l872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 24.vi.1872. 00/147/2*5.
2. See below p. lo%-uO-
3. Min. t*y Herbert 3*viii*l,c?72 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 25.vi. 1872. C0/l47/23.
4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 6.viii.l872.
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By October 10T72 winds were bloving in the other direction. As Manchester
merchants complained about Pope-Hennessy#s policy and called for the return of
Glover, Knatchbull-Hugessen aired some of his anxieties to Kimberley.
"Our presence on the Vest Coast of Africa must be supposed to indicate our 
wish to extend Trade, Civilization and Christianity: these objects, however, 
cannot be effected by remaining with our hands folded and shrinking from any 
combat with native habits, ignorance and prejudices. Every now and then an 
administrator feels this so strongly that he acts with greater vigour than
a total non-interference with Native Policy would sanction - then he is
called 'ambitious' and accused of anting beyond his instructions. This is 
what I imagine Captain Glover to have done. On the other hand Mr. Hennessy 
has gone out, very proud of his supposed talent for 'managing* natives, and 
quite ready to^believe that he knows how to do so better than anyone who had 
preceded him".
Kimberley, while now agreeing that there was a lot to be said for Glover, was still
not to be moved. "I am I confess less combative than Mr. Fugessen, and I am not
2
prepared for ai crusade in W.Africa on behalf of trade, civilization and Christianity?
Knatchbull-Hugessen was not deterred by this and maintained that Glover would
probably turn out to have been right. Even Kimberley wavered in November 1872 when
a respected missionary, David Hinderer who had spent 21 years in the Yoruba country,
3
expressed views very similar to Glover's. Kimberley now said,
"Captain Glover wa^ I never doubted, quite right in his main views, but he 
vent too fast. Our position at Lagos is a very difficult one. We want of 
course free access to the interior but we cannot undertake the task of 
controlling all the powerful coast tribes, and if we succeed in getting 
them under our control, we shall immediately come into.collision with the 
tribes beyond, and so on until we come to Timbuctoo".
Glover, defending his policy, seems to have had a remarkable grasp of Yoruba history,
so Kimberley still further diluted his objections, and suggested that Glover simply
5
"wanted to play one party off against the other to promote the interests of Lagos".
1. Min. by K-Hugessen lO.x.1872 on Leigh-Clare to Kimberley 3.x. 1872. 00/147/25.
2. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 12.x.1872.
3. Hinderer was the first C.M.S. missionary to penetrate to Ibadan. (Anna Hinderer, 
Seventeen Years Yoruba land (1873) pp. 20-1). As the Hinderers were cut off at 
Ibadan in the Ijaye War, their account has an Ibadan rather than Egba bias.
Glover made three attempts to relieve them during the war and Mrs. Hinderer counts 
Glover as a friend, (p. 279)
4* Min. by Kimberley 16.xi.1872 on Hinderer to Kimberley l.xi.1872. CO/l47/26.
5. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 24.xi.1872 on Glover to Kimberley 7.xi.l872.
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Kimberley had all but come round to Glover's policy by December 1872. The
roads, expected open in October, remained closed and a new Administrator suggested
a 'quiet blockade* to coerce the Egba. Pope-Hennessy was unwilling to propose
this, but Holland, the Legal Adviser in the Colonial Office, suggested sending a
warship, which Glover had suggested in May.^ When Goldsworthy furnished further
defence of Glover's policy Knatchbull-Hugessen predicted that one day Iagoe would
have either to be extended or abandoned. As things were there was a stalemate,
"since the Policy of HM Govt, would not allow for extension A Public Opinion would
2
certainly not permit its abandonment"•
At the beginning of 1873 the Colonial Office forgot the personal quarrel and 
had a more general discussion over the instructions for R.W.Keate, the new Govemor- 
in-Chief. Glover's policy was finally recognised as a logical one, but one which 
antagonised the middleman States near Lagos. Pope-Hennessy had followed the official 
policy but had done it badly. "The root of the difficulties must lie deeper", wrote 
the Head of the Africa department, "it existed from the first and what puzzled Mr.
3
Freeman and Captain Glover, has puzzled Mr. Hennessy and Mr. Fowler".
*
Once again it was Knatchbull-Hugessen who questioned the whole basis of 
Britain's position, and although the argument was occasioned by the Lagos question 
he was speaking for the Vest African Settlements as a whole. The Gold Coast in 
particular was obviously in his mind. It was not a matter of mistakes by individual 
governors, he said, so much as "the inherent viciousness of the whole system under 
which we find ourselves administering the governments on that coast". To leave 
boundaries undefined, jurisdiction uncertain, and administrators uninstructed, 
was to ask for trouble. "Hatives", he said, "are to be governed either by fear 
of the dominant race, or by a conviction that i’t is to their own interests that
1. Mins, on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 28.xi.1872. CO/147/24.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 12.1.1873 on Goldsworthy to Kimberley 4.1.1873. C0/l47/29.
3. Min. by Hales 22.ii.1873 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 30.xii.1872. C0/l47/24.
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the desired form of government should exist* Either alternative vas - and 
probably still is - open to us in the case of the Vest African tribes* But neither 
has been fully or fairly tried".* The Africans were now hostile, and Khatchbull- 
Hugessen laid the blame squarely on the 1865 committee. He criticised the "half and 
half policy of Great Britain - occupying territory as if she were ashamed of it... 
coaxing one day and threatening the next"* Above all, he said, public opinion would 
not stand a withdrawal.
What was the object of Lagos, he asked. If it was still to put'down slavery and 
spread Christianity,he believed that the best thing for Lagos, and for all Vest 
Africa, "would be that the whole sea-board should be under British control. The 
Egbas, Jebus and others should then have power and influence brought to bear on them 
which would oblige them for their own sakes to open up roads into the interior". He 
supported the annexation of Porto Novo and the occupation of all the seaboard to 
Leckie. If this was against the governments policy, he was sure they would come 
to it one day. As an interim policy he proposed defining the boundaries of British 
territory, where slavery could not exist, and he proposed of form of Indirect Rule 
elsewhere. He suggested ruling the 'Protected territory* through African rulers
2
and paying stipends to the rulers of Abeokuta and Ijebu Ode to keep the roads open.
Knatchbull-Hugessen's blend of frank long-term appreciation and practical 
compromise was not without effect on Kimberley, who finally decided to maintain the 
status quo at Lagos. Vithdrawal was out of the question, he said, and Lagos would 
be defended if necessary. He proposed that British sovereignty would be maintained
at Lagos, Badagry. Palma and Leckie, and that the rest of the territory would only
1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 23.ii.1873. This very long minute would make an 
excellent political speech. Compare it with the similar long minute (lR.ii.1873) 
on the Gold Coast Protectorate (below p.“>8~T). February 1873 seems to have been 
the crucial month for the development of K-Hugessen's criticism of a passive 
policy. On 24 Feb. the telegram Indicating that Fiji was 'offered* was received* 
( See his minute 24.ii.1873 on Robinson to Kimberley 20.ii.1873 (Tg) C0/20l/573).
2. Lagos minute of 23.ii.1873.
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be •protected* because of the existence of domestic slavery. The boundary of this
protectorate would have to be defined and the new governor was instructed to inquire
and report.^ Thus a passive policy prevailed at Lagos, but the 1865 policy had been
rejected. In 1873 the Colonial Office was diverted to more pressing problems on the
Gold Coast. The roads to and from Iagos and the interior re-opened in May 1873# but
when Carnarvon took over in 1874 he found the position still precarious# and his
2
laconic Under-secretary wondered "whether the game is worth the candle". Although 
the idea of annexing Porto Novo was revived in 1874 there was no real attempt to 
try out the Glover policy, and the future of Lagos was# for a time, bound up with 
the Gold Coast.
Anglo-IXitch Relations on the Gold Coast 1865 to 1872.
On the Gold Coast the escape clause of the 1865 resolutions was utilised in the 
Anglo-Dutch exchange treaty of 1867 which virtually partitioned the coast line at 
the Sweet River. The ]Xitch took the forts and protectorate to the west# and Britain 
assumed control to the east. This was not a sudden reversal of policy; it was the 
end of a decade of negotiations, which underlined the main administrative ^roblem of 
the Protectorate. The Anglo-Dutch partition was designed to meet the revenue problem.
It had lain behind Grey*s Poll Tax in 1852 and when this proved inadequate, Ord 
pointed, in 1856, to the customs free Dutch forts interspersed between the British 
ones. He thought the Dutch might sell their forts, as the Danes had done in 1850, or 
they should impose import duties mutually with the British. The government had agreed 
to this and be^ been July 1856 and May 1857 Ord visited The Hague and Paris in the first 
fruitless attempt at agreement over duties.
The second attempt (1859-61) followed Carnarvon’s 1858 memorandum. Moral
1. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 25-ii. 1873 and draft for Keate 5.iv.l87^.
2. Min. by Lowther 10.iv. 1874 on Berkerly to Carnarvon 14.iii.lB74 . 00^147/30.
obligations apart, Carnarvon wanted to avoid clashes with foreign powers over "our
vague and anomalous jurisdiction" behind the forts,^ but the second series of talks
floundered on the question of 'interior delimitation'• The Dutch wanted Britain to
renounce the Protectorate over Western Wassaw, to the north-east of Klmina, which
stood between the Dutch and their Ashanti allies. Ord supported them, hut although
Carnarvon was tempted, he felt bound in good faith to the Wassaws not to leave them
to the Dutch without their own consent. Thus Britain broke off negotiations in 1861.
Successful negotiations opened on Dutch initiative after the Ashanti War of 1863-
1864. With their settlements now costing over £10,000 a year, there were suggestions
3
afoot in Holland in 1864 for disposing of them altogether. In 1865 Pransen van 
Putte, the Liberal Colonial Minister, was anxious to reach agreement with Britain 
over Sumatra, where relations were strained because of conflicting views of the 
ambiguous treaty of 1824. As the Dutch expanded in the island by treaties with the 
local rulers, British merchants in the Straits Settlements complained that the Dutch 
tariff damaged their trade, and the usual policy of the British government was to 
object to the Dutch treaties. By 1865 there were signs of a change. Whitehall was 
not so sure that Straits trade really was adversely effected by Dutch activity in 
Sumatra. The Dutch Liberals held out the promise of abolishing differential tariffs
4
in return for British acquiesence at Dutch supremacv in Sumatra. In October 1865
van der Putte said he was disposed to throw the Dutch Gold Coast settlements into 
* 5
such a bargain*
Here is the origin of the famous 'link* which lies behind the assertion that in 
1872 Britain and the Netherlands made a bargain whereby Britain acquired Klmina in 
return for giving the Dutch a free hand in Sumatra.^ Although this is a stage ahead
1. Min. by Carnarvon 16.ix.1858 on Gov. Bird to Sec. of State. ?.viii.!858. CO/96/4*5.
2. It was Kimberley who suggested dropping the matter. Wodehouse to CO. 18.viii.1860 
F0/97/250.
3. "What must the Netherlands do with her settlements on the coast of Guinea9"* Trans, 
of pamphlet in FO/37/466. African Aid Soc. to CO. 6.vi.l«64. in C0/Q6/66.
4. Discussed below p. (5’x-rsv
5. Kilbwike to Russell 31.x. 1865. FO/37/450.
6. First raised by Sir James Elphinstone 13.ii. 1872. 3 Hansard ccix, col. ^28.
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of the 1868 partition, a word on the question is necessary here. The real 'link*
originated in the battle for ratification in the Netherlands of three separate
agreements made in 1870 - the Sumatra treaty, a treaty allowing the Dutch planters
*
in Surinam to recruit labour in India, and the treaty by which the Dutch gave 
up their Gold Coast forts. The Dutch asked that the three treaties might go 
before the States-General together so that the various concessions would balance 
each other; permission to recruit in India to balance the concessions to British 
merchants in Sumatra; the recognition of Dutch supremacy in Sumatra and the 
labour agreement to balance the loss of the Gold Coast settlements. Granville 
still further strengthened the link by insisting that all three treaties should 
•stand or fall together'•
But even before this the two matters had been un-officially linked by van 
der Putte and Sir Charles Adderley. They were both anxious to reach agreement 
over Sumatra and were both willing to use the Gold Coast, which they wanted to 
quit, as a bargaining counter. Thus the Foreign Office assertion of 1874 that 
during the entire course of the negotiations over the Sumatra treaty Hno allusion 
was made to the relations of the two countries in the West Coast of Africa",* is 
not strictly true. Paradoxically, it was the Sumatra treaty which failed when 
first presented to the States-General because it involved granting commercial 
concession to British merchants. Yet essentially they were separate agreements 
designed to remove long standing sources of difficulty. And while the Foreign 
Office had been prepared to discuss a Sumatra agreement as early as 1866, the 
Gold Coast cession it was supposed to paliate only came in 1870 after Dutch 
conservative opinion was affected by the disasterous results of the 1868 partition.
To return to the partition: Baron Bentinck, the Minister in London, announced
1. FQ. Print of 28.i.1874 of Memo by H.Percy Anderson, 5.i.1874. p. 10.
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the Dutch readiness to partition the coast on 12 January 1867.* British scruples 
over western Wassaw were forgotten; tempted to abandon them in I860, Carnarvon,
%2
now Colonial Secretary, consulted Ord again and accepted his view. "Vhen we 
have given up our territorial possessions, we have no call I think to reserve 
our most shadowy... convention which has been inaccurately termed a Protectorate 
with certain barbarous tribes of the Interior- we do not transfer them to the 
Dutch**, he told the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Office suggested Ord as a 
negotiator, and as he was already designated Governor of the Straits Settlements
n
they said he might incidentally have opportunity of sounding the Dutch about the
3
Sumatra question**.
Now there were no complications; these came only after the partition. Elliot, 
Ord and Col. Nagtglas drew up the Convention which was signed on 5 March 1867.
It provided for joint tariff policies and for a boundary running north of the
4
Sweet River. Governor Blackall and Governor Boers effected the exchange of
5
forts in January 1868. So just as Ord went to Singapore as the first colonial
governor his policy of ’tidying up* the Gold Coast bore fruit. At the same time
Herbert T.Ussher, the Administrator, optimistically reported progress in the 
Protectorate. Adderley, now the Parliamentary Under-secretary and a consistent 
advocate of leaving the Gold Coast either to the French or the Dutch,^ said this
was flying in the face of the 1865 recommendations. Sojjo'1865 policy was
invoked as a reminder to Ussher and as a salve to consciences in DowningStreet.
1. FO to CO. 12.i.1867. CO/96/75.
2. Carnarvon to Stanley 17th and 31.1.1867. FO/37/466. Carnarvon eald his vievs
on Vassaw were based on Ord's.
3. Min. by Anderson 17.i.1867 on CO. to FO. 17.i.1867. FO/37/466.
4. Text in fo.to co. S’. i(.i3£7. 7^ .
5. Blackall to Buckingham 6th and 28.1.1868. CO/96/76. Britain gave up Beyin, 
Dixcove, Sekondi & Kommendah and the protectorate over w.Wassaw and Denkyera 
and Appollonia. She received from the Dutch Mori, Formantine, Apam and Dutch 
Accra.
6. Mins, by Adderley 4.iii.l868 on Ord to Rogers 21.ix. 1867. Private. C0/27^/l7,
« and 15.v.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 16.iv. 1868. CO/96/76.
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The 1868 partition had two results. Firstly, the Dutch had to use force 
to take some of their new possessions. Secondly, the Fante and their neighbours 
felt betrayed by Britain, and , led by a Council of Chiefs at Mankessim, they 
formed a defensive alliance against Ashanti and joined in the resistance to the 
Dutch and the Elmina Africans.
The major forts were transferred peaceably and Blackall, who was about to 
relinquish his post, returned to Freetown satisfied of the 'perfect tranquility* 
of the ceded areas.^ Trouble started a few days later after the Kommendahs
2refused to accept the Dutch, and the town had been bombarded from the sea.
When Sir Arthur Kennedy, the new Govemor-in-Chief, arrived the Fante chiefs 
at Mankessim, joined by chiefs from Wassaw, Denkyera and Kommendah, were all 
determined to resist the Dutch. A force of Wassaws and Denkyeras assembled 
near Kommendah and Ussher warned Governor Boers that as Britain had only 
exercised a protectorate over Wassaw it would be unwise to assert sovereignty.
He did not want to assist the IXitch in their troubles in case the Fante attacked 
the British forts. A Dutch detachment at Kommendah was attacked on February,
3
Elmina itself was surrounded by a large Fante army, and some of the educated 
Africans were urging the Fante to throw off their British alleigance.
In this serious crisis the Colonial Office stuck to the policy of non­
intervention, prompted in particular by Adderley, who wanted to get of the
4
settlements. But the officials on the coast feared another Ashanti invasion 
or even intervention by the French, and Ussher was determined to discredit the
1. Blackall to Buckingham 28.i.1868. CO/96/76.
2. Ibid. Ussher to Blackall 6.ii.l868. Ward, History, p. 231 comments on the 
exchange : "never was there a greater political mistake" as the Africans were 
not consulted. Claridge (i, pp. 560-62) called the partition "a monumental 
piece of folly and injustice" as for the Wassaws and Denkyeras it "involved 
the practical surrender of these tribes to Ashanti".
3. Ussher to Blackall 6.iii.l868. CO/96/76.
4. Ibid. Mins by Adderley 18th and Buckingham 20.iv.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 
30.iii.1868*
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Fante Council ,vho, he said, were interpreting too literally the 1865 self-
government resolution. He believed Britain would either have to buy out the
Dutch completely or to forgoe excercising any influence in the interior.* Thus
Ussher made the first British suggestion of acquiring the Dutch settlements
since Ord*s 1856 report and at the same time the Wesleyan missionaries came to
the same conclusion; "the Dutch are a great nuisance. If they could only be
2got rid of we should have lasting peace**• FOur years later this suggestion was 
acted on but in 1868 Adderley said it was absurd. Ussher's immediate policy 
was for an alliance between the Fante and the Elminas. But even though they 
withdrew their forces from Elmina the Fante refused such a treaty. They had 
good cause for, since the eighteenth cehtury, when Ashanti capturdd the 'Note* 
by which the Dutch agreed to pay rent for Elmina, the Elmina Africans had 
maintained a close connection with Ashanti, and so were hated by the Fante.
The emnity was deep rooted and a valid reason for hesitancy by the Fante, who
4
also believed the Elminas had recently requested help from Ashanti against them.
But Ussher lost his patience; he gave the Fante until 12 July to accept the
alliance, and when he was rebuffed, he severed all relations with them and said
that if the Ashantis invaded - and they were reported in Wassaw and Denkyera -
5
the Fante would get no British help.
In London Adderley alone took much notice of the crisis. He urged Buckingham
to face it: "Ussher seems to me too figity and to have too much idea of building
up our 'prestige***. Adderley wanted to hold the forts alone and let the Africans 
6
fight it out. During August and September 1868 he continually called for a
1. Kennedy to Buckingham 16.iv. 1868. CO/96/76. file.
2. Taylor to Boyce 7.xii.l868. Methodist Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71 
Ward, History, p. 155.
4. Taylor to Boyce 5.vi.l868. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71 file. 
5* Ussher to Kennedy 17.vii.1868. CO/96/76.
6. Ibid. Min. by Adderley 17.viii.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 28.vii.1868.
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consistent policy; and he still harboured the plan of giving up the Gold Coast
in ord<=r to get concessions in Sumatra.^ Re pursueded Buckingham to send
2
Kennedy to investigate the Gold Coast, But at the end of 1868 a crucial hiatus 
took place among the Gold Coast policy makers. In November Kennedy visited the 
Fante and took an entirely different view of them to Ussher, who went on 
furlough leaving W.H.Simpson as acting Administrator. In the middle of all this 
Gladstone came to power in England and Granville followed Buckingham at the 
Colonial Office.
In West Africa the new Govemor-in-Chief reversed Ussher*s Fante policy. It
was futile to coerce them, he said9 impressed by their "general bearing,
intelligence, and comparative civilization''. He ^as not impressed by Gov. Boers
or by the Elmina chiefs who were only a small, and to him, "wholly barbarous and
uneducated" tribe. So Kennedy left Simpson to pursue a conciliatory policy
3
towards the Fante. In London Sir George Barrow, Head of the African department,*
accepted Ussher's view that there would be no peace until the Dutch left, but 
Elliot felt it was dishonourable to have persuaded the Dutch to partition and 
then let the Protectorate peoples make this an excuse for attacking the Dutch.
As the conservatives were about to leave office Buckingham left the decision to 
his successor.
Granville at first took the same view as Adderley. He approved of the policy 
of non-interference and he was shocked to find that £36, OCX) was being spent each 
year if only to "raise the moral tone of the natives who are gradually becoming
4
less under our influence". He saw no reason for remaining there and the local
5
officials were warned that their posts were liable to abolition. Granville, it
1. Fin. by Adderley 26.ix.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 3.viii.l868. CO/273/ 21.
2. Min. by Adderley 4.ix.l868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 13.viii.1868. GO/96/77.
3. Kennedy to Buckingham 7.xi.l868 (and confidential same date) 00/96/77.
4. Ibid. Min. by Granville 12.xii.l868i
5. Kin. by Granville 24.xii.1868 on Treas. to CO. 15.xii.1868. CO/96/78.
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appears, felt none of the moral responsibilities which troubled Carnarvon, and 
he resolutely tried to apply the 1865 policy. Even when Kennedy came round to 
Ussher’s view that there would be no escape from the problem until the Dutch 
left, Granville refused to consider taking Elmina.^
He soon changed his mind. In February 1869 Vice-Admiral Edward Harris, the
British Minister at The Hague, hinted that the Dutch might be glad to sell
2 * 3Elmina, and an unofficial offer was made before the beginning of October.
Meanwhile, the Colonial Office became interested in getting rid of the Dutch.
Monsell said on 1 March, "if we remain at the Gold Coast we ought to have Elmina
Next month Rogers had his bright idea. Kennedy who was worried about French
activity in the rivers north of Sierra Leone, had revived the Gambia exchange
plan.** "How would the Dutch like to take [the Ivory Coast postsj... from the
French <9b let us have Elmina", scribbled Rogers in the margin of a minute,^and
Granville, finally convinced that Britain would have to secure Elmina if she
remained on the coast, thought Rogers’s plan might help the Dutch to overcome
7
their King’s opposition.
This opposition prevented negotiations for the first half of 1870, and 
although Granville tried to make a move in April, Clarendon urged caution. When 
the Dutch King was approached for tho 'third time in June 1870 he agreed, as 
Dutch honour had been restored by reprisals at Kommendah. However, it is 
possible that the conditions suggested by van Limburg, the Foreign Minister,
1. Granville to Kennedy 9.ii*1869 (draft). CO/96/79.
2. Harris to Clarendon 19.ii.1869 in FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/96/82.
3. Clarendon to Granville 5.x. 1869. PRO. 30/29/55 p. 38. Cf. E.S.de Klerck, 
History of the Netherlands East Indies. II, p. 338.
4. Min. by Monsell l.iii.1869 on FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/96/82.
5. See above p. L%.
6. Margin of Barrow, 2.iv.l869 on Kennedy to Granville l^.iii.1869. C0/87/^l.
7. Granville advised this in spite of Barrow’s opposition. See note by Granville 
after Barrow, 21.iv.1869 on Kennedy to Granville 13.iii.1869. CO/87/91.
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had swayed him. The cession was to be gratuitous but Britain would pay for 
fixtures at Elmina. More significant was the condition that the cession treaty 
would go to the States-General along with the Sumatra and Surinam treaties
w
recently completed. The Dutch had wanted these two treaties to go before the
i
States-General together so the priviliges granted to the Surinam planters would
offset the admission of British traders on an equal footing in Sumatra.^ Mow
the Gold Coast matter was to be added. Here is the official 'link* between the
treaties; Granville accepted it, in fact he inverted it and said they would all
"stand or fall together".
However, forgetting that Britain was, in a way, doing the Netherlands a
favour in taking Elmina, Limburg tried to re-open the Sumatra and Surinam matters.
He thought the Surinam planters should be able to recruit labour on more
instead
favourable tenns, and suggested of the Sumatra agreement a treaty re-defining
the respective spheres of the two nations in South-east Asia. Granville, now
Foreign Secretary, flatly refused; in fact he said he would rather defer the
*
Gold Coast matter then prejudice the Sumatra agreement. But the Dutch were
anxious that the Gold Coast treaty would be presented with the other two, so it
2
was agreed that all three would stand or fall together.
As Gladstone said he was ignorant of the matter Kimberley, now at the
Colonial Office, drew up a precis for him, making sure, on Granville’s advice,
3
to leave it "as little open for Lowe to cavil at as possible". He assured 
Gladstone "It is by no means a case of extending our responsibilities, to which 
I would be most averse, but of relieving us of a serious embarrassment in the
4
only way", and the Prime Minister said he would stop "a good cluster of
1. Discussed below p.*si'«si.
2. FO. to CO. 5.x.1870. CO/96/86.
3. Granville to Rogers. Private, attached to Gladstone to Granville 11.x.1870 
(copy) in Kimberley Papers 8b.
4. Kimberley to Gladstone 14.x. 1870. Gladstone Papers 44224/88.
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agreements". Kimberley warned Lowe that an Ashanti War would cause the
Treasury to "bleed freely", and the Chancellor agreed to the payment of £24,000
for stores, although he disliked the increase of territory. Kennedy was told to
prepare the Africans for the cession.
Then three things happened which were to hold up the Elmina cession for
over a year. The Dutch government resigned, Ussher published the proposed
cession prematurely in Elmina giving the impression it was a 'sale and purchase',
and the Asantehene laid claim to Elmina. Meanwhile Kennedy urgently warned the
Colonial Office of the presence in Elmina of Akjarapong, uncle of the Asantehene,
and a hundred Ashanti warriors.* The purpose of this force was not yet realised
but Kennedy insisted that it would have to leave before the transfer took place.
Thus hope of early agreement faded in January 1871 because Elmina was unsettled,
the new Dutch government had to consider it, and a battle was brewing over the
ratification of the three treaties in the States-General.
The Colonial Office was tortured all the while by fears of another Ashanti
war. The Dutch categorically denied the Ashanti claim to Elmina, and Col.
Nagtglas, the Governor, was told to get rid of Akjampong and the Ashantis.
Kennedy was told to offer the Asantehene the same payment the Dutch paid as rent, 
2
as a stipend, which Khatchbull-Hugessen called Ha good cheap investment" provided
the Asantehene understood its payment depended on good behaviour. But when
Nagtglas was slow to remove Akjampong, Khatchbull-Hugessen said "do not let us
3
drift into an Ashanti war. Better abandon the idea of taking the Eorts". A
fortnight later he wondered whether a show of force might not be the cheapest
4course in the long run, and Kimberley decided to reserve the right of freedom
1. See below p.
2. CO. to Kennedy 2.i. 1871. 00/96/87.
3. Min. by K*-Hugessen 7.iii.l871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 9.ii.l^71. Ibid.
4. Min. by K-Hugessen 20.iii.1871 on F0. to CO. 18.iii.1871. C0/96/90.
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of action over occupying the forta in case Ashanti attacked.* .
Opposition to the Gold Coast cession treaty, which m s  signed on 25 February
1871, mounted in the Netherlands as the States-General was called upon to ratify
it. Tet when it came before the Second Chamber on 7 July 1871 it passed, while
2
the Sumatra treaty failed. Diehards of the Dutch Indian interest opposed the
extension of equal trading rights to British subjects in Sumatra. Rumour had it
that the Dutch had been pressed to sell Elmina and that the cession was a prelude
to other colonial retreats. Ihus, the Dutch took the Gold Coast 'pill* and
rejected the Sumatran 'gilding* and the real gilding, the Surinam treaty, which
was designed to sugar the Sumatran pill was not even risked. The Sumatra treaty
whs slightly re-drafted and was submitted in the 1872 session.
There was further opposition to the Gold Coast treaty in the First Chamber.
During a three day debate which opened on 15 January 1872 a mulatto from Elmina 
*
named Graves, who had brought a petition to the King, was seated in the gallery 
by the opposition. The British annexation of the 'outh African diamond fields 
in October 1871 was criticised. But the Surinam planters were anxious to get 
their labourers from India so the Gold Coast treaty was accepted. So was a 
more concisely worded Sumatra treaty, and on 24- January 1872 Admiral Harris 
reported that the King had signed all three treaties, which were ratified on 
17 February.
On the Gold Coast it only remained to transfer the forts. The task fell to
Pope-Hennessy who was, apparently, well regarded by the IXitch. He was only a
1. CO. to FO. 23.iii.1871. But in a private letter to Harris, 25.iii.1871 (copy 
in Kimberley Papers A/27h) he said, "Pray make our Dutch friends understand 
that we have no intention of leaving them to the mercy of savages, though this 
is very different from an engagement (which we cannot give) to protect their 
settlements against an attack" •
2* See below p. ffi-
3. "He stood well in the eyes of the Dutch in Borneo". Kimberley to Granville 
23.1.1872. PRO.30/29/55 P. 251.
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temporary Govemor-in-Chief, but his six-month tour became extended to nearly 
a year, and this enabled both Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen to exonerate 
themselves from blame for the troubles which followed the cession, by making 
Pope-Hennessy their private scapegoat.^ He was instructed emphatically that 
the object of the Elmina cession was Hnot the acquisition or the extension of
4
British power, but the maintainance of tranquility on the Coast". The Dutch
2
blunders in the 1868 exchange were to be avoided* He landed at Elmina on 4 
April 1872 and two days later received Admiral de Ruyter's baton - symbol of 
Dutch sovereignty for 235 years. In May the Colonial Office heard the news with 
satisfaction.
Their pleasure was premature for the cession had two results: one involved
the unfortunate dismissal of Ussher; the other concerned relations with Ashanti.
On 22 April, after Pope-Hennessy had gone to Lagos to deal with Clover, a Dutch
officer,Lieut. Joost, was murdered in Elmina. First thought to have been an
attack on C.E.Eninsang, a mulatto who was appointed Civil Commandant, it later
3turned out there was a personal grudge against Joost. Pope-Hennessy hastened
back from Lagos to discover that Ussher had been slow to act after the murder,
and having just got rid of Glover at Lagos, he took the opportunity to remove
Ussher from the Gold Coast. He was sent home on 'sick leave'. Khatchbull-Hugesser
thought it best for West Africa that they went, saying "Mr. Hennessy has gone
out as a new broom to sweep clean places which have become foul, and the old
4
brooms and old housemaids•• • will be better away". But there were serious 
doubts in the Colonial Office about Pope-Hennessy and Herbert thought that they
1. Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 630-32. Kimberley's Journal p. 42.
2. Min. by Kimberley 29.1.1872 on FO. to CO. 29.1.1872 and draft for Pope- 
Henneeay 12.ii.1872. CO/96/95.
3. Ussher to Kimberley 27.iy.1872 CO/96/92. K-Hu^eaaen vaa rijtht alien he aaid 
"I hope and believe that this has nothing to do with the transfer of 
territory". Min, 27.V.1872 on Ad. to CO. 25.T.1872. CO/96/95.
4. Kin. by K-Hugeaaen 6.yi.l872 on P-H.nneasy to Kimberley 6.Y.1872. CO/96/93.
would have to restrain him Hor he will become confirmed in the opinion which
I suggest he unconsciously holds, that every officer who differs from him is
to be suspended. We had too much of that at Labuan".*
If the Ussher affair had been the only result of the Elmina cession all
might have been well. But the Plante were afraid of the Ashantis, the allies
of the Elminas, and arming together they caused trouble in the Protectorate.
What was not known in London (until 1873) was that in December 1871 the King
of Elmina sent his brother to Ashanti to report that Britain was about to take
Elmina, and the Ashanti chiefs, convinced that Elmina was theirs, demanded war.
The Asantehene, Kofi Kari Karl, told the Elmina envoy that he would come down
in January to remove the English flag; the Elminas were to be patient until 
2
then. This attack did not materialise, but relations with Ashanti had long 
been strained. Considerable efforts were made throughout 1872 to forstall 
an Ashanti attack, but they failed because peace had never really been made 
after the 1863 invasion, and from Ashanti's point of view the indignity
suffered in 1862 had not been redressed. It is therefore necessary to trace
the devopcient of relations with Ashanti.
Relations with the African States on the Gold Coast.
Elmina*s fate was decided by a European agreement. But although the local 
government at Cape Coast Castle had been anxious to get rid of the Dutch, its 
major problems were really relations with Ashanti and with the States in the
1. Min. by Herbert 11 .vi.1872 on Pope-Hennessy to Kimberley 18.v. 1872. CO/96/93. 
Cf. Barrow to Hales 21.ii. 1873. Private, with Pope-Hennssy to Kimberley 3o. 
xii.1872, C0/l47/24. "It is well known... that one of the 'Pope's1 failures 
is to endeavour to establish infallibility & at the same time to obtain 
supremacy - hence his liability to anathamize all around him".
2. Lawson to Harley 14.iv.1873. CO/96/98. P.A.Ramseyer & J.Keuhne, Four Tears 
in Ashantee (1875) p* 205.
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Volta region of the Protectorate* Ussher's great fear had been that the 
aftermath of the 1868 partition v^uld cause another Ashanti invasion. Howeveri
since Ashanti was active in the Volta region before the 1867 convention,* poor
relations with Ashanti need tracing further back* Maclean, in laying the
foundations of the Protectorate, made peace with Ashanti one of the keystones 
2
of his policy. But Ashanti, on the one hand, found it difficult to accept the
independence of former subjects in Assin, Akim and Denkyera, and the protecorate
States, on the other hand, tried to maintain their position of middlemen and
provoked Ashanti by molesting their traders. The Asantehene Kwaku Dua was a
peaceable man, but his reign (1838-67) was full of wars.
After Governor Pine had refused to give up the fugitives in 1862 Kwaku Dua
and his chiefs believed that Pine had broken an agreement made by Maclean to 
4
return runaways; hence the Ashanti invasion of March 1863 and the events which
followed and caused the 1865 committee. What was not known in London was that
the Ashanti chiefs were only dissuaded from invading the Protectorate again in
5
1864 by Kwaku Dua's influence. When a Dutch Sergeant visited Kumasi in February
1865 the Asantehene was still waiting for the fugitives; talk of war was still
6
in the air. Col. Conran, the Administrator, tried reconciliation in September 
1865, but he thought the war had been over cruelty meted out to Ashanti traders.
He ignored the difference with Pine over the fugitives* But Conran did.his best
7
to re-open trade with Ashanti, and he thought the danger was past by October 1865.
1. Conran to Blackall 3*xii*1866. CO/96/72* Accra traders reported that Ashanti
was sending 3000 men to join the Akwamus who who about to assist the Awunas in 
operations vest of the Volta. 2. See above p.
3. Claridge, op* cit* I, p. 512: "He was the most pacific man who ever sat on
the Ashanti stool". Cf* P.C.Puller, A Vanished Dynasty-Ashanti.(1921) pp.B5-QC>. 
4* This is not in the 1831 treaty unless under the phrase "terms and conditions 
of peace already agreed to". Evidence of such an agre^ent is discussed by 
Claridge, I, p. 505-508, Puller, op. cit. pp. 91-95, Ellis, History, p. 225*
5* Ward, History, p. 213, FViller, p. 97*
6. Pine to Cardwell 8*iii.l865. CO/96/67.
7* Conran to Cardwell 8*ix and 9*x*1865* CO/96/68*
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But the Ashantis had merely given up the direct approach. Taking advantage of
local wars in the Volta region they continued to harass the Protectorate.
British authority in the Volta region was practically non-existent. After
the Danish purchase of 1850 the Protectorate extended theoretically beyond the
river. The Accra merchants were the only people interested in this area. But
when in the early 1860*8 the Volta States changed from slaving to legitimate
commerce fierce warlike competition grew between the States at the river *s mouth
who tried to maintain their position as middlemen. On the west bank the
Adas and their allies the Accras faced the Awunas of the eastern shore who were
allied with the Akwaraus further north.* Ord reported in 1865 that the eastern 
*
protectorate was much less effective than the rest and Cardwell forbade
2
interference there.
In 1866, however, the locfal government decided to intervene in the Volta. In
February Conran sent troops to Accra and Ada, in October he visited the Avuna
chiefs and In December he passed a report that 3000 Ashantis had crossed the
Volta to join the Awunas and their allies the Akwamus. Carnarvon, who had
succeeded Cardwell, forbade interference, but in March 1867 TTssher sent 25
soldiers to Ada to remove the impression Mthat HMG intended to remain perfectly
5
passive under any circumstances but those of a direct attack upon the Forts”•
The impression was, of course, a correct view of British policy* TJssher vas 
taking a line contrary to the 1865 policy.
At this stage, in April 1867, Kwaku Dua died. He vas said to have been 
planning a new invasion of the Protectorate to avenge the disgrace of 1862 and
1. Accra Confedercy to Fante Confederacy 21.ix.1869 (copy) enclosed in Solomon 
to Boyce 22.xi.1869. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 1868-71 file.
Cf. Wolfson, Relations, pp. 120-127.
2. Reports from Committes. V, 1865, p. 67*
3. Blackall to Carnarvon 26.xii.1866. CO/96/72.
4. Ibid. CO. to Blackall 22.ii.1867 (draft).
5. Ussher to Blackall 9.iii*1867. CO/96/74.
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the campaign was only delayed by a straggle for the succession in Kumasi.* In
July he was succeeded by Kofi Kari Kari, who is said to have sworn on his
2
enstoolment, "My business shall be war". Yet in the late months of 1867 there
was an air of optimism on the Gold Coast. Ussher sent as Commissioner to the
Volta the veteran Wesleyan missionary, Thomas Birch Freeman vho made a treaty
with the Akwamus. He wanted to appoint Freeman as Magistrate in the area, where
3
his experience and prestige might have had a salutary influence, hut Buckingham,
4 •prompted as ever by Adderley, refused. Prince Ansa, an English educated and 
stipended Ashanti who lived at Cape Coast, visited Kumasi and reported that 
although the events of 1862 still rankled Kofi Kari Kari was prepared to let 
bygones be bygones.
In 1868 Usshers optimism passed when the Ashantis continued to harras the 
Protectorate. In May they invaded Denkyera, by August they were in Wassaw, and
in spite of all Ussher's efforts in the Volta region and a visit there by Sir
5
Arthur Kennedy in November 1868, the Ashantis still remain in the vicinity. 
Although Kennedy thought that an Ashanti attack vas unlikely, Ussher's locum 
tenens W.H.Simpson visited Akwamu in March 1869 and found Krobo 'swarming' with 
Ashantis and was himself held virtually a prisoner for a few days.
Simpson determined to stop Ashanti. Once back at Accra he reported a four 
pronged attack against Denkyera, Akim, Fante and Elmina, and Krepi. His policy
1. Claridge, I, p. 555* Ramseyer & Kuehne, op. cit. p. 202, say that they were 
told by a chief that Kwaku IXia died of grief because of the slight in 1862 from 
Pine. In Ussher to Blackall 15.v. 1867 CO/96/74 the Administrator said Boers 
warned him that Kwaku Dua was about to attack Cape Coast, Elmina and Accra.
2. Ramseyer & Kuehne, loc. cit.
3. The story was told that when crossing the river to make a treaty with Awuna 
he was fired on; then he was recognised - "It's Freeman'' - and he was able to 
make the treaty. A.Birtwhistle, Thomas Birch Freeman. West African Pioneer. 
(1950)- p. 101.
4. CO. to Blackall 23.xi.1867. CO/96/74 (draft).
5. Wolfson, Relations, p. 139 calls Kennedy's trip a 'pioneer venture'. He took 
Glover fran Lagos with him and reported enthusiastically on the prospects for 
building a Palm Oil and Cotton trade. Kennedy to Buckingham 14.xii.1868. 
CO/96/77.
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was to assist Ashanti's enemies in the Volta area, to urge the Asantehene to 
call off the attacks, and to assert the British Protectorate both on the Volta 
and the former Dutch lands to the west. When this plan reached London in May 
1869 Granville was Colonial Secretary and a serious discussion tooV place.
Rogers could not see why Ashanti should be stopped; she appeared only to be 
trying to gain a route to the sea. Monsell regretted that in the dangerous 
situation there was anyone more than a Consul on the coast. Granville, who
decided to censure Simpsonwas nearer to the truth than he knew when he wrote,
2
"we are drifting into war"; there had virtually been a state of war since 1863. 
Downing Street stuck to the policy of non-interference, while the Ashanti
i
army commanded by Adu Boffo, although checked, continued to alarm the Protectorate
by its raids in the Volta region. Two members of the Basle Mission at Anun were 
3
captured, in August 1869 Adu Boffo received re-inforcements, and the Ashantis 
were also reported in Appollonia in the western protecorate. By January 1870
4
Akjampong and his force had reached Elmina. Thus when Kimberley came to the 
Colonial Office in 1870 on the eve of the IXitch treaty over Elmina the 
Protectorate was encirled by Ashanti activity: Adu Boffo in the Volta area, 
Akjampong in Elmina, and some forces in the former iUtch protectorate of Wassaw 
and Denkyera.
Kimberley did his best to maintain the policy of non-intervention. When
1. Min. by Rogers, Monsell and Granville on Kennedy to Granville 14.iv. 1869. 
CO/96/79.
2. Min.by Granville 23.vii.1869 on Kennedy to Granville l.vi.1069. CO/96/80.
3. Claridge, I, p. 577 states that Adu Boffo was ordered not to enter the 
Protectorate. Wolfson, Relations, pp. 141-2, says Ashanti had the same motive 
as the Europeans - to break the middlemen of the Volta; that Adu Boffo had 
orders to gain Krepi and a route to the sea via Avuna.
4. Kennedy to Granville 24.i.1870 CO/96/84. At Cape Coast it was thought that 
the Elminas had requested Ashanti help. Rumours were afoot that the Dutch
had asked the Ashanti for help, that Akjampong came to assist the Dutch against 
the Fante. The Dutch admitted they had sent a mission to Ashanti but said 
it concerned trade. Barrow was very suspicious, Min. 24.iii.1870 on F0. to 
CO. 23.iii.1870. CO/96/86.
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Ussher and Glover ascended to Volta in June 1870 to scotch Ashanti activity by 
bombarding Doffo and Volo, Kimberley disapproved of such a "wholescale massacre".1 
When Ussher wanted a Steamer for permanent service on the Volta, Kimberley ssid
"I am most reluctant to assume any fresh responsibilities whatever on the African
2
Coast". Even when the Asantehene laid claim to Elmina, and Kennedy insisted
that Akjampong was the advance guard of an Ashanti army to resist the cession,
Kimberley remained cautious. Khatchbull-Hugessen wanted to pay a stipend to keep
Kofi Kari Kari happy, as he believed that "if he is not ’squared1" there would
be trouble, but Kimberley thought it useless to make appeals to "the Ashantee
savage"; he did not know what to do.
Matters seemed to improve in January 1871. Kofi Kari Kari repeated his
4
determination to let bygones be bygones, and as the Elmina agreement reached 
its conclusion British policy was directed to appeasing Ashanti. Yet it was 
about this time that Knatchbull-Eugessen began to dissent from Kimberley’s 
cautious line. When a British gunboat destroyed, in May 1871, the house of 
Geraldo, a former slave dealer, who lurked in the background of the Ada-Awuna
v
troubles, Kimberley disapproved, but Khatchbull-Hugessen said, "if we claim to 
exercise a Protectorate upon this coast... it is absolutely indispensible that
5
we should preserve our moral hold upon the native tribes".
In the last months of 1871 and throughout 1872 great efforts were made to 
keep the peace with Ashanti. Protracted negotiations took place.over the question
1. Min. by Kimberley 27.vii.1870 on Kennedy to Kimberley 4.vii.l870. CO/96/85.
2. Min. by Kimberley 2.xii.l870 on Kennedy to Kimberley 2.xi.l870. CO/96/85.
5. Mins, by K-Hugessen and Kimberley 11.ii. 1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley
25.i.1871. CO/96/87.
4. Ibid. Asantehene to Ussher 51.i.1871.
5. Min. by K-Hugessen 7.vii.l871 on Kennedy to Kimberley ?.vi,1871. 00^ 96/88. 
Hugessen made frank and somewhat cynical comment on this ’moral hold’ when 
Kennedy suggested stipending the chiefs as the best way to secure peace.
"It is a question of moderate (continual) bribery or greater expenditure
on military force and loss to the colony, or more (periodical) breaking out 
of the native chiefs. I think bribery is preferable - and cheaper". On 
Kennedy to Kimberley 8.xi.l871. C0/96/89.
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of the exchange of the captured German missionaries and prisoners from the
Protectorate States. An envoy from Cape Coast, J.E.Cravfurd, met Kofi Kari
Kari in August and Downing Street vas delighted to receive from the Dutch a
letter purporting to be from the Asantehene in which he no longer claimed
Elmina as tribute.1 Kennedy thought that good relations might be assured by
the appointment of a Resident Agent at Kumasi, but Kimberley feared his life
might be endangered and an insult to national pride would require a punitive
expedition. In 1873, however, Kimberley revived the idea of a Resident.
In spite of , all the optimism relations with Ashanti did not improve. The
Asantehene's renunciation of Elmina is now thought to have been a forgery by
2
H.Plange, the Dutch envoy. Kofi Kari Kari prevaricated over the release of
the missionaries because Adu Boffo, who captured them, demanded £1000 before
giving them up. Akjampong was arrested in Elmina and banished to As sin, but as
he did not go back to Ashanti an expedition was sent to capture him and he was
'^ escorted* through to Protectorate. The Pante feared that an Ashanti invasion
would follow the cession of Elmina and events proved them right. The Colonial
Office remained hopeful - and out of touch with the situation. While the chiefs 
1
at Kumasi grew more and more restless in 1872 attention in London was diverted 
from the Ashanti problem by developments within the Protectorate.
So far this account has revealed that the British attitude to the Gold Coast 
was governed by European considerations. A rather legalistic interpretation of 
the Protectorate, a revenue problem unsolved because of the doctrine that the 
colonies should be self-supporting, attempts to solve it by agreements with the 
Dutch, attempts to buy-off Ashanti - these had little to do with African
I. 'Certificate of Apology' in Salmon to Kennedy 19.x. 1871* CO/96/89*
2. Discussed by Ward p. 242 end Claridge I, pp. 608-9*
*
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aspirations. Yet the 1865 committee had recommended the encouragement of the
qualities of self-government. How was this resolution sustained in practice?
Between 1865 and 1872 there were three attempts by Africans on the Gold Coast to
implement the resolution. In 1865 King Aggery of Cape Coast tried to get the
phiefs to support his contention that British authority rested on African consent.
In 1867 a Fante Council of Chiefs took measures of self-defence against Ashanti
and resisted the 1868 partition, and in 1872 a Fiante Confederation Constitution 
*
was promulgated. Neither movement produced permanent institutions, but the
agitation which followed in the House of Commons might have resulted in a
significant change of policy by Kimberley in 1873# had not the long presaged
Ashanti invasion taken place.
John Aggery was enstooled the first Christian King of Cape Coast on 13
February 1865. Standing beside a Wesleyan missionary he exhorted the Fante to
become Christians and he told Conran that he was at the administrator's disposal
at all times.1 But in April 1865 he insisted on the equality of his court with
the Judicial Assessor's Court and great restlessness followed in the Gold Coast.
Messengers were sent to all the protectorate chiefs and when Joseph Martin, who
had been questioned by the 1865 committee,returned, the 'self-government* clause
¥
in the report was hailed as a victory for Aggery. Finally in 18^6 Aggery claimed
2
that the local government could pass no laws without Africans' consent, and 
the Colonial Office viewed the matter seriously. "If we are to choose between 
loss of our influence and asserting our sovereignty over the town of Cape Coast,
I should do the latter", wrote W.E.Forster, and Cardwell said Aggery must be told 
that he misinterpreted the 1865 resolutions, that "in return for protection we 
expect deference to our authority". The affair subsided in December 1866 when
1* Conran to Pine 8.iii.l865. CO/96/67.
2. Blackall to Sec. of State 19.iv.1866. CO/96/71.
3. Ibid. Mins, by Forster (20th) and Cardwell 21.v.1866.
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Aggery was banished to Bulama.
Some of Aggery'e followers were involved in the next African movement. On
the eve of the Anglo-Dutch partition agreement in 1867* Ussher suggested a new
policy for the Protectorate. British authority, he said, should be asserted to
help "in consolidating this large assemblage of native tribes into a confederation"
based on self-defence against invaders.1 The Anglo-Dutch partition fulfilled
Ussher's dream remarkably soon for in February 1868 he reported that a Council
of Chiefs had been gathered at Mankessim for some time taking measures of self-
defence against the Ashantis, and assisting the Kommendahs, Denkyeras and Wassaws
against the Dutch. It was this movement which waged the Elmina war, already
mentioned. Africans had not been consulted over the partition and because of
their fear of the Ashantis they organised swiftly to combat it. In January 1868
Ussher warned the Fante against 'treasonable practices' against the British, but
Buckingham urged conciliation. Adderley, somewhat perversely, was delighted by
these events: "fortunately it seems that the Fantees are playing us false, so
2
that we are absolved from all obligation" to defend them. Ussher severed 
relations with the Fante on 18 July 1868.
As so frequently happened policy on the coast changed sharply with 
personalities. When Kennedy visited the Fante in November 1868 he was impressed 
by them and Ussher's successor, Simpson, determined to meet them. He visited 
Mankessim in May 1869 and claimed that, by humouring the talk of independence, 
he supplanted the influence of the educated Africans by that of the local 
government. It is more likely that the Fante Council suspended their operations 
when they learnt that the Dutch were leaving Elmina.
News of the third movement, the 'New Fanti Confederacy', was sprung on the
1. Ussher to Yonge 5*xii.l867. CO/96/74.
2. Min. by Adderley 18.iv.1868 on Kennedy to Buckingham 30.iii.lR68. CO/96/76.
i
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Colonial Office in January 1872. A comprehensive written constitution of forty-
%
seven articles was drawn up at a meeting at Mankessim on 16 October 1871. Under
it the first 'National Assembly' met on 18 November, and it appointed the first
King-Presidents, a Ministry, and nominated Fitzgerald, the Editor of the Vest
African Herald, as the agent in London. A poll tax was attempted in the Mankessim
area. It was a movement dominated by the educated Africans and Fitzgerald's and
Horton's influence were seen behind it.^
Salmon, the Administrator, appears to have panicked. "This is a dangerous
conspiracy", he reported, and he promptly arrested the leaders - later releasing 
2
them on bail. The Colonial Office did not agree; Holland, the Legal Adviser, 
said the confederation had done nothing illegal and Kimberley said Salmon had
t
made a great blunder, but "I would disavow him in as gentle a manner as is
3
consfetent with disavowal". The government did not want to stamp an legitimate
4
schemes, but as protecting power they would like to be consulted. There vas 
a great fluster in the Vest African Herald over the arrests, but by February 
1872 Simpson reported that on the coast things were subsiding. The chiefs, he 
said, had affinned their loyalty to the government and disavowed the 'characterless 
mulattoes' •
But in the House of Commons the Fante Confederation remained alive. McArthur
5
urged, in July 1872, the recognition of the confederation. Meanwhile Pope- 
Hennessy was at work in the Cape Coast archives. Just as he followed his removal 
of Glover with research at Lagos to back up his views, so at Cape Coast he delved
1. Horton's letters to the Colonial Office, which were read with interest and 
respect there, were published by Horton in 1870 under the title Letters on 
the Political Condition of the Gold Coast.
2. Salmon to Kennedy 4.xil. 1871. CO/96/89.
3. Ibid. Mins, by Holland (6th) K-Hugessen (9th) and Kimberley ll.i.1872 on 
Kennedy to Kimberley 16.xii.1871.
4. Ibid. Kimberley to Kennedy 16.1.1872 (draft).
5* 3 Hansard ccxiii, col. 36.
\
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around for justifications of his removal of Ussher. Encountering the Fante
problem he told the Colonial Office in July 1872 that he was gathering information
about the confederation.1 This research was m^re fruitful than his muck-raking
on Glover and Ussher, and in October he sent home some far reaching proposals
for administration on the Gold Coast. He ' ad told the Fante that legitimate
schemes would be encouraged, but that the government wanted to be consulted first.
He had also told them he "entirely approved of some parts of their scheme", and
he told the Colonial Office that the only alternative to the Confederation was
2
a "firm extension of Her Majesty*s Authority". Kimberley seemingly disregarded
this view. He had no faith in Pope-Hennessy now; the despatch is extensively
annotated by Kimberley, and on the proposal for extension.he wrote: "This is
3
contrary to the policy of HM Government".
let there is a possibility that Pope-Hennessy forced the Colonial Office
4
to change its policy. McArthur asked for the correspondence with Pope-Hennessy 
on 17 February 1873 and he enquired what instructions had been sent to Col.
Harley the new administrator. This caught the Colonial Office unawares. Herbert 
wanted to withold the papers, but Kimberley insisted on publication. Khatchbull- 
Kugessen, however, persuaded McArthur to postpone his question for a fortnight, 
which gave them a chance to consider Harley's instructions as they had not been 
written.
Khatchbull-Hugessen now boldly stated his views. He severely criticised 
"the absurd system of * protectorate*by which the government never knew how 
much authority it had and lacked the power to enforce it. The talk of self—
1. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 6.vii.l872. CO/96/93•
2. P-Hennessy to Kimberley 29*x.l872. CO/96/94.
3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley.
4. The tory Pope-Hennessy was probably behind Adderley1 s efforts in the Commons, 
(Brabourne Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 631, 637-8). It is just possible also that 
Hennessy's despatch of 9 Oct. was written deliberately knowing that its 
policy was contrary to the official view — thus subtly advocating the 
confederations point of view which fitted, theoretically, the 1865 policy.
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government in 1865 had made matters worse. As in the Lagos case Khatchbull-
Hugessen blamed the 1865 report for the present troubles.
"In the present tone and temper of the British mind no abandonment of 
territory would, in my view, be permitted by Parliament, or sanctioned 
by Public Opinion.•• but... there is a long step between that indignation 
and a readiness to put its hand into its pocket to pay for the enlargement 
... of territory from w h ic h jth e  advantage material to Great Britain may 
be considered remote".
He proposed that the British position on the Gold Coast should be "more
accurately defined and more certainly established", and at last Kimberley agreed
with him. Khatchbull-Hugessen saw the same two alternatives for the Gold Coast
as he had for Lagos - withdrawal to the forts, or extension of territory and
the creation of Crown Colony administration. Here Kimberley parted company.
Whatever they did, said Khatchbull-Hugessen, they should comoletely disregard
the educated Africans; having undertaken responsibilities Britain could not
«
"in justice to her own character evade them, nor can the will stand still to
2watch the progress of events".
On the whole Kimberley agreed with this advice and said, "For all practical
3
purposes therefore we may dismiss the question of retiring from the Gold Coast".
In a short sentence Kimberley finally condemned the 1866 policy. On the Gambia, 
at Lagos and now in a third case Kimberley decided to remain in West Africa and 
provide the best government he could. Rejecting the Fante Confederation he 
decided to try governing the Gold Coast through the chiefs. "We must keep within 
the line of a Protectorate, defining by agreement with the chiefs what are to be 
the powers and obligations of the Protecting Power, and what on the other hand
4
are to be the obligations of the natives towards us". With this in mind he
1. Min. by K-Hugessen on McArthur’s Question 18.ii. 1875. C0/Q6/104.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley (after 20th) and draft for Harley. These can probably 
be regarded as Kimberley's Gold Coast policy had not the Ashanti war intervened.
4. Ibid.
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drafted Harley's instructions, outlining a sort of 'Indirect Rule' scheme* But 
they were never sent. In the middle of the deliberations came the news of the 
Ashanti invasion.
The decision to intervene against Ashanti in 1873.
News of the invasion reached London on 19 February 1873.* The Ashanti army 
had crossed the Pra on 22 January, but Harley was so surprised, when he was told, 
that he had sent an officer to confirm it. The Ashantis made a familiar three 
pronged attack - in the west through Denkyera, in the east through Akim, and the 
main force going down the Cape Coast road. It was estimated that 12,000 men 
crossed the Pra to make up the main attack under the command of Amankva Tia.
A prisoner related that the Asantehene had announced that he would 'take Elmina
i
which was his, and the Assins who were his subjects'. Full reports reached
Downing Street on 26 February.
Pope-Hennessy tried to blame Harley, but the accusation was disregarded as
2
the Governor's judgment was no longer trusted in these matters. Kimberley
would express no opinion without further information, but Knatchbull-Hugessen
straightaway said "the Ashanti must now receive a severe lesson, the more
severe and effectual it is, the better chance of arresting future inroads".
The War Office was alerted. When Lauderdale asked in the Lords on 7 March if
it was true Ashanti had declared war on England, Kimberley related the facts
4
as he knew them and said the reasons for the invasion were not yet known.
On 10 March Pope-Hennessy*8 appreciation arrived: that this was not an
Ashanti invasion. Similarly R.W.Keate, the new Covemor-in-Chief, decided not
1. Braboume Diary, IV 1870-73, p. 598.
2. By the same mail (received 26.ii. 1873) P-Hennessy reported that trouble in the
Gambia had subsided, but Kimberley noted on the Gambia file, 26.ii. 1873, "I
am sorry to say I altogether distrust Mr. Hennessy's judgment on these 
matters". C0/87/l04*
3. Mins. 26th and 27.ii.1873 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley 8 A 10.ii. 1873. C0/°6/96.
4. 3 Hansard ccxiv, col. 1515.
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to send re-inforeements from Sierra Leone as it did not appear that the Ashantis 
! were going to attack the British.^ Keate,s policy was that laid down “by Cardwell 
in 1864; British efforts would be confined to holding the forts "thus to make it 
clear to the natives around that they must depend upon their own exertion if
I "2they are not to be entirely destroyed by the Ashantees. But by the time this
i
news reached London, on 19 March* it was realised in the Colonial Office that
I
the matter was very serious* Herbert suggested sending officers to rouse the
Fante and Kimberley agreed. He also arranged for supplies of rice, and agreed
to consult Goschen, at the Admiralty, about naval support. All agreed that
Pope-Hennessy had been wrong, and Knatchbull-Hugessen said, "Mr. Hennessy
fancied he had pleased everybody ft done wonders ft being disappointed ft deceived
was too eager to fix the blame on Col. Harley. The Ashantee should now be
3
. severely dealt with - the first cost will be the last".
To make matters worse Governor Keate died at the height of the crisis a few
days after arriving on the Gold Coast. Harley took his place but stayed at Cape 
4
Coast. On 10 March the Ashantis defeated a large Fante force at Fante Uyankumaai
5
and two days later Harley arrested the King of Elmina who supported Ashanti. A 
hundred re-inforcements arrived from Sierra Leone on 20 March and Harley sent 50 
armed Hausa police to IXinkwa as he thought it undesirable to create an impression 
among the Fante that they would get no support whatever happened.^ But Downing
1. Keate to Harley 18.ii.1073 (copy) CO/96/96.
2. Ibid. Keate to Kimberley l.iii.1873*
3. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 21.iii.1873*
4. Harley to Kimberley 19.iii.1873* CO/96/97.
5* Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 15.iii.1873. The following explanation is in 
O’Reilly to Harley 26.iii.1873. Because of the Asantehene’s long-standing 
alliance with Elmina, there were said to be two parties in Elmina - the King’s 
(anti-British) and the raulattoes’ (pro British). Rumour had it that the King 
had asked the Asantehene to assist him against his rivals. (Lawson to Harley
14.iv.1873.)
6. Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 21.iii.1873.
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Street 8tuck to the policy of non-intervention. When questions were asked in
the Commons on 25 April by Sir John Hay and McArthur, Knatchbull-Hugessen
repeated Cardwell's 1864 policy; the government would use the chiefs to defend
the Protectorate. British steps were so far confined to sending 100 troops
from Sierra Leone, the use of 50 Hausas at the front, Harley*s efforts to
rouse the *ante, the arrest of the King of Elmina, and the sending of two
warships to the scene
At the same time Pope-Hennessy began to mobilise his Tory friends. During
2the first week in May Adderley got in two questions in the Commons, but when 
he tried to re-iterate the 1865 policy on 9 May, Knatchbull-Hugessen reminded
3
him that the attempt to get rid of the Gambia to Prance had met with an outcry.
Thus during May 1873 publicity in England mounted, end if Kimberley ns usual 
( .
did not l^ke to take too decisive a line - he disliked the deportation of the 
King of Elmina - Knatchbull-Hugessen believed it was "essential to show the 
native kings and chiefs that we will deal with a strong hand with treachery
4
and disloyalty". At all events it began to look as if somebody would have to 
act".
Re-inforcements were decided upon. A despatch from Harley received on 9 May 
showed that the Ashantis were in greater strength than had been thought. They 
were also reported to be in Appollonia in the western districts, and it seemed 
likely that all the former Dutch protectorate would rise against the British 
if the Ashantis appeared successful. Harley had also received a letter from
1. 3 Hansard ccxv,col. 970. The Times,, 26.iv.1873.
2. There was a large polemical correspondence over the Harley-Hennessy trouble, 
as there had been over the Glover affair. A good example in Harley to 
Kimberley 31.iii.1873 caused K-Rugessen to write, "these letters disclose
a state of anarchy on the Gold Coast among the officials". CO/96/97.
In May K-Hugessen prepared to announce some of P-Hennessy*s mistakes if 
Adderley pressed his questions too deeply. Re also suspected that P-Hennessy 
was behind an anti-Harley letter in The Times. 27.ii.1873.
3.The Times. 13.V.1873.
4. Mins, by Kimberley and K-Hugessen 4th and 5.v. 1873 on Harley to Kimberley 
2.1t .18T3. CO/96/97. ......
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the Asantehene saying that the Elmina cession was the cause of the war. The
Fante sustained another defeat at the battle of Dunkwa on 14 April after earlier
putting up a stout resistence for a time, Harley ordered a general retreat**
$
After this news a War Office conference was held in London on 10 Fay which was
attended by Kimberley , Cardwell, Goschen and also Herbert and Sir Andrew Clarke*
They decided to embark 100 Royal Marines immediately, and to transfer four
2
companies of the Vest India Regiment from Barbados*
A change in basic policy was not intended by this. But the situation at
Cape Coast, and the demands from officers on the spot for a more forceful policy,
were clearly making some new decision necessary. On 19 May the War Office
learnt that the Commander at Cape Coast thought it would be impossible just to
defend the forts because of the refugee swollen towns around* He wanted some
ruling about Cardwell’s 1864 instructions. Although the Ashanti camp was known
to be in a wretched state though lack of food and the spread of emal 1-pox* the
3
Ashanti army numbered 40,000. The day after this news Kimberley noted in his
4
Journal that* "the Ashanti war begins to look troublesome"* He told Gladstone
5
that questions would have to be discussed by the Cabinet. On 22 T*ay a proposal 
arrived at the Colonial Office from Lieut-Col. Ruvignes, who had been Civil 
Commandant at Anomabu in 1863, suggesting n^ invasion of Ashanti by the Volta 
route. Here was another request for a change in the policy of non-intervention, 
this time from London. Knatchbull-Bngessen said they should not entertain the 
idea "unless we make up our mind to alter that policy and the nature of our 
protectorate".^ Surprisingly enough he opposed such an expedition. So did
1* Ibid. Harley to Kimberley 12 & 14.iv.1873.
2. Minutes of conference WO/32/826 file 076/219. Instructions for the Marine 
commander, Col. Fes ting in 076/235. Kimberley told to WO. (12 .v. 1873) that 
no time could be lost as he was anxious to send back the Hausas to Lagos .where 
the situation was still unsettled*
3. Capt. Brett to WO. 21.iv. 1873. Ibid. file €76/233*
4* Kimberley's Journal p* 38.
5. Kimberley to Gladstone 21.v. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/38* and Cabinet 
Minute 24.V.1873 4464l/l24.
6. Min. by K-Hugessen 27.V.1873 on WO. to CO. 22.v. 1873. CO/96/l07.
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Kimberley, who eaid of Rovignessfear of French ambitions,
"it is absurd to talk of French aggrandisment in that quarter when 
we have just extended our influence over the whole coast from Lagos 
westward nearly to Assinee with the single exception of Porto Novo.
If we weaken ourselves we cannot adopt a better course than to spend 
a few millions in conquering Ashanti and establishing a West African 
Empire. It is to be hoped that no^Govt. will be mad enough to embark 
on so extravagant an enterprise*1.
There was to be no change of policy. The commander at Cape Coast was told that
2
the 1864 instructions would stand.
In June the news was confirmed that the Ashanti effort appeared to be spent.
3
Leaving Dunkwa the invading army moved west into Denkyera. Harley tried to 
rally the Fante, suspecting the Ashantis would make a final effort before 
retiring, and by the end of Hay the latter had moved from their position 
threatening Cape Coast, to Jukwa the capital of Denkyera, fifteen miles from
A
Elmina. From London things were beginning to look quiet. Possibly the Ashanti 
would soon go home. But the calm was delusive, for two mail ships had been lost 
and a shock was in store.
It arrived on 10 July in the shape of news of a British bombardment of Elmina,
5
and a rout of the Fante before Jukwa. "An end to all peace and quiet for the 
unlucky Colonial Office", wrote Kimberley.^ An Ashanti force- had advanced upon 
Elmina on 13 June while Cql. Fes ting, commanding the Marine re-inf or cements, 
was bombarding a section of the town after the hostile * King’s party* had 
refused to surrender their arms. A battle raged throughout the day, Fes ting 
calling for all the Hausa, naval and military help he could get, and he only
1. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 28.V.1873.
2. WO. to OC. Cape Coast 29.V.1873 (draft) WO/32/826 file 076/237.
3. Harley to Kimberley 17.T.1873 CO/96/99.
4. Ibid* Harley to Kimberley 29eV«1873.
5* The Times. 10.vii.1873 p. 10, a correspondent’s report dated Freetown 29.V.1873.
6. Kimberley's Journal p. 39*
115
managed to drive the Ashantis three miles before dusk when they retired 
Kimberley was alarmed by the news and at a meeting at the War Office on 15 July 
he pressed the military authorities, who he said were 'Very unwilling to move11*
to send 200 more Marines who were standing by, and to alert a wing of an Infantry
2 th
Battalion. The Marines sailed in Simoon on the 16 while the Colonial Office
studied its belated despatches about the Fante defeat at Jukwa on 5 June. The
Ashantis were reported at Efutu, twelve miles from Elmina, and there was "alarm
3
and panic" at Cape Coast.
It was in the two weeks following this news that Cardwell, the chief author 
of the 1864-65 policies, and Kimberley, who had realised their limitations, 
changed their minds abou1j|hon-interventian,and decided to send the much publicised 
Ashanti expedition. I’he main stages of this crucial change of policy stand out 
clearly. Who was ultimately responsible for this decision is still obscure.
On 26 July after reading of Harlejs difficulties in rousing the Fante, Kimberley
thought something would have to be done to repair the disorganisation among the
/
Fante. Harley was to be told that £40,000 would be asked from Parliament to aid
the Fante. He must tell the chiefs that "while HMG expect them to do their best
to defend themselves, they will on their part give them cordial and active
4
support in ordet to put an end to this disastrous war". The same day Kimberley 
sought Cardwell *s advice. He thought that the two of them with ^oschen should 
discuss what to say to Harley on the military situation by the moth's mail. 
Kimberley was not certain what course to take:
1. The Marine re-inforcements from England made Elmina their base. But they 
found that the section of the town occupied by the ’King's party* supported 
Ashanti. The Legislative Council decided on 12 June to make this group give up 
its arms, and the operation was planned for first light on 13 June* When no 
arms were forthcoming at the appointed hour, Fes ting gave another half-hour
and then bombarded the town. At this moment the Ashantis appeared.
Fasting to WO. 18.vi.1873. WO/32/826 file 076/320.
2. Kimberley's Journal p. 40. 5 Hansard ccxvii, cols. 308, 267-8.
3. Harley to Kimberley 10.vi.1873. CO/96/99.
4. Min. by Kimberley 26.vii.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 30.vi.1873. CO/96/lOO.
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"The question seems to be: can any active measures be taken against 
the Ashanti during the rainy season? if so, within what limits, and 
of what nature?
Of course if the Ashanti attack our forts, the course is simple, 
to repel them, but if they do not attack what then? We cannot leave 
them quietly in occupation of the Protectorate. Public opinion would 
not allow us to do so, if we ourselves desired it: and all the trade of 
our settlements is practically destroyed by the presence of the invading 
force, so that if things are left in their present position the settlements 
will be merely a heavy burden upon the Imperial Treasury. Are we to 
contemplate an attack on Coomassie^and could we assemble a force sufficient 
enough for the purpose".
Kimberley asked to see Cardwell on Monday 28 July. After this conversation
he called for all the papers on Ashanti affairs since 1864. He also wanted the
details of Glover's Volta expeditions, and he asked the Foreign Office to get
2
from The Hague particulars as to the navigability of the Pra. Hales produced
the Colonial Office material immediately, but when the despatch was sent to
Harley on 30 July, Kimberley had not yet made any decision. He really intended
to stir Harley up, he told Cardwell, it committed "no one to the Pra or any other
3
particular line of action".
4
The same day Captain Glover R.N. offered his services to the Colonial Office.
1
Herbertjvas Inclined to accept but Kimberley feared that after the Yoruba country
roads trouble they could not use Glover again in West Africa; he thought Glover
wrote a "vainglorious letter". Nevertheless Kimberley saw Glover on 4 August
and commissioned him to lead a flank expedition against Ashanti up the River 
5
Volta. Kimberley gives the clue to what happened in a note to Knatchbull- 
Hugessen on the 4 th:
1. Kimberley to Cardwell 26.vii.1873. Cardwell Papers, PRO.30/48/5/33.
2. Mins, by Herbert and Kimberley 28.vli.1873 on Harley to Kimberley 30.vi.1873
CO/96/lOO. , , ,
3. Kimberley to Cardwell 30.vii.1873. PRO.30/48/5/33.
4. See above p.74-.
5. Kimberley said of Glover (Min. l.viii.1873 on Glover to Kimberley 30.vi 1.1873
CO/96/IO9) "he is one of those exceptional boasters who have proved that
boasting and solid qualities sometimes go together". Earlier in the year 
Glover had tried for the job of Govemor-in-Chief. (Glover to Kimberley
15.iv.1873 CO/267/325.
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"We mean to employ Glover to lead an expedition of natives and Hausas 
against Ashantee up the Volta. I see him today at 3. We cannot mention 
this in the House, as it would be dangerous to disclose prematurely our 
military plans...^The plan was mentioned in the Cabinet on Saturday and 
approved"•
The Cabinet,then,had on 2 August decided on Clover's expedition. Gladstone 
also noted that a frontal assault on the Ashantis might have to be considered 
later.^
But the plans for the frontal assault were actually made without consulting
the Prime Minister. At a meeting at the War Office on August 13 the forty year
old Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the 
3
Gold Coast. Kimberley reported his work to the Prime Minister afterwards. 
"Whatever we do must be done quickly, and if possible in such a manner as to
4
deter the Ashantees from attacks upon our settlements for a long time to come".
Glover was to be allowed to spend £15,000 on his Volta expedition; the final
decision about a possible attack on Kumasi would depend on Wolseley*s
appreciation when he arrived at Cape Coast. "It is very provoking", said
Kimberley, "to have to spend such large sums of money on these savages, but
we cannot leave the matter as it is". Gladstone admitted that he was a bad
judge of Ashanti policy, but as Rogers before him, he did not see why the
5
Ashantis need always be enemies. To him there was little consolation in the
war, but he hoped that
"The miserable war will not be without some compensation, if it slackens 
the precipitate zeal of MacArthur and Co. for the annexation of Fiji, or
1. Braboume Diary, IV 1870-73* pp. 634-5*
2. Cabinet Minute 2.viii.l873 Gladstone Papers 44641/189. Wolfson op. cit. p. 287 
says Parliament's consent was obtained on the 2nd. This can hardly be so, as 
it is contradicted by Kimberley's note to K-Hugessen on the 4th. On the 
motion for the adjournment on the 4th Sir Patrick O'Brien +ried to get a 
debate on the Ashanti war but Gladstbne declined to 'use his influence' to
get one. 3 HansartJ ccxvli, p. 15?6.
3. G.Wolseley, A Soldiers Life. II, p. 267.
4. Kimberley to Gladstone 13.viii.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/79.
5. Gladstone to Kimberley 14.viii.1873 Kimberley Papers A/52.
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if it abates the^disposition of John Bull to put his head hereafter 
into a noose".
*
Very soon Gladstone was full of doubts and queries about the new policy. And 
well he might have been since the main decision appears to have been taken 
behind his back. It is not easy to point to the responsibility for this, but 
it seems to lie with Kimberley, Cardwell or Wolseley himself.
It was the news of the Elmina-Jukwa battles (received 10 July) which really 
stirred the responsible authorities in London. It was after his conversation 
with Cardwell on 28 July that Kimberley reviewed the Ashanti papers and asked 
for information about Glover's exploits in the Volta. It is fairly certain 
that Cardwell told Kimberley about some of the considerations which had taken 
place in the Admiralty and War Office. A few days after the Elmina-Jukwa news 
Goschen had called Glover to the Admiralty to discuss the possibility of getting 
stores to Prasu. A few days later, according to Glover's account, he was sent 
for by Cardwell to repeat what he had said. Thus on 29 July, at a meeting in 
the War Office, Glover suggested raising a force in the Accra and Volta region
i
to attack the Ashantis in the flank and rear and to threaten Kumasi from western
2
Akim. Sir Andrew Clarke supported the Glover plan, suggesting operations far
up the Volta. He advised that Glover should be given a free hand to deal vith
3
the whole situation. The day after this interview Glover offered his services 
to the Colonial Office, no doubt on Cardwell's and Clarke's advice. Somewhat
surprisingly Gladstone approved the plan on 2 August and the Glover offer was
4 5accepted the same day. Gladstone later said the Glover plan was a good one.
1. Ibid. Gladstone to Kimberley 21.viii.1873*
2. Clarke had been grateful to Glover in 1864*when by making sure that he got
to sea during a bout of fever, Glover probably saved Clarke's life. Vetch,
Life of Clarke, p. 82 and E.Glover, Life of Glover pp. 118-120 disagree as
to whether this took place at Iagos or Cape Coast.
3. E.Glover, life of Glover pp. 149-152 based on an autobiographical fragment 
now in the library of the Royal Commonwealth Society.
4. Herbert to Glover 2.viii.l873* Letter Book in Glover Papers.
5. Gladstone to Kimberley 14.viii.1873. Kimberley Papers A/52.
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Yet from the start Clover's was a flank operation.^ The Important appointment
was Wolseley *s, which paved the way for the march to Kumasi in 1874. Sometime,
probably at the end of July, Wolseley drew up a memorandum outlining a plan of
2
campaign against Ashanti. He proposed that he should assume the government of
the Gold Coast, and should take out a staff of officers who would raise an
African force which would attempt to drive the Ashanti beyond the Pra. He also
indicated that he would probably need two battalions of English troops, who could
3
be rushed to the Pra along a road with staging posts. Cardwell evidently
4
favoured this plan by the hero of the Red River Expedition in Canada, who was
also his ally in the battle against purchase. He sent the plan to Kimberley
before the Cabinet of 2 August, saying Wolseley was "now ready to capture 
5
Coomassie". Thus Cardwell's support of the Wolseley plan makes him a fair
candidate for shouldering the responsibility for the attack on Ktmiasi, although
he was quick to deny this to Gladstone: "you will observe that I have said
£
nothing about any expedition to Coomassie, or anywhere else”* Tf Cardwell 
wanted a forceful policy on the Gold Coast he was not strictly honest with
1. In his instructions (Kimberley to Glover 14.viii.1873. Gold Coast Print 35# 
p. 148) Glover was appointed "Special commissioner to the Native Chiefs of 
the Eastern District". He was to raise an African force there and create
a diversion in the flank and rear of the Ashanti army in the Protectorate and 
to force them to retreat.
2. This memo, has not been found and the date is unknown. Volseley's biographers 
say, "As soon as difficulties arose on the Gold Coast# Sir Garnet prepared 
for Mr. Cardwell a memo, on the situation". (P.Maurice & 0.Arthur, The Life of 
Lord Wolseley. pp. 61-62). Wolseley himself said, "Mr. Cardwell had in 
confidence already informed me that he would like me to go there should it be 
determined to undertake active operations against the invading Ashanti... I 
submitted privately to Mr. Cardwell a rough outline of a military scheme....”
(A Soldier's Life. II, p. 262.)
3. Ibid. pp. 262-3. This plan was carried out.
4. R.Willock, 'Green Jackets on the Red River', Military Affairs, XXII, 1958, No.l 
p. 26. For a contemporary account by an officer, Blackwood's Magazine.
Dec. 1870 p. 704# Jan. 1871 p. 48 and Feb. 1871 p. 164.
5. Cardwell to Kimberley l.viii.1873 (copy) Cardwell Papers, FR0.30/48/5/33.
6. Cardwell to Gladstone 3.ix.l873. Gladstone Papers 4A120/ll9.
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Gladstone about it.
Nor can Kimberley be exonerated from bearing a big share of the responsibility. 
As a consciencious Colonial Secretary he had not been prepared to let matters 
slip on the Gold Coast. He had already rejected the 1865 policy by deciding 
to remain at the Gambia, Lagos and the Gold Coast. Early in 1875 he was 
contemplating stronger administration in the latter. Tf his word in his Journal 
is to be trusted, he had to persuade unwilling authorities to send the re­
inforcements on 15 July and he also called for part of a British battalion to 
be alerted, so he was prepared to use English troops. Afterwards he said he 
never doubted for a moment that they would have to use them,^ and he told
Gladstone that the burning of Kumasi was as justifiable as killing an enemy 
2
in battle. YJhen he wrote to Cardwell before the decision on Glover he 
mentioned the possibility of an attack on Kumasi. Thus the Wolseley-Cardwell 
plan found a ready supporter in Kimberley. Wolseley records that at one of the 
meetings subsequent to his appointment, Kimberley answered "in a somewhat sharp 
tone of voice" questions by Goschen. Kimberley became so nettled at the cross 
examination by some of his collegues that finally, says Wolseley, he bang'ed his 
fist on the table saying "either this expedition comes off or I cease to be 
Colonial Minister". And in some ways Kimberley's change of mind was greater 
than Cardwell's; the lat + er appears as the advocate of the ambitious Wolseley 
project, which itself was part of the new spirit stirring among the younger 
officers who were quick to volunteer for the expedition, but Kimberley accepted 
*the plan only after first entertaining a milder alternative proposed by Sir
1. Kimberley's Journal p. 42.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 2.v.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/150.
3. Wolseley, Soldier's Life. II, p. 268. Wolseley did not mention Goschen, but 
said "a minister"... "but I fancied that the question reflected Naval 
sentiment at the Admiralty".
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Andrew Clarke.^
In his Journal Kimberley says he first offered the new Gold Coast command 
2
to Clarice, who was Director of Works at the Admiralty, but who had accepted the 
governorship of the Straits Settlements on 30 May 1873 in succession to Sir Harry
7  M
Ord. Clarke's 1864 report on West Africa was favoured in the War Office, and 
he was called into the various conferences during 1873* Like Wolseley he drew
5
up a plan of campaign and an itinery to Kumasi, He opposed the employment of
English troops and asked for a free hand to make a settlement with Kofi Kari Kari.
His precise plans are unknown, but he told Col. Anson at Penang a year later that
he had "stipulated that the country should be handed back to the native government
6
after the war was over". After Wolseley's appointment Clarke suggested than an 
autographed letter from the Queen to the Asantehene and the Protector"te chiefs
1. Sir Andrew Clarke (1824-1902) was then Director of Works at the Admiralty, but 
was called into the Gold Coast discussions because of his experience. B. 1^ 24, 
educated King's, Canterbury and the RMA Woolwich, commissioned R.E. 1844, and 
served Chatham, Woolwich and Ireland before going to Van Dieman's land in 1846. 
For a short time he built roads during the New Zealand war in 1848; from 1849- 
53 he was ADC and Pr. Sec. to the Ldeut-Cov. of Van Dieman's Land. In 1858 he 
became Surveyor-Qeneral of Victoria with a seat on the Legislative Council. He 
helped draft the constitution when Victoria received responsible government, 
and he was elected to the new Assembly by S.Melbourne. A member of the Cabinet 
and an advocate of universal suffrage in the 1857-58 session, he was invited
to form a government but decided to return to military duty in England. He 
was at the Gold Coast during the 1863-4 war and he acted as a staff officer 
for Gov. Pine, and oven acted as Chief Justice. His report seems to have a 
wider scope than a strictly military mission would suggest. His admiralty 
post began in 1864. See below Chap.  ^for his career in Malaya.
2. Kimberley's Journal p. 42. Ihe Duke of Cambridge also favoured Clarke.
HRE to Cardwell 19.viii.1873. Cardwell Papers PRO.30/48/4/17•
3. Clarke to Kimberley 30.V.1873. Kimberley Papers A/69.
4. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 82.
5. Information from Vetch p. 115. Like Wolseley's Memo. Clarke's cannot be found.
However there is in the Glover Papers a memo, on Singapore Government note
paper signed by Clarke ll.viii.1873, initialled by Cardwell "written by Sir 
A.Clarke at my request". Here Clarke says if an attack upon Kumasi is decided 
upon regular troops would be needed, but he is convinced that sufficient
forces could be raised in the Protectorate.
6. A.E.H.Anson, About Myself and Others (l92l) p. 324.
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would be much better than an expedition to Kumasi.^ One suspects that Gladstone
would have preferred Clarke's scheme, and three years later, after Sir Arthur
Gordon's successful "little war" against the Fiji mountaineers, one W.P. suggested
that some such limited effort (which Clarke obviously preferred) should have
2
been used against the Ashantis# Kimberley evidently favoured this at one stage,
but in 1864 Clarke had favoured withdrawal from the coast, and as Wolseley said,
"peace loving as Lord Kimberley undoubtedly was,he took no such church-varden*s
3
view of our Imperial responsibilities"# So Kimberley definitely accepted the
*
forceful Wolseley plan and he had the onerous task of persuading Gladstone, a 
task he did not shirk. On the whole he handled the Prime Minister shrewdly and 
got his way, as he did over the Malay States and Fiji at the same time#
One person who seems 'out' of the crucial Gold Coast decision was Knatchbull- 
Hugessen, the very man who had so often urged an agressive policy. Parliament 
was prorogued on 5 August 1873 and he was probably busy with last minute 
parliamentary duties. He was also going through one of his periodic bouts of 
dissatisfaction over the prospects of Gladstone's government and his own career. 
Kimberley wrote to him on 10 August, "I trust you are not serious in talking 
of making your bow. You would not I am sure turn your 'backside'..# to Coffee 
CalicalU".4
Yet if Kimberley and Cardwell were finn in their support for Wolseley, the
Cabinet, which had not yet fully been drawn into the matter, were not unanimous,
and Gladstone was by no means happy when he discovered the scale of the
preparations. Thus although the decision to undertake active operations was
made between 26 July and 2 August, the final decision was not made until 7
November, when Wolseley's request for English troops was sanctioned.
1. Clarke to Kimberley 19.viii.1873. Kimberley Papers, a/69.
' 2» G.Shaw Lefevre to Gordon l.ii.1877. Gordon, Fiji Records. Ill, p. 117.
3* Wolseley, Soldier's Life. II, p. 271.
4# Braboume Diary, IV 1870-73, pp. 639.
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Now it seems fairly clear that from Wolseley's point of view an English
expedition to Kumasi was part of the plan fran the start. Both Kimberley and
Cardwell realised this, although probably both of them hoped that a peace might
be achieved without one.^ The plan as presented to Gladstone was that Wolseley
would use the forces already available and those he could recruit in West Africa
to strike a blow at Ashanti if possible, and request a British expedition only
should it prove necessary. But Kimberley, much franker than Cardwell, told
Gladstone they should prepare for such an expedition by Wolseley. "It is a
hateful affair, but I feel sure, that the only safe policy is to deal with it
2
quickly and thoroughly".
A minor wrangle took place early in September over Wolseley's instructions.
i
On the peace terms with Ashanti and the question of human sacrifices Gladstone
pointed out that "they are not crimes under the moral law as recognised in
Africa", but the Queen telegraphed that they must say that if the Asantehene
3
continued such sacrifices she would regard him "with horror". Kimberley steered 
his way through these verbal niceties by adding an innocuous phrase about ending 
'atrocities'. Wolseley was to warn the Asantehene that an expedition was in 
preparation in case he did not leave the Protectorate. The object politically 
vas to get a new treaty with Ashanti - perhaps based on the 1831 Treaty. Kimberley 
also suggested that a Resident or Consul might be appointed to Kumasi;^ these 
instructions were dated 10 September 1873, the day on which Kimberley sent 
Gladstone Clarke's instructions for the Straits Settlements in which Residents 
in the Malay States were suggested.
Cardwell also had trouble with Gladstone over Wolseley's instructions as the
»
Prime Minister thought the General was given too wide a discretion. But Cardwell
1. See Kimberley to Goschen 12.ix.1873, in A.D.Elliot, Life of Goschen. p. 122.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 18.viii.1873* Gladstone Papers 44225/79.
3. Gladstone to Kimberley 4.ix.l873 Kimberley Papers A/52. Kimberley to ponsonby
9.ix.l873 (copy) Ibid. A/46. Kimberley to Gladstone 9.ix.l873. 44225/99.
4. Kimberley to Wolseley 10.ix. 1873 (draft). C0/96/l08.
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insisted that the question of a British expedition would be a Cabinet decision.
Beyond that limitation Wolseley should have the widest latitude to deal any
blow at Ashanti with what he found at Cape Coast.1 While all this was going on,
Goschen, faced with the need of providing a hospital ship, confessed to ‘Very
great qualms" and a feeling "so uncomfortable about the expedition and now so
2
doubtful as to its necessity". Cardwell, the main author of the 1864-5 policies 
replied:
"you cannot be more opposed to an ambitious policy on the Gold Coast than 
I am... but could Kimberley have a state of things in existence, under 
which his revenue is destroyed by a Barbarian invader and the people whom 
he assumes to govern-are butchered or enslaved? Is he to eat humble pie 
and withdraw?"
So the first wave of opposition was overcome. Wolseley sailed from Liverpool 
on 12 September. Gladstone thought Kimberley had "judged wisely" about the
A
instructions - although he was soon "aghast" at the expense.
Indeed the preparations, as Cardwell told Kimberley, were "assuming large 
5
proportions". So Gladstone, who had also taken over the Treasury on 1 August,
was full of enquiries; he discovered that a hospital ship was being prepared,
and that eqipment for 15 miles of railway was being sent to Cape Coast. Fe began
to suspect that an expedition to Kumasi was preparing - vhich, or course, was true
Cardwell tried to ease his mind:
"We have not (as Northcote argues) involved the country in a war without 
calling Parliament. We are in a war forced upon us... and existing long 
before Parliament broke up. I believe the steps we have taken have averted 
a storm of indignation, which would have burst forth if these il1-tidings 
had arrived and no such steps had already been taken. As regards the 
tramway;.. I do notgregard it as pledging us to an expedition into the 
Ashanti territory".
1. Cardwell to Kimberley 3.ix.l873 Kimberley Papers A/52. Cardwell to Gladstone 
3.ix.l873 Gladstone Papers 44120/119. Gladstone to Cardwell 6fix.l873 (copy) 
Ibid. 123. Military instructions: Caldwell to Wolseley R.ix.1873 (draft) 
WO/32/826 file 076/594*
2. Goschen to Kimberley 8.ix.l873 Kimberley Papers a/52. Goschen to Cardwell 
10.ix. 1873 Cardwell Papers PRO. 30/48/5/27 p. 115.
3. Ibid. Cardwell to Goschen (copy) 12.ix.1873. p. 115.
4. Kimberley^ Journal p. 42.
5. Cardwell to Kimberley 18.ix.1873. Kimberley Papers A'52.
6. Cardwell to Gladstone 20.ix. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/140.
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But Kimberley and Cardwell sensed that the atmosphere at Cabinet level was
getting rather 'hot' for them, and at a meeting at the War Office on 22 September,
which finally decided on the hospital ship and the railway (a meeting which^
Gladstone had been invited to attend), they agreed that the circle of
responsibility would have to be.enlarged to include the Cabinet generally.*
The Cabinet finally discussed the matter on 4 October. In a meeting which
lasted from 12 to 5 pro Bright, sitting in his first Cabinet as Chancellor of
the Duchy of Lancaster, was one of those who opposed the Kimberley-Cardvell
policy. His diary recorded: "Ashantee policy to be pacific: no invasion of
2
Ashantee, ft no assault on CoomassieH. This sounds more like Bright's wishful
thinking, but certainly as a result of this Cabinet a despatch was sent to
Wolseley on 6 October, drafted in the main by Gladstone, which respresented the
first real attempt by the Prime Minister to assert any authority i1" the
Ashanti war.^ Wolseley was warned against conducting desultory operations; he
was told that the government would be most reluctant to sanction an English
expedition. They would be satisfied with an honourable peace, or, failing that
an effective chastisement of the Ashanti forces. Apart from this the main object
now was to drive the Ashantis from the Protectorate.
Gladstone's intervention was a month too late. Wolseley arrived at Cape 
4
Coast on October 2, and a mere week elapsed before he asked for 1500 English 
5
troops. A sober military appreciation of the situation on his arrival might 
have told the General that he would be cheated out of the cherished march to 
Kumasi. The Ashantis were definitely about to retreat and there had been no 
further alarms like the Elmina battle in June, which had really caused Cardwell
1. Cardwell to Gladstone 22.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44120/144.
2. P.Bright, Edition of The Diary of John Bright, p. 357.
3. Gladstone's rough drafts in Cabinet Minutes 3 ft 4.x.1873, Gladstone Papers 
44641/193-6. Kimberley's draft (based on Gladstone) in C0/96/l06.
4. Wolseley to Kimberley 6.x.1873. Confidential Print,GoId Coast 36 p. 267.
*
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and Kimberley to consider sending Wolseley. There had been considerable 
suffering among the Ashanti invaders since May; they had no faith in their 
commander Amankva Tia, and they had settled down at Efutu and Mampon, until 
early October when they began to fall back. But if the immediate threat to
k
Elmina and Cape Coast was removed, British authority throughout most of the
Gold Coast had collapsed under the impact of the invasion. Nearly all the
former Dutch Protectorate west of Elmina was seething with discontent, and as
the Ashanti forces under Akjampong and Adu Boffo advanced in June and July 1873
many of the chiefs joined the invaders. The British were reduced practically
to holding Second!, Dixcove and Axim with frequent Naval assistance. King
Blay of Appollonia was the only African ruler in the western Gold Coast who
could be relied upon.*
When Commodore Commerall, commander of the Squadron, tried to reconnoitre
the mouth of the Pra on 14 August, preparatory to a drive up the river to cut
the Ashantis in two, his party was attacked by the Shama people, and Col.
Harley decided to blockade the whole coast frcm Cape Coast to the Asslni River.
One of the Kings of Secondi was deported; several towns were bombarded from the
sea. In the eastern part of the Protectorate Glover found, when he arrived in
September, that the Awunas were threatening Ada, and that the whole problem of
the east side of the Volta remained unsolved. Parley had wanted to try
negotiating with the Awunas and the Akwamus in January 1873, but Pope-Hennessy
had forbidden him, so the situation had deteriorated for over half a year. To
1. Kimberley wrote "King Blay is a really good fellow. He seems to be worth
all the rest put together". Min, 29*x.l873 on Harley to Kimberley ?9*ix.l«73. 
CO/96/102.
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make matters worse Harley's relations with the military and naval officers 
were far from cordial.^ The Protectorate was in a bad state then, but the 
real danger from Ashanti was past.
Two days after his arrival Wolseley met the Cape Coast chiefs and offered 
£10 to any chief who would field 1000 men and £10 a month while they were under 
arms. These levies would be provided with arms and food and each man would 
be paid 3d a day. British orficers would be appointed to the various chiefs,
2
and recruiting officers were also sent to the Gambia, Iagos and Sierra Leone.
Tat in only a week after his landing, before he could have made any systematic 
effort to train and assess the Fante forces, he told Kimberley he would need 
the English troops. In his memoirs he said he never thought he would finish 
the war without them; in fact, it is fairly clear that he had made up his mind 
beforehand that tlie Africans would be useless. Prom Sierra Leone he wrote to 
his wife that "The Africans are like so many monkeys; they are a lazy good-
3
for-nothing race”. Before he even heard the replies of the Cape Coast chiefs
to his proposals he told his wife he would see "these wretched kings and chiefs"
4
but that he would have to ask for English troops. He was confirmed in this 
belief by the first operations on 14 October - some punitative attacks on 
hostile villages around Elmina where a survey party had been attacked. But his 
official application to the War Office for the English regiments was dated the
1. Comm ere 11* s wounding at Shama removed Harley's greatest enemy among the local 
officers, but his poor personal relations came to a head early in September 
when he disagreed with Col. Pesting over military measures against the Ashantis 
Harley thought that an invasion of Ashanti was now feasible and he also urged 
Pesting to attack the Ashanti camp at Mampon. Fes ting however refused to 
move at a conference on 11 Sept. as Wolseley's appointment was known, and 
Wolseley late upheld Pesting. •
2. Wolseley to Kimberley 5.x.1873, Cold Coast 36 p. 209. Wolseley to WO.
7.x.1873 VO/32/826 file 076/1235.
3. Wolseley to lady Wolseley 27.ix. 1873. 0.Arthur, The Letters of Lord and 
lady Wolseley. p. 10.
4. Ibid. loc. cit. In A Soldier's Life. II, p. 276 he wrote: "The term 'slave*
jars upon the ear, and yet the more one sees the negro at Cape Coast the 
more one realises that he was intended to be the white man's servant".
128
day before this. It is safe to judge that Wolseley decided to have a British
expedition from the start; that he did not consider any other alternative when
he got to Cape Coast.
The request reached London on 17 November. Already the Cabinet had
authorised Cardwell to ship stores for 1500 men,^ and on the 17th it sanctioned
the despatch of three English battalions, which sailed on the 19th to 21st.
Gladstone re-iterated his desire that Wolseley should make peace if possible,
2
and strike a blow as far short of the Pra or Kumasi as possible. When the 
Cabinet considered, on 21 November, the instructions they should give Wolseley 
on the use of the English troops Bright tried to prevent any invasion of Ashanti,
3
but he failed and contemplated resigning. Gladstone warned the General that
if Ashanti was completely crushed he might reach Kumasi and find no one there 
4
to negotiate - this happened. The Queen, with a sure instinct in these matters,
5
hoped that Gladstone was not fettering Wolseley*s movements.
This caution was really the last interference the Liberal government made 
in Wolseley's Kumasi campaign, which culminated in his entry of the Ashanti 
capital on 4 February 1874. Since this news did not reach London until after 
Gladstone's fall, it was the Glover expedition which caused the most misgivings 
in the government in the last months of 1873 • As Glover prepared to attack the 
Awuna in an effort to protect his fla^k by clearing the lower reaches of the 
Volta before turning on Ashanti, Kimberley demanded the reason for this extra war^
1. Cabinet minute dated Nov. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44641/209.
2. Ibid. Minute 17.xi.1873, 44641/218. Gladstone to Kimberley 19.xi.1873. 
Kimberley Papers A/8b.
3* P.Bright, The Diary of John Bright, p. 358.
4. Cabinute Minute 21.xi.1873• 4464l/223.
5. Ponsonby to Kimberley 23.xi. 1873. Kimberley Papers a/40.
6. Min. by Kimberley on Wolseley to Kimberley 13.xi.1873. CO/96/l03. Kimberley 
to Wolseley 23.xii.1873. (draft).
4
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When Glover began paying £5 a man for Hause slaves to build up his African
force, Gladstone stopped it.^ Wolseley, in fact, complained that his own
efforts at recruiting in western Akim were jeopardized by Glover's little war,
although Glover had distinctly told his lieutenant Capt. Sartorius not to
interfere with Capt. Butler in western Akim. Kimberley began to wonder if
2the whole Glover expedition had not been a mistake.
One thing Kimberley was certain of - "how utterly without authority we are
3
in the 'Protectorate* and that we are defending little more than a shadow".
Nor is there any indication that he had any constructive idea of what to do
about the Gold Coast after the war. He opposed Wolseley's plan for an Anglo-
French-Portuguese arms embargo; "Suppose after the war we retire from the coast?
4
The whole measure will be nugatory". He realised that great reforms were
needed, yet he doubted if the settlements could ever be governed satisfactorily.
In such a mood he once told Wolseley that he would not bother him "on this 
5
futile subject". Possibly it was poetic justice that the hardworking, but
now quite weary, Kimberley should remain in office until the eve of victory,
but the younger, more imaginative, Carnarvon should have to deal with the
peace^  treaty and the settlement of the Protectorate.
Perhaps it was poetic justice too that on 15 January 1874, the day Wolseley's
main campaign in Ashanti territory began, Sir Andrew Clarke began the Pangkor
»
conference, which laid the foundations of the 'Resident system* of government
1* Mins, on Wolseley to Kimberley 13.xi.1873. C0/96/l03. Kimberley to Gladstone 
15.xii.1873 Gladstone Papers 44225/129. Gladstone to Kimberley 16.xii.1873 
Kimberley Papers A/52.
2. Min. by Kimberley 25.xii.1873 on Wolseley to Cardwell 2.xi.l873. C0,/96/l07. 
Herbert said however: "The truth is that Capt. Glover has succeeded in a 
business with which he is familiar and the officers who had no African 
experience have naturally been less successful". Glover had earned a high 
reputation at the Colonial Office for his training of the first Hausa police 
at Lagos.
3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 25.xii.1873.
4. Kimberley to Granville 17.xii.1873. Granville Papers PR0.30/29/55/33
5. Kimberley to Wolseley 9.i.1874 (copy). Kimberley Papers A/22.
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in the Malay States* As already noted, Clarke might well have been wearing 
Wolseley's boots on the humid banks of the Pra, but his solution to the Ashanti 
problem had been rejected. He went to Singapore to be faced with the problem of 
the civil wars in the Malay States. There, he was told in London (quite rightly), 
"matters were much more critical and the situation more difficult than on the 
African coast".^
1. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 115.
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Chapter 3.
SIR HARRY ORD AND THE MALAY STATES, 1867-73,
The Straits Settlements and the Malay States before 1867.
It took Sir Andrew Clarke less than four months to decide on his policy
for the Malay States. He appointed the first Residents in Perak and Selanfror,
and although they were intended as advisers to the Sultans, over the years
these officers came to control the government of the States. As a result of
the change of policy which produced Clarke’s plan the British government ceased 
to think in terms of small outposts and trading centres which were guardians 
of the trade route through the Straits of Malacca to China, but to regard itself 
as the ’paramount power* in the Malay Peninsula. The origin of this new 
departure is the subject of the present chapter.
Unlike the West African settlements the colony of the Straits Settlements 
was a comparatively new Colonial Office responsibility. First developed as an 
outpost of India, it had been transferred only in 1867. The settlements 
consisted of the island of Penang, ceded by the Sultan of Kedah in 1786; Province 
Wellesley on the mainland opposite, which was added in 1800; the island port 
of Singapore, Stamford Raffles *s creation of 1819; and the old colony of 
Malacca on the mainland, ceded by the Dutch in 1824. While Raffles had 
envisaged British dominance and commercial supremacy over the entire area, the 
Government of India, had, traditionally, tried to keep aloof from the internal 
affairs of the Malay States.
The Colonial Office inherited this policy of non-intervention within the 
Peninsula. It thought in terms of isolated strategic and commercial settlements 
situated on the road to China. When the trusted West African negotiator. Sir
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Hairy Ord, was sworn in as the first Colonial Governor on 13 April 1867 he had
instructions simply to install the normal crown colony administration in
Singapore. The chief interest of the new master in London at first was the
revenue of the new colony, since the Treasury had been very reluctant to let
the imperial government take over from India. Therefore, although those who
had agitated for Downing Street rule had hoped that more attention would now be
turned to the Malay States, they had to wait seven years before anything was
done. In his draft of Ord*s instruction Rogers deleted the heading "Political
Relations)1 because in 1867 the Colonial Office gave little thought to the
question of relations with the Malay Peninsula. They regarded their new 
s
- responfibility in the Straits Settlements purely as an administrative matter,
similar perhaps to the West Indies.
They were wrong, and they were very soon to realise their mistake. Already,
throughout the whole area a complex web of political relationships existed.
British sovereignty was confined to Penang, Malacca and Singapore, but British
influence embraced the whole Peninsula. Stated in broadest terms, the Malay
States had been saved from dominance by Siam from the north, and the IXitch from
the south, only by British intervention. In 1860 Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, the
Governor, claimed that, with the exception of "one or two petty Independent
states, the possession of the Malay Peninsula is divided between the British
2
and the Siamese". When Ord arrived in 1867 the influence of Siam was confined 
to the so-called tributaries in the north, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, and 
the independence of the most important west coast States, Perak and Selangor,
1. Draft instructions for Ord 6.ii.l867. C0/273/l6. The bias of official 
emphasis can be judged from the *'act that it was a Treasury letter which 
occasioned this draft.
2. W.G.Kaxwell <Sfc W.S.Gibson, Treaties and Engagements effecting the Malay 
States and Borneo (1924) p.l. See also Cavenagh*s despatch to the Govt, of 
India, 19.vii.1861. A & P. 1863, XLIII, p. 306.
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had been guaranteed by intervention and treaties,* Tn the east and south of
the Peninsula, the States of Pahang and Johore were by-products of Anglo-Dutch
2
rivalry for the lands of the former Johore Empire. Johore itself was virtually
a British creation. A more recent threat by Siam to Pahang had led to inter-
3
vention by Governor Cavenagh in 1862. The IXitch had undertaken never to form 
establishments or to make treaties in the Peninsula by the London Treaty of 
1824* and relations over Sumatra, the southern shore of the Straits of Malacca,
4
were governed by the same agreement.
The most recent writer on the subject has suggested that the East India
1. Perak treaties, Maxwell ft Gibson pp. 20-26; Selangor treaties pp. 30-35.
The best account of early relations between the British settlements and 
the Malay States is L.A.Mills, 'British Malaya, 1824-1867', Journal of the 
Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 1. Pt. 2. (1925) rp. 128-69.
2. During the period of intense Anglo-IXitch rivalry stirred up by Raffles in this 
area after the Napoleonic Wars, the Sultan of Johore (p-resent Johore, Pahang, 
Singapore and Riouw-Lingga archipelago) was living at Lingga, a puppet of
the ruler of Riouw. The dominions on the Malay Peninsula were ruled by great 
officers who became virtually independent, the Temenggong of Johore and the 
Bendahara of Pahang. Raffles's method of securing Singapore; the Anglo-Dutch 
treaty of 1824; and the Pahang civil war 1857-63, all served to give 
permanence to this arrangement and to 'partition* the old Johore empire.
(See Mills, British Malaya, pp. 19-81; W.Linehan, *A History of Pahang', 
JMBRAS. XIV, May 1936 pp. 56-67; Cowan, Origins. pp. 8-9; R.O.Vinstedt,
'A History of Johore', JMBRAS, X, Pt. Ill Dec 1932, p. 08; and for the 
British treaties with Johore, Maxwell ft Gibson pp. 115-132.)
3. The Pahang civil war really included two conflicts: a fight for the succession 
in Pahang following Bendahara 'Ali's death in 1857, between his sons Tun 
Mutahir and Wan Ahmad; and a final attempt by a successor of the 'Riouw half' 
of the Johore empire to recover a mainland province. The latter was Mahmud 
(deposed Sultan of Lingga) who Joined Wan Ahmad. Siam saw opportunities of 
extending her influence and backed Mahmud, Wan Ahmad and their ally the 
Sultan of Trenggaiiu. Mutahir was supported by the Temenggong of Johore. Tn 
1862 Mahmud went to Siam and married the sister of the Ming and returned to 
Tx^ngganu (Wan Ahmad's base) with Siamese troops. Wan Ahmad's third invasion 
was successful and in 1863 he became the ruler of Pahang, and he tried to 
cultivate good relations with the British.
(Contemporary accounts in A ft P, 1863, XLIII, pp. 303-387 and 0.Cavenagh, 
Reminiscences of an Indian Officer (1884) pp. 303-307. See also Tlnehan, 
Pahang, pp. 66-89; Winstedt, Johore, pp. 94-96; M.C.ff. 5heppard,'A short 
history of Trengganu', JMBRAS. XXII, Pt. 3 June 1949, pp. 31-"M; Mills, 
British Malaya, pp. 165-166; Cowan, Origins, pp. 18-21.
4. See below p.
*
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Company could be regarded as paramount power in the Peninsula:
"Out of the five states south of Kedah (counting the Negri Sembilan as 
one) there were thus by 1862 two whom the East India Company were pledged 
to protect, and three over whose external relations they had a right of 
control,,. On a strict legalistic interpretation Johore and P^rak would 
no doubt have been regarded^by later nineteenth and twentieth century 
opinion as protectorates".
But the treaties in no way implied intervention in the internal affairs of the
States, Here British policy was strictly one of non-intervention. However, by
the middle of the century the Straits press had suggested acquisition by Britain,
and it had attacked what was called "a course of utter neglect" towards the 
2
Malay States, Cavenagh's exceptional intervention in 1862 came after prompting
from Singapore merchants because the events in Trengganu and Pahang were
3
hampering trade on the east coast. Thus, in Singapore at least, it was thought 
that the Malay States should not be left to themselves, and it was argued that 
trade with the Peninsula could be increased, that great riches lay ready for 
the picking. Therefore although British sovereignty did not stretch beyond the 
small settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, already the frontier of 
trade and political influence had moved beyond.
Because of the peculiar internal conditions of the Me lay States this wider 
frontier was to cause a rethinking of the traditional policy of non-intervention. 
It is evident that there was a gradual appreciation of the problem in London 
during the first six years of colonial office administration in Singapore. It 
was realised in Whitehall that the Straits Settlements were not simply a 
normal colonial responsibility like, say, the West Indies, but they-presented 
the problem of a frontier bordering on politically unstable States, potentially
I
rich in resources, which was not unlike the contemporary frontiers in West 
Africa and the South Pacific.
1. Cowan, Origins, pp. 21-23.
2. The first suggestion of annexation was made in 18^ 4. See C.B.Buckley,
An anecdotal history of Old Times in Singapore (1902) II, pp. 421-2, 575, 584.
3. Paterson, Simons, Co. to the SS. Govt. 23.x.1862, and Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce to Cavenagh 31.x.1862, A ft P« 1863, XLIII, pp. 330-332.
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Ord *a proposed Malay States policy. 1867-71.
Sir Harry Ord was well installed in Singapore before the Colonial Office
seriously considered the problems raised by the Malay States. But on 8 June
1867, among a bundle of papers which the India Office rather belatedly turned
from its cupboards, Charles Cox, the head of the Eastern department, found a few
which were "interesting and instructive as regards our relations ft difficulties
with Native Chiefs".^ The rulers of Johore and Pahang disagreed over their
boundaries,•and the ruler of Larut, a province in Perak, and the Sultans of
Kedah and Kelantan were in various ways restricting trade. A report was also
included on Sumatra^ east coast States, which formed the southern shore of
the Straits of Malacca.
None of these matters were regarded as urgent. "Nothing further to be done"
was the favourite comment. Ord was simply asked in July 1867 to report on two
matters: the Johore-Pahang dispute, and the effect of the Sultan of Kelantan*s
2
mononolies on trade. Only in one respect were the India Office papers regarded
as useful; they indicated the Government of India*s policy inaspecifie case.
Negotiations had been attempted from time to time with the ruler of Larut, who
levied irksome duties on the tin exports. In 1866 Cavenagh had expressed a fear
to the Government of India that there was a tendency in Penang "to push British
interference with the Native States further than is either necessary or 
3
desirable". Generally, the Governor said, he interfered in two cases only: 
where a British subject was murdered in Larut, or where there was murder or 
piracy on the high seas. Cox quoted this in a precis for the Duke of Buckingham, 
the Colonial Secretary, to show,
1. Mins, l.vii.1867 on 10. to CO. 6.vi.l867 containing papers relating to the 
SS, Malaya and Sumatra.
2. Ibid. CO. to Ord 19 * 20.vii.1867 (draft).
3. Cavenagh to the Govt, of Indie 15.11.1866 (copy) In 10. to CO. 6.vl.l867. Ibid.
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"what may be taken I conclude as the standing instructions under which 
the Governor of the Straits Settlements would act in any future case 
where his interference was asked for agst a Native Chiefj- and T 
should say that these instructions are sound ones".
*
The Sumatra paper touched a wider question, for the Foreign Office was
about to consider a new policy. The long standing attitude of opposition to
Dutch expansion in Sumatra was being re-examined;in 1866 and 1867, however,
both the India and Colonial Offices were too busy with the transfer of the
Straits Settlements, so serious thinking about Sumatra policy was confined to
the Foreign Office. In September 1867 Lord Stanley decided it was inevitable
that the Dutch would gradually rule the whole island, and that British protests
would not stop them. Therefore he asked the Colonial Office "whether it would
not be adviseable to abandon the practically useless right to protest against
inevitable territorial acquisitions" if in return trade in Sumatra on equal
2footing with the Dutch could be achieved. Here again the Colonial Office did
not regard the matter as urgent and they refused to give an opinion until the
3
new governor at Singapore had reported. They were less concerned with diplomacy 
then with the revenue of the Straits Settlements. In 1867 the Malay States on 
either side of the strategically vital Straits of Malacca did not arouse any 
anxiety in Downing Street.
Early in 1868 this complacency was shaken. Governor Ord was asked to report
%
on a few matters concerning the Malay States, but since he ^ad governed only 
colonies with representative institutions he was unused to the crown colony 
routine of detailed reports. He was a regular officer, who, although he had 
missed the active service which might have come his way, had also been spared
1. Min. by Cox l.vii.1867 on Larut papers, Ibid.
2. FO. to CO. 17.ix.1867 C0/273/l4.
3* Discussed below p . R o g e r s  warned Adderley that Sumatra was sure to 
crop up again, on 10. to CO. 28.ii.1867. C0/273^15«
ij
i
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the dull routine to be found at home. He was above all things a willing
volunteer, who fully exploited any chance for exceptional service. Mormal
postings on the home establishment had been enlivened by his trips to Vest
Africa, Paris and The Hague. Unexceptional posts as a Colonial Governor in
Bermuda and the West Indies were relieved by the Inquiry in West Africa and the
1865 committee. At the age of forty-seven Ord was well accustomed to negotiations
and responsibilities. A man of considerable, if rather narrow, experience, a
professional soldier, military engineer, and 'expert* on Anglo-Dutch arrangements
in West Africa, he also had a high opinion of his ability with 'native chiefs*.
So he promptly began negotiating'with the Malay rulers. Re tried to teach the
Sultan of ^elantan the virtues of free trade, and to tidy the colony's boundary
with the State of Kedah.
Both Kedah and Kelantan were 'tributaries' of Siam. Definition of their
precise status is difficult, but all the Malay States north of Perak and Pahang
were regarded as within Siam's sphere until the boundary settlement of 1909.
The Burney Treaty of 1826 is exceedingly vague as to the relationship with
Kelantan and Trengganu,^ but the northern states sent tribute to Siam. While
Kedah and Kelantan were definitely under considerable influence and their foreign
affairs w e re  conducted by the Siamese, Trengganu resisted Siamese influence in
this period and Governor Cavenagh had supported this.
Ord's negotiations with the rulers of Kedah and Kelantan introduced the
Colonial Office to the question of relations with the Malay States. A bare
2
hint of the Kedah negotiations was received on 27 January 1868, but the full 
reports were not received until 12 February. Apart from the details of the 
negotiations, which will be discussed later, Ord's action opened an important
1. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties. p. 80.
2. Min. by Cox on Ord to Buckingham 18.xii.1867. 00/273/13.
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question of principle, which was to occupy the Colonial Office for five years:
"namely our mode of dealing with the Native States - a point on which ^ir H.O.
has had no instructions".^ Buckingham, the Colonial Secretary, was adamant, and
said, "Col. Ord is to Govern the settlements not to diplomatise, which may he
2
left to the Foreign Office". But Rogers realised that a much wider problem
had been raised concerning the whole sphere of the authority of the governor of
3
the Straits Settlements in South-east Asia. Ord, characteristically, had his
i
own ideas. Under the old regime relations with the Malay States and the Dutch
had been subject to the approval of the Government, of India, and Straits
residents had often pressed for wider powers for the Governor. Ord supported
their view and warned the Colonial Office that any diminution of his authority
4
would lower his prestige and encourage piracy. The Colonial Office therefore 
considered this question of principle before the details of the Kedah and Kelantan 
Pleased to have a concrete case not an abstract question Rogers considered 
relations with the Malay States in the broadest context by surveying the division 
of responsibility on the entire imperial frontier. This was something that had 
not been possible under the Government of India, therefore his long minute is an 
important stage in the realisation of the Malayan frontier problem. He wrote:
"in some places the FO has no machinery thro* which it can act, no 
channels thro* wh it can desire information - ft no interest in the 
questions wh arise - which on the contrary the CO has all these 
advantages for the transaction of business. Such is the case in 
the countries adjoining Natal ft the Cape. Consequently the CO deals 
absolutely without any intervention on the part of the FO, with 
Kaffirs and Zulus.
In China the contrary state of things exists ft the contrary mode of 
proceeding is inferred. We are continually impressing on Sir R.Macdonell
1. Ibid. Min. by Cox 17.ii.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 31.xii.1867.,
2. Min. by Buckingham 17.ii. 1868 on Ord to Buckingham 3.i. 1868. CO/273/17.
5. Rogers fir~t saw the Kelantan despatch ( 3.i.1868) on -19 February and the
reply to Ord was dated 22nd. But on the 19th Rogers had added a further 
note that the Kedah despatch (31.xii.1867) which he saw the s«me day was 
part of the same problem.
4. Ord to Buckingham 31.rii.1867. C0/273/l3.
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[Gov. of Hong KongJ that he is only to communicate with the Chinese 
Govt, thro* the diplomatic authorities.
On the West Coast of Africa^  I shd think the CO wd be le**t to take 
its own way a\>solutely, but for the fact that the F0 has an interest in 
the Slave Trade question <Sb consequent Treaties with Native "Kings" - Here 
I believe it is not unusual to invest a consular authority in the Govr 
or administrator who in that capacity takes orders from the F0. Teg. Glover 
at lAgos7[ ... I am inclined to say that this double responsibility of the 
Govr to authorities whose bias is not always the same is not, except in 
very easy times, a very safe or satisfactory method, if it can be avoided.
In Honduras the Govr I think would be expected to deal under instructions 
from the CO with the neighbouring Indians with little or no interference 
from the F0 so long as the question was merely a matter of Indians, but all 
matters wh could be matters of discussion with Mexico as sovereign of the 
Indians - wd ro to the F0.
Now as to the Straits...."
Here Rogers defined three spheres; suggesting (l) that the governor should deal,
under the Colonial Office, with the Malay States "not subject to any influence
than our own", (2) that he should be able to deal directly with the Siamese
tributaries, under Foreign Office approval, and (3) that relations with the Dutch
would, as usual, be handled by the Foreign Office, with Colonial Office advice.^
In March 1868 the two departments worked out a policy on these lines for the
Straits of Malacca area. The Colonial Office agreed with Ord that the governor
was the official best placed for gaining information in the Malay Peninsula, and
that prestige was important, but the governor’s activities might conflict with
British policy towards Siam or the Netherlands, and that a local colonial
interest might embarrass the home government. Stanley, the Foreign Secretary,
found it all "rather an irritating and troublesome question". Rogers's Foreign
2
Office counterpart, the painstaking Edmund Hammond, said "let the Colonial
3
Office adopt their own rules".
In this rather casual way Ord's ideas were accepted in London and embodied 
in his belated instructions on the Malay States. Agreeing in principle with
1. Min. by Rogers 19.ii.1868 on Ord to Buckingham *51.xii.l867. CO/273/l?.
2. See M.A.Anderson, Edmund Hammond. Pemanent Under Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. 1854 to 1873. (PhD thesis London 1956).
3. Notes by Stanley and Hammond with CO. to F0. 17.iii.1868. FO/^7/487.
141
the Kedah negotiations Buckingham told Ord that in negotiating he had exceeded
his powers and his methods were criticised. As to the frontier question -
relations with the Dutch would be as in similar regions like British Guiana
and the Gold Coast. The important oart of the instructions concerned the Malay
States not subject to Siam:
"with regard to the native powers you will possess a larger authority.
But you will remember that the relations of the settlements with those 
powers are matters which may at any time become of serious importance... 
Although therefore circumstances may not unfrequently arise in which 
you may be called upon to act absolutely on your own judgement, yet it 
is generally undesirable that you should enter into formal negotiations 
with native princes... except^in pursuance of an object or a policy 
approved by HM's government".
Unfortunately Downing Street could not close the matter with a neat
instruction and throughout 1868 the problem of relations with the Malay States
kept reappearing in the despatches from Singapore. Ord*s negotiations with
Siam over Kedah and Kelantan produced complications and commercial interests in
the Straits added variations on the same theme. Before the end of 1868
Buckingham would be forced to admit - if only in confidence to the department -
that British intervention might be necessary in Malaya, and the Colonial Office
would find itself defending its newly won preserve from the Foreign Office.
Before discussing this, however, a brief word is necessary about the Kedah
and Kelantan negotiations. Relations with Kedah were poor because the Sultan
levied duties on cattle imported into Penang for food, and he took advantage
of his irregular boundary with Province Wellesley to provide gambling houses
which were forbidden in the colony. The India Office passed on reports of
2
previous negotiations but Cox had said "nothing appears to be done". Evidently 
Ord reopened negotiations on his own initiative, and his efforts to get a new 
boundary treaty gave the Colonial Office its first cause for alarm over his
1. Buckingham to Ord 22.iv.lP68 (draft). £b/2T5/2'x>.
2. Min. by Cox l.vii. 1867 on 10. to CO. 6.vi.l867. CO/275/l5*
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methods. Not only was he dilatory in reporting home, but he lost his temper
on two occasions and suspended negotiations. When the treaty was finally signed
in Singapore on 21 March 1868 the verdict was: Ma very questionable proceeding”,
and that Ord had been "successful in carrying out his object and intentions
tho* he has not obtained that success in a regular manner".^
He began the negotiations in August 1867 when Tan Kim Ching, the Siamese 
2
Consul at Penang, took the Sultan of Kedah to Singapore, where a memorandum 
was agreed upon as the basis for a treaty. It provided for the straightening 
of the Kedah-Province Wellesley boundary by an ecre for acre exchange of land, 
for a fixed scale of duties to be levied by the Sultan, and both parties agreed 
to clear a belt of country either side the boundary and they would not licence 
gambling houses within two miles of it. Ord said he would travel to Penang to 
sign the new treaty on 30 December 1867. But when the draft in Malay was presented 
there the Sultan refused to sign. Being an actual draft treaty it differed from 
the August memorandum and the Sultan s$id he would sign nothing without the 
express approval of Bangkok. Ord had a fit of temper, severed relations with 
the Sultan, and withdrew the pension which had been paid to him since the 
cession of Penang.
Only after this failure did Ord report home, and he transferred his 
negotiations to Bangkok, writing on 10 January 1868 to the British Consul. The 
Siamese government appointed Fhya Thep Worachin, and Tan Kim Ching as 
commissioners with full powers of negotiation on behalf of Kedah, and Ord met 
them at Penang on 13 February 1868. The commissioners agreed to Ord's terms
1. Min. by Cox 5.V.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 26.iii.1868, with treaty and 
maps. CO/273/17.
2. Tan Kim Ching (1829-92) was Riven this title by the King of Siam. He was a 
Straits Chinese with wide interests in the Fast. He had rice mills in 
Saigon; influence among the Chinese in the Siamese tributaries of Kelantan 
and Patani; his Singapore house was >no'Ti as *Siam House*. Song Ong Siang,
100 Years of the Chinese in Singapore (1923) pp. 92-3* 115* 156.
143
and asked for twenty-four hours to fetch the Sultan. Then, as they were about 
to visit Junk Ceylon, they suggested they might visit the Sultan route and 
bring him to Singapore in about three weeks. This request for further delay 
caused another outburst of temper by Ord, who now broke off negotiations with 
the Siamese and withdrew the offer of an acre for acre exchange of territory.
In spite of this the Siamese commissioners brought the Sultan to Singaporei
in March 1868. Ord withdrew his threat and the new treaty was signed on 1 March. 
Perhaps a little lecture on British policy towards Siam from Harry Alabaster, 
acting Consul in Bangkok, had modified Ord’s views. The governor had already 
formed his ideas about his relations with the Malay States but he had not yet 
received his instructions; Alabaster reminded him that British policy was to 
butress Siam’s hold over her tributaries. If Kedah was to be treated as 
independent, what of the other tributaries. Dealing with them through Bangkok 
was convenient, but although direct relations with the Malay tributaries were 
feasible, relations with the Iaos States, where the French were interested, would 
not be so easy.^ In March, therefore, Ord complete! the Kedah matter through the 
Siamese.
The same is true of the Kelantan affair. Ord was asked bv the Colonial
»
Office to investigate the report that the Sultan monopolised the sale of cotton 
twist and yam in his country and farmed exclusive rights of trading in certain 
commodities. But after consulting the Singapore Chamber of Commerce Ord 
straightway urged on the Sultan the adoption of free trade. When the latter 
pleaded his weakness in resources and need of revenue, Ord decided to get 
satisfaction from Siam. Thus the commissioners who visited Singapore in March 
1868 assured Ord that the Raja of Kelantan would comply with his wishes and 
make an apology.^
1. The Siamese side of the case and copies of the Alabaster-Ord correspondence 
are in Alabaster to Stanley 18.iii.1868. FO/69/46.
2. Ord to Buckingham 23.iii.lB68. C0/273/l7.
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The details of both these negotiations wore not important. Their significance
lies in the fact that both were settled through Siam, that quarrels over the
Kedah treaty took place in Whitehall, and that Kedah and Kelantan first raised
the question of relations with the States on the frontier in the Straits.
Rogers's minute of 19 February 1868 represents the first stage in Colonial
Office thinking on the British frontier in Malaya.
The second stage was caused by British companies which were trying to enter
tin mining in the Peninsula. Within two days during May 1868 requests for
interference in the Malay States came from different quarters. The roost
comprehensive was from W.H.M.Read,* a leading Singapore merchant who brought an
introduction from Ord. He was in London making arrangements for a number of
commercial ventures in South-east Asia, notably the projected Selangor Tin
Company and some telegraph extensions. His London collaborator was his brother-
in-law, Seymour Clarke, the highly successful General Manager of the Great
p
Northern Railway, who was something of an expert on telegraph systems. While 
Clarke pestered the Foreign Office about a telegraph line through Siam, Read 
perplexed the Colonial Office with a forthright indictment of the policy on non­
intervention in Malaya. That policy, he wrote,
"if it can be called a policy, has been to allow matters to follow their 
own course. The consequence is, that at the moment the rich and fertile 
countries of the Malay Peninsula are as little known as they were at the 
time of the first settlement of Singapore... I do not apprehend that any 
political complications are likely to follow from the formation of new 
treaties with the rulers of the independent native states, but on the 
contrary, I am led to believe that they will gladly avail themselves of 
any opportunity which would enable them to derive revenues... and such 
good counsel and advice as would enable them to govern their subjects 
upon more enlightened principles than at present prevail". ^
1. William Henry McLeod Read had been in Singapore since 1841. He was Consul- 
General for the Netherlands, a friend of the King of Siam, and he had the ear of 
the Straits authorities at some crucial moments. He was a promoter of 
telegraphs in Siam, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies: he was also interested
in Gold Mining in Siam and planting in Borneo. He assisted in quelling the 
Singapore riots of 1854 and 1863, and he was later the Municipal President.
2. See below p. Lc>3.
3. Read to Buckingham 9.v. 1868 with a Memo, on the Malay States. CO/273/24.
145
Although rather embarrassed by Read, the Colonial Office was agreed on one 
thing: "Sir H.Ord does not require any stirring up in negotiating with the 
Native Chiefs"* They feared that Read's views would make him more inclined "to 
meddle with native policy & that is an evil to be avoided"• Adderley, the 
Parliamentary Under-secretary, knew about the problems of the expanding frontier 
from his experience as Chairman of the 1865 committee, where he also had had an 
opportunity to assess Ord* He said "the danger of friendly motives to Natives
is that they always take them to mean more than they do A Ord is too ready that
» 1 way".
Rogers decided to scotch Read's notions* Pulling his favourite iron from
the fire - the local contributions for defence - he said that if the Straits
merchants cared to pay for their own defence it might be very politic to
"undertake the duty of saying in such of these states who should govern & 
how he should govern. But to endeavour to dictate with effectual physical 
force as the backbone of dictation^I think is to involve oneself in quarters 
of which we cannot see the end"*
He said the government should not approve
"any policy which is dictatorial in its character, and which has for its 
object either territorial extension wh they look upon as an absolute 
disadvantage, or political^influence, which as they believe will follow 
as a matter of course...."
When Read's letter went to Singapore, therefore, Ord was reminded that British
policy in regard to the internal affairs of the Peninsula was one of non—
4
intervention*
At the same time as the Colonial Office was considering Read's letter another
reached them, from the London agent of Paterson, Simons Company who had worked
5
tin mines at Kuantan in Pahang. Some of the company's property had been
1. Ibid* Min. by Cox (l2th) Adderley (13th), and Buckingham 15*v. 1868.
2. Ibid* Min* by Rorers (undated) 3. Ibid.
4. Ibid* Buckingham to Ord 20.v.1868 (draft).
5* Peterson, Simons to Buckingham 8*v*1968. CO/273/24 * Paterson's concession 
of 1862 is printed in A & P. 1863, XLIII, pp. 331-2.
confiscated by one of Wan Ahmad's followers in 1863, and the new Bendahara had 
not restored it. Assistance had been sought from the governor and from the 
Government of India without success. Now the Colonial Office was asked to 
intervene.
Rogers was beginning to sense the seriousness of the question and wrote,
"A false step may cause a good deal of mischief".^ He suggested that the Colonial
*
Office should completely disassociate itself from commercial ventures in the
Malay States. Thus the answer to the mining company closely followed that given
to Read, and also to similar projects in West Africa and New Guinea. Merchants
venturing into semi-b^rbarous lands did so at their own risk; the government
would not intervene to enforce their contracts "when the disturbed state of the
country, and the disputes of rival claimants to power cause embarrassment and 
2
loss". The phrase quoted is significant as it represents a slight qualification
of Rogers's view. It was added by Buckingham on 4 June 1868 because he thought
3
"there may be cases in which it might be proper to take strong measures". He 
did not specify which cases, but his admission represents a further stage in 
the appreciation of the real problem in Malaya. And on the same day at least 
one possible case for intervention was cited in a reply to Ord on his Kelantan 
despatches. These had reached London at the time when any idea that Ord might 
'diplomatise' was anathema, so he had been cautioned. But as the Siamese
1. Min. by Rogers 25.V.1868 on P & S Coy. to CO. 8.V.1868. CO/273/24*
2. CO. to P & S Coy. 8.vi.l868 (draft). Ibid. The same attitude was shown over 
West Africa; "persons who trade at remote places must understand that they are 
to settle their own quarrels and that they are not to expect the intervention 
of British forces". (Min. by Elliot ll.vii.1866 on Blackall to Carnarvon
20.vi. 1866. CO/96/71.) Cf. the reply to the N.Guinea Coy. of vSydney: "any 
persons who embark in it ([the N.Guinea expedition] must not look for aid and 
protection from the national forces, nor for the confirmation of HM government 
of their titles to any acquisitions of land which they may make from the 
natives". (Buckingham to Young 14.ix.1867 (draft). C0/201/542).
3. CO/273/24. Buckingham first saw the papers on 26 May, but on 4 June he 
corrected the draft and added this 'escape clause' for the benefit of the 
office.
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commissioners satisfactorily completed the Kelantan negotiations in March 1868, 
so Ord took the opportunity, in replying to his caution over Kelantan, to raise 
the whole Malay States problem again. His despatch, which arrived erectly a 
week after Read's letter, was couched in such similar terms that Rogers, 
remarking that all these letters were about "extension of our influence", 
suspected some concerted move.^ Possibly Ord and Read had discussed their line 
of approach before the latter left Singapore.
Ord now offered for the first time a comprehensive policy for the Malay 
States. Firstly, in the case of *tie Siamese tributaries he did not know what 
Siam's authority really was but the Siamese commission completed the Kelantan 
and Kedah business without so much as a reference to the rulers concerned. 
Following Alabaster's view Ord thought that "the subjugation of these native 
states of the Peninsula to Powers greater or more civilised than themselves is 
an advantage to themselves and to all who have relations with them". Secondly, 
in the southern part of the Peninsula Ord considered that outside Johore the 
situation in the Malay States was dangerous. "Nothing can be more unsatisfactory 
than the condition of the Native States that are not dependent upon any superior 
power, in most of them there is, as a rule, neither order, peace, nor regular 
government". This insecurity discouraged the exploitation of their immense 
resources, for although tin mining flourished in a few places, the 'squeezing 
points' of the minor Malay rulers were ruinous to enterprise. Only with Perak 
were the relations of the colony satisfactory; they were not defined, but the 
Sultan usually sent an officer to settle disputes with the colony. In Selangor 
and the other States there was no such arrangement; thus said Ord "I feel that it 
would be greatly to the advantage of the settlements if our influence could thus 
be extended over the Peninsula and I shall not fail to avail myself of any
1. Min. by Rogers PO.v.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 8.iv.l868. C0/273/l8
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opening that may present itself for do doing".^
Ord then had decided on his duty in the Malay States, but Rogers did not 
like it. "Settlers and merchants are always ready to call for operations of 
which they are to reap the profit and government to bear the cost... And
Governor*s are only too apt to fall in with a policy which gives interest and
2
importance to their proceedings". Nor did Edmund Hammond, in the Foreign Office
like Ord's efforts. Only a few days before Rogers's remark he wrote, apparently
quite independently, "I hope Governor Ord will not be too active with the petty 
3
states". For a third time Ord was reminded that "the true policy of the 
Government of the Straits Settlements is not to attempt to interfere, but to 
keep entirely clear of any disorders which may occur in the neighbouring native 
states vhich do not directly effect or threaten the peace of the settlements
4
themselves". The ground for local discretion was limited to this single 
eventuality.
When Rogers went on his summer holidays in 1868 he could feel confident that 
the Colonial Office had made it clear that its policy in the Malay States was 
one of non-interference. But a slight advance had been made; some of the 
States had been under careful review, and Buckingham had admitted, to his 
department, that interference might be necessary. Thus Ord had been authorised 
to interfere if the safety of the colony was threatened. Further advances were 
about to follow. In the latter part of 1868 the Colonial Office would be found 
jealously guarding its new sphere from the Foreign Office, and it would learn 
that in spite of all the warnings Ord was widening his personal sphere of 
influence to include, not only the Peninsula, but also the territory to north 
and r^ outh. In August 1868 he was entertained by the King of Siam and met the
1. Ibid. Ord to Buckingham B.iv.1868.
2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers 20.v.1868.
3. Min. by Hammond 16.v. 1868 on CO. to FO. 15*v.l868. FO/69/47
4. CO. to Ord 4.ri.l868 (draft). C0/27V18.
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Malay Sultans on the east coast. In November he visited his Dutch counterpart 
at Batavia.
The concluding phases of the Kedah Treaty give an instructive glimpse into
metropolitan attitudes and of departmental rivalries in Whitehall. It was
assumed in Singapore that the treaty of 21 March 1868 was in force. Not so in
London. Adderley, who was something of an expert on Vest Africa by now, was
thoroughly confused about "all these Rajas" in Malaya.* But if the Colonial
Office did not like Ord negotiating, even less did they like the Foreign Office
poaching in the area and taking the kudos.
The two departments misunderstood each other from the start. When the
Colonial Office passed on Ord's despatch with his draft Kedah treaty and his
general question as to his responsibilities on the frontier in Malaya, the
Foreign Office, like the Colonial Office, had considered the question of principle
first. The Kedah treaty could wait; Stanley could see no objections and
Hammond sent it to the Law Officers. Then, on 26 May, Ord's treaty arrived as
a fait accompli taking the Foreign Office completely by surprise. "The matter
and the questions involved in it are in such a state of muddle that T hardly
2
know what to advise", wrote Hammond. To make matters worse Rogers ^as soon
away from the Colonial Office, so that in the summer of 1868 confusion reigned.
Adderley did his best, but grumbled that "no object seems simpler" - only the
3
process complicated".
He agreed that the governor ought to be able to negotiate in cases like 
Kedah. It was really a question of the division of responsibility; Rogers had 
drawn up the rules, the Foreign Office had agreed, now the first case had come
up, and the departments were at loggerheads. They were all agreed that in the
1. Min. by Adderley 26.vi. 1868 on FO. to CO. 17.vi.lR6R. C0/2T/23.
2. Hin. by Hammond 31.'v. 1868 on CO. to'FO. 25.V.1868. F0/W47.
3. Hin. b. Adderley 24.x.1868 on PO. to CO. 17.vii.lR68. CO/273/23.
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Malay States the governor ought to have some responsibilities, but the Siamese
1
tributaries still bothered the Colonial Office.
It would all depend on the circumstances, said Rogers carefully, when he
returned from vacation to shed light on the matter.
"I am inclined to think that when the tributary can settle a question 
without any communication between our authorities ft the Siamese 
authorities, the Governor shd negotiate, but that if it is necessary 
that the Siamese authorities should intervene visibly, it is better 
the whole matter shouldppass through the hands of the Consul... and 
the King of Siam".
In this case the Foreign Office won; the treaty was completed by the Consul,
3
after consultation with Ord, and it was signed in Bangkok on 6 March 1869.
However the affair provided a warning for the Colonial Office, Thus when
Granville took over in December 1868, Rogers, briefing him as to the Malay States,
said "experience seems to show the necessity of maintaining a verv clear line
indeed between the junction of the officers of the Colonial Office and those of
4
the FO. Else they will certainly quarrel ft probably draw us in",
Granville, who was Colonial Secretary December 1868 to July 1870, had to 
restrain Ord on only one occasion. But energetic Sir Barry was well in his
t
stride in South-east Asia. In August 1868 an eclipse of the sun, which was to 
be observed by a French scientific expedition, was made the occasion for a 
State entertainment for the governor by the Kipg of Siam. At Whae Whan, near 
Patani, on the south-east coast of Siam, King Mongkut dined Sir Harry and lady 
Ord and Mr and Mrs Alabaster in the royal quarters. Ord in turn enterained the 
King. Siamese court customs were apparently disregarded as a compliment to
1. Buckingham without Rogers was not sure what was going on. Mr. Bergne, the
P0. treaty writer, was consulted on holiday but could not help. The matter
was held over until Rogers was back in London.
2. Min. by Rogers 22.x.1868 on FO. to CO. 17.vii.l«68. 00/273/23.
3. Knox to Clarendon 19.V.1869. FO/69/48. Text in Maxwell ft Cibson, '’’reatlea. 
pp. 82-85. It closely resembled Ord's 1868 treaty.
4. Min. by Rogers 21.i. 1869 on FO. to CO. 8.i. 1869. CV273/34.
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to the visitors and Ord believed he was treated to honours "rarely if ever 
accorded to a European". He said that"the King’s visit to me had no parallel 
in history",^ and he thought that the Whae Whan meeting was of great significance 
in Anglo-Siamese relations. Certainly, the first documents perused by Granville
after he took office were reports of a controversy between Alabaster and the
2
Siamese government in which Ord was asked to mediate.
The Whae Whan meeting was probably more significant than Ord realised. In
1867 the French had persuaded Siam to renounce her suzerainty over Cambodia, end
King Mongkut was still intensely suspicious of the French. After one of their
gunboats had selected Whae Whan as a suitable site for viewing the eclipse,
Alabaster had to oblige by sending a British gunboat to allay Siamese fears.
The French application to build an observatory caused dismay as it was Peered that
3
the French, once established, might not leave. Finally, Mongkut made the
eclipse viewing an international affair. He wanted some ’high British official*
to attend so Alabaster suggested Ord. During the festivities -the French were
"complaining and dissatisfied, and said the Siamese were so suspidous o^ them”,
4
but for everyone else the whole time was spent "as a picnic". European and 
American ladies came from Bangkok in Siam’s finest gunboat? many uninvited came 
too. Mongkut personally fired a seven-gun salute for the British Acting Consul, 
stop watch in hand, and he posed for photographs with Ord’s party. The whole 
was a triumph for Siamese hospitality and for Ord's self-esteem.
1. Ord to Buckingham 27#viii.l868 CO/273/21. Booklet and photos, received 
16.xi.1868 in CO/273/22.
2. Alabaster to Stanley 10.ix & 17.x.1868. FO/69/46. By this time Ord’s stock
in the FO. had fallen very low. Hammond wrote (2.xii.lR68) "if Governor
Ord is not preremptorily prohibited from meddling in Siamese matters, ve 
shall have never ending difficulties."
3. Alabaster to Stanley 13.vi.1868. CO/69/46.
4. Ibid. Report in Alabaster to Stanley 24.viii.1868. The actlng-consul's
report is much more exuberant than Ord’s, and included a water colour of 
the scene by himself for Stanley. Hammond drily commented! Ha very curious 
account".
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But Ord's August journey was not confined to these pleasing informalities*
The voyage back to Singapore was interrupted first to visit the Sultan of
Trengganu, who made friendly compliments to the Straits government* Ord then
►
took the Maharaja of Johore to Pahang and mediated in the boundary dispute with 
Bendahara Wan Ahmad.^ By the en^  of 1868 Sir Harry Ord seemed to be bent on 
establishing a sort of personal paramountcy in the Malay Peninsula* The Colonial
Office had to remind him that 6uch long absences from the colony should have
2
received prior approval from them.
Ord next turned his attention to Sumatra, where Anglo-Dutch relations were 
governed by the 1824 treaty. Pare Ord had a personal interest based on his long 
negotiations with the Dutch over the Gold Coast; in fact he may even have
3
discussed the matter with the Dutch while completing the 1867 partition agreement. 
In 1824 Britain permanently evacuated her Sumatran settlements and undertook 
not to make treaties with Sumatran rulers, and the Dutch agreed, in Notes 
exchanged at the same time, to respect the independence of Atjeh, the northern­
most State in the island, ^oth nations agreed to admit each others* subjects 
to trade with their respective possessions and would not charge more, than double 
the duty chargeable on their own subjects. They also agreed not to make treaties 
with the local rulers which expressly excluded the trade of each others*
A
subjects. The territorial clauses of this treaty were clear, but the commercial 
articles caused constant friction.
Disagreements over the treaty arose for three reasons. Firstly, as the
1. The boundary arranged in 1862, when Mutahir was Bendahara of T>ahang, was the 
Endau River, but the islands off its mouth went to Johore. ’^an Ahmad rejected 
this agreement, but in 1867 Sultan Omar of Trengganu persuaded him to accent 
Ord*s mediation. Ord persuaded Abu-Bakar of Johore to return the islands
to Pahang, which were north of the mouth of the Endau. Tlnehan, Pahang, 
p. 91. Covan, Origins. pp. 48 & 75. Ord to Buckingham 20.i. 1869. C0/273/26.
2. CO. to Ord 4.XH.1668 (draft). C0/27V?2.
3. See above p. SI.
4. n'ext in Maxwell & pGibson, Treaties. pp. 8-12.
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Dutch pushed their influence northwards towards the borders of At.leh by treaties
with the Sumatran rulers they brought these areas within the sphere of the
Dutch tariff.^ Secondly, these treaties provided for Dutch paramountcy in
States where, in some cases, Britain had made treaties previous to the 1824
2treaty, as in Siak, Deli, Langkat and Serdang. The Dutch maintained that these 
were abrogated in 1824, but the British government insisted that the latter 
treaty was not retrospective. Thirdly, the territory between At.leh and Siak was 
disputed by the local rulers. The Dutch treaty with Siak of 1 February 1858 
recognised this area as part of Siak, and in I865 they sent an expedition to 
Asahan when this wos disputed. The British government regarded the Dutch t^eaUes 
as ’annexations *•
It would be wrong to assume the Dutch ware effectively occupying Sumatra.
But by the 1860’s treaties had been made with most of the States south of Atjeh
and the Siak treaty of 1858 provided that Siak and its dependencies "forms a
part of Netherlands India and consequently is placed under the supremacy of the 
3
Netherlands”. Moreover the local rulers agreed not to make treaties, or permit 
foreigners to excavate, own land or reside without the consent of the Dutch 
Resident at Riouw. In 1859 an Assistant-Resident was stationed at Siak, 
Controllers were appointed at Deli, Parai and Mia in 1864, and after the 
Asahan expedition of 1865 an official was placed there.^
The usual British policy was to object to Dutch expansion in Sumatra on the 
grounds that the tariff was injurious to British commerce, and that the treaties 
embodying it were contrary to the 1824 treaty. Although, f o^m time to time
1. Eg. Djambi Treaty 15*xii.l834 in FO. Confid. Print dated Sept. 1867 pp. 21-24 
copy in C0/275/H.
2. Memo, by Sanderson, l.ii.1869. FO/^/ASS.
3. FO. Confid. Memo, relating to the Proceedings of the Netherlands Authorities 
in the Eastern Archipelago 1824-62, by A.S.Green, p. 37. Copv in CO/273 A?.
4* Memo, by Gov-Gen. of Netherlands India, M.Wijer, June 1869. FO print of 
Ord’s mission to Batavia pp. 12-17. FO/37/488.
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the Dutch made concessions, withdrew thoir forces, told the local rulers to
make exceptions in favour of British subjects and reduced the tariffs, the
Straits merchants frequently complained.
In 1865 a change was evident both in London and The Hague. Fransen van
Putte, the Liberal Colonial Minister, was anxious to re-define the 1824 treatv
as it referred to Sumatra and Borneo and he was prepared to remove differential
tariffs in Netherlands India and give up the Dutch Gold Coast settlements to
get this,^ It was suggested at the same time that Straits trade with Sumatra
was really increasing, and that complaints from Singapore were caused by
2
jealousy of the success of the Gorman merchants there. Lord Clarendon, the
Foreign Secretary, was prepared to encourage the Dutch to adopt a liberal trade
policy by allowing Dutch supremacy in Sumatra, and Berman Merivale,from the
India Office said "to get free trade in exchange for this acknowledgment would
3
be an excellent bargain". In March 1866 Clarendon authorised the British
reoresentative at The Hague to open informal discussions over Sumatra, but the
4
to exclude Borneo.
No progress was made because of changes of government in both countries.
The new Dutch Conservative Colonial Minister, Mijer, was not favourable. Lord 
Stanley, the Conservative Colonial Secrterary, was not helped by the India 
and Colonial Offices which were too busy with the transfer o** the Straits
5
Settlements. Pending negotiations the Foreign Office decided to make formal
1. Milbanke to Iayard 16.viii. 1865* Private. & Milbanke to Russell 31.ix.1865, 
F0/37/450.
2. Ibid. Capt. Ricketts (HM Consul, Sarawak) to lAyard 22.viii.1865.
5* Ibid. Merivale to Hammond 10.xi.1865. Private.
4* -Ibid. Clarendon to Milbanke 30.iii.1866. Neither the CO. nor the Admiralty 
were disposed to commi* themselves on the sublect of Borneo*
5* Ibid. Min. on CO. to FO. 13.ii. 1867, "the former consider that they h*ve done^ 'H 
the Straits Settlements, and the latter that they are not yet in a position 
to deal vith questions relating to them".
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protest against recent IXitch treaties with the States between Siak and Atjeh.*
Meanwhile the Colonial Office did not regard the matter as urgent and simply
asked the governor for information along with other matters*
Sir Harry Ord, however, reminded Whitehall that he was "not altogether without
experience" in relations with the Dutch, and he suggested that he might conduct
2
negotiations on the spot* This was refused, but when Stanley decided in
September U967 to abandon "the practically useless right of protesting against
inevitable territorial acquisitions" if equal trading facilities were granted in
Sumatra to British subjects, he agreed that Ord’s opinion on the draft treaty 
3
should be asked* Ord’s reputation still st^od high in the Foreign Office, who
were not yet antagonised by his Siamese negotiations* His views on the new
Sumatra treaty were sent to the Foreign Office in March 1868. Agreeing with the
idea of the treaty he pointed out the difficulties likely to be encountered and
4
suggested that Britain should offer a more attractive quid pro quo. Privately 
he suggested to Rogers that he should be allowed to tackle the Oovernor-Ceneral 
of Netherlands India; he had been eleven years on and off involved in the Cold
5
Coast negotiations and he would like Ma chance of trying my hand here"*
Ord found an ally in Vice-Admiral Edward Harris, the British Minister at 
The Hague, where discussions were resumed in June 1868 on the return of the 
Dutch Liberals to power* Stanley's draft treaty, known as the Siak Treaty,
referred to the territory between the River Djambi and Cape Temiang, but de Waal
>
1. Dutch treaties with Bila, Panei, Serdang and Deli in FO* Confid Print Dec.
1866. Copy in CO/273/15. Stanley to Ward 16.ii.1867. F0/37/450.
2. Ord to Buckingham 18,iv.1868. CO/273/lO*
3. Ibid. FO. to CO. 15.x.1867.
4. Ord to Buckingham 16.i.1868. Confidential, in CO. to FO. 25.i1i.1868. F0/5?/dP7,
5. Ord to Rogers 21.ix.1868. Private. CO/273/17.
the Colonial Minister asked "why not all'Sumatra?"•^  This raised the question 
of Atjeh, with which Raffles had made a treaty in 1819f which should have been 
changed after 1824 but nothing had been done. The Dutch had agreed in the 1824 
Note to respect the independence of Atjeh, but de Waal said that certain 
Achinese chiefs now sought Dutch protection. Stanley was prepared to Meal 
liberally1 over Atjeh, but the Colonial Office advised that this be left out of 
the original proposal. Harris, however, suggested that Ord should visit 
Batavia, and Ord revived the idea of allowing the Dutch to have At,1eh. He re­
iterated his view that the IXitch were asked to make a large commercial concession 
to British subjects and would require something more material in return than 
a conviction of the "abstract propriety” of the matter. He suggested that
Atjeh should be left to the Dutch, just as he proposed abandoning the former
protectorate over Wassaw on the Cold Coast. Northern Sumatra was, he said, in
a state which encouraged piracy, and the Sultan of Atjeh had "the usual vices
2
of the Malay Rajahs". The Colonial Office now agreed with Ord; they were
more anxious in getting the commercial concessions and Adderley several times
suggested offering the British Cold Coast forts to get this. The Foreign Office
vers more cautious, regarding the Atjeh question as a 'nice one', but they
treaty
concluded that Raffles's 1819/was a dead letter, that Dutch control over 
Sumatra had distinct advantages, so Clarendon (although recently returned to 
office and not really clear about Ord's mission) said "if Sir H.Ord is to
3
negotiate with the Dutch Governor I suppose he must make the most” of Atjeh.
Ord was not, in fact, permitted to negotiate, but he was allowed to make it
4
known that the British government would 'deal liberally' over Atjeh; his real 
mission was to sound opinion in Batavia and create a favourable feeling towards
1. Harris to Stanley 24.vii.186 copy in CO/273/22.
2. Ord to Buckingham 9.xii,1868. Ibid.
3. Min. by Clarendon on Sanderson Memo, i.ii.1869. FO/37/488.
4. FO. to CO. 23.ii.1869. CO/273/34.
the treaty. Mijer, the Governor General, was known to be an opponent, the
States-General was evenly divided, and the IXitch King had not yet been told.^
Ord reached Batavia on 14 June 1869 and returned to Singapore a month later.
He found great opposition in Java to any concessions, and he felt that Hijer
himself was most reluctant. The policy of the Liberals at The Hague towards
Netherlands India was regarded as uncertain, but the local officials wanted
no change which would give advantages to British traders. M  ier gave Ord his
own ideas for a future treaty. Stanley’s final draft was designed to cover
all area3 in Sumatra which the Dutch had acquired since 1824 and might acquire 
2
in the future. Mijer suggested it should apply only to Siak, so reducing the
3
area where British traders would be admitted on an equal footing. Ord urged 
the British government to accept Mijer's version, and if there was still 
opposition at The Hague to adopt a tough line with the Dutch to demand redress
4
for violations of the 1824 treaty, or take to matter to arbitration. The latter 
idea was rejected, but Whitehall was surprised that 6rd had not exceeded his 
instructions and produced some rash committment; instead he seemed to have
5
"conducted his negotiations quietly and with distinction". Hia particular 
contribution was the inclusion of Atjeh in the final agreement and his 
sympathetic understanding of the difficulties of the IXitch Liberals, but after 
this the Colonial Office deliberately kept Ord out of the matter and an attempt 
at intervention he made in 1871 was resisted.^
The new treaty was not completed until 1872, partly because of the precarious 
political position of the Dutch government, and partly because of the 'links*
1. Harris to Clarendon 26.iii.1869* FO/37/488.
2. Copy in FO. to CO. 17.ix.1867. CO/273/14.
3. FO. print of Ord's Mission pp. 6 ft 34. Copy in F0/37/4RS.
4. Ord to Granville 22.vi. ft 10.vii.1869. C0/27T/30.
5. Ibid. Min. by Cox 23.viii.lR69.
6. Min. by Cox 14.ix.lB71 on Ord to Meade 14.ix.lR71. co/?73/5M.
I
with the other agreements#
Firstly, at the end of 1869 the Dutch asked if the agreements negotiated
separately to allow Dutch planters in Surinam to recruit labour in India could
be presented in the States-General at the same time to offset the concessions
to Britain embodied in the Siak Treaty#^ Granville agreed, but in September
1870 he insisted that both treaties should fstand or fall together*. Secondly,
the British government first agreed to attach a note to the treaty withdrawing
opposition to future Dutch occupation in Atjeh, and later the treaty was
2
expanded to include the whole of Sumatra# Thirdly, in June 1870 the ’link1
was -forged by van Limburg, the Foreign Minister, with the Gold Coast treaty, which
3
has already been discussed, and Granville, rejecting an attempt by the Dutch 
to reopen the Sumatra treaty and re-define the Anglo-Dutch spheres in South-east 
Asia, agreed that all three should 'stand or fall together*# Kimberley told 
Gladstone that the Sumatra Treaty, signed 8 September 1870, was "dependent on
4
the conclusion” of the Gold Coast one, The latter was not signed until 25 
February 1871 and this is what kept all the treaties from the States-General 
until the 1871 session. In July 1871 the Gold Coast treaty was accepted and the 
Sumatra one was not, but the latter, re-submitted in slightly revised form in
5
January 1872, was finally accepted and was ratified on 17 February 1872.
Thus during his mission to Java in 1869 Ord kept within his instructions
and he made a useful contribution to the treaty which was completed three years
later# In the Malay Peninsula he tried to take one other step forward#
Concerned over the problem of piracy off the coast of Perak he revived the
1# Harris to Clarendon 17#xii#1869 ft 2)3# i. 1870# F0/’57/488#
2. Ibid# Clarendon to Harris 10#iii#1870. Confid. (draft)#
3# See above p# -^q£-
4. Kimberley to Gladstone 14.x.1870. Gladstone Papers 44224/88#
5# Text of Sumatra treaty, signed 2#xi#1871, Maxwell A Gibson, Treaties, 
pp. 17-18.
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British claim to the Dindings, but the Colonial Office restrained him# Tn 1826 
the Sultan of Perak had offered to cede a coastal area known as "the Pulo Binding 
and the Islands of Pangkor".^ This area was not defined, and it was never 
occupied as the East India Company did not ratify the treaty# ^ome negotiations 
were in progress when Ord arrived but they were discontinued, but in 1869 Ord
4
tried to re-open the matter# In England, Lord Stanley of Alderley, a traveller
in the East and a former Straits resident, read of the new move in the Straits
newspapers, and he demanded explanations from the Colonial Office. Ord insisted
that he never intended to occupy new territory without authority, and Granville
had this one occasion to remind Ord of the usual policy: "I should not be
disposed to approve of any proceeding which would extend the responsibility of
2
HM Government in the neighbourhood of the Straits Settlements"#
In 1870 the Malay States caused little anxiety in Whitehall. Ord*s attention
was diverted by more pressing problems in the colony, and Kimberley took office
in July 1870 with little apparent knowledge of, or interest for, the welay
States. For instance, when some photographs of Malays arrived for Professor
Huxley, the Minister who was to alter the course of Malayan history, found them
3
"a hideous series", and when a rumour was circulated by the Butch that the
Maharaja of Johore vas about to lease the island of Tiomang to Prussia,,Kimberley
said, "the first step is to ascertain distinctly where the Maharaja and his 
4
islands are".
In March 1871 Ord, sick with malaria, left for his first leave in England# 
Having covered in five years the whole range of British policy towards the 
Malay States, he had achieved only a part of his policy# His general notions
1. Perak treaty No. 1, 1826. Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, p# 2^ .
2, Granville to Ord 10#ix.1869 (draft). Cg/275/30. For a fuller discussion 
of the whole Bindings controversy see Cowan, Origins# pp. 67-6o#
3# Kimberley 14.i.1871 on Ord to Kimberley 21.xi.1870. C0/27V41.
4. Kimberley 21.vii.1870 on F0. to CO. 7#vii.l870# C0/27T/42#
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of responsibility were accepted, and within each of Rogers’s three spheres, Ord
had made some useful contributions. In the case of Siam and its tributaries,
*
he had urged the value of preserving Siamese power and had concluded agreements 
over Kelantan and Kedah. His visit to Mongkut had furthered good relations with 
Siam itself. In»the case of the independent Malay States he had carried his 
point that the Governor should have wider authority, and with ifcds freedom he 
had successfully mediated in the Pahang-Johore dispute and made a friendly 
visit to the Sultan of Trengganu. He found relations with Perak more or less 
satisfactory. In the third case, where relations were with the Dutch, his 
Gold Coast experience had given him a special interest. Agreeing that the 
Sumatran States could be conceded to the Dutch, he carried the important point 
that Atjeh should not be excepted. In all these matters one can say that Ord 
was a success.
But he had also envisaged further British intervention within the Peninsula,
and this had been flatly rejected in London, Ord was convinced that the policy
of non-intervention in Malaya needed revision. The Colonial Office vould allow0
intervention only if the security of the colony was threatened, and although 
the germ of a revolution in policy lay in this proviso, Sir Harry Ord was not 
to be the executor. He accepted his position as Downing Street's catspaw and 
told his Council "my hands are tied".^
While on leave in England he tried to press his views, but although he made 
some headway on administrative details, he failed to carry his concept of a 
Malayan policy. Ord's impact on the Colonial Office, however, cannot be viewed 
apart from the more general opinions held there about his administration in 
the Straits. Officials would regard Ord's ideas in their light of thoir 
confidence in the Governor. It is therefore time to take stock of Ord's 
position in Singapore - the fulcrum whence he sought to influence wider spheres.
1. Legislative Council minutes, 20.x.1869 received in CO. 7.ii.l870. C0/?7*/d3.
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Ord's government of the Colony. 1867 to 1871.
The first Colonial Office administration of the Straits Settlements had
been a stormy one. On the one hand, Straits residents who had longed to be rid
of the superintendence of the Government of India, now found ^owning Street a
more vigilant master;^ * on the other hand, the Colonial Office realised that
Ord, for all his experience, was unacquainted with the system in Crown Colonies.
Expenditure on new steamers and Government House drew criticism from both sides.
Atthe transfer ceremonies in Singapore, Ord offended local society by his brusque 
2
manner. Sir Benson Maxwell, the Chief Justice, clashed with him from the 
start. For several years even the layout of his Estimates and Blue Books was 
unacceptable to London.
i
Thus Ord's limitations were realised. In January 1868 Rogers remarked that 
service in Bermuda and the Y/est Indies, where there were representative 
institutions, ill fitted anyone for the detailed reporting required from Crown 
Colonies. When Ord, with the best of intentions, suggested in the Legislative 
Council that new revenue was needed and that import duties were not ruled out 
he sent shivers of fright around Singapore, the City and Whitehall. "I cannot
help thinking that the relations between Sir H.O. and this offioe are becoming
3 4unsatisfactory", said Rogers, who prepared a tart lecture for the governor.
Eventually Ord produced Blue Books in the correct foim, but some typical
expressions of his personality left a bad impression. Demands for an A.D.C.
caused irritation, although he got his way. Letters about his future career,
and claims to what amounted to special consideration, made Rogers think him
5
"most unduly pertinacious". But when criticism came from outside,Downing
Straits Times. 20.iii.1869.
2. C.B.Buckley, Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore. II, p. 786.
3. Min. by Rogers 16.i.1868 on Ord to Buckingham 7.xii.l867. CO/?73/l3.
4. CO. to Ord 31.vii.1868. Confid. (draft). C0/273/l8.
5. Min. by Rogers on Ord to Granville 25,i.l869« CO/273/26.
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Street supported the governor. In Singapore Ord became very unpopular, but 
evidence suggests that in his early days he had a good deal of support.
Opposition first centred in London.
When the framework of Colonial rule in the Straits Settlements was embodied 
in the first ordinances which Ord presented in the Legislative Council in April 
1869* old Singapore residents were alarmed that the cherished independence of 
the Supreme Court seemed threatened. One result of this was the foundation in 
London in January 1868 of the Straits Settlements Association ”to guard against
any legislation that might prejudicially ’affect the interests of the Straits
i ' 7
Settlements”. This society took the initiative in the attack on Ord. Month
by month it badgered the Colonial Office, and it secured two interviews with
Granville and at least one with Kimberley. But after two years of controversy
2
Ord emerged victorious, and his reports became so satisfactory that it was said
* that his 1868 Blue Book ”might be read as Sir H Ord’s general reply to the
3
Straits Association.” In 1870 the association’s influence slumped after Herbert 
wrote in January: ’the time has arrived when the Association may be relieved ofi
4
the supervision of the Col: Office”.
Yet at the very moment when the Colonial Office felt that Ord was holding 
his own, opposition came to a head in Singapore. Public meetings were held 
against him, and when he went on leave newspapers hoped he would never return. 
Sir Benson Maxwell, his perennial rival, was said to command the unofficials in
1. Wm. Napier (Sec.) to Granville 7*ii.l868. co/273/24.
2. Granville, sensitive to political pressure, was fairly indulgent to the 
Assoc'n, and its letters were often the only Straits documents he endorsed.
He received a deputation on 4 May 1869, but since a reply by Ord to his 
attackers was received on 1 May, Granville conceded nothing. In December lp68 
a ’Singapore Merchant* wrote three vicious letter*3 to The Star, which soon 
appeared as a pamphlet, The Straits Settlements, or How to Govern a Colony. 
Ord’s reply was contained i*1 * series of reasoned annotations to this, in
Ord to Granville 29.iii.1869. Co/273/31.
3. Min. by Sandford 30.x. 1869 on Ord to Granville 27.ix.1869. CO/273/30.
4. Ibid. Min. by Herbert on SS Assoo. to Granville 31.i.1870.
4
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in the Council, W.H.M.Read resigned his position as a Magistrate for a year after 
a row with Ord, and Rogers found himself "suspecting the truth to be that Sir
H.O. is irritating".^ Politically, this meant that people were reluctant to
serve on the Legislative Council. Possibly pressure was put on people to refuse
to serve as unofficials to embarrass Ord, which made Cot feel that he was
2
"hardly meeting with fair play".
Ord overcame his political troubles with some courage. While the Straits
Association in London hedged when Granville suggested adding a Chinese member
to the Council, Ord welcomed the idea, and he vent further, and decided that
two more Europeans could also be appointed. The Colonial Office feared th^t
he might only get a majority by using his casting vote, but Ord. said he was
3
"quite prepared to take the risk". At the outset on the 1870 session Cox was
4
"curious to see how Sir H.Ord will get through this session. If wise - well**".
And this suspicion that he might pull it off was fulfilled. When the new steamer 
Pluto proved inadequate for local needs Ord decided to settle the question
of government transport, which had vexed him from the st»rt, for himself. He got
the Executive Council to vote $7000 to alter Pluto.and they also agreed to
spend $15,000 building a new steamer after selling two old ones. Herbert was
furious. "It really is a great impertinence in him to sign these despatches 
altogether", ^nd he suspended the matter by telegram. But Knatchbull-Hugessen 
was not so sure that Ord would not make out a good case: "Note Ord had his 
Council unanimously behind him now - last year he needed to use his casting 
vote".** While he was at home in 1871 Ord managed to persuade Kimberley over
I. Min. by Rogers 23*iii*1870 on files ref. Maxwell ft Read.received 21.ill.1870. 
CO/273/36.
2. Min. by Cox l.vi.1869 on Ord to Granville 26.lv.1869. C0/?7V29.
3. Ord to Granville 9.ix.l869. Co/273/31.
4. Min. by Cox ll.vii.70 on Ord to Granville 24.V.1R70. CO/273/38.
5. F.Swettenham, Footprints in Malaya (1942) pp. 13-15 recalls Pluto’s limitations
6. Mins Herbert (22nd) and' K-Huge^een 23.iii.1871 on Ord to Kimberley Id.ii.1^ 71, 
CO/273/45* Herbert was annoyed because he arranged to purchase Pluto second 
hand - a bargain which proved very doubtful.
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the steamers.
Ord may have mastered his troubles with the Council, just as he got the
better of the Straits Association, but he also had trouble with his subordinate
officials, ^specially those immediately below him, the Lieut-Governors of
Malacca and Penang. Herbert*s was probably a fair summary of the impasse Ord
reached in his personal dealings:
"I am rather inclined to think that Governor Ord*s unfortunate temper 
and disposition to act harshly and imperiously towards those who do 
not humbly obey his will has led a party of officials to combine in 
giving him trouble and putting him in the wrong. Any symptom of this
should be repressed - but one cannot help feeling^that if he is
uncomfortable he made the bed on which he lies".
Only in the light of this judgement on his character can the reception of Ord’s
proposals and actions as to the Malay States be seen.
Nevertheless, this view must not. be allowed to obscure the real achievments
of Ord’s first tour at Singapore. In spite of all the criticism, he produced
a revenue to cover expenditure in years of trnde depression, and the estimates
for 1871 shoved a surplus of $71,192. Government House was completed. As a
professional engineer Ord was a highly suitable person to introduce Crown
Colony rule in Singapore, and he introduced much resented, but essential,
ordinanpes to provide more sanitary conditions in the growing urban centre.
i
(Sir) Frank Swettenham, who was only twenty when he arrived as a Cadet, saw 
much of Ord while travelling as his Malay interpreter, and he remembered hiip as
i
MA big and very masterful Governor, of great ability and strong character". He
paid tribute also to Ord’s financial ability, and said "Sir Harry and Lady Ord
3
were exceedingly kind to me from the first". Ord’s opponents were usually from 
the European mercantile community, never a class much trusted by aristocratic
1. Min. by Herbert 22.viii.1870 on papers concerning troubles with ^aw in 
Malacca received n.viii.1870. Ord also had trouble with Cairns in Malacca 
and Anson in Penang. See A.E.H.Anson, About Myself and Others, up. 2QX-4#
2. Ord to Kimberley 19.ix.1870. CO/273/41.
3. Swettenham, Footprints, pp. 16-17.
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ministers like Granville, Kimberley and Carnarvon. On the eve of Ord's 
departure even Herbert thought the governor should have his due: "We have had 
to find fault with him about administrative details, but he should have credit 
for conciliating and keeping in good order the Asiatic population".*
\
Whatever the Colonial Office thought about Ord they were very soon completely
disenchanted with his locum tenens. Col. Anson,the Tdeut-Govemor of Penang.
Only three months after Ord's departure from Singapore Herbert complained of
"too much eagerness in the Colony to amend his proceedings now that his back is 
2
turned". Knatchbull-Hugessen noticed how "Mr. Anson is very busy & inclined
3
to put a great many irons in the fire at the same time". Kimberley insisted 
that "a very strong check is required on the foolish tendencies of acting 
Governors to fussy meddling in the policy of their superiors".^
Yet Anson's meddling was really a continuation of Ord's own policy. After 
seeing the Malay States, Ord had recommended what he felt, as the roan on the 
spot, the circumstances demanded, but he was restrained by the policy of non­
intervention. Anson, now standing in Ord's shoes, cam© to the same conclusions 
as Ord. He saw a critical deterioration of order and trade on the west coast.
To appreciate his position it is necessary to turn aside and consider the Malay 
States at the time of Ord's leave in England in 1871.
The Malay States in the 1870fs.
5
Only in Johore and Kedah was there anything like effective government. Kedah, 
along with Kelantan, has already been noted as und^r the suzerainty of Siam, and
1. Min. by Herbert 12.iv.lP7l on Ord to Kimberley 3.iii.lP71. C0/27V45#
2. Min. by Herbert 6.vi.lP7l n^ Anson to Kimberley 25.iv.1871. CO/27^/46.
3. Min. by K-Hugessen l.vii.1871 on Anson's speech to Leeds, Council. Received 
28.vi.1871. CO/273/47.
4. Min. by Kimberley 6.vi.l871. on Anson to Kimberley ^.vi.1871. CO'273/47.
5. Report of the 'Committee on Native States' in Anson to Kimberley 25.iv.1^ 71, 
CO/273/47.
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Ord had established good relations with Siam.^ Johore had been ruled since
1862 by Abu-Bakar, who styled himself Maharaja and was in close touch with Ord.
2
His family owed its position to British influence and his home was in Singapore.
In 1866 he had visited Europe and he has been called, somewhat doubtfully, the
3
one Malay ruler the British could trust and the "father of modern Johore".
In the East of the Peninsula. Trengganu was ruled peaceably by the remarkable
4Sultan Omar, who had centralised the administration on the Sultanate. After 
the excitements of the early 1860*s Trengganu could be said to be outside the 
main stream of Malay politics as seen from Singapore. Pahang was war-sick
5
and somewhat de-populated after Van Ahmad's three invasions; even at the end
6
of the century Pahang was still something of a backwater in valaya.
The regions that would worry Col. Anson lay on the west coast between the
British settlements of Penang and Malacca, in the States of Perak and Selangor
and Sungei Ujong, more precisely,4hey lay around the rivers which flowed through
the tin bearing areas and issued into the Straits of Malacca. On these rivers
the leading Malay Rajas based their revenues in the form of tolls; along the 
same rivers a growing traffic in tin was transported.
The west coast States were afflicted by two problems which became interwoven. 
Firstly, Chinese tin miners, backed bv capital in Penang and Malacca, and 
attracted by the possibility of great wealth, brought to Malaya clan rivalries
1. While Ord was on leave King Chulalongkom visited Singapore. Anson, Abtyout 
Myself and Others, pp. 299-301.
2. See agreement between Sultan and Tumen^gong of Johore, 1869. ’-"axwell ft Gibson, 
Treaties, pp. 127-129.
3. See Winstedt, 'History of Johore* JMBRAS. X, Pt.Ilt (Deo 193?) pp. 100-120.
In England Abu-Bakar was created a Knight of the Star of India - the first 
Malay ruler to be so honoured. His special position in Singapore did not 
prevent him causing anxiety to the Straits government on a number of occasions. 
W.H.Read was a frequent critic. For some of Abu-Bakar's economic interests, 
see Cowan, Origins, pp. 44-48.
4. M.C.ff Sheppard, 'A Short History of Trengganu', JMBRAS. Ft III (1949).
5. See above p. Ud--
6. H.Clifford, East Coast Etchings (1896) p.11.
168
which erupted into open warfare.^ Secondly, the decay of Malayan royal 
institutions gave rise to dynastic rivalries, jealousies, and civil wars among'
the Malays# Since the Malay Rajas usually depended upon revenues from river
2
tolls, and the yields from these increased when the rivers were used by the tin 
traffic, rivalry for territorial jurisdiction over the mouths of the rivers was 
rife# Two sorts of rivalry existed therfore, (l) among the Chinese societies 
in the mines, and (2) among the petty Malay rulers. When Malay Raja allied 
himself with Chinese Headman, the result was the type of confused warfare which 
halted trade and even threatened the security of the British settlements.
In Perak the rivalry of opposing candidates for the Sultanate lay behind
the tension among the Malays# Only two months after Ord’s departure Sultan Ali
3
died on 25 May 1871, and the irregular election of Bendahara Ismail to succeed
1. See V.Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (1948) pp# 155-173, and Mills, British 
Malaya, pp. 203-208 for the Chinese Secret ‘Societies. These societies had 
their origin in China and membership was usually based on regional or clan 
divisions in China. Originally ’benevolent associations*, some had taken on 
a criminal character. In the Malay States they usually provided the only 
organisation among the mining communities. By the 1850*s two groups had 
emerged at Penang:
(a) The Ghee Hin, and the Ho Seng, which corresponded with the Triad Society 
of China, and was largely composed of Cantonese. Locally these were known as 
the ’Four Districts’, *See Kwan*.
(b) The Hai San and Toh Peh Kong, which had been formed in Penang, and 
consisted mainly of Hakkas. These were known as 'five District*, *Go Kwan*.
In the Penang riots of 1867 these two parties were invloved in a regular war 
for ten days. (Anson*s account, Myself ft Others, pp. 278-283.)
The divisfon and rivalry of the Ghee Hin and the Hai San were projected 
into the Malay States. Little was known about the societies in the Colony 
until Gustav Schlegel’s, Thian Ti Hwui, published in Batavia in English in 
1866, and based on records seized by the Police. It was used, according to 
Purcell, by Anson*s committee of inquiry into the Penang Riots, whose report
was published in 1868.
2. See R.J.Wilkinson’s chapters in R.O.Winstedt, *A History of Perak*, JMBRAS,
XII (1934) pp. 13A-158 for the Perak Constitution and for some account of 
the various officers of State, and v-hat they were, in theory, entitled to 
in the way of revenue. Mills, British Malaya, pp. 170-173 says the Valay 
States at this time were committing political ’hara-kiri* among themselves.
3. Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p. 93 gives the d«te as 26 **ay. Cowan, .Origins,
p. 98 gives 25 May, flowing the Irving Report, 24.vii.1872. CO/8O9/I P. 152.
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OUTLINE SKETCH OF PERAK
him, left the Perak Rajas in rival groups, the authority of the Sultanate
of Perak had been declining for twenty years the normal constitutional processes
were becoming upset.* The decline began in the late 1850 *s when Sultan ,Abdu,llah
Muhammad Shah (reigned 1851-1857) and his sons were so unpopular and weak that
2
the chiefs were in open rebellion. By the time of the death of Sultan Ja'afar 
(reigned 1857-1865) the Perak royal house had so declined that the new Sultan,
3
Ali, reigned until 1871 in impotence at Sayong, while an ageing Bendahara, Ismail, 
who was not a member of the royal house, lived in isolation up the K’inta River.^
In 1871 the dominating characters of Perak were neither the Sultannor the 
Bendahara, but the Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah and the so-called Mantri of Larut. The 
highly intelligent, but unpopular, Raja Yusuf, son of Sultan 'Abdu'llah Muhammad
5
Shah, remained a persistent claimant for the Sultanate.
g
These rivals faced each other in 1871, and as their names will recur again 
and again in the background to British intervention their antecedents are worth 
discussing. The Sultan and Raja Yusuf may, for the momemt, be dismissed quickly. 
The former had been Raja Muda to Sultan Ja'afar and became Sultan in 1865. A 
weak ruler, he had no real authority in Perak. Yusuf was several times passed
7
by in the succession, apparently because he was disliked because of his harshness,
1. The best account of this period of Perak's history is the Introduction to 
C.D.Cowan, 'Sir Frank Swettenham's Perak Journals, 1874-76', JMBRAS, XYIV,
Pt. 4 (Dec. 1951) pp. 12-20. The Constitution of Perak is discussed at length 
by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, pp. 134-158. Usually the heir presumptive, 
or Raja Muda, was accepted by the minor rulers in an election as the new Sultan, 
The Bendahara or 'Prime Minister', if of the royal house,then often succeeded 
as Raja Muda, and a new Bendahara was elected.
2. Winstedt, Perak, pp. 75-76. J.M.Oullick, 'Capt. Speedy of larut', JMBRAS, TTVT, 
Pt. 3 (Not. 1953) pp. 24-25.
3. Ibid. p. 25.
4. Cowan, Origins, p. 62. 5. Cowan, Swettenham*s Perak Journals, p. 16.
6. Gullick, Speedy, p. 24 speaks of two parties among the Perak Malays - the un- 
river (UluTchiefs centred around Kuala Kangsa on the U p p e r Perak, and the 
down-river (Hilir) chiefs living nearer the mouth at Bandar Bahru and Durian 
Sabatang.
7. In 1874 Swettenham was told by the Iaksamana, ,,T3y rights Vusuf ought to be 
Sultan of Perak, but he is so severe the chiefs cannot bear his harshness", 
Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p. 56.
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but he persisted in claiming he was the rightful Sultan, and in 1874 Swettenham 
found him "by far the most royal looking man I have seen in Perak"Bendahara
Ismail was not of the royal house; the date of his election to office is \m-
2
certain, but is said to have been about 1851. By 1871 he was old and living 
apart, wisely caring after his tin mines at Kinta and he continued to do so even
i 3
after he was elected Sultan in succession to Ali. The Raja Muda Abdu’llah 
was the son of Sultan Ja'afar and was made Raja Muda in 1865, probably because 
Bendahara'sIsmail'a non-royal descent prevented the normal succession being
4
followed. By 1871 'Abdu'llah was at odds with the Sultan, and he antagonised
the Mantri of larut by trying to collect taxes there, which he claimed were
5
a perquisite of the Raja Muda's office*
This quarrel introduces the most significant factor in Perak politics in
this period. For while the Malay Sultans of Perak had declined a parvenu family
had achieved an almost independent domain in the province of larut, where it
owed its position to wealth from taxes on tin mined by the Chinese in Larut.
These were said to number 40,000 in 1871, and to be exporting tin worth one
6
million dollars a year.
Forty years earlier Larut had been a marshy tract on the periphery of perak
7
affairs, under the nominal jurisdiction of a minor Malay ruler. But about 1840 
this ruler employed a relative, Long Ja'far, the Mantri's father, to collect
1. Ibid. p. 54. In February 1869 Tusuf had presented his case to the Straits 
government and Col. Macpherson, the Colonial Secretary, regretted at the 
time that it was not possible for Britain to govern Perak "through a 
nominee". Wilkinson, 'Notes on Perak History', Papers on Malay Subjects, v.4, 
(1908) p. 99.
2. Date discussed in Cowan, Swettenham*s Journals, p. 13. Ismail's origins 
are discussed by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, p. 140.
3. See below p. 114-
4. 'Abdu'llah's background discussed in Cullick, Speedy, p. 25. 5. Tbid. p. 26
6. F.McNair, Perak and the Malays: Sarong and yrls (1878).p. 351.
7. Wilkinson in Winstedt. Perak, p. 78 calls Larut a 'no man's land' and describes 
the authority, such as it did exist, of the one interested ^alay ruler, the ;
Panglima Bukit Gantang, or Keeper of the pass between larut and the Perak R. !
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the taxes in the area.^ When he first went to Larut, it is said there were
only three Chinese living there, but seeing the possibilities for tin mining
he encouraged the Chinese to work there, and he gradually gained for himself
nearly independent jurisdiction. After he died in 1857 his son %ah Ibrahim,
2then in his twenties, managed to gain even greater powers than his father. Yet
if Ngah Ibrahim gained 'titular and official 'authority' over Larut, he did not
attempt to govern. The Chinese miners at Klian Pauh (later Teiping) and
Kamunting were largely left to themselves and such organisation as there was was
provided by the secret societies. Others have described the origins of these
societies which in 1862 first brought disorder to Tarut. It is sufficient to
mention here that in 1862 the Hai San miners at Klian Pauh drove the Ghee Fins
of Kamunting from Larut, assisted, it should be noted, by Ngah Ibrahim.
This was the first of a continuing series of disorders which troubled Perak
and Penang, where the Chinese had their headquartars, for fifteen years. Put
while it illustrates vividly the precariousness of Ngah Ibrahim's wealth, the
affairs of 1862 also assisted him indirectly in getting greater powers. For
by paying large sums to meet claims against the titular Sultan Ja'far (who could
not pay)t it appears that Ngah Ibrahim was given further freedom in larut and
was made one of the four great chiefs of Perak. Henceforth he was known as 
 1----------------- — — —    -    ■' -- —
1. Gullick, Speedy, p.18-19. Long Ja'far's origins are discussed by Wilkinson 
in Winstedt. Perak, p.78. His brother had carried the daughter of the 
Panglima Bukit Gantang.
2. The grants of jurisdiction over Ihe Larut to Long Ja'far and Ngah Ibrahim are 
best presented by Wilkinson in Winstedt, Perak, pp.78-79, where he says of 
Long Ja'far: "Beginning as a mere representative of the Sultan he bought from 
his master one after another the various sources of revenue in the province". 
Translations made by Swettenham in 1873 of the documents said to be the grants, 
are quoted by Wilkinson, Papers on Malay Subjects, op. cit. pn, 102-5.
3. Wilkinson's careful phrase.
4. The dispossessed Ghee Hin members made claims against the titular authority 
in Perak, Sultan Ja'far. Gov. Cavenagh blockaded the larut River to enforce 
the payment of $17,447. It is said that the arrangement whereby Ngah TbraMra 
settled this debt was negotiated by the Laksamana, Mohomed Amin, who OulUck 
(Speedy p.25) calls the ablest Malay financier in Perak. (See also Cowan, 
Origins. p. 60. McNair, 0£. cit. p.351* Wilkinson in Winstedt, perak. p.81, 
and Cavenagh, Reminiscences, pp. 323-324. )•
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the Mantri of iArut.^ Whether he received a freehold or simply a sort of fief
is undecided, hut certainly in the late 1860's he was the de racto ruler of
Larut* His revenue from the tin trade was said to amount to ^ 200,000 a year:
he had a small police force of forty men, and forts on the larut river commanding
2
the seaward and landward entrances of the Larut tin mining area.
In Selangor a civil war,which had begun before Ord went to the "East, was
reaching a more crucial phase when the Governor went on leave. The Sultan of
Selangor had actually requested Ord's assistance in July 1870, hut this was
refused because the real nature of the Selangor civil war did not emerge until
after his return, Selangor’s problems differed from Perak's, hut the same
5elements - Chinese mining clans, and rival Rajas - played their part..
In his long reign from 1826 to 1857 Sultan Muhammad had allowed the kingdom
to split into what were virtually principalities centering round the five main
4rivers - the Bemam, Selangor, Klang, Langnt and fukut. The most powerful of 
these territorial rulers by the time of Kuhammad'a death in 1857 was Raja Juma'at 
of Lukut, who, like the Mantri on Larut, built his wealth and power by a wise 
cultivation of tin mining by Chinese, whom he first introduced into Selangor in 
the 1840's, He was soon copied by Raja Abdul-Samad, ruler of the Selangor River, 
who opened up the Kanching Hills mines, on the upper Selangor River about 1844, 
and by Raja Abdullah of Klang, who opened' the Amnang mines on the upper Klang 
in the late 1850's.^
1, Referred to hereafter as The Mantri. A discussion of the nev title in u^llick, 
Speedy, p.22, and a careful discussion of the meaning of the new grants, and
a copy of the document, in Wilkinson, in Winstedt, Perak, p. 81,
2. Ibid. p.82. The forts were at '’atang, near the mouth of the l/mit River, 
and at Kota, commanding the land route over the pass from the Perak River.
3m See Cowan, Origins, pp. 84-5 for discussion of the differences between the 
situations in Perak and Selangor.
4, Wilkinson, 'History of the Peninsula Malays', Papers on Malay Subjects flQP'O 
vol. 7 p. 142, speaks of "five petty states",
5. S.M.Middlebrook, 'Yap Ah Loy', JMBRAS. XXIV, Pt. 2, (1951) PP. 17-20.
I
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It was rivalry for the possession of these rivers rather than for the
Sultanate which caused the Selangor civil war. The years between 1860 and 1867
have been described as those particularly disastrous in Selangor’s history.^ As
Swettenham says, Selangor became "the war playground of a number of walay Radas,
whose pastime was fighting and intriuging to gain control of the rich districts'
2
in Selangor where Chinese, and a few others, were mining tin”. The most 
ambitious and persistent of these warring Malays was Raja ™ahdi, who in 1866
3
managed to commandeer the lower Klang district. At first the Sultan Abdul-Samad 
did not demur to this coup; he told Ra.ja Ismail, the heir to the dispossessed 
ruler of Klang, that as they were both young men they should fight it out. Put 
when Raja Mahdi stopped paying his ^ 500 a month into the Royal Revenue, the 
Sultan’s equanimity passed, and he refused Raja Mahdi the hand of his daughter 
Arfar,^
Sultan Abdul-Samad gave his daughter instead to the Tengku ’Zia’u’d-din, 
brother of the Sultan of Kedah, who henceforth for about ten years was to be one
1, Wilkinson, History of the Peninsula Malays, p. 144. Abdul-Samad, nephew and 
son-in-law of Muhammad, had become Sultan of Selangor in 1859# As ruler of 
the Selangor River district he had b^en active in opening up the Kanching 
Hills mines, but as Sultan he lived in indolence, neutrality and semi- 
retirement at Langat. Middlebrook (p.24) states the view that his election 
was a mistake. Possibly a worse event was the death in 1864 of Ra.ja Juma’at, 
for under his sons Raja Bot and Raja Yah.ja Lukut went into a rapid decline.
2. Swettenham, Footprints, p. 20.
5# Raja Mahdi was the grandson of Sultan Muhammad, and the son of Raja Sulaiman, 
who originally ruled Klang before he was displaced in 185**, ^hen the Sultan 
gave the region to Abdullah, who opened the Ampang mines. Raja Mahdi had been 
living in Klang as a trader in the early 1860’s, receiving an allowance from 
Abdullah. The coup took place when Abdullah was embarrassed by his **alay 
subjects.
4. In Abdullah’s time, Abdul-Samad had arranged for the Klang revenues to be 
collected on a commission basis by the Singapore tycoons w.H.M.Read and Tan 
Kim Ching. (Winstedt, Selangor, p. 19). This possibly made ^ahdi’s 
defaulting more obvious to the Sultan and it also involved awkward demands 
for compensation from the British merchants. In May 1867 Oov. Cavenagh 
refused to intervene in the dispute between Raja Mahdi and Raja Ismail.
Ibid. p. 30.
of the leading figures in Selangor politics.^ " And not only did Mahdi loose a 
wife, for in little over a year he lost Klang to Raja Ismail, who with
2
'Zia'u'd-din's help attacked the area, and captured T*^ lang by March 1870,
However before many months had passed the persistent Mahdi had found a new prize, 
for in July 1870 he droye Raja Muda Musa from the mouth of the Selangor River,
The motive for each of these skirmishes was the rivalry of the Rajas for 
control of the river mouths which would yield an income from duties on tin 
exports. The mining areas, as already mentioned, lay nearer the headwaters of 
the rivers. There, rivalries of a different kind were brewing, '^ he miners around 
Kuala Lumpur, on the Klang, were Hai Sen members, while the Kah Yeng Chew clan
4
of the rival mines nearby were Ohee Hins# Thus potential eranities, like those
in Perak, existed in Selangor. Worse still when the Chinese Peadman, Liu *Vim 
Kong, died in 1868 having appointed Yap Ah Loy as his successor, disappointed 
relatives of Liu descended on Kuala Lumpur. Led it seems by Chong Chong, a former 
employer of Yap Ah Loy, they constituted a threat to the peace among the miners 
of the area, Nothing happened in February 1869, however, when Chong Chong first
1. The Tengku is said to have been educated among Europeans, and Abdul-Samad, who 
had no territory to offer him after he married Arfar, asked him what he wanted 
to do. When the latter stated a preference for administrative work the Sultan 
made him a sort of governor of Langat, which would enable him to collect revenue 
as an income. More vaguely the Sultan said he would Mgive up the country 
with its districts to our son... to govern and develop for Us and Our sons”. 
(Written authority dated 26.vi.1868). Whatever was intended by this the
Malays came to style him as Tengku Wakil and the British authorities regarded
him a® ’Viceroy*, Thomas Braddell*a Report on Selangor, 18.ii.1874.
CO/809/l p. 216.
2. Cowan, Origins, p.93 & Wilkinson, Hist, of Pen. Malays, p.145. Tsmail received 
financial backing in Malacca and he captured most of the Klanr forts in August 
1869, but Raja Mahdi remained at Kuala Klang. ’Zia'u’d-din had to go to Kedah 
in 1868 when his mother died, but he returned to Klang in Oct, 1869, and 
Middlebrook (p#43) suggests that a previous arrangement had been made about 
recruiting a Kedah force the Klang operation. This seems unlikely if 
Wilkinson’s account of the Tengku*s attempted mediation between Mahdi and 
Ismail is correct. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 145.
3. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy. p. 47.
4. The town of Kuala Lumpur grewin the late 1850*s at the confluence o^ the ^ lang
and Gombok Rivers. Mu Rgim Kong took charge in 1861 and,he was soon elected 
Headman, or Capitan China. In 1862 he called upon a more remarkable Chinese,
Yap Ah Loy, to be his agent, and this man, who achieved great wealth and 
power, succeeded to the Capitancy in 1868.
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arrived, but he soon became the leader of the Kah Ten/? Chews who were planning
to attack Yap Ah Loy.^
It was this situation - the inflammable rivalries of the miners - which
caused the Chinese and Malay quarrels of Selangor to coalesce. During the seige
2
of Klang Yap Ah Loy did not commit himself, but sometime before November 1869 
he went to langat to see Sultan Abdul-Samad. There he net the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din 
and he came away, it is believed, "a nominal associate” or his party. When, 
therefore, in September and October of 1870 Kuala Lumpur was attacked by Chong 
Chong and Sayid Mashhor (a former ally of the Tengku),^ Yap Ah Loy looked to 
the Tengku for help. And when Sayid Mashhor and Chong Chong failed in their 
attack, thgrfell back, it seems, on the Raja Mahdi's positions on the Selangor 
River. ^
The situation thus created represents the position of the Selangor war on 
the eve of Ord's departure for England: the Tengku at Klang, Yap Ah Loy at Kuala 
Lumpur, and the dispossessed Raja Ts^ail on the one side, vere ranged against 
Raja Mahdi at the mouth of the Selangor and Sayid Mashhor and Chong Chong, who 
were planning another attack on Kuala Lumpur.
1. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy. pp.‘52-34* 2. Ibid* p.
Ibid. pp.44-45* Yap Ah Loy's first formal recognition as Cap!tan China had 
been from Raja Mahdi, and this must have been desirable to them both for purely 
business reasons. Ah Loy wanted a favourable ruler controlling his export 
outlet, and Raja Mahdi wanted a prospering, secure miner whose exports would 
provide him with a revenue. See Cowan, Origins. up.92-94 for consideration of 
the date of Yap Ah Loy's trip to Langat, and also for a more foresighted trip 
to the Sultan by Liu Ngim Kong (before Yap Ah Loy knew he would be next 
Capltan). It is suggested that the impending demise of *fahdi's reputation 
at Langat was realised by the Headman.
4. Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, pp. 52-53 for the best account of this remarkable 
Borneo warrior. 'Zia'u'd-din employed him to garrison the mouth of the 
Selangor River, where Raja Muda Musa was the weakest link in his chain, but 
after the murder of one of Sayid'a brothers at Langat (possibily by one of the 
Sultan*s sons), the warrior deserted the Tengku.
5* Wilkinson (Peninsula Malays p. 146) who neglects the up-river sector of the 
war, says Mahdi went to Selangor immediately after his defeat at Klang, and 
that Sayid Mashhor went to Selangor directly after he defected from the Tengku. 
Middlebrook p.48 <Sb Cowan, Origins, p.97 say thay when Sayid Mashhor left the 
Tengku he joined Chong Chong in the attack on Kuala Lumpur, and they joined 
Raja Mahdi after their defeat.
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On the southern border of Selangor In Sungei Ujong, a leading State of the
Negri Sembilan, a similar struggle was repeated on the Linggi River* The river
had long been a focal point during wartime and it was the chief highway to the
tin mines at Rasa, where the Chinese began work about 1828** In the forty years
before 1870 illegal tax-gathering constantly interrupted trade on the Linggi, and
the problem was complicated because at its mouth the river was the boundary of
Malacca and Selangor, and the land immediately north of the river’s fork, between
the Rembau River and the Linggi proper was disputed between Sungei Ujong and
Rembau* Further upstream the authority of the Dato'Klana, or territorial ruler
of Sungei NJong, was challenged by the Dato'Bandar whose wealth from his revenues
2
gave him the position of a virtually independent ruler* In 1849 the ruler of the
*
Negri Sembilan had imposed a settlement whereby the Linggi revenues were divided
3
between them, and they were recognised as politically equal* But the emnity 
continued# Dato'Bandar Tunggal (1849-74) successfully asserted his equality 
and regarded himself as independent ruler of the middle Linggi. '’’he Dato'Klana 
tended to support the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din of Selangor and he cultivated good 
relations with the British, while the Dato'Bandar, a better fighter, harboured
4
Raja Mahdi of Selangor and opposed British attempts to clear the Linggi*
It should be emphasised that this sketch of the Malay States in the early
1870's cape from the reports made in 1874 and from work^ of modem scholarship*
Most of the information was not available to Col. Anson in Singapore, still less
was it known in London. Ord had made hints to the Colonial Office, but failed to
X. G.M.GuIlick, 'Sungei \Jjong', JMBRAS. XXII, Pt.2 (1949) pp.18-19 and Purcell, 
The Chinese in Malaya, p. 101.
2. R.J.Wilkinson, 'Sun«ei Ujong', JSBRAS. No. R? (1921) p. 1?9.
3* Gullick, o£* cit* p. 19*
4. See below p. US wf>*
excite them. In the light of Ord*8 failure, official annoyance with Anson ia 
understandable. But by the end of 1871 Anson had gone further in the Malay 
States than Ord had ever done; he made an armed landing in Selangor, he intervened 
in the Selangor civil war and he obtained Kimberley’s approval. Mia action 
sparked a controversy in the English press, and even caused Gladstone to raise 
hia eyes from the Irish church and the English public houses.
Anson’s adrinistration and the Selangor Incident, 1871*
Anson's opening moves in Singapore were tactless. By attempting pettyfogging
changes in the Malay States policy he created a hostile feeling in Downing Street.
Therefore the Colonial Office reacted unfavourably to the honest attempt he made
to face real problems. Firstly in April 1871 he suggested commuting the Sultan
of Kedah's pension for an outright payment. Ord, who was consulted in England,
agreed this might be useful, but he was not so worried about the pensions as
Anson. Kedah's'was one of eleven, costing $20,000 a year all told, which gave
the governor the means, said Ord, of exercising "a wholesome control over the
Native Princes".^ Kimberley decided to discuss the whole matter with Ord and
told Anson "not to moot any questions as to changes in our relations with the
2
native states without express instructions from hofne”. Secondly, in May 1871, 
Anson suggested that since British traders were increasingly interested in the 
Peninsula, the extra-territorial .jurisdiction of the Straits courts should be 
extended to the Malay States. Ord again said this would be useful, but needed 
great care, so Kimberley said it could wait until Ord got back. When, therefore 
in June 1871 Anson announced the finding of a committee he had ^pointed to 
review Malay States policy, a hostile reception, partly on personal grounds, was
1. Ord to Kimberley 14.vi.1671. CO/273/55.
2. Ibid* Min. by Kimberley 22.vi, 1871#
*
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to be expected, "This is only one of the many instances to show that Col, A,is
somewhat over zealous, as if to cast the absent Governor in the shade".*
Anson must have known that at least Perak was unsettled, when he went to
Singapore. Then after the death of Sultan Ali in May 1871,and the election of
Bendahara Ismail instead of Raja Muda 'Abdullah to the Sultanate, matters in
2
Perak rapidly came to a head, Anson knew that there had been a lot of coming
and going between Perak and Province Wellesley; he knew too that Penang merchants
had outstanding grievances against the Achinese, across the Malacca Strait. In
Singapore he found papers from Malacca referring to a case of robbery in Rembau
x
in the Malacca hinterland which were endorsed by Ord "Left for Col. Anson".
But as something of a novice in Singapore, instead of acting hastily off his
own bat, Anson appointed a committee to consider what should be done as to the
4
Malay States in general. Arthur Birch, the acting Lieut-Covernor of Penang, 
Commander Robins, the senior naval officer, and Major. Pred McNair, the Colonial 
Engineer, were instructed to consider relations with the States not subject to, 
or having representatives from, any other Power. They reported in May 1871 and 
apart from McNair their judgement was probably impartial. Birch a^d recently 
come from the West Indies department of the Colonial Office to act for Anson 
in Penang, and the naval commanders were always being posted in »nd out.
Moreover later events suggest that a number of their observations were valid ones. 
Relations with Johore, and to a leaser extent with Kedah, were found to be 
satisfactory as disputes were usually settled. It was with Atjeh, in worth 
Sumatra, and with the West ooast States, especially Perak, that problems arose.
1. Min. by K-Hugessen ll.viii.1871 on Anson to Kimberley 3,vi.l871. CO/275/47.
2. See above p. /U-I74-.
3. Anson did not report this until October after the C.O. had demanded 
explanations• Anson to Kimberley 19.x.1871. CO/273/50,
4. Anson’s rather negative personality may be gathered from his memoirs - mostly 
social gossip, as its title suggests. Sir A.E.H.Anson, About Myself and 
Others (1920).
»
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The Straits officials were appallingly ignorant about the States,* so the
committee made three proposals. A commission should visit At.leh and Perak to
settle outstanding matters and make arrangements for future relations. European
officers should be appointed, on the application of the Sultans, to reside in
2
the Malay States. Paid by the Sultans they would advise them, act as the 
channel of communication with the Straits government, and foster trade. Johore, 
they said, had virtually adopted this system. They also proposed a new treaty 
with Perak to exchange Pangkor and the Dindings for some land adjoining Province 
Wellesley.
Anson himself offered more modest proposals when he sent the report to
London. Agreeing on the commission to visit Perak and Atjeh, he did not advise
the appointment of resident officers. Nor did he press the idea of the exchange
of the Dindings because he knew th*t the whole claim to this territory, based as
»
it was on a treaty which had not been ratified, had been shelved. He simply 
recommended that a "political agent" should visit the Malay States frequently - 
b‘y no means an outrageous idea in view of Ord*s itinerations. Put, no doubt 
because of Anson*s previous efforts, the Colonial Office was impatient with him. 
"I do not find the slightest pressing need for moving", wrote Cox. As to 
policy in the Peninsula generally Cox agreed that increased commerce would mean
1. Cf. Swettenham, Footprints, p.25* "There did not exist a book of reference 
which supplied any information whatever in regard to the Malay States".
2. Cowan, Origins. p. 107, says this idea came from McNair, who was familiar with 
the Indian Residents at the Courts of the Princes. McNair was a graduate of 
the Royal School of Mines and was an R,A.cadet in 1845. Re served with his 
Battery in India until 1850 and was in the Straits and Labuan, 1853-S7. Re 
was Adjutant of the R.A. in the Straits, and in 1857 was made Pr. Sec. to the 
governor. later he was Executive Engineer and Superintendent on Convicts.
He returned to Europe in 1865 and was promoted Major in the Madras Artillery, 
but in 1867 he was appointed Chief Engineer in the Straits.where he was 
responsible for the building of military works. Thus his Indian experience 
was not great. He figured prominently in the beginning of Rritish intervention 
in Malaya 1874-76.
3. Min. by Cox on Anson to Kimberley 3.vi.l871. CO/273/47.
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increased influence, but since Kimberley and Ord had discussed the question^ the 
matter vas dropped.
Ord later claimed that he had tried hard in London to convince yimberley that
policy needed changing if, as he-said,"We hoped to hold our own in peace on the 
2 ,
Peninsula**. When he got home in April 1871 he put hi9 ideas to Khatchbull-
Hugessen and Herbert, who told him to submit them to Kimberley. In an interview
Ord told the latter that he was more hampered in his dealings with the Malay
States than the governors under the Indian regime, and this had caused a decline
in British influence. He had tried to exert influence and he believed the Malays
recognised the value of British intervention, but the idea was growing in M*laya
that the British government did not care. Ord attributed the deterioration of
affairs on the West coast to this notion.
Kimberley recognised the force of Ord's arguments, and approved his attempts
at personal relations with the Malay rulers. Beyond that Kimberley was adamant,
and he "expressed in the most decided terms his objections to extending in any
way the Oovemor's authority to deal with native affairs". He "would not approve
of any measure entertaining addition of territory, nor any step likely to bring
3
us into collison with the natives", save only in the case of self defence, When
precisely this interview took place is not known. However if Ord remembered
4
rightly, Kimberley conceded nothing. The same was true for the Anson committee
1. Kimberley saw Ord 8.viii.l871. Kimberley's Desk Diary. Kimberley Papers.
2. Ord to Carnarvon 18.xi. 1874. CO/273/78.
3. Ibid.
4. Ord's account of this interview was written after his successor's actions were 
made public in 1874» Ord claiming that he had tried to do the same thing but 
had been forbidden. Kimberley's Desk Diary noted interviews with Ord on
21 April, 24 May, 7 July, 8 August and 12 December 1871 and 23 January 1872.
No doubt Ord spoke to Herbert and K-Hugessen and Kimberley as soon as he got 
home. Possibly he was again consulted on the Anson committee, and final words 
were no doubt exchanged in Jan. 1872. Whatever the case Ord does not indicate 
what meeting it vas in his letter. There are no records in the 0.0. files 
of any report to Kimberley on the Malay States submitted by Ord while he was 
on leave.
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proposals. Anson was simply referred to previous instructions on not interfering.
In judging the ‘Native States Committee• simply in the light of the usual 
policy, and their confidence in Anson, instead of on the findings of the committee 
itself, the Colonial Office neglected a realistic warning. For even before they 
received the report, events took place in Selangor, which cost British lives, and 
one could say, vindicated the committee. Moreover, the news of these events was 
received in Downing Street on 21 August, five days before the reply to Anson's 
report was sent. The committee had warned that Vevolutiorf was daily expected 
in Perak. Anson, looking far ahead, saw Pangkor as the 'key' to Perak, whence 
some day civilization would spread into the interior. What actually happened 
was an act of piracy by some Chinese from Penang, who took refuge in Selangor: 
but the repercusnions of this incident might have warned the Colonial Office of 
mounting danger on the West coast of Malaya.
The 'Selangor Incident' began with an act of piracy by some Chinese. Its
importance lies in the British intervention which followed, and the publicity it
received in England. Intervention began in the pursuit of pirates, which was
unexceptionable. It ended, more dubiously, in the Colonial Secretary of the
Straits coercing the Sultan of Selangor, and almost certainly promising British
help to the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din.
Late in July 1871 the crew of a Penang Junk were murdered by Chinese and the
2
Junk vas taken to the Selangor River. 'Vhe owner reported the matter to Anson
3
on 25 July and a search was immediately begun. Within three days the searchers 
were surprised to find the Junk near Kuala Selangor and they received permission 
from the Raja Muda Musa, nominal ruler of the Selangor mouth, to recover the
1. Kimberley to Anson 26.viii.1871 (draft). CO/273/47.
2. Account in Penang Argus, l.vii.1871.
3. Details of the affair in the public despatches are printed in A * 1872, I7X,
pp. 661-713. There are certain discrepancies between this and the Mss. records 
which begin Anson to Kimberley 14.vii.1871. CO/273/48.
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cargo, which waa found in some Chinese shops close by.^ ^usa, however, was no
longer really in control of the Selangor River, having been ousted by Ra.1a ^ ahdi
a year before, and when Mr, Cox, the Police Commissioner from Malacca, tried to
2chase one of the Chinese pirates, an angry crowd surrounded the British party.
Therefore they withdrew to the Pluto and took the Junk in tow. As they left the
3
Selangor River some stray shots were fired on them from the Raja wahdi*s stockades. 
The search had been a success; but it had obviously been a bad case of piracy, 
six pirates were still thought to be at large, and shots had been fired on the 
colonial steamer,
Anson -could have turned the matter over right away to the Sultan or
'Zia’u'd-din because in the 1825 treaty the Sultan of Selangor had promised not
4
to harbour pirates, but Anson took immediate action. He authorised a search for 
the rest of the pirates and HMS Rinaldo arrived at Selangor on 3 July for the 
purpose. There ensuod an incident which remains obscure. A landing party under 
Lieut. Maude R.N. met a Raja, almost certainly Mahdi, who refused to go to the
A & P. 1872 cited above. Comdr. Rradberry to Lieut-Oov. of Penang l.vii.1871. 
The Junk was found at 11am and was immediately boarded by Police Inspector 
Barnum, *rho took six Chinese prisoner, Bradberry and Police-roramissioner 
Cox landed and found the cargo in some shops. Three more prisoners were taken. 
In Winstedt, Selangor, p. 24 is a different account of this by Raja "ahdi.
2, Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 148 says Raja Musa ^ad returned to the Selangor 
River early in 1871 and remained the 1 titular authority*, but had no real 
control, Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p. 47 suggests that vusa had no special 
liking for the Tengku *Zia,u,d-din and may have even abetted Raja ^ ahdi 
during the Klang episode.
3, A & P. 1872 cited pp. 668-671. Cox to Anson 30.vii.1871. For a critical 
treatment of these arrests, see Cowan, Origins, p. 110.
4, Maxwell & Gibson, Treaties, p. 33 see articles IV and V.
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Pluto, and a skirmish took place in which a sailor was killed.^ The upshot was
that on 4 July Rinaldo shelled the Selangor forts and next day a landing was
made by over four hundred troops from Penang when the remains of the Raja
2
Mahdi's forts were destroyed.
In theory the affair was still within the realms of piraoy and self-defence,
but in effect Anson had intervened in the Selangor civil war. The significant
event was the political settlement that followed. Acting on the advice of
Charles Irving, the Auditor-Ceneral, Anson decided that Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was
the key to a settled Selangor. The Tengku, said Irving, had "what might be
called European ideas about his government, and I am inclined to think that, if
circumstance gave him the chief command in Selangor, he would prove a good ruler
5
and a good neighbour to the Colony”. Accordingly Anson sent James W.W .Birch, 
the Colonial Secretary, to make a settlement with the Sultan of Selangor, and
4
HMS Teazer was sent to Selangor to keep Raja Mahdi away.
1. The facts as reported by the participants are in Capt.Robinson to Anson 6.vii. 
1871, A ft P. 1872, LXX, pp. 673-676. On the morning of 3 July Rinaldo rendez­
voused with Pluto. Robinson says that on landing Maude asked for vahnrud but 
met Raja Mahdi, who he tried to take to Pluto. The latter resisted, a sailor 
was shot and Maude wounded. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 24 says: "Maude met a
Raja understood to be Mahdi or Mahmud, who shook hands with the Lieutenant, but 
refused to embark in the boat. Maude insisted. The Raja's followers opened 
fire...." Winstedt quotes Mahdi's version: "While I was searching for the
Chinese pirates to send to Penang, the English came and arrested Sayid ^ashhor 
and tried to arrest Raja Mahmud and me, seizing me by the sleeve". In a later 
defence of his action (A ft P. 1872 cited pp.702-704) Anson said he did not 
know Raja Mahdi had fortified the mouth of the Selangor River. Tf this is
true he had not read the memo, prepared by Trving very carefully. This was
favourable to 'Zia'u'd-din, and by implication hostile to Mahdi.If the officers 
knew the sense of Irving's Memo, they would have been prejudiced against 
Raja Mahdi. The despatches do not contain the fact (recorded in Wilkinson's, 
Peninsula Malays p. 147) that Allan Skinner, Anson's 'Political Agent* during 
the operation, had been defied by Sayid Mashhor before a stockade on the 
opposite bank. Skinner the senior cadet in the Straits service was a very 
young man.
2. Account of landing, by 400 men with artillery, in Lieut-Ool. Portland to Capt. 
Robinson 7.vii.l871. A ft P. 1872, cited pp. 671-673.
3. Ibid. p. 679. Memo, on Selangor disturbances bv C.J.Irving.
4. Birch's account in A ft P. 1872 cited pp. 686-689, and a separate report was
made by Irving pp. 690-694.
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Birch arrived at the Sultank palace at Bangat on 21 July after visiting
'Zia'u’d-din's forts en route# His ostensible purpose was to deliver a letter
from Anson requesting the Sultan’s aid in tracing the pirates, who, it was said,
had been aided by Mahdi and Mahmud; and the suggestion was included that the
Sultan should appoint a governor to administer his country.^
The Sultan wanted time to consult his chiefs. Tengku 'Zia’u'd-din was already
in theory such a governor, but Abdul-Samad Wiew that the ’Kedah interloper* was
unpopular. Yet Birch gave the Sultan only twenty-fou^ hours to make up his
mind. Next morning the Colonial Secretary put what had nassed in writing,
reminding the Sultan that the British urgently requested him to
"appoint pne man whom the English government can trust to act as our 
friend’s Vakeel, and conduct the affairs of the whole country between 
Malacca and Perak, and we promised to assist our friend’s Vakeel in^ case 
any of our friend's subjects ventured to dispute his authority".
At 3 pm the Sultan replied that Mahdi and Mahmud would be outlawed and that
Tengu 'Zia’u'd-din's authority of 1868 would be confirmed, with the proviso that
Raja Bot of Lukut and his brothers should also be associated with the government.
But Birch already knew that Raja Bot was 'Zia'u'd-din*s enemy; accordingly
British troops were landed again and Birch insisted that the proviso be removed.
The Sultan gave in and the Tengku received again that vague authority "to govern
3
and open up the country so as to bring it into proper order for Us and Our sons." 
Birch then accepted a rift of tusks for the Queen, the Sultan's flag was 
saluted and by 25 July the mission was back in Singapore.
Just a month had passed since the 'piracy; an intervention such as Ord had 
never attempted was completed; with British troops in the offing what Birch 
optimistically thought was a better form of government had heen forced on the 
Sultan of Selangor. Birch's precise promises to the Tengku are not recoded, >ut
1. Ibid. p. 689.
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all the authorities agree that Birch was ’impressed V by the Tengku, and it is 
suggested that the Colonial Secretary "left him with the full support of the 
British government".*
♦
The Selangor Incident was not discussed in London until August 1871 because
Anson did not use the London telegraph as he might have done. His first reports
reached the Colonial Office on 21 August, where they caused no excitement at
first, although they later gave the Prime Minister some anxious moments. Herbert
and Kimberley were a bit anxious that the vulnerable steamer °luto had been
endangered but they suspended judgement. When Birch's report arrived on A
September Kimberley thought the settlement quite satisfactory and Anson was
simply told that he should have applied to the Sultan for re d re s s  before taking
2
action. Kimberley hoped Birch did not pledge support for the Tengku, but for 
the benefit of the Office he wrote, like Buckingham in 1868, a significant 
saving-clause: "I U3e the word pledge because it ^ight become adviseabl© to give 
him our support but it is very different from promising it". Kimberley saw the
i
papers on 10 September. The reply to Anson, however, was not sent until the 26th.
The Colonial Office was quite happy, but the affair had caused flutterings 
elsewhere. On 13 September a letter in The Times by Sir Benson Maxwell attracted 
the Prime Minister's attention. Anson's efforts were called an "act of war".
What power, asked Maxwell, had a colonial governor to arrest offenders in a 
foreign country and to punish the subjects of th*t land who obstructed him? T^en 
if Anson did have the power to make war, was there any necessity in this case0 
Did Anson approach the Sultan first? These questions were posed by the former 
Chief Justice, vhose interpretation ran;
1. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p. 149 pictures the Tengku sitting "through the 
interviews with impassivity, showing neither pleasure nor disappointment at 
the turn affairs were taking". Cowan, Origins, p. 116 says the affair "is 
remarkable in the first instance for the great irresponsibility of the men 
on the spot".
2. Kimberley to Anson 26.ix.1871 (draft). CO/273/48.
3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 10.ix.1871.
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Hit would seem that because some inferior officers of Selangor interfered 
to prevent the extradition of a suspected criminal and the restoration of 
some stolen property, a Colonial Governor commissioned two vessels to 
invade the Malay territory and to punish those officers, without even 
calling upon their sovereign to punish them, although that sovereign was 
at peace with us... and because the men engaged in carrying out this 
unlawful order were resisted and fired Jipon, his towns and forts were 
on subsequent days destroyed, a number of his subjects were billed, and 
he was himself compelled, but threats of further hostilities to appoint 
to the administration of some province an officer nominated by the 
English Governor...."
It was neither glorious nor necessary, said Maxwell, it should "raise a blush
of shame and indignation on every English face".
Maxwell's tirade reached the right quarters, Gladstone remembered Raja
Brooke's suprassion of the Etyak pirates.* His secretary made a few enquiries
a^nd on 19 September Kimberley sent Gladstone the Selangor papers, holding up the
reply to Anson until the Prime Minister had seen them. Kimberley said that
Maxwell was ignorant of many of the facts. The Times had carried a scanty letter
on 5 September which Commander Robinson had inserted in the Gtraits Times in July
to allay the fears of the relatives of his men. Maxwell had evidently seen this
and other newspapers. "The Malay pirates are desperate men, and the murders
committed on this occasion were most atrocious", said Kimberley melodramatically,
2
and not very accurately. He was uneasy about the employment of the Pluto, but
otherwise he intended to approve Anson's action. Gladstone was satisfied with
Kimberley*s judgement, but he admitted that Maxwell's letter made him uneasy.
He wondered, with quick perception, whether "on principle as well as from wftnt
1
of sufficient force" the governor should not have applied to the Sultan first,
and Kimberley altered the despatch to Anson accordingly. He cautioned the local
government "not to be too hasty as they are apt to be in resorting to force
3
against native states". Clearly Birch's intervention was not really regarded
1. Gladstone to Kimberley 21.ix.1871. Kimberley Papers A/8b.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 19.ix.1871. Gladstone Papers 44224./203.
3. Ibid. Kimberley to Gladstone 25*ix.lR71.
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in London as exceptional. The whole affair was treated as one of piracy.^
Sir Harry Ord was shooting grouse while the Colonial Office was studying the 
reports on the Selangor Incident. Pa was still weak from malaria, and when he 
applied for four months extension of leave in October, the Colonial Office had 
so quickly forgotten the lesson of the Selangor Incident that *Tr. MacDonald
could see "no reason why Sir H„ Ord'a presence at the Straits is urgently
2
required". nis leave was extended until January 1872. Then Anson applied for
leave and Mr. Meade thought it well that the acting governor should disaonear
when Ord returned. Kimberley agreed and admitted that "I cannot say that Col.
■5
Anson's administration of the colony has impressed me favourably".
Anson's departure left a vacancy at Penang because Arthur Birch was wanted
back in the West Indies department in London. James Birch, the tireless Colonial
Secretary, volunteered to go to Penang, but Ord would need him in Singapore,
therefore a temporary Lieut-Govemor was wanted. The choice oroved of the
utmost importance, Kimberley's secretary produced (Sir) George W.B,Campbell,
the Inspector-General of Police in Ceylon, a man with ten years previous
4
experience in India. Campbell was to play an important part in Malayan history 
in his short stay. If the Colonial Office brought to Malaya experience of 
frontier problems in other areas, Campbell took to Penang exnerience of the 
administration in some of the Indian States. Moreover, he interpreted his duties
1. Like Gladstone The Times also remembered Sarawak, but it told its readers not 
to expect "an unhesitating verdict", as lack of evidence prevented this.
The evidence waited until Jan. 1872 when the papers were published for 
Parliament but were not debated.
2. Min. by Macdonald 3.x.i871 on Ord to Kimberley 2.x. 1871. 00/27*5/55.
3. Min. ty Kimberley 4.1.1872 on Anson to Kimberley 20.xii.1871, CO/273/51.
4. G.W.R.Campbell was b. 1853; Ensign in the Bute A Argyll Rifles in 1855: went 
to India in 1856, where he was appointed Assis-Supt. in the revenue survey. 
During the Mutiny he was Adjutant of the Ahmedabad Koli Corps and he was Assis- 
Supt. of Police and Assis-Magistrate. In Dec. 1859 he was appointed Sunt, of 
Police and Commandant of the Rutrahgerry Rangers. Promoted in 186^  he was 
sent to re-organis© the Canara Police. Transferred in 1866 to the Belgaun 
Police; and he was selected to re-organise the Police in Ceylon. He then 
transferred to the Colonial Service. Qualified in three Indian languages.
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towards the Malay States too widely and made frequent suggestions as to new 
policy towards them. More important still he impressed Kimberley by his ability 
and appears to have been consulted by the Minister during the most crucial turning 
point in the Malay policy. In fact Kimberley's first admission that some 
intervention seemed necessary in Perak was made after reading one of Campbell's 
reports. Campbell arrived at Penang on 23 March 1872, the same day on which 
Sir Harry Ord returned to the Straits; Anson left on the SOth,
Ord and the West Coast States of the Peninsula, 1872 to 1873.
Ord returned to harness with enthusiasm and within a week he reported a 
scheme for re-organising the Straits Police. Bu+ although he had tricky problems 
to cope with inside the settlements during his second tour, the outstanding one 
was the state of the West Coast of the Malay Peninsula, Whether through Ignorance 
of, or simply through lack of interest in the Malay States, the Colonial Office 
had not seen the dangers which the Selangor Incident revealed, Ord was partly 
responsible for this, for the normal relations between the colony and the States
k
were almost entirely kept from London's scrutiny. Only when explanations were 
demanded, or when Ord got into hot water, had matter been referred home.
Sometimes hints slipped out; Arthur Birch when he left the colony was thanked 
by Penang residents for the "visits you have paid to the neighbouring Native 
States and for friendly correspondence you have opened with their Rulers, bv 
which an attempt has been made to bring to bear the legitimate inrluence of the 
British Government". "Of which, however, we know nothing", wrote Cox.^ As had 
been the case for years, everyday correspondence with the Peninsula had not been 
seen in London.
During Ord's second tour in Singapore these relations involved him in more
1. Min. by Cox on Ord to Kimberley 11.iv. 1872 received lT.v.!872. CO/273/57.
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and more difficulty. In 1872 and 1873 the Colonial Office was drawn in deeper 
at every step. Yet because he had been unable to carry his main ideas in London, 
Ord was always hampered by the policy of non-intervention, which he was now 
bound to apply. He tried to pick up the threads laid do^ by Anson, but failed
to make much improvement. "I was always alive to the fact that a more
preremptory course of action would have been more successful"^ he wrote later, 
but he had been prohibited from doing what he thought right. In' 1872, for the 
first time in his career, the appearance on the scene of energetic, optimistic,
practical, Sir Harry, did not reduce things to order and reason. All he could
do was convince the Colonial Office that something had to be done. Unfortunately 
for Ord he did this by his own mistakes rather than by force of argument, ^or 
some reason he could scarcely put a foot right with the Colonial Office in the 
crucial twelve months from July 1872 to July 1873, and he finally returned to 
England under something of a cloud.
Mounting exasperation both in Downing Street and at Government House erupted 
in 1872 over relations with Johore. In many respects, the policy attempted by Ord 
was one of tho most delicate *md well meaning of his administration. Johore was 
the closest State to Singapore in every respect, and Ord rightly believed he 
should have a special relationship with Maharaja Abu-Bakar. Hut opinion in 
Singapore was not united on the question of relations with the Malay States, and 
when in 1872 Raja Mahdi turned up in Singapore, then took refuge on the West 
coast of Johore, where he was said to be planning a return to Selangor, Ord was 
placed in a difficult position.2
1. Ord to Carnarvon 18.xi.1874. CO/273/78.
2. For Mahdi's movements since the Rinaldo attack see Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, 
pp. 151-3 A Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy. p.H0,fn.2o# Mahdi went to Benkalis in 
Sumatra to raise forces. 'Zia'u'd-din asked the Dutch to stop him, but he 
slipped away. Wilkinson says he went to Singapore to claim redress against 
the Dutch, and this led to a cleavage among the officials, ^raddell (no lover 
of 'Zia'u'd-din) and the Maharsja of Johore were said to favour ^ahdi. Among 
the merchants, J.C.Davidson supported Tengku 'Zua'u'd-din, and w.H.M.Read
was a constant critic of Abu-Bakar.
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He attempted a risky policy. Charles Irving, the Auditor-General, insisted
Mahdi was a danger} Thomas Braddell, the Attorney-General, said there was very
little evidence against him. Confronted with this conflicting advice, Ord leaned
towards Braddell. By allowing Raja Mahdi to stay in Johore Ord hoped that
terms could be arranged between the Raja and the Tengku •Zia'u'd-din.* He
tried to persuade the Raja to accept a pension of $“350 a month, if he undertook
never to return to Selangor, but the adventurous fugitive refused and he soon
2
made trouble again.
This came to light in London when a newspaper accused the Saharaja of Johore
3
of sheltering Raja Mahdi with Ord's collusion. Kimberley demanded an explanation,
and Ord, unwisely, showed this letter to the Maharaja. Hurt to think that
Kimberley believed he was assisting the Raja, Abu-Bakar explained that it was
customary to offer hospitality to fugitives and that anyway the Raja was
4
watched by spies. The article, he said, was a "tissue of falsehoods". Ord on
his part was equally annoyed with Kimberley, regretting that he "should have
dreamed it possible that I could have taken the part which the article attributed 
5
to me". Privately he wrote to Herbert, "I might have been credited with a little
„ 6more common sense", *
Quite frustrated now by the policy of non-intervention and the increasing
• 1. Ord to Kimberley 24.x.1872. CO/273/60.
2. In June or July 1872 Raja Mahdi slipped out of Johore and made his way via the 
Linggi River in Sungei Ujong to Selangor, where he joined Sayid Mashhor, who 
was preparing a fourth campaign against Kuala Lumpur. See Middlebrook (pp. 64- 
65) for a comparison of the characters o** Raja Mahdi and Sayid Mashhor.
3. The occasion of Kimberley's demand clearly illustrates the way Ord kept London 
in the dark. Abu-Bakar requested some rifles for his police and Ord sent to 
request home on 10.vii.1872 (CO/273/58)* Before asking the War Office to supplj 
them, Kimberley (having seen about Raja Mahdi in the London $ China Telegraph, 
26.viii.1872) asked for an explanation, on 2.ix.l872. This was not answered
by Ord until 24.x.1872 and was received in London on 25 Mov. Thus, the news­
paper had anticipated the governor by two months.
4. Abu-Bakar to Ord 15.x.1872 in Ord to Kimberley 24.x. 1872. <^ 0/273/60.
5. Ibid.
6. Ord to Herbert 24.x.1872. Private. CO/273/60.
3
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disorder on the West Coast, Ord tried to shake the Colonial Office's complacency 
by writing: "murder, plundering, and burning are the order of the day 4? the bad 
ones are beginning to believe that popular cry 'nothing will induce the 
government to intervene"*.^ But Herbert said they could not trust Ord to 
intervene wisely. He had made two mistakes over Johore; firstly, to encourage 
Abu-Bakar to let Mahdi stay, secondly, to inform him of Kimberley's fears. The 
Colonial Office staff were unanimous in their condemnation of Ord. "Guilty of 
great indiscretion", said Meade; Herbert said that "Sir H.O. hardly understands 
the rudiments of his duty as a Governor"; "Most indiscreet", wrote Kimberley, and 
Ord was censured
Abu-Bakar was mollified and Ord reprimanded, but the same thing happened 
the next year. This time the Maharaja asked Ord for a loan of $45,000 to pay 
his debts, and he reaffirmed a promise to govern Johore according to British 
wishes. Ord agreed to the loan after consulting the ^ecutive Council end he 
reported the matter to London afterwards. Another storm followed. "There is
*
often more objection to the form in which Sir H. Ord does a thing than the thing
3
itself", said MacDonald; London should have been consulted, but presumably Abu-
Bakar could not be disappointed. Cox was opposed to such loans generally and he
though Ord*s action was most objectionable. Kimberley decided to do what they
did in the previous case. "A very severe censure is deserved", but the loan
4
would not be refused as this would lower the governor's prestige.
Yet Johore, surely, was not really a problem. Ord's tactlessness merely 
deflected the Colonial Office's attention from the very real troubles on the 
Vest Coast to which Ord had rather desperately referred. In London it had been
1. Ibid.
2. Mins, on Ord to Kimberley 24.x.1872.* CO/273/60. The censure was drafted by 
Kimberley and dated ?4.xii.l872.
3. Min. by MacDonald lO.v.1873 on Ord to Kimberley 24.iv.1873. CO/273/66.
4. Ibid. Mins, on Ord to Kimberley 24.iv.1873, and draft of censure dated 
24.vi.1873.
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imagined that all was not well after Birch*s mission to Langat in 1871, but this 
was far from true. A note fpom the Admiralty on 6 November 1872 warned the 
Colonial Office that Raja Mahdi was back in Selangor. In December two long 
reports from Ord brought the situation fully into Downing Street*s view.^ While 
the civil servants had been losing their tempers with Ord over Johore, matters 
in Perak and Selangor had been coming to a head,
/
On his return to Singapore in 1872 Ord had immediately tried to do something,
within his limited powers, to settle affairs on the West Coast, In April Charles
Irving was sent on a mission in the Peninsula. First he went to Selangor where
he found ’Zia'u'd-din in control of the mouths of the Klang and Selangor Rivers,
2
but he reported the ’rebel rajas’ to be in command of the headwaters. "he Tengku
was not interfering with trade, but was trying to stop supplies reaching his 
3enemies.
In Perak Irving was ordered to discover who was the right Ail Sultan. If
Anson had not really known what was hanpening in Perak, Ord was determined to
find out, and in April 1872 Irving produced the best picture to date. Be met
Raja vuda 'Abdu’llah in the Mantri's presence on 25 April and the former presented
his claim to the Sultanate, The Mantri (but only after ’Abdu’llah left) said
Ismail had been rightly elected. Thus Ord learnt of this fundamental controversy,
now nearly a year old, and he sent Irving back to try to persuade ’Abdu'llah and
1. Ord to Kimberley 6 & ll.xi.1872. 00/277/61. 2. Ibid. 6.ri.lR72.
3. Although Irving's report was the most up-to-date account of the Peninsula 
troubles, it was less sound on Selangor than it was for Perak. After Birch’s 
Mission to Selangor, July 1871, 'Zia’u’d-din took certain measures to improve 
the government. Estimates of revenue % expenditure were made; a steamship
was acquired, and European offioers were put in command of garrisons at Kuala 
Uunpur and Kuala Selangor, But as Middlebrdok (pp. 63-64) points out, the 
Tengku's position was still precarious. His allies failed entirely to deal 
with the threat of Sayid Mashhor from Kuala TAiba in Upper Selangor, and in 
December 1871 the Tengku was forced to look to Wan Ahmad of Pahang for help. 
Ibid. pp. 65-67.
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Ismail to meet in the presence of a British officer and settle their differences.
Nothing came of this.*
Meanwhile the effects of the disturbances upon trade produced complaints
from the Straits merchants. Some Malacca traders claimed that the colonial
government was not living up to its promise to support the tengku 'Zia'u’d-din,
and said that unless it did there would be "great sacrifice of human life and
2
British property". In answer to this Birch, who had made the promise, had to
re-affirm the policy of non-intervention. But W.H.M.Read replied that already
much harm had been done by Ord's equivocation when Raja Mahdi ^as in Johore. Ve
said that while the Singapore Chamber of Commerce
"would deprecate any recourse to coercive measures, it would argue upon 
the government the absolute necessity of adopting some straightforward 
and well defined policy in dealing with the rulers of the various states 
of the Malay Peninsula, for the purpose of promoting and protecting 
commercial relations... as there is every reason to believe that they 
would readily accept tl^impartial views and friendly feelings of the 
British authorities". 3
Ord must have agreed with all this, but he knew the idea was not acceptable in
London. At the end of October 1872, however, he made an attempt at intervention
himself. He achieved nothing, but he was at least able to produce a comprehensive
idea of the problem on the West Coast for his superiors,
1. 'Abdu’llah was styling himself Sultan by April 1872, and Cullick (Speedy, pp.27- 
28) says he was planning to oust the '"antri from Larut, Cowan.(Origins, p.127, 
fn. 90; quoting from ’Perak and Larut Disturbances’, Raffles Museum, Singapore, 
shows the sort of worry which existed among British officials before the 
Irving Mission. Irving wrote on 13 April (before his mission or at Penang on 
the way?) an impression he had gathered from Arthur Birch; "larut is virtually 
an independent state. Its present position is interesting because it is a 
specimen of what is likely to become a common state of things Along the coast 
... If ever the Chinese choose to combine and turn out the Malays altogether 
I cannot see what is to prevent them".
S«a Ord to Kimberley 6,xi.l872. CO/273/61, for a belated end none too
detailed despatch describing the Irving Mission. The full Memo, by Irvin# 
dated 24.vii.1672 was not sent to London until 1874. (Oonfid. Print, Eastern
11. CO/809/l p. 148.)
2. Malacca traders to Singapore Chamber of Commerce 27.vii.187? in Ord to 
Kimberley 6.xi.l872. CO/273/61.
3. W.H.M.Read to Col. Sec. SvS. 17.ix.1872. Ibid.
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i
j In a general account of the 'State of the Country' Ord reported that Perak,
f
j Selangor, and now Sungei Ujong, were unsettled. In Perak the Chinese from
Penang were deeply involved in the kirut War; supplies for the factions fighting
over the mines were procured there* and hundreds of wounded were returning. On
top of this it was thought that Raja Uuda 'Abdu'llah was about to attack Sultan
Ismail. In Selangor Ord discovered that P.aja Mahdi was undoing anything Birch's
mission might have accomplished, and when he visited Langat on 1 November with
an escort of British troops, the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din's position seemed so
hopeless that Ord suggested he 'throw in the towel'.* But the Tengku was
determined to hold on and the governor assisted him in getting the help of
2
Wan Ahmad of Pahang.
Finally, the war looked like spreading from Selangor into Sungei TT.iong, as
Raja Mahdi had returned to Selangor by way of the Linggi and Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din
therefore wanted to secure this exposed southern flank. To this end he had
made an agreement in 1870 with the ruler of Rembau defining the boundary of
Selangor and Rembau at Serapang so he could build a fort to command the Limrgi 
3there. After the return of Raja Mahdi the Tengku tried to g^t the ruler of 
Rembau to revive his claim to the territory on the right bank of the Linggi, but 
the chiefs of .Sungei Ujong prepared to resist. The Dato'Xlana's nephew, who 
was acting for him, ordered arms in Europe to fight Rembau, therefore when Ord 
was asked to intervene in September 1872 he decided to do so.^ Re went to Sempang
1. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 29.
2. The Tengku first approached Wan Ahmad in December 1871, but the latter would 
not assist without Ord's permission. In April 1872 the TengVu went to 
Singapore to discuss the alliance. (T^ iddlebrook, Yap Ah Loy. p.76) Sometime 
between May and August 1872 Ord vent to Pekan to make arrangements with the 
Bendahara. (Cowan, Origins, p.136.) The first Pahang expedition crossed into 
Selangor in August 1872,but failed to relieve Kuala Dumpur, which fell late 
in August 1872. (Linehan, Pahang, p.96)
3. R.O.Winstedt, 'History of the Negri Sembilan', JMBRAS, XII, Pt. 3 (Oct. 1Q34) 
p. 69. Report on the State of the Country in Ord to Kimberley 6.xi,1872. 
CO/273/61.
4. Memo, by Thomas Braddell, p $2..
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but the ruler of Rembau failed to arrive to present his case, and Ord persuaded 
Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din to drop the matter on the condition that the Dato'Klana of 
Sungei Ujong promised not to help the Tengku *s enemies.^
In Sungei Ujong, then, Ord prevented a new sore from festering, but four 
ma.jor ailments remained uncureds (l) the war among the Chinese in larut, (2) the
question of the Perak succession, (3) the Selangor civil war, and (4) the
2
interruption of trade. Yet somehow Ord tried to persuade the Colonial Office
th«at he had everything in hand. He hoped, he said, that T/imberley would feel
"I have neither been so ignorant nor so unmindful, as has been alleged, of 
the bearing which the internal condition of these states h«a upon certain 
interests of the settlements, and that notwithstanding the little actual 
power I amiable to exercise I have done what I can to protect those 
inters ts**.
But the report had quite the reverse effect; Kimberley vrrote, "a tangled web
4
which I fear Sir H.Ord is not the man to unravel**.
A week after he wrote this a report arrived on what was happening in Tarut.
It^concerned an expedition by George Campbell, which in some ways had important 
consequences. The Mantri of larut went to Penang on 16 October 1872 to complain 
that the warring Chinese in larut were being re-inforced from Penang. On the
t
evening before this Capt. Speedy, the Police Superintendent, had found some arms
in a Junk, which had left cleared for Perak, so Campbell decided to see what was
happening for himself. He set off with Speedy intending to **bring thoroughly
home to the persons who had sent the Junks already mentioned, the grave offence
of which th^y had been guilty and prevent turbulence by the presence of a British
5
man-of-war at larut”. Eight miles up the river they found a blockade, which
1. Ord's State of the Country report. Covran, Origins, pp. 137-139.
2. There was speculation at this time among investors in England as to whether 
the iArut troubles were connected with the fluctuations in the tin trade. 
See Mining Journal , 14.viii.1869 p. 592; 27.iv.1872 p. 304; 15.vi.187?
29.xi.1873 p. 1312; 31.i. 1874 p. 117, and 21.xi. 1*7/1 p. 1281.
3. Ord's State of the Country report.
4* Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 22.xii.1872.
5. Ord to Kimberley 11.^1.1872. CO/273/61.
included one of the Penang Junks. On board they found two Chinese who said they 
were about to be decapitated. Speedy released them, while Campbell sent a 
telegram to Singapore indicating’that an impasse had been reached in larut.
Two thousand people, it was said, had recently been killed in one day.
Campbell's expedition was insignificant and did nothing to solve matters, but 
it is important because its aftermath in Singapore and London brought forth 
suggestions for a radical change of policy. The first reaction in Singapore 
was to ensure an administrative ' cover-up*. Ord wanted to know why the Junk had 
been allowed to leave Penang in the first place, but Campbell, the man on the 
spot, was more interested in thinking about the bigger problem of achieving peace 
in Perak. He reported in October that the Hai San miners who had been expelled 
from Larut in February 1872 had recovered their mines again, and that the turn­
coat Mantri seemed finally committed to their side. Campbell insisted on 
advocating a change in the British policy. Like the Anson Committee, Campbell, 
no doubt drawing on his Indian experience, said: "I w^uld again press the 
suggestion for the appointment of a Resident or Political Officer for cer+ain of 
the Malay States'*. Apparently a leading Chinese had told him, "when the British 
flag is seen over Perak or Larut, every Chinaman will go down on his knees and 
bless God".'*’
These tidings reached Downing Street in the first week in January 1873. 
KacDonald thought Campbell's expedition had been undignified and he agreed with
1, Ibid. Campbell to Col. Sec. SS. 24.x.1872. Fere Campbell refers to a similar 
suggestionmade on 6.ix.l872. This may be the letter, quoted undated in 
Wilkinson, 'Notes on Perak History,' Papers on Malay Subjects, vol 4, (1908) 
PP. 99-100, which clearly shows Campbell's source for this all-important 
idea: "I speak with diffidence being so new to this portion of the Fast, but 
I think it worth consideration whether the appointment under the British 
government of a British Resident or Political Agent for certain of the Malay 
States would not, as in India, have a markedly beneficial e^ect. Such a 
Resident or Political Agent would need to be an officer of some position and 
standing and a man of good .judgement A good personal manner, and he should 
of course have a thorough knowledge of the Malay language... In India, in 
many a native ruled state, it is marvellous what work a single well-selected 
British officer has effected...."
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Ord that the Junk should have been stopped in the first place, but Knatchbull- 
Hugessen said,
"the presence of an English man of war might have a salutary effect... 
if my memory is correct, the annexation to British Buie of the country 
in which the disturbances took place, and which its inhabitants are said 
to desire, would be most beneficial to Penang, and contribute to the 
tranquility & prosperity of the settlements in no slight degree^- this 
idea however, is to be discouraged I suppose, .just now...#"
His supposition proved correct. Kimberley could not agree "that further extension
of British territory is the proper remedy for these evils. If we are to annex
all the territory in Asia where there is misgovemment we must end in dividing
2
Asia with Russia". He said Campbell was wrong in letting the Junk leave 
Penang, and that stringent measures were needed to prevent a recurrence.
Thus Campbell^ suggestion about Residents, like that of the Anson Committee, 
and Knatchbull-Hugessen’s ideas about annexation, fell on deaf ears in January 
1873. Yet in only eight months Kimberley was to change his mind and give Ord*s 
successor, Sir Andrew Clarke, the scope which enabled him to fulfill Campbell*s 
hopes. Therefore it is necessary to assess the factors which would appear to 
have caused Kimberley^s crucial volte-face in the summer of 1873. From the 
evidence available three things seemed to have weighed heaviest on his mind;
(l) international rivalry appeared to hover over the Straits, (?) the situation 
on the West Coast, especially in Perak, deteriorated, and (3) the pressure from 
English economic interests was skillfully and persistently kept up.
The decision to intervene, 1873.
0
In February 1873 Cranville passed to Kimberley a Butch rumour that Italy and 
the U.S.A. had ideas of making treaties with At.ieh. That this was a surprise for
1. Kin. by K-Hugessen 6.1.1873 on Ord to Kimberley 11,xi.1872. C0/?73/61.
2. Ibid. Kin. by Kimberley 8.i.1873.
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the Colonial Office can be judged by a minute Herbert began but then crossed
out: "It is hardly to be supposed that the ITS would intervene in the affairs of
1 PAchin". But after the incident of the American colony in Borneo in 1865, end
the Italian plans for a penal colony in 1870? the possibility could not be
ignored, and a month of enquiries followed. Arthur Birch, now back in the Office,
wrote what he knew of the Sultari of Atjeh; Washington and Rome issued denials;
finally Kimberley saw the Dutch minister in London on 11 March 1873*^ The Dutch
were about to attack Atjeh and the Sultan had appealed to the three hundred years
old friendship between the two countries to secure British assistance. But in
view of the agreement of 1872 Kimbnrley assured the Dutch Minister that Britain
5
would not interfere in Atjeh and would be friendly to the Dutch.
* At the end of March 1873 the Dutch began their long war with Atjeh. They
requested Britain, on 13 April, to forbid the export of arms from the Straits to
Sumatra, and on ,the same evening Granville and Kimberley decided that although
this would not be done, they would be friendly to the Dutch and if necessary
would seize arms as contraband. The Dutch were told that no specific proclamation 
6
would be made, but unfortunately for ministerial scruples Ord issued an arms
embargo without orders from home. Unfortunately for the Dutch their first
offensive in Atjeh failed.
No sooner was the Atjeh scare over than the Colonial Office heard about the
confusion in Larut. In December 1872 the Ghee Rin Chinese had made a successful
invasion, the Mantri’s Matang stronghold was captured, and an attempt at mediation 
7
had failed. Though the Hai San still retained a few mines, the Ghee Fin were
1. Kin. by Herbert on TO. to CO. 6.1U.1877. C0/?73/73.
2. K.G.Tregonning, ’American Activity in N,Borneo, 1865-1881*, Pacific Fist. Rev. 
(Not 1954) p. 765.
3. TO. to CO. 16.ix.1872. CO/144/39.
4. Memo, by Kimberley ll.iii.lf’73 on TO. to CO, 6.iii.l87t. CO/?77/77. Wemo. by 
C.Vivian 25.ii.1873. FO/37/574.
5. Byland to Kimberley 4.iv.l873 and reply (copy) 5.iv.l877. Kimberley Paper9,A/27
6. Min. by Granville on Byland to Granville 3.iv.l873. TO/37/574 and Min. by
Kimberley on TO. to CO. 3.iv.l873. CO/273/73.
7. Gullick, Speedy, p. 30.
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blockading the Larut River. Thus early in 1873 Larut was virtually abandoned
to the Chinese who waged a regular war,1 while Malay authority in the area was
almost non-existent. Even the Mantri and ’Abdu’llah made a temporary
2
rapprochement from February to April 1873. Ord prohibited the export of arms
to the territory between the Krian and Perak rivers on 21 February and he sent
HMS Hornet to enforce the blockade. This only served to cut off the Chinese
factions from their supplies and it drove them to piraoy.
Details like this of course did not reach London, bTit in April 1873 the
Admiralty (again first with the news) reported the reason for the presence of
3
HMS Hornet at Penang. In June the Colonial Office had a discussion over the
4legal difficulties of defining piracy. Finally, on 7 July, Kimberley admitted 
that something would have to be done. He had just read George Campbell's report, 
dated 28 June, on the Larut war.
"It is possible", the Lieut-Govemor had written, that friendly intervention 
on our part would end the condition of things described and it is more' than 
probable that a resident political officer, a carefully chosen discreet man 
with a good knowledge of the people and their language would prevent its 
recurrence. Most of the native ruled states in and around India have such
officers and the value of their influence is unquestionable... T have found
all the Malay potentates^most amenable to reason, most courteous and mo3t 
anxious to please".
Kimberley thought it "an excellent report", and at the same time he had a
7
conversation with Campbell, who was at home on leave. Evidently Campbell
1. Cowan, Origins. p. 143.
2. Qul1ick. (Speedy. p. 3l) says that the Mantri had so often played the Vicar of 
Bray with the Chinese that he went into virtual exile. Wilkinson (Winstedt, ' 
Perak, p.85) says in February he moved to Krian, where he lived on a boat to 
facilitate a quick getaway, and he quotes a document (p.86) dated H.viii.l^TB, 
in which *Abdu*llah confirmed the Mantri's rights over larut in return for 
recognition as Sultan. 'Abdu‘llah then appointed Raja Yusuf to be his Raja 
Muda, but he soon fell out with the Mantri again.
3. M. to CO. 29.iv.1873. CO/273/72.
4. The Fair Malacca case, which is discussed by Cowan, Origins, pp. 147-149.
5. Campbell's report on Penang for the annual Blue Book, 28.vi.1873, CO/273/74,
6. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 7.vii.l873.
7. Min. bv Kimberley 8.vii.l873 on Ad. to CO. 27.vi.1873, CO/273/72. This is 
where Kimberley mentions the conversation with Campbell on the other topic.
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impressed Kimberley and possibily it was he who convinced the .Secretary of State
that something would have to be done about the **alay States. For Kimberley
noted on the same day that Sir Andrew Clarke, the new governor, would have to
look into the Larut problem,
”1 think we must endeavour to put a stop to these disturbances. It is 
evident that Penang is a base of operations for these contentious Chinese.
The difficulty ia how to do anything^without direct interference with 
Perak which is very undesirableM.
Kimberley, then, vent as far as admitting that he should try to stop the
disturbance in Perak, but he still clung to the policy of non-intervention.
As yet, he was undecided what action ha should take. In the case of the
Ashanti War he had clung to the policy of non-intervention since Februeijy and
he had not yet changed his mind. Put in the Malayan matter another factor
came into play at the end of July and moved him still further. This time it
was the English economic interests in Selangor.
A few English companies, inevitably attracted by the success of Chinese
mining, were attempting to enter Malaya in the early 1870's. In the 1850's
some Americans had worked a mine at Ricko in Selangor, but they gave up because
2
of the political insecurity. Early in the 1860's Paterson, Simons and Ooranany 
operated in Pahang for a time through Chinese agents. Henry Velge of Malacca 
promoted the Sungei Ujong Tin Company. Two persistent Englishmen with an 
interest in Selangor were James Guthrie Davidson and the ubiquitous w.H.W.Read. 
Davidson was a leading Singapore lawyer who had some knowledge of the Peninsula,
4
and who was a financial backer of the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din and Tap Ah Loy. Read's 
wide connections in South-east Asia have already been noted and like Davidson 
his investments gave him a stake in the Tengku'a success. In 1866 he had
1. Kin. by Kimberley 7.vii.1873' cited above.
2. Swettenham's Report on Selangor 8.iv.l875. CO/809/5 P. 138.
3. Braddell's rfemo. on Sungei Ujong, in Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xli.l874.Tbid.p.86.
4. Svettenham, Footprints. p.20; Middlebrook, Yap Ah Loy, p. 84; P.B.Maxwell,
Our Malay Conquests (l878) p. 36.
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attempted to collect the Klang revenues on a commission basis for the Sultan,
but the civil war had upset the scheme.^ Read and Davidson came together in
the projected Selangor Tin Mining Company, which Head had been pushing in
o
London in 1868, but the company was still unincorporated in 1875•
*
Their chief ally in London was Seymour Clarke, who was married to Read's
sister. He was a very successful railwayman, who probably became concerned vith
Malaya, through Read, as a telegraph expert. His was a strange background to
influence Malayan history, but he was obviously a significant man in the city; a
leading railwayman in the golden age of English railroading, a telegraph exnert
who hust have had useful contacts with the cable manufacturer, he was also known
3
and respected by the politicians. leading London director of the Selangor
Tin Company he was destined to influence British policy in unexpected fashion.
In 1873 the promoters of the company were still anxious to inform prospective 
investors in the City and Singapore that operations in Selangor would be safe.
On 25 June 1873 Davidson's London solicitors asked the Colonial Office if it 
would sanction the Company employing its own troops. Even Knatchbull-Hugessen 
disapproved of this. On 18 July however Seymour Clarke produced an entirely 
new series of possibilities. A letter from the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din dated 3 June^ 
sought protection from a European Rower. Apparently the Tengku warted the
1. Winstedt, Selangor, p.20.
2. The company was finally registered, 6.vii.l874 under the name of Malayan 
Peninsula (East India) Tin Mining Co. Ltd. A ^ P, 1875, LXXI, p. 500.
3* Seymour Clarke was Brunei's chief clerk during the building of the C.V.R. As 
Traffic Supt. of the London division, while in his early twenties, he had 
demonstrated early telegraphy equipment for the Duke of Wellington, and had 
organised the first Royal Train. When the O.N.R, began operating into Kings 
Cross in 1851 he became its General Manager, and he helped build the coraosny 
into one of the great industrial concerns of the land. He is said to have 
had influence with Gladstone, who arbitrated in railway pooling agreements.
He resigned from the Great Northern in July 1870 because of illness.
.(See E.T.MacDermot, History of the C.W.R., pp. 57, 230, 661 & 677. 
C.H.Grindly, History of the G.N.R. 1854-95, pp.153, 2^ 5, and O.N.R. Minute 
Books 1/36 (B.T.C.Archives) pp. 148, 236.)
4. By this time the Tengku's fortunes is Selangor were nor© promising. Tap Ah 
Loy having re-captured Kuala Lumpur in March 1873. Middlebrook, p. 81.
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promoters of the company to find out ”if the English or any other Government,
i
would interfere in any disturbances that might arise in the territory of
Selangor"^- a vague, and not unusual request. But Clarke added that a Singapore
resident, probably his brother-in-law Read, had recently expressed the view that
"the independent sovereigns of the smaller states of the Malayan Peninsula would
put themselves under the Protectorate of some European Power, and Germany was
2
mentioned as most likely to be approached failing England".
Germany had already been mentioned in connection with Malaya * f®* years
before and this had occasioned no alarm. In July 1870 Rogers had said "if
Prussia likes to have an island then T should say let ^er by all means, the
government will not be prepared to oppose such a cession unless it will in,1ure
3British interests". A later rumour about a German harbour at the mouth of the 
Endau River in East Johore had come to nothing. But in the two years following 
the Franco-Prussian War, with the balance of power in Europe radically altered, 
some English statesmen were watching Germany carefully. If the .luniors in the 
Colonial Office passed Seymour Clarke’s warning without comment, Kimberley was
4
alarmed. "The possibility of a  German protectorate seems small", wrote MacDonald. 
Cox agreed, but as he valued prestige he wrote "with a judidous Governor we 
might almost imperceptibly have a considerable influence on the various Native
5
Chiefs". Herbert suggested the governor might consider confidentially "if it 
might be safe and advantageous to extend our influence to some parts of the 
Malay territories beyond our settlements".^ Knatchbull-Hugessen said this would
1. Enclosed in Seymour Clarke to Herbert 18.vii.1873. CO/273/74.
2. Ibid*
3. Min. by Rogers 20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14*vii,1870. CO/273/42. Cf. Min.
3.viii.l867: "I believe a German colony in New Guinea wd be a very good thing 
for the Australians. Why shd it hurt them?", on Young to Kimberley M.v.1867.
co/201/542.
4. Kin. by MacDonald 19*vii.l873 on Clarke to Herbert 18.vii.l87^. CO^Tl/lA*
5* Ibid. Min. by Cox 20.vii.1873.
6. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 21.vii.1873*
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be easy, but this time he thought it better to please his chief by echoing 
the usual policy:
"I do not understand that to be the policy of HM Govt, but rather to 
keep ourselves to ourselves as much as we can & to avoid! those 
complications which may follow extension of 'influence*, which 
entails as a rule extensions of responsibility". ^
He can hardly have believed in this; one senses in the words *keep ourselves
to ourselves' a contempt for such a viewpoint. Over Fiji he had condemned "the
surpassing love of Economy" and "dread of incurring responsibilities". Later
2
he said "Serve us right if Germany annexes Fiji", and when Fiji was, as he 
thought, offered to Britain in April 1873 he said public opinion would not 
stand a rejection.
Certainly Kimberley saw Clarke's letter in entirely new light: "It would be
impossible for us to consent to any European Power assuming the Protectorate of
any State in the Malay Peninsula". Writing this on 22 July he decided to
consult Granville and Argyll, the Secretary of State for India. His first thought
was that Sir Andrew Clarke, the new Governor, could make new treaties in which
the rulers of the Malay States would agree not to cede territory to other Powers
without British consent. Meanwhile he studied what the existing treaties
implied. MacDonald made a summary of the existing treaties on 23 July, and
Kimberley was full of questions, but on 31 July he made an interim decision.
Seymour Clarke was to be told that all correspondence would have to go 
4
through the Governor. With this breathing space gained Kimberley ordered a
thorough study of the Malayan treaties. Meanwhile in the first few days of
5
August he was busy deciding on the Ashanti expedition on the Gold Coast. Before 
deciding on Malaya he gave the department a fortnight to nrepare a comprehensive
1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 22.vii.1873.
2. See below p.211.
3* Min. by Kimberley on Clarke to Kimberley 18.vii.1873* CO/273/74.
4. Ibid. Kimberley to Seymour Clarke 5.viii.l873 (draft).
5. See above p. it I- I1#-
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memorandum on relations with the Malay States under the Indian regime and after, 
"so complete as to be intelligible without reference books or papers".^ MacDonald 
did this, but Kimberley still called for the files on the 1869 treaty with 
Kedah, He studied the memorandum carefully and it is adorned with his pencilled 
comments. When he replied to Seymour Clarke on 5 August, with a repetition of 
the non-intervention policy, he told the department that the whole question was 
to be dealt with in connection with Sir Andrew Clarke's instructions as to the 
Malay States.
The following pattern emerges then: the Larut and Perak troubles had made
Kimberley decide, early in July, that Governor Clarke would have to look into
the Peninsula problem. The possibility of European rivalry added further urgency
to this inquiry. The next step forward came at the end of August when Kimberley
decided on Clarke's instructions. Another petition from Chinese traders had
just reached London with the comment by Ord that the whole West Coast of Malaya
from Province Wellesley to Malacca was in a state of anarchy. On 28 August Cox
noted that "Lord K. is about to consider how far it may be desirable for the
British government... to interfere actively in an effort to stop the dissensions
2
in the Malay States", Kimberley wrote his famous draft of Sir Andrew Clarke's
3
instructions on 31 August 1873.
On 10 September, having just settled Wolseley's Gold Coast instructions, 
Kimberley sent Clarke's Malayan instructions to the Prime Minister with this
4
rather apt summary of the situation:
"It is the old story of misgovemment of Asiatic States. This might go 
on without serious consequences Accept the stoppage of trade were it not 
that European and Chinese capitalists stimulated by the great riches in 
tin mines... are suggesting to the Native 'Princes that they should seek 
the aid of Europeans.,. We* are the paramount power in the Peninsula up
1. Min. by Herbert 10.viii.1873 on Clarke to Kimberley 18.vii.l87^, CO/27^/74.
2. Min. by Cox on Ord to Kimberley 10.vii.1873. C0/273/67.
3. Ibid. Kimberley's draft 31.viii.1873.
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to the limit of the States tributary to Siam, and looking to the 
vicinity of India & our whole position in the East I apprehend that 
it would be a serious matter if any^other European power were to 
obtain a footing on the Peninsula".
Thus far had Kimberley’s conversion , perhaps simply knowledge, advanced since
July. Clarke #8 instructions did not pledge the government to anvthing; they
simply implied that "some attempt is to be made to produce a better state of 
2
things". They were despatched on 20 September, after Clarke had set sail. In 
1867 Ord's instructions had concerned the Colony alone: in 1873 Clarke was told 
that an important part of his duties was the conduct of relations with the 
Malay States, In 1867 Buckingham had said that diplomacy could be left to the 
Foreign Office, but in 1873 Kimberley decided "we are the paramount power in 
the Peninsula"•
Ord's last day9 at Singapore.
While the Colonial Office had given up hope that Ord could accomplish anything,
by July 1873 the Governor himself had thrown in the towel*. Selangor had ceased
3
to trouble him, but Perak's problems were unsolved and Ord did not think that 
his government would be able to solve them. In his final months in Singapore 
Ord simply met emergencies as best he could.
The Chinese faction in Larut, cut off from supplies in Penang by the R.N.
4
blockade, began to prey upon shipping near the coast. At the same time the
struggle for power among the Malays of Perak approached its last phase, and the
the two conflicts were mixed as the Mantri finally committed himself to the
Hai San Chinese. Therefore 'Abdu^ llah, once again at odds with the Mantri who
was also Ismail*s chief supporter, is said to have offered the Ghee Hin half their
1. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/103. 2. Tbid.
3. After the relief of Kuala Lumpur in March 1873 Raja Mahdi and Sayid Mashhor 
were confined to upper Selangor, where the Pahang troops finished off the
fighting. In November 1873 'Zia'u'd-din recovered Kuala Selangor and the
Pahang troops withdrew. Linehan, Pahang, pp. 95-1GO*
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expenses if they were victorious in L a r u t I n  planning an offensive to recover
lArut himself the Mantri persuaded Captain Speedy, who resigned as Police
Superintendent, to raise a sepoy force in India, and the latter left Penang on 
2
27 July. Now an Englishman, a former Straits official, was involved in the
Perak war. Although the important policy decisions were already being made in
London, the men on the spot made a last effort at settling Perak. Tn doing this
they virtually committed the government to the Mantri's side.
Col. Anson made an effort to reconcile the Mantri, *Abdu*llah and the
Chinese Headmen at a meeting in Penang on 10 August, but he failed. Therefore,
as he feared the war night spread into Penang where the secret societies had their
headquarters, he decided to take the Mantri*s side and he sent an urgent telegram 
4
to Singapore. This brought Sir Harry Ord on a last visit to the scene of trouble.
When he arrived at Penang on 25 August, *Abdu*llah was invited to a conference
but he pleaded illness, so Ord, no doubt persuaded by Anson, decided to 
recognise the Mantri as the independent ruler of larut. The arms embargo was 
lifted from exports to his supporters and Ord organised the R.N. strength in the 
area into a flotilla of small boats to police the larut shore and suppress the 
growing piracy.^
1. Cowan, Origins. p. 144. Cullick, Speedy, p. 33 says *Abdu*llah spent 16,000 
on the Ghee Hins.
2. Agreement with the Mantri discussed by ^ullick, Speedy, p. 32*
3. The proclamation by Anson in Wilkinson (winstedt, Perak) p. 87. Attending this 
meeting were the Mantri, *Abdu*llah, Ho Ghi Shi (Ghee Kin Headman) and Chang 
Ah Kwi (Hai San Headman), Capt. Grant (HMS Midge) and Tengku *Zia*u*d-din of 
Selangor. ‘Abdullah seems to have been the only one to make a serious effort 
to get peace, and he sailed in Midge taking the proclamation to Tarut. Put
on 14 Aug. Grant reported that the Ghee Hin refused to lay down their arms.
4. Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak) p. 88. *Abdu*llah was furious with Anson for
this and immediately ‘deposed* the T'antri and went off the Singapore to raise
money from Kim Ching. ’Gullick, Speedy, p. 37.
5. Wilkinson, Peninsula Malays, p.112; Cowan, Origins, p.154; Gullick.Speedy.
p.34. Ord invited fAbdu*llah to meet him on 2 Sept., the Mantri was recognised 
on the 3rd., and the arms embargo lifted on the °th. The genuiness of 
*Abdu*llahls illness is not known, hut he did offer to send a representative. 
Ord refused this, and this may possibly be simply a typical example of his 
highhandedness•
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Anson's fears for Penang looked like being fulfilled on 16 September when
the Mantri's town house was blown up, so the Royal Marines were alerted. On the
same day one of HMS Midge’s boats was fired on from a Ghee Hin stockade at
Selinsing.^ These sailors had a thankless task in policing the river, and
Swettenham, who had three weeks with them, has described the sweltering days and
rain drenched nights, when over half the ship's companies went sick. Almost
invariably when sighted, the pirates could pull away into manrrrove enclosed
waters in their narrow craft manned by twenty or more men pulling on double
2
banked oars, before the Bluejackets could pull their cutters close, 'Tnus after 
the attack on Midge's men the government in Singarora authorised the T^avy to 
take its revenge.
Two stockades were destroyed by HMS Thalia on 20 September, and three large
Junks, fifty guns and many pirates were captured. The Colonial Office heard
about this from the Pall Mall Gazette on the evening of 26 September, and when
the official reports arrived MacDonald wrote: "we are getting somewhat actively
3mixed up in Perak politics", but this no longer caused heart searchings in
4
Downing Street. Herbert could not see what else could have been done and
5
Kimberley approved the attack. Until Sir Andrew Clarke had reported the 
Colonial Office was content to let the men on the spot have a free hand on the 
troubled frontier in Malaya, so they did not object either to other independent 
actions by Ord. These concerned Speedy's sepoys and the Dutch campaign in Atjeh,
1. Wilkinson (Winstedt, Perak) p.89. The gig was fired on from the shore and 
from the water and as the Malay steersman lost the rudder at the crucial 
moment she ran aground and two officers were seriously wounded, Ord to 
Kimberley 17.ix.1873 (Tg). CO/273/69.
2. Swettenham, Footprints, pp. 28-30.
3. Min. by MacDonald on Ord to Kimberley 5.ix.l873. CO/273/69.
4. Ibid. Min. by Herbert ll.x.1873.
5. Ibid. The qualified nature of Kimberley's change to a more active policy in 
Malaya and his now realistic attitude can be seen from his reply to the 
suggestion, made by Herbert on the 11th that the Malay rulers should employ 
British manned gunboats for police work. "Englishmen commanding Malay gunboats 
would soon acquire a preponderating power in the Malay States", s«id Kimberley.
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The Mantri made his deal with Speedy before he was recognised by Ord, The 
latter asked Kimberley what attitude he should take to Speedy's action, and 
Herbert insisted that the Mantri had as much right to employ Englishmen as the 
Khedive of EgyP^. Kimberley did not want to interfere with the Mantri'a affairs 
but he was not so sure about the troors from India, so the matter was passed to 
the India Office. They could only say that Speedy and a hundred men had been 
prevented from embarking for a time. But after reference to Singapore, where
Ord had not objected, they had left^and Speedy's force sailed up the larut River
2
on 29 September. The Colonial Office were annoyed that Ord had not waited for 
the instructions which he had asked for, but it was too late to do anything,
Ord's action, however, was consistent with his support for the Mantri. The 
Colonial Office only hoped that he bad not committed himself to support Speedy. 
Actually Speedy*8 force was unable to recapture Larut completely for the Mantri, 
but Speedy's presence was to be useful to the new governor.
When Ord forbade arras exports to At jeh without orders from home Kimberley 
again approved, although the governor was reminded that he should have referred
t
the matter home first. Sir Harry made his last farewells to the Legislative 
Council in Singapore on 31 October 1873, where he took a final tilt «t the 
policy of non-intervention. The verdict in London was - "with a little more
4
discretion Sir H.O. might have left Singapore a popular governor". left
Penang on 2 November, and Sir Andrew Clarke's administration began on the r^d.
Clarke's instructions, in contrast to Ord's in 1867, emphasised the matter
1. India Office to CO. 14.x.1873. CO/273/72.
2. Gullick, Speedy, p. 34.
3. For Speedy's progess see Cowan, Origins. p.157. Major McNair was not impressed 
by Speedy's force, but he said that 'moral support' was given to it by the 
local government. (McNair, Perak and the Malays, p. 35*5-4). When Anson visited 
Larut in December 1873 he found the Mantri more interested in opening the 
mines, his source of revenue, than clearing out his enemies,
4. Min, by Meade 2.1.1874 on Ord to Kimberley l.xi.1873. CO/273/71.
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of relations with the Malay States. Because of the growing anarchy and the 
decline in trade it was now thought "necessary to consider seriously whether 
any steps can be taken to improve their condition".* The British government 
had no desire to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsula, but, wrote Kimberley 
in words often quoted,
"I have to request that you will carefully ascertain as far as you are 
able the actual condition of affairs in each state and ... report... 
any steps which can properly be taken by the Colonial Government to 
promote the restoration of peace and order and to secure protection 
to trade and commerce with the native territories. 1 would wish you 
especially to consider whether it would be edviseable to appoint a 
British officer to reside in any of the Malay States. Such an 
appointment would2only be made with the full consent of the native 
Government...."
Kimberley admitted that something would have to be done in Malaya. He put 
forward tentatively the suggestion of Residents, which had been mooted by the 
Anson Committee and strongly advocated by George Campbell. He told Gladstone 
that the government committed itself to nothing; Clarke was to inquire and 
report.
But the Colonial Office had not bargained on their man. later in life Clarke 
described his own feelings about his instructions:
"My instructions were simple. The Colonial Office was thoroughly 
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Peninsula. I was to 
make it the subject of a careful enquiry, and report my views as soon 
as possible. I fear that in some quarters there lurks a belief in the 
efficacy of reports... It was necessary to act in the first place and 
report Afterwards... The Principles upon which I acted were simple.
Personal influence has always a greater effect on natives of the type 
of the Perak chiefs, and this influence I endeavoured to apply... In 
place of anarchy and irregular revenues 1 held out the prospects of 
peace and plenty. I found them in cotton: I told them that, if they
would trust me, I would clothe them in silk... and since, I have often 
wondered how many of ouphseless, expensive, and demoralising small wars 
might have been avoided by similar modes of procedure... and I imagine 
that the secret of Imperial as of commercial success lies in knowing 
where to adventure". ’
1. Kimberley to Clarke 20.ix.1873. (draft). C0/273/67.
2. Ibid.
3. A.Clarke, *The Straits Settlements1, British Empire Series, vol.I, pp. 45- 
450-455.
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Sir Andrew Clarke's adventure began on the Island of Pangkor on 14 January 1874, 
when ha started to use his ’influence' with the Perak chiefs.
On the same day in West Africa Wolseley stood poised for his invasion of 
Ashanti, and in the -^ outh Pacific, similar proceedings to Clarke's were in 
progress in the Fiji Islands. Goodenough and Layard were Veginning their 
formal enquiries into the question of annexing Fiji, where, as in Malaya, the 
situation was urgent. In fact onfthe day that Clarke began the Pangkor Conference 
one of the Fiji Commissioners wrote home this private impression: "for God's 
sake let there be no delay after our report is sent in, or I shall not be able 
to restrain these folk, they will one side of the other draw blood".*
1. Layard to Wylde 14.i.1874. Private, FO/58/l39 p.30.
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Chapter 4.
THE DEBATE OVER FIJI AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC. 1855-1874.
Sir Andrew Clarke, who went to Malaya to inquire and report following 
Kimberley's change of mind in July 1873, nearly went to Fiji on a similar 
mission, after a Cabinet decision in June of that year.* Since 1855 there had 
been repeated proposals that Britain should annex the Fi.1l Islands or make them 
a protectorate* They were resisted until February I873 when Kimberley urged 
Gladstone to accept. Even then a decision was avoided, for Kimberley, knowing 
Gladstone's reluctance, provided yet another opportunity for delay. The Cabinet 
agreed, on 7 June 1873, to send F.L.Layard, the new Consul for Fiji, end 
Commodore J.G. Good enough, the new commander of the Australasian Squadron, to 
inquire and report on the question of annexing Fiji*
2
Their recommendations were probably a forgone conclusion, but their action
was not expected. In the case of Malaya, Clarke was given the idea of apnointing
Residents by a Secretary of State who was nevertheless taken aback by the fait
accompli at Pangkor. Similarly, if the wording of Goodenough*s instructions
left little doubt as to Kimberley's predilections, authority for the preliminary
cession of the islands, which took place on 20 March 1874, cannot be found in
them. Lord Tenterden, the Assistant Under-secretary in the Foreign Office,wrote:
"I thought Layard and Goodenough were to inquire and report, not to invite a
3
plebiscite for annexation".
1. Kimberley to Gladstone 50.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/29. Here Kimberley
first moots the idea of a commission and says Clarke would be excellent man 
if the Admiralty could spare him. Sir Arthur Gordon, then the Governor of 
Mauritius,also volunteered to go to Fiji.
2. K-Hu&essen believed that the Commission 'paved the way* for annexation and, 
unless Gladstone had overruled them later, he felt the Liberal Govt, would 
have annexed the islands. Braboume Diary, V 1874-79, p. 752,
3. Min, by Tenterden 10.iii.1874 on Commissioners' published correspondence with 
the Fiji Govt., 12.i.1874. FO/58/139 p.33.
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The cession of Fiji, which was accepted by Disraeli's ministry in the same 
way as it accepted Pangkor, and Wolseley's Treaty of Fonana with Ashanti, ended 
the Fiji debate. But it was only the beginning of another. This concerned the 
problem of the British frontier in h^e South Pacific. Just as in West Africa 
and Malaya the frontier of British commerce, investment, settlement, crime, 
political influence or administrative assistance had moved beyond the British 
settlements, so in the case of the islands of the South Pacific, it had moved 
beyond Australia and Mew Zealand. Moreover, like the slave trade in West Africa, 
the labour traffic in the Pacific caused the humanitarians in Britain to make 
a clamour, which, politically, was a potent factor behind the Fiji decision. 
Therefore this chapter on the background to the annexation of Fiji will involve 
three closely interrelated themes - the British reaction to governmental changes 
in Fiji after 1855; the attempt to regulate the labour traffic; and the awakening, 
in a quiet rather academic sense of expansionism in the Pacific. "The waste 
places of the earth were being filled up", said Lord Carnarvon in 1874, "... and 
there were few outlying properties left".^ The debate on these themes in London 
followed a pattern which coincided remarkably with the debates over West Africa 
and Kalaya.
Early requests for the annexation of Fiji, 1855-1863.
In the middle of the nineteenth century Fiji, in the South pacific, began
to follow the pattern of Hawaii, in the North. Traders, missionaries and then
settlers from the British colonies and from the U.S.A. introduced new notions of
*
government into the Polynesian kingdoms. The Hawaiian (Sandwich) Islands were 
the most important group in the Pacific outside Australasia: first a port of call 
for whalers and traders between Nootka Sound and China, they received a United
1. To a deputation of the Fiji Co?>mittee, 4.vii.l874. CO/83/5.
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States Consul in 1820, the same year the American missionaries came. American 
influence predominated throughout most of the nineteenth century and in 1843 
Britain and Prance renounced all intention of acquiring Hawaii. But whatever 
the ambitions of American settlers, traders, politicians or the Navy Department, 
vith Congress reluctant to assume oversea responsibilities, Hawaii was left a 
sort of international no-man*s-land. Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans took 
office under the Hawaiian Kingdom which was able to maintain a precarious 
independence until the end of the century.
Although English missionaries had been active in the Pacific since the 
eighteenth century, the government declined on the whole to excercise forceful 
political influence. The L.M.S. ship Duff took the first missionaries via the 
Horn in 1797 to Tahiti and the Marqueses, and the society gradually expanded 
westwards to Samoa, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia and the Solomons. The 
Wesleyans worked eastwards from New Zealand, entering Tonga in 1826 and Fiji in 
1835. The Presbyterians went to the New Hebrides in 1848, and Bishop Selwyn 
founded the Anglican Melanesian Mission in the same year. Yet after securing 
New Zealand in 1842 the British government refused numerous requests for protection 
or annexation - from Tahiti (1838), Hawaii (1843)* Tonga, Tahiti and Tutuila (1844^  
Samoa (1857) and Tonga (1859).
French interest in the Pacific provided a notable contrast, ’^hile the 
Protestant missionaries, traders and settlers from the U.S.A. and the British 
colonies carved out their strictly private empires protected only intermittently 
by navalj intervention, the French government worked hand in glove with the Roman 
Catholic missionaries to create French influence in areas where French settlement 
and trade were negligible. The Mission d*0ceanie vas founded in 18?0 and by 
1835 the Pacific was divided into two apostolic vicariates. Beginning tentatively 
at Hawaii in 1827 the French Catholic missions expanded to Eastern Polynesia: to 
the Gambler Islands (1834)* Tahiti (1836) and the Marquesas (1838^ . In the South
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Pacific, after an attempt in Tonga, they created stations at vrallis and 
Futuna islands,near Samoa, in 1837, and they centred their mission here in 
New Zealand. Moreover, the annexation of the Marqueses and the creation of the 
Tahiti Protectorate in 1842, and the occupation of New Caledonia in 1853 were 
deliberate acts, a part of the French policy of securing bases in the Pacific,
The Hamburg firm of Godeffroy did not establish its Agency in Samoa* which 
was the basis of the German interest, until 1857.^
I
Thus by the middle of the nineteenth centu-ry, when the frontier of British 
interest moved beyond the Australian colonies, Britain, France and the TTnited 
States had firm stakes in the Pacific. In the South, Britain had secured ^ew 
Zealand, the finest prize in the ocean; in the North the TT.S.A. was assured that 
the other two would not make Hawaii into a Pacific Bermuda, and her citizens were 
quietly consolidating their hold on the economic life of the kingdom. France was 
the leading power in the Eastern Pacific from her base at Papeete, and in securing 
New Caledonia, the nearest large island to Australia (apart from New Guinea), she 
had demonstrated also that the islands of the South Pacific in the region of the 
British colonies, were not automatically a British preserve. In Fiji British 
influence predominated in religion,trade and settlement. A measure of this 
influence ca^  be seen in the words of Thakombau: "The Americans are all bluster, 
and the French are all grimace and very polite, hut the English are the most 
honest".^
The Fiji Islands are a group of over two hundred islands about 1000 miles 
north of New Zealand. Viti Levu, the largest island has an area of 4010.70 square
1. The best general accounts of the growth of European expansion in the Pacific 
are, J.I.Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875.(l°Al) 
and J.M.Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific, 1786 to 18Q3 (1048). 
G.H.Scholefield. The Pacific, its past and future. (lG19), although rather out 
of date, has a lot of very useful material.
2. Goodenough*s Journal, II, 24.ii.1873*
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miles and lies at latitude 18 South and longitude 178 East. The first 'European
to visit them was Tasman in 1643, and after Cook (1774) and Bligh (1789), a
number of explorers, traders and a mission ship called in the late eighteenth
centufy. The first chart vas published by Aaron Arrowsmith in 1818. More
systematic surveys were made by D'Urville in 1838, Commander Wilkes of the U.S.
<*
Exploring Expedition in 1840, and by Captain (later Admiral Sir ^angles) Denham,
1
R.N., in 1865-56.
In the early years of the nineteenth century trading ships from India,
Australia and New England sought sandalwood and bech-de-mer for the markets of
2
China, Manila and Batavia, and from the early trading ships and from shipwrecks
came the beachcombers -"deserters, marooned sailors, derelict scourings of the
3
ports of the old world" - who rave to the Fijians their first taste of western 
civilization in the shape of new diseases, alcohol and firearms.
If European interest in Fiji began with explorers and traders, European
influence was first exerted by the Wesleyan missionaries. Actually the first
4
Christians in Fiji were two L.M.S. teachers from Tonga, who landed at Takemba
S
in 1830, but at end of 1834 the Wesleyans decided to enter the Fijian islands.
William Cross and David Cargill, the first missionaries, reached Iakeraba in
6
October of 1835 and four vears later Fiji was a separate mission district. A 
doctor soon arrived and a Fijian Bible was produced. In spite of their initial 
horror at cannibalism, slow conversions and disillusionment when Christian foue'ht 
Heathen in the battles for power among the chiefs, the Wesleyans were destined to 
play a significant part in Fijian history. By 1860, with sixteen missionaries
1. For voyages of discovery see C.C.Henderson, Fiji and the Fijians 1835-^6 (1831) 
pp. 16-25 & R.A.Derrick, A History of Fiji (1946) vol. I, pp. 28-36.
2. Derrick, History, p. 39. 3. Ibid. p.37.
4. Phonetic spelling will be used for Fijian names. Fijian b is pronounced mb,
c - th, d - nd, g - ng, q - ng.
5. Henderson, op. cit. pp. 42-43.
6. G.G .Findlay & W.W.Holds worth, The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary 
Society (l92l), vol. Ill, pp. 371-380.
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in the field aided by over 200 local preachers, they claimed 9*715 church 
members and 60,000 churchgoers. When Sir Arthur Gordon anrived as Governor
i
in 1875 he found the head of the mission was one of the most important men in
2
the islands controlling an organisation which Gordon likened to the Jesuits.
Missionary influence was not confined to religious teaching. They provided
the interpreters for political meetings between the chiefs and the visiting
naval officers, and Jaties Calvert, who headed the Ovalau circuit from 1861 to
1866, worked to bring about the cession of the islands to Britain. Calvert's
activities, moreover, were not confined to the chiefly level, for the Methodist
leaders in England and Australia were urged to exert pressure by their colleagues
in the mission field. The missionaries visited Australia for the annual Methodist
Conference, and in New South Wales the local Methodists, who controlled the ^iji
Mission after 1855, were influential politically. At one time there were seven
3
Methodists in the Colonial Assembly, and one of them, Alexander MacArthur moved 
a resolution in 1859 urging the annexation of the islands. In London the leadingi
agitators for annexation were briefed by the Methodists; Admiral J.E.Erskine WP.,
who had visited the Fiji Islands, corresponded with Calvert. Above all Alderman
William MacArthur MP., brother of the Sydney politician, was a leading Methodist.
It was he who led the agitation in the House of Commons and he earned the sobriquet
4
of "the patron saint of the Fiji Islander".
Fijian, to the early nineteenth century mind, stood for cannibal. Henderson
wrote that if a great chief visited Mbau and human joints were not available
"women and children fishing on the reefs would be stalked and taken, dressed and
5
cooked to furnish him*with appetizing dishes". Yet early traders were often
1. Rev.W.Wilson to Dr.Hoole, May I860. Methodist Missionary Society Archives, 
Various Fiji Papers, 1858-60 file.
2. Gordon, Fiji Records, I, p. 164.
3. Notebook 13, Calvert Papers, Method. Miss. Soc. Archives.
4. Sir Wilfred Lawson in the Commons, A.viii.1874. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 12^ 6,
5. nenderson, op. cit. P.55.
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hospitably received. Until the late eighteenth century there were no large 
political unit3 in the Fiji Islands,1 and when the early discoverers arrived, 
the chief 'kingdoms' were Rewa, Verata and Mbau (on Viti Levu), Thakaudrove, 
Mathuata and Mbua (on Vanua Levu) and Iakemba in the Lau Islands. Derrick says 
that "during the first half of the century, native affairs in that part of Fiji 
were dominated by a struggle for supremacy in which ^Reva, Mbau and Verata] 
engaged. The border lands between Rewa and ^au became the cockpit of Fiji".
By almost continual warfare the chiefs of. Mbau raised their power so that by 
the 1850's Thakombau was styling himself Tui Viti. 'King of all Fiji*. The
4
decisive point in his fortunes was the battle of Kamba in 18B5, a year which 
in many ways may be seen as the great watershed in Fijian history.
But Thakombau's victory over his rivals at Kamba frustrated his ambition to 
be in reality a 'King of all Fiji'. The victory was only possible with the help 
of the Christian King George Tubou of Tonga, whose relative Wa'afu, the 'Bismarck 
of the Pacific', had been established in the Lau group since 1848. From the time 
of Kamba until he became a British official in 1874, Ma'afu and the Tongans of
3
Lau played an important part in Fijian history. By 1855 he had acquired all the 
northern lau group and he eventually united eastern and northern Fiji into a 
confederacy to rival the power of Thakombau.
In 1855 also the debate over Fiji in London, which ended in the annexation of 
1874, really began, for two comprehensive proposals for British policy in the 
South Pacific were received. Firstly, Charles St. Julian, a law reporter who was 
also Consul-General for Hawaii in Sydney, suggested that Samoa and Fiji should 
be taken under "protective supremacy" on the analogy of Earl Grey's Gold Coast
1. Derrick, History.says the largest kingdoms, Verata and Thakaudrove "were at 
most a few miles of coast with perhaps a conquered island or two".
2. Ibid. p. 54.
3. Early Tongan contacts are discussed by Derrick pp. 118-128.
i
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Protectorate.^ Secondly, Mr. Pi.Oliver of Bradford suggested the annexation of
2
Fiji and other, islands. Although their advice was not followed, it was not
rejected out of hand; only after careful consideration was it rejected and the
Treasury did sanction the appointment of two new Consuls in the Pacific, one of
which went to Fiji where the United States had had a Consular Agent since 1846.
It was in July 1855 also that James Calvert, the Wesleyan leader at Ovalau,
»
engineered the first of Thakombau's fruitless requests for British protection,
"lest the French and Popery should gain these islands". ^
Again, it was in 1855 that Commander Boutwell of the U.S.S. John Adams made
Thakombau admit liability for *45,000 dollars worth of damages due to American
citizens. Most writers, from Sir Arthur Gordon onwards, have accepted Consul
5
March's memorandum of 1873 and date the American claims from an Incident in 1849 
when the U.S.Agent, John Brown Williams, set fire to his house ^hile faring a 
Fourth of July salute. He claimed that some Fijians looted his property, and he 
subsequently added interest to his original figure. Thus the American claims
1. P. 2 of Memo, dated 31.vii.1854 in FO/58/82 p.306.
2. Oliver suggested, in a letter to Clarendon dated 26.xii.1854 which has not 
been found, that Britain should annex New Guinea, the Celebes, Fiji,Tonga and 
the New Hebrides. This was sent to Capt. Fremantle, Senior Naval Officer in 
Australia, who reported that a protectorate over Fiji could be gained with 
little trouble. Oliver's suggestion was known to Calvert in July 1855 who was 
under the impression th^t the British government favoured it. Circumstances 
seemed ripe for gaining Fiji, but no action was in fact taken. However, in 
1883, Augustus Gregory, the Australian explorer, said he had received 
confidential instructions in 1855 to annex New Guinea, should the Crimean war 
continue. (information from J.H.T.Cumpston, Augustus Gregory and the Inland 
Sea, unpublished manuscript, used by courtesy of the late author's daughter,
Dr. I.M.Cumpston, pp. 41-43;. See also Calvert to Gen.Sec. 24.vii.1855.
Meth. Miss. Soc, Fiji Incoming 1855 file, and Memo, on the Oliver proposal 
dated 5.i.1855. FO/58/82 p. 308.
3. Brookes, International Rivalry, pp. 230-231.
4. The chief of Levuka, in rebellion against Thakombau, had treated for help from 
the Roman Catholic missionaries. Calvert to Gen.Sec. l^.vili.lBSS. weth. ^iss. 
Soc. Incoming Fiji 1855 file.
5. Memo, by E.March, London 14.v.1873. FO/58/135 p. 179. Calvert's version of 
the figures are in G.S.Rowe, Fiji and the Fijians,by ^ .Williams and J.Calvert 
(1858) p. 574.
have always been severely criticised. However, the documents published by the
State Department make it clear that although Williams's claims were certainly
excessive they were in fact only the last of a list which included legitimate
2
lasses suffered by Americans dating from 1844.
Williams, as chief creditor, was a persistent claimant and the State
Department ordered an investigation; but it was Boutwell's actions, rather than
the claims, which were most discreditable. The commander was "a Papist and a 
3
Southerner”. He ignored a more senior officer who warned him not to accept
Williams's figures, and he threatened Thakombau with deportation to the United
States if he did not admit liability for outrages which were not really his 
4
responsibility. This action was disavowed «by the American government after 
the Civil War, but Boutwell's high-handedness in 1855 set off a long chain of 
reactions.
In the long run Calvert's persistent advocacy of Thakombau's case reached 
President Grant's ears in 1868 and eventually there was a reconsideration of the 
case, but this was not before an Australian company had inveigled 200,000 acres
5
from Thakombau in return for the payment of the debt. In the short run, 
Thakombau's debt caused the premature cession of the islands to Britain. For 
when Commander Sinclair of the U.S.Corvette Vandalia arrived in October 1858 to 
collect the money, Thakombau was threatened again and now promised to pay $45,000
1. Gordon, Fi.ji Records. I, p. 495; Brookes, International Rivalry. p.?T5; Le^ ge, 
Britain in Fi.ji. p. 28; and Henderson, History of Government in Fi.ji. II,p.66.
2. Details of all the claims were presented to Comdr.Petigru of the T T .S . S .
Falmouth in Feb. 1851, to Comdr.Facgruder of the U.S.S. St.Gary's in July 1851, 
and were sent to Washington, l.i.1854. They are published in Treaties and 
other International Acts of the United States of America, ed. by H.Miller.
Dept, of State publications (1942) vol. VII (1855-58) pp. 286-?<T5.
3» Rev.J.Waterhouse to Gen.Sec. 13.xi. 1855* Meth. Miss. Soc. *5*.11 Incoming 185$ 
file.
4. Comdr. (later Rear-Admiral) T.Bailey, U.S.S. St.Mary's, arrived while ^ outvell 
was at work and reminded him, as a .junior officer, to obey his instructions.
See letter in Miller, Treaties, pp. 297-298; cf. Meth. Miss. Soc Fi.ji Incoming 
1856 file.
5. See below p.^ i£-in.
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in a year.^ Having no means of paying he turned to the newly appointed British
2Consul, William Thomas Pritchard, who had arrived on 10 September 1858. On his
advice Thakombau ceded the islands to Britain on the condition that the United
States debts would be paid. Drawn up by Pritchard, and signed at Levuka on 12
October, only four days after the promise to Sinclair, the cession document
recognised Thakombau as Tui Viti "having full and exclusive sovereignty and
domain in and over the islands". It also provided that the British frown would
3
receive 200,000 acres of land. Pritchard set off for England with this on 3
November; the Colonial Office heard via Australia in January 1859t and Pritchard
reported in February to Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office, who apnroved his
4
action in bringing the document personally and gave him work in the office.
Should the government accent Fiji? Carnarvon, the youthful Parliamentary
Under-secretary in the Colonial Office, was in two ^inds; "It is painful to
refuse but there must be a limit somewhere to our protecting and governing duties
5
especially when we gain nothing by the acquisition". Yet it was selfish, he
said, to refuse to protect "unfortunate islanders wtr are terrified by the licence
of French sailors and the annexation ideas of the US. Covernment".^ Bulwer Lytton,
the Colonial Secretary, pit the decision off until the controversy over Disraeli’s
’fancy franchise* reform bill was over.
There was widely deployed support for accepting the cession. In Sydney
Alexander MacArthur caused the New South Wales Assembly to vote an address to the
7
Crown in support, and Captain Towns, a wealthy merchant, offered to pay the
1. Miller, Treaties, p. 303.
2. W.T.Pritchard, Polynesian Reminiscences (1866), p. 209.
3. Copy of text in B.Seemann.Viti; an account of a government mission to the Titian 
or Fi.jian Islands. 1860-61 (l862) pp. 124-1281
4. Pritchard, op. cit. p. 221.
5. Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 244
6. Ibid. p. 245.
7. KcCullagh, MacArthur, p. J.47*
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American debts. The Admiralty hydrographer, Captain John Washington, favoured 
the cession with hia often-quoted warning that between Vancouver and 5>ydney 
Britain had "not an island nor a rock in the 7000 miles of ocean”.^  The 
Manchester Cotton Supply Association reported favourably on the standard of 
Fijian cotton, and the Rev. William Arthur, general secretary of the Wesleyan 
Missionary Society, fearing that the French might create another Tahiti, 
publicised the matter in a pamphlet, "What is Fiji?". Lord Derby, the Prime 
Minister, listened to what some of the supporters of annexation had to say, 
but before any decision he was defeated over the reform bill.
Thus Palmerston’s second government was formed in June 1859# and Russell 
and Newcastle took over the Foreign and Colonial Offices. The American payments 
were due in October 1859* so Russell sent Pritchard back to Fiji in July with 
a verbal instruction to tell the chiefs that the cession was being considered. 
Reaching the islands on 1 November the Consul was immediately faced with the 
problem of rivalry between Thakombau and Ma’afu. Thakombau had already been in 
difficulty with the Mbau chiefs when Pritchard left in 1858; a year later the 
Consul found that the abler Ka’afu had prevailed on Vanua Levu and had allies on 
Viti Levu on either side of Thakombau, at Mbengga, in the south, and Rakiraki to 
the north-east. Both sides appealed to Pritchard. Thakombau wanted help; Ma’afu 
asserted that he himself would soon be master and that the Consul must recognise 
him.**
Pritchard*3 instructions were vague and as the oession offer was still un­
answered, he faced an embarrassing choice. Deciding to preserve the status quo
at the time of the cession he determined to maintain Thakombau and check Ma'afu 
*
and the Tongans. Without announcing this he called the first conference of the
1. Quoted in Seemann, Viti. p. 421,
2. Pritchard,. Reminiscences, p. 225-232.
leading Fijian chiefs, which began at the Consulate at Levuka on 14 December 
1659f with m s  Flk standing by. Here Pritchard, with the concurrence of the 
United States Consul, got signatures on a remarkable group of documents. "T 
secured the controlling power of the group in my own hands”, he later wrote.* 
Ma'afu was persuaded to renounce his pretensions, the 1858 cession was "ratified 
and renewed" by twenty chiefs including Thakombau, and finally the Consul was
4
granted "full unreserved entire and supreme authority to govern Fiji and to
2
make what laws he pleased".
Pritchard probably regarded these powers as an interim system of control
pending a decision as the question of the cession. But before Palmerston's
government made up its mind the Colonial Office sent a commissioner to investigate,
The officer chosen was Col. W.T.Smythe, R.A. Finding no ship for Piji in
Sydney he went to New Zealand, and he finally reached Fiji on 5 July I860 after
having to spend at least a month in New Zealand during the first Taranaki War
^March 1860 to March 1861), an outbreak which followed a land dispute between
4
Maori chiefs and the government. In Sydney Governor Denison warned Smythe of
New Zealand’s experience of settlers' problems with the local inhabitants, and
this lesson was not lost on the Colonial Office where the Maori War was seen to
5
"illustrate the difficulty of carrying out the Fiji project".
It was soon quite evident that Smythe would advise against the cession as ' 
he discovered that Thakombau did not have authority to make it. He sent a
1. Ibid. p. 234.
2. Derrick, History, pp.143-4; Seemann, Viti. pp.128-9. Copy of treaty giving him 
jurisdiction over British subjects, 15.xii.1859 in F0/58/l24 p.65. The treaty 
vesting full powers in him, I6.xii.1859 in Smythe to Newcastle Q.xi,1860. 
CO/83/1.
3. Derrick (p. 144) says Smythe was appointed at the end of 1R5Q, but the **0. was 
not officially told until CO. to FO. 31.vii.1860 (draft). C0/83/l.
4. J.Hight,'The Maori Wars, 1843-72', Camb.Hist .Brit. Bmp. VII, Pt.2, np.1^-1^6
5. Min. by Sandford 19.vi.1860 on Smythe to CO. 14.iv.I860. CO/rV i. Legge. 
Britain in Fiji, p. 34 says that these fears of another New Zealand "were 
decisive" in leading the CO. to accept Smythe's advice against annexation.
6. Smythe to Newcastle 9.viii.l860. C0/83/l.
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a provisional adverse recommendation in November I860,* but the full report did 
not reach the Colonial Office until 17 August 1861. As his conclusion was already 
announced, Smythe aimed in the report to dismiss the reasons which were given in 
favour of annexation. Thus he said (l) that steamers from Sydney to Panama would 
have to make a more dangerous journey and go 359 miles out of their way if they 
went via Fiji, (2) that although cotton grew well, the land question would have 
to be settled, and production would be low because the Fijians would not work, 
and 3^) that Fiji was not necessary for the maintainance of British power in the 
Pacific. That depended on the ships of the Australasian Station, piji would be 
a costly addition, and he thought that instead of being annexed it ought to be 
allowed to develop gradually under western influence like the Kingdon of Hawaii. 
All he suggested was that the British Consul should be given magisterial powers
2
over British subjects and that the Consulate should be moved from Levuka to Suva.
Agreeing with Smythe the Colonial Office advised, on 7 September 1861, that
3
the cession should be rejected. So far as the Colonial Office was concerned this 
disposed of Fiji until 1870, and their attitude in the early 1860's is illustrated 
by Rogers's statement that ’’the present juncture is certainly not one in which it 
would be convenient to become responsible for the Government of more warlike
4
savages than we already have on our hands". Thus offers of Samoa in 1862 and
1. Smythe to Newcastle 9.xi.l860. C0/83/l.
2. Report in A & P. 1862, XXXVI,pp.734-742. Smythe's qualifications and his 
conduct of the enquiry are severely criticised by Derrick, History, pp.146-7.
In 1873 Smythe changed his mind over Fiji and K-Hugessen wrote: "The fact is 
that his report on 1861 was all wrong in many of its most essential particulars 
(Min. l.iv.1873 on FO. to CO. 26.iii.1873. CO/83/3). This did not prevent 
Kimberley, who got to know Smythe in Ireland, from suggesting sending him as 
the Commissioner in 1873. (Kimberley to Gladstone 30.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 
44225/29).
3. CO. to FO. 7.ix. 1861 (,dr*ft). C0/83/l. Russ.ll, th. Foreign S*e. Ten 
years later Kinnaird told the Commons that when he had tried to persuade 
Palmerston to annex Fiji the P.M. had looked at the map and recited all the 
depths of the harbours in Fiji, but Gladstone replied that Newcastle ’**9 the 
only member of the Cabinet who favoured annexation. 3 Hansard,ccxii,col.213-7.
4* Min. by Rogers 19.vi.1860 on Denison to Newcastle 10.iv.1860. C0/83/l.
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Raratongain 1866 were also rejected.
The Foreign Office, however, had a continuing responsibility in Fiji. To
begin with Smythe advised the removal of Pritchard; there were rumours about his
past, accusations of financial irregularity, and above all the evidence that
Pritchard had interfered in Fijian politics and achieved a position of great
power. He was an able man, said Smythe, but needed supervision.^ Pritchard had
indeed worked indefatigably to develop and civilize Fiji. By advertising In the
Australian papers for settlers, he claimed that he attracted between ten and
2
twenty new arrivals a week. His rules governing land purchases were recogised
to the extent that by 1863 the Consular Seal on a deed was accepted as legally
binding. He persuaded the settlers and the chiefs to support a ’Mercantile
Court of Fiji' consisting of the British and United States Consuls and other
assessors.^ British ships were required to register and he issued ’sailing
letters' as the condition of giving them protection. In April 1862 he visited
King George Tubou of Tonga after the Wesleyans the U.S.Consul had warned
him that Ma'afu's ambitions might lead to a Tongan invasion of Fiji. And although
Smythe had a poor impression of Pritchard, Dr. Seemann, the botanist, and
Commodore Seymour, the Senior naval Officer, - both of whom witnessed Pritchard's
4
relations with the Fijians - paid tribute to him.
Faced with these conflicting reports Russell ordered the Governor of Mew
South Wales to investigate, and a commission of three arrived at Levuka in June
1862 for this purpose. Evidence of stealing by Pritchard was found unsatisfactory,
5
but his financial affairs "led to very justifiable suspicion". Therefore the
1. Ibid. Smythe to Newcastle 9.xi.l860. 2. Pritchard, Reminiscences. p.235.
3. Cf. the Courts of Equity in the Niger Delta, see ^tleve
4. Seymour's view in AD. to CO. 22.xi.1861. C0/83/l. Derrick, History, p.146. 
Seemann*s Viti (1862) was in some respects a contradiction of Smythe, and 
Seemann also published and edited Pritchard's Reminiscences in 1866.
5. Commission's report in FO/58/108 p.535* Pritchard does not mention the 
commission in his Reminiscences. He blames the missionaries, who he said, at 
first told him that Thakombau was Tui Viti, then later said he had no power to 
cede to islands, (p.218). After the formal refusal of the cession, Pritchard
says he ceased to exercise the powers he had gained.
I
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Consul was suspended and he left Fiji in 1863. The British government's refusal !
of the cession was announced in the islands in July 1862. !
undoubtedly Pritchard was an able and energetic man, who, probably with 
the best of motives, exceeded his vague instructions. He was obviously ambitious \
i !
and in financial matters, if not dishonest, certainly incompetent: yet Henderson's i
criticisms seem somewhat violent,* and both Derrick and Legge have concentrated
i
2
on his achievments. He is important for this discussion because his five year 
tenure of the Consulate raised most of the problems which were to worry Whitehall 
for a decade or more. Who was the lawful authority in Fiji? Who would prevail 
in the struggle for power between Thakombau and Ma'afu? How were the British 
settlers in the islands to be governed? What was Fiji’s commercial and 
strategic value? The same ship which delivered the formal British refusal was 
handed a paper by Robert a.Swanston, one of the ablest of the settlers, on the 
corrjnercial potential of the islands. Very impressed by the economic possibilities 
and racial harmony of the group this writer said all that was needed was
4
magisterial power for the British Consul, so that the settlers could be controlled,
Smythe had also recommended this, and in the Foreign Office the Hon. H.C.Vivian
agreed. Fiji would present all sorts of difficulties but he thought there would
3
be no harm if the new consul tried to get jurisdiction over British subjects.
Thus from 1862 to 1869 British policy towards Fiji invloved an attempt to give 
the consul magisterial powers over British subjects. The attempt failed.
1. Henderson (History of Government in Fiji, II, pp.61-102) completely accepts 
Sroythe's view and has not a word of criticism of the commissioner. He 
considered Pritchard an autocratic, dangerous megalomaniac who "would be a 
King in Fiji".
2. Derrick.(History, pp.154-5) says that but for Smythe Pritchard would be 
regarded as the "Stamford Raffles of the South-western Pacific", and Legge, 
(Britain in Fiji, p.38 & 106) says "it is impossible not to admire his 
tactical skill in controlling the native affairs of Fiji, or to admit the 
justice of his pride in his ac’ ievment".
3. Min. by Vivian ll.iii.1863 on CO. to FO. 5.iil.l863, with Swandbn’s paper 
dated 24.vii.1862. FO/58/124.
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The development of Fiji and the attempt at Consular Jurisdiction.186^*70.
Ten years after the Smythe Report consular jurisdiction in Fiji was provided 
by Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts. Yet the order was 
never published or carried into effect.* A decade of drafting and re-drafting 
in Whitehall ended in failure; a failure which cannot be explained simply by the 
changes which were taking places in the islands. Here is a clear example of the 
muddle and indifference by which the departments of state in London could obstruct 
the formulation of policy when it concerned such a peripheral area as the South 
Pacific.
Only rarely did Fiji come before the Cabinet. In theory the islands came 
within the ken of the Foreign Office, who aopointed the Consul, but the Foreign
Office rarely moved in these waters without consulting the law officers. The
* 3Colonial Office could not remain aloof, however much it tried, because
Australian colonists were interested in Fiji, the R.N.Squadron was based in 
the colonies, and most of the plans for consular jurisdiction envisaged appeals 
to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Most of the delays in the Fiji 
discussions were caused by the Treasury, which once took over a year to answer 
a letter and which was responsible for the dropping of plans for consular 
jurisdiction in 1869* Again, when the growth of the South Sea labour traffic 
attracted publicity to dusty comers of Whitehall there was no clear cut line 
of responsibility, most of the ships involved came from colonial ports, but 
much of the information could only be gathered by the consul. Any measures 
for regulation depended on Treasury sanction of the expense and Admiraly 
enforcement. In these circumstances, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Treasury,
1. FO. to CO. 19.ix.1871 vdraft). FO/5fi/l?? p.107.
2. When he was working in the FO. Pritchard found a parcel in a comer addressed 
to him at Levuka with some forms. It had been there for 16 months. 
Reminiscences, p.225.
3. Kimberley often wrote minutes like this: ”1 wish to discourage the notion that 
the Colonial Office has anything to do with the Fiji islands". Min, on 
Belmore to Kimberley 25.i.1871. CO/20l/563.
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Admiralty and Law Officers between them managed to prevaricate for ten years 
over providing facilities which were already being taken for granted elsewhere.^ "
k
Herbert was conscious of the muddle when he wrote that Ma vast quantity of the
2Polynesian business has been done twice over”.
Admittedly Fiji was a unique case. Normally consular Jurisdiction was based
3
not only on the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts but on treaties with the ruling 
sovereigns. Pritchard had forgotten the latter, so his successor, Henry M.Jones
VC., was asked by the Foreign Office in September 1863 if there was any authority
4
in Fiji with whom a treaty could be made, Jones replied that there had "never
been any law and order in Fiji”, but he said that in I860 Congress had granted
the United States Consuls in lands without 'civilized government* the same
5
powers as had been obtained by treaty in China, Japan and Siam. A year later
Jones reported that he had persuaded the Fijian chiefs to form a confederation.
Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, was encouraged by the American act, so on
6 November 1866 the Treasury was consulted about an Order in Council to apply
6the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to Hcertain islands in the Pacific”.
7
The Treasury did not reply until 25 January 1868, when Mr. Reilly, their 
draf^ ter, produced a scheme similar to those operating in China, Japan and Siam.
It provided for the registration of British subjects in Fiji, civil and criminal 
jurisdiction by the ^ Consul similar to that exercised by an English county court, 
the Consul to be able to award penalties up to six months imprisonment or a fine
Q
of £50. Prisoners, serious cases and appeals were to go to New South Wales.
1. See below p*Ms-3*U.
2. Min. by Herbert 30.vi.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley R.iv.1871. CO/?Ol/563.
3. See below p. si.
4. Min. bv Vivian ll.iii.1863 on CO. to FO. 5*iii*1863 & FO. to Jones 14.ix,1863 
(.draft). F0/5fyi24 pp.30-31.
5. Jones to FO. 6.x.1866. Ibid. p.35-& 43*
6. FO. to Tres. 6.xi.l866 (.draft). Ibid. p. 69*
7. The delay was caused by a misunderstanding between the Treas. and Mr.Reilly.
8. Booklet in Treas. to FO. 25*i*1868. F0/58/l24 p.91*
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Another delay followed as the Law Officers considered that an Act would be 
necessary to make the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts apply to Fiji; in January 1*6Q 
Reilly drafted the required Bill.
These delays were caused by the legal conclusion that in Fiji jurisdiction 
could not be based on sufferance and that there was no regular government with 
which a treaty could be made. Reilly's Bill was designed to overcome this bar, 
and it was only after the matter had progressed thus far that the Lords of the 
Treasury realised the true nature of the Fiji anomaly and took fright. As the 
Bill involved giving the Crown jurisdiction in a case not experienced before,they 
felt that British subjects might force the Crown to exercise powers in a territory 
territory which was not British and which another Power might acquire. Therefore 
the Treasury deluged cold water on the whole scheme by re-iterating a familiar 
doctrine:
"If a jurisdiction is created it may be presumed to Courts must be 
established to administer it. These cannot exist without a Government 
to protect them nor a Government without taxes - nor taxes without some 
sort of police; and all these things being created under British Taw they 
must... in the too probable case of default, be supported from Imperial 
resources”.
The Treasury suggested instead that Fiji should be placed under the jurisdiction
of one of the Australian colonies.^ They did not realise, said Vivian, that
consular jurisdiction usually paid for itself out of fees.
ihe Colonial Office was not pleased by the Treasury's alternative. Granville,
the Colonial Secretary, would not allow Fijian crimes to be punishable in
Australia without colonial consent, as this would be "pro tanto a revival of 
2
transportation". He suggested a voluntary scheme of law enforcement in Fiji 
among the settlers, or some joint arrangement with the United States. But the 
latter had found that their 1860 Act of Congress was ineffective, and as the
X. Treas. to FO. 2.1.1869. FO./5S/l24 p.223.
2. CO. to FO. 26.11.1869. F0/58/ll6 p.123.
,233
British I aw Officers were unable to recommend any satisfactory way of auplying 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to Fiji, Clarendon dropped the Bill in May 1869,*
The Foreign Office decided to rely on the Hprudence and discretion" of the new 
Consul, Edward March, Thus eight years after Smythe's suggestion the attempt to 
get consular jurisdiction was dropped, until Granville revived it in 1R71.
While Whitehall dabbled with Fiji in this leisurely fashion in the 1860's,
events in the islands conspired to draw more urgent attention to them. The
abortive cession of 1858, Pritchard's advertisments in the colonial press, and
the high cotton prices induced by the Civil War in the TJ.S.A, increased the
2
white population to three hundred and fifty by 1865# and the value of trade 
3
grew steadily. But the problem of government still remained. At its core lay
the rivalries of the Fijian chiefs, especially Thakombau and Fa'afu. From 1862
to 1874 three approaches were made to the problem of government in Fiji, Firstly, 
4
British Consuls did their best to encourage the Fijian chiefs to create a 
unified government, and to protect them from unscrupulous settlers. Secondly, 
individual settlers, or mere'adventurers, became the secretaries of the leading 
chiefs, and later tried to create constitutional regimes with themselves as 
ministers. Thirdly, white settlers formed 'mutual protection societies' whioh 
planned to take the law into their own hands in the event of a complete crisis.
The third solution was the least constructive and its recurrent manifestations
1. FO. to CO. 20.v. 1869 (.draft). FO/58/124 p.274.
2. They will be called 'white* settlers as theyincluded Europeans, Americans and 
Colonials. In 1865s 230 Brit, 70 Am, 30 GennftScand, & 20 others. (Jones
to FO. 24.xi.1865. FO/58/124 p.49.)
3. Value of exports, from Consul'a reports
1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870
£13,030 13,085 19,764 24,225 30,970 39,960 45,167 *7,020 08,755.
Imports, occasionally estimated by the Consul
1865 1866 1867 1870
£20,000 25,000 29,000 71,000
4. Capt. Henry Michael Jones VC July 1863-July 1867: John Bates Thurston (acting)
July 1867-November 1869; Kdvnrd March November 1869-January 1873.
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emabarrassed the Consuls, In 1871 for instance some British subjects formed an 
armed Klu Klux Klan.^ The second solution represented Fiji's short-lived attempt 
to emulate Hawaii; in many ways a constructive solution, its breakdown in 1873-4 
was the immediate cause of British intervention. The efforts of the consuls were 
usually ineffective, but they were important because they identified the British 
government with the cause of protecting the Fijians from the settlers, a cause 
taken up by the colonial government after 1874.
Consul H.M.Jones VC arrived in 1864 with instructions to look into the 
question of consular jurisdiction. Finding no recognised and unified authority 
in Fiji with which to make a treaty he tried to create one, by calling a meeting 
of the leading chiefs on 8 May 1865 when the 'Confederation' was launched. The 
seven leading chiefs of Mbau, Reva, Lakemba, Mbua, Thakaudrove, T'-'lathuata and 
Nanduri agreed to constitute an annual assembly of chiefs which would legislate 
for all Fiji. Local autonomy would remain, each chief would levy his own taxes,
i
but wars would have to receive the sanction of the assembly, and a stinend would 
have to be found for the annually elected ^resident. A national flag was adopted; 
Thakombau was elected the first President and the next assembly was arranged for 
1 May 1866.
The Confederation was short-lived. To Jones the Fijian idea of sovereignty
3
was "simply an unlimited privilege of plundering". Disputes over the delimitation
of the chiefs* territories and suspicion of Thakombau were rife, and early in
1867 Kbua, Lakemba and Thakaudrove seceded from the Confederation. When Jones
left Fiji in July 1867 he had to report that Ma'afu now led the seceding states
4
which formed a federation of north-eastern Fiji. But Thakombau was not to be 
outdone. Encouraged by some white settlers he styled himself Fing of Kbau and
4
1. Govt, of Fiji to Gov. of N.S.W. 3.1.1872 in CO. to FO. 2.iv.lR7?. FO/58/l33p. 
160.
2. Jones to FO. 24.xi. 1865* FO/58/124 p*49*
3* Ibid. p.80. Jones to FO. 18.vii.l867«
4. Also called the 'Lau Confederation' or the ’Eastern Confederation*. Derrick, 
History p.161 says Ma'afu did not push himself forward until 2 years later.
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its dominions, and Samuel St.John vfrom California) his secretary, drew up a 
constitution based on Hawaii's. At a ludicrous ceremony on 2 May 1867 the 
'Mbau Constitution' was launched.^ This was just as ineffective as Jones's 
confederation, and Fiji was left divided into two rival camps, Thakambau in 
Mbau and Ma'afu at Lau. Each had their white advisers, or 'Ministers*, and 
Thakombau's domain compared unfavourably with Ma'afu's.
At this stage (Sir) John Thurston entered Fijian political life. He had 
landed a year before after a shipwreck and he was soon the close friend of
i 2
Captain Jones , who, when he left for England in 1867, appointed the newcomer 
as acting Consul. Thurston, who was the acting Consul until 1869, was destined 
to stand beside Sir Arthur Cordon as one of the great makers of modem Fiji.
After entering the merchant navy as a boy he had served five veers in Indian and 
Pacific waters before attempting sheep farming in Australia. On a final voyage 
to the South Seas before starting a new ranch he was shipwrecked at Roturna and 
after landing at Levuka in the mission ship John Wesley, he devoted the rest of 
his life to Fiji. With little formal education he was a man of great versatility 
and instead of becoming just another planter he mastered the Fijian language and 
the land tenure system, and he was also an expert on ships and botany. The 
Foreign uffice refused to make him the permanent Consul in 1869, but he
shepherded Thakombau's government through the storms of 1873-4 as Chief Secretary,
3
and although this stage of his career is still most controversial, it is fair 
to say that he was indispensible to the first colonial administration in 1874. 
his career culminated in 1888 in his appointment as Governor of Fiji and High
1. Derrick, History, pp. 163-4* In 1873 St.John supported annexation by Britain, 
Goodenough's Journal, II, 6.xii.l873.
2. They discovered they had both been on the same ship to India. A.B.Brevster,
King of the Cannibal Islands 1.1937) p* 241*
3. See below p.34-s-3s7.
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Commissioner for the Western Pacific#
Thurston had no illusions about Thakombau's pretensions# Nevertheless he 
continued Jones's policy of encouraging the growth of a single Fijian authority#
He found the Fijians well disposed to the settlers on the whole and he sought to 
preserve this harmony# Two incidents in 1867 illustrate the trend of Thurston's 
policy; in one he urged Thakombau to fulfill his responsibilities; in the other 
he tried to save him from being exploited by Australians#
Firstly, on 21 July 1867 the Rev. Thomas Baker was murdered by a mountain
i
tribe in the interior of Viti Levu# Although settlers paid taxes to Thakombau 
for his protection as King of Mbau, he tried to disclaim all responsibility for 
the Viti Levu 'mountaineers'. Thurston pressed him to assert his authority; he 
urged him to punish the murderers and Captain Hope of HMS Brisk refused to do 
it. Although Thurston succeeded in getting several Fijian expeditions organised 
for this purposte, they were not effective#
in the second case, Thurston's efforts to save Thakombau from the Polynesia 
Company of Melbourne, were more successful# The American debt was still unpaid 
in June 1867, when Capt. Stanley of the U.S.S. Tuscarora reminded Thakombau of 
them and made the now usual threats. This time the American representative secured 
an •Indenture * by which Thakombau promised to pay the value of the balance due, 
amounting to $43,565.19# in four yearly instalments of island produce beginning
1 May 1868. On top of this the islands of Moturiki, Batiki and Nairai were
2
'mortgaged* as security. It was obvious‘that Thakombau would not be able to pay
again, and early in 1868 the American Commercial Agent suggested that the three
islands should be advertised in the Australian newspapers, but when Seward, the
1. For his early career see J.Millington, The Career of Sir John Thurston# Governor 
of Fiji 1888-97, (MA# thesis London 1947) pp. 22-26. For a slighter and 
rather different account see Derrick, History. p#l60, fn#14 and the Introduction 
to "Journal de Bord D'une Tournee de Recrutement aux Nouvelies-Hebrides en 1P71, 
sur la Goelette 'Stratl'mover'", bv J .B.Thurston# Journal de la Soclet^ des 
Oceaniates. XIII, No#13 (Dec.1957; p# 69#
2# Miller, Treaties, pp. 304-305.
237
Secretary of State, gent the matter to the Senate, no action was taken.^
A way out was suggested for Thakombau by a group of Melbourne businessmen.
A company had been formed (probably through the efforts of the American Consuls
2
in Melbourne and Fiji) to pay Thakombau's debts plus a stipend of £1,000 a year,
in return for 200,000 acres of land with the right of making laws and establishing
courts, and a commercial and banking monopoly in the islands. Thakombau signed
a charter in these terms on 22 June 1868 after a champagne breakfast aboard the
3
Albion at Levuka. Thurston immediately protested. He told the Polynesia
Company that it was negotiating as if it were a foreign State and he Issued an
injunction staying the actions of the British directors while he called on
Commodore Lambert, the Senior Naval Officer, to investigate. He told Lambert
that Thakombau did not own any of the 200,000 acres at Suva Bay, Mbengga and Viti
Levu Bay, and Lambert approved the Consul’s action. Thakombau therefore disowned
the charter, but he promptly signed another on 23 July, and by a gentelmen's
4
agreement the company also agreed to supply him with a gunboat. Eventually the
1. Miller, Treaties, pp. 311-312.
2. The Gov. of Victoria believed that Gen.Latham, US. Consul, Melbourne, was one 
of the promoters, but he is not in the list of investors given in fn,3. But 
Dr. Isaac M.Brower, US. Consul, Fiji, did sign the company's charter. Arriving 
in Fiji about 1858, he had been appointed Vice-Consular Agent by J.B.Williams 
on the day the latter died,10 June 1860, and he retained the post until 1876.
He was a planter with considerable estates and experimented in wool growing. 
(Miller p.304; Derrick, History, pp.178-9; Thurston to Fo. 27.v.1868, Tburston 
to Lambert l.vi.1868 (copy), F0/58/ll3 pp. 116 A 120; CO. to F0. 18.viii.1869, 
F0/58/116 p.243).
3. Charter signed by Brower, John Lavington Evans A W.H.O'H.Brewer. Their 
'associates* were Frederick Cook(financial agent) Andrew Lyall (merchant) J.B. 
Butters (Mayor of Melbourne) W.C.Smith (banker, Ball era t) A T.Davey(Mayor of 
Ballerat). Miller, p.313.
4. Ibid. pp.314, 318-323. By the time the final payment was paid,l.ix.1870, the 
U.S. Govt, had decided to re-examine Williams's claim, first admitted by 
Boutwell in 1855. One of the Rev. Calvert's letters had reached Pres. Grant in 
May 1868 and the State Dept, suggested an impartial inquiry. A Court of Inquiry 
was held in October 1869 by Comdr. Truxton, who allowed all the claims except 
the late Consul Williams's. While Boutwell had allowed t19,^65, he was only 
entitled to $7,199.67. Truxton did not think the Polynesia Camoany should be 
released from their obligation to pay, but he suggested that the excess of 
Williams's claim should be refunded to Thakombau. This was not done, but as 
Thakombau did not own the 200,000 acres the money was all refunded by the 
Colonial Govt, in Fiji to the Company, who gave up the land.
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company paid 9ff the U.S. debt, and the company1', first settlers arrived at
Suva Bay in 1870.^ Thurston continued to oppose the company, and although it
continued its activities, he probably prevented it from becoming a miniature
East India Company in Fiji.
in 1869 there was an attempt to revive the 1867 Mbau Constitution, when
W.H.Drew ^Thakombau's new secretary) produced, in March 1869, a blue-print for
a consitutional monarchy known as the 'Amended Mbau Constitution*. But although
2
Drew tried to enlist help in New Zealand, his government was no more successful
than St. Johns's. Edward March, who replaced Thurston as British Consul in
1869, said the government was quite ineffective, and that all disputes ware
usually referred to the British and American Consuls.^
In fact the period from 1869 to 1871, when a determined effort wa9 made to
*
form a workable constitutional government in riji, were years of great uncertainty 
for the islands. White settlement increased rapidly; 1870 saw the 'Great Fiji
Rush* when there were over 1,000 fresh arrivals bringing the total to nearly
4 5
4.,000* The value of cotton exports reached £92,700, and suggestions, rumours,
resolutions and some concrete proposals for annexation by one of the Powers were
rife. Consul March's position was difficult. He was instructed to remain
neutral in Fijian disputes and to rely on his tact and judgement to smooth matters
6
where British subjects were invloved, but in a tumbledown Consulate on the beach
1. An account by one of them in Brewster, op. cit. p,52.
2. Bowen to Granville 14.iii.1870. CO/2097216.
3. Derrick, History, p. 189.
4. Growth of the white population from the Consul's reports:-
1867 1868 1869 1870 1871
366 600-650 est.1000 2000 3,900.
5. Value of cotton exports from the Consul's reports
1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870
£ 360 900 3,000 6,000 19,000 34,004 30,975 45.000 92,700.
6. FO. to March 19.iii.1869 (draft). F0/58/llS p.163.
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at Levuka, a place steadily taking on the character of a rowdy American frontier 
town, his 'tact anj judgement1 were hard pressed and he hecerae alienated from the 
British settlers.i
"I am in the midst of low adventurers, absconders from the Colonies, and 
a class of men who are in a chronic state of excitement caused by continual 
indulgence in alcoholic drink. I am at the mercy of any ruffian who chooses 
to walk into the office...,;'
he wrote in despair.* Thus by 1870 the Fiji files in London grew large and
urgent again.
Annexation projects. 1870-1871.
Kimberley's attention was drawn to Fiji in his weeks at the Colonial Office
in July 1870 because proposals for annexation were mooted in Australia. While
the pace of change in the islands quickened at the end of the 1860's, and the
Foreign Office struggled with the Treasury over consular jurisdiction, strange
*
rumours and suggestions reached London. By the middle of 1870 the officials in 
the Colonial Office were doing a good deal of thinking about the future of Fiji.
Some fruitless projects were canvassed. In December 1869 the Melbourne Age 
wanted the colony of Victoria to prevent the annexation of Fiji by a foreign
2Power by emulating the East India Company and governing Fiji through a Resident.
A group of Germans in Fiji applied for annexation by the North German Confederation
but Bismarck refused in October 1869 although he agreed to appoint a Consul and 
3
send a gunboat. A public meeting in Levuka on 14 June 1869 discussed the
question of protection from the United States or a European Power. The conclusion
reached was that since Britain refused to annex, her protection should be sought
for a period of ten to twenty years to enable to islands to develop a type of
4
government like Hawaii's. A group of seventy Americans,nevertheless, signed a
1. March to T.V.Lister 2.vii.l870. Private. FO/58/118 p.^ 06.
2. The Age. Il.xii.l869» cutting in Canterbury to Granville 2.i.1870. C0/3o9/93.
3« Copy of Bismarck's letter dated 16.x.1869 in March's Report on Fiji, 27.iii.1870
F0/58/118 pp. 181-196.
4. Memorial in March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. Ibid. p. 219.
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petition to the United States Government, but the American Consul refused to
send it to Washington,* and the State Department denied that it had any desire
2
to interfere in Fiji. A rumour was passed that Napolean III had made a treaty 
recognising Thakombau*s government, but it transpired that a convention, supposed
to have been signed 8 July 1858, had provided freedom for the Roman Catholics,
* 3and the French had merely recognised Thakombau as 'King of Mbau'. In March
1870 the'British Consul sent home memorials from Thakombau, Ma'afu and the British
4
residents purportihg to pray for British protection. This was never answered by 
the Foreign Office and in 1874 letters were found in the Consulate which indicated
c
that this was not a bone fide request. But it certainlyjkpneared in 1870 that
some Power might take Fiji; when Admiral J.E.Erskine, MP., visited the Foreign
Office early in 1870 he was surprised to find Clarendon and his staff "so well
up and deeply interested in the islands".^
The Colonial Office was not alarmed by the prospect of a foreign Power in
Fiji. Sooner than see Britain become responsible for the islands, Granville was
7
prepared to risk the possibility of annexation by the United States. Herbert 
wondered if "it might save the credit of England and be of general advantage, if 
any diplomatic communications could result in the establishment of a friendly
g
European Government over these islands". He vrote a long memorandum in May 1R70 
on the activities in London of Lavington Evans (one of the directors of the 
Polynesia Company) who had been to see the Agent-General for Queensland. Evans
1. March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. F0/58/ll8 p.175. Copy of the American petition
acknowledged by US. Consul, 31.viii.1869 enclosed in Sutton to Granville
8.xi.l869. CO/309/71.
2. FO. to CO. 16.iii.1870. C0/20l/561.
3. March's Report, F0/5fl/ll8 pp.181-219.
4. March to Clarendon 31.iii.1870. Ibid. p.215.
5. Goodenough's Journal, III, 12.i.1874.
6. Rev.Calvert to Rev. Hoole 17.iii.1870. Weth. *iss. Soc. Home letters 1867- 
1870 file.
7. Rogers to Hammond 4.ii.l870. F0/58/ll9 p. 206.
8. Min. by Herbert ll.vi.1870 on Dr.L.Fison to W.Fison 27.viii.1869 (copy) in 
CO/201/562.
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claimed he had authority from the Fijian settlers to secure British or German 
aid.
111 do not pF course at all regret", wrote Herbert, "the decision of this 
Government to have nothing to do with a country which is too likely to 
be involved very shortly in native difficulties. But it is by no means 
unimportant to England that it should pass into the hands of a power 
likely to contribute to the maintainance of a fair balance of naval 
power in the Pacific. France, Holland, Russian and America have their 
fleets in or handy to the area surrounding Australia, and as Prussia has 
now a somewhat considerable steam fleet, I venture to suggest that it is 
well worth while for this Government to make some exertion with the view 
of causing the Fijis to be constituted a North German Colony..• If North 
Germany will not come forward, then possibly Belgium might do it. About 
ten years ago a Belgian Commission... visited Australia and the neigh­
bouring countries with a view to reporting on the practicability of 
founding a Belgian Colony in these Seas...
It is really very necessary that some Government (which should^not be 
the French or American) should be established in these islands".
Receiving this with his first brief on Fiji Kimberley discovered that the
Colonial Office had no fears of Foreign Power near Australia. Rogers said that
"if Prussia would adopt the task of reducing these savages into Berlin Order it
2would be a useful and very curious to look at". He seemed to welcome Germany
into the colonial field; he thought a German colony in New Guinea would be a
good thing, and in July 1870 said he would b<= happy to let the Germans have a 
3
base in Malaya.
These ideas of an international approach to the Fiji problem were veiy much 
within the realms of abstract discussion. More concrete business reached London 
in July 1870 in the shape of a definite proposal that Victoria should annex Fiji. 
The Governor of Victoria indicated that the Australian Inter-Colonial
Conference would pass a resolution urging the creation of a British protectorate
4 5in Fiji, and the Governor of New South Wales endorsed this resolution. Kimberley
1. Ibid. Memo, by Herbert 10.v. 1870.
2. Ibid. Min. by Rogers.
3. Mins, by Rogers 3.viii.l867 on Young to Buckingham 31.v. 1867. C0/?0l/B42 and 
20.vii.1870 on FO. to CO. 14.vii.1870. CO/273/42.
4. Canterbury to Granville 20.v.1870* Confidential. C0/309/9^.
5. Belmoreto Cranville 13.vii.1870. C0/20l/558.
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agreed to consider the matter, but he warned his staff that "feeling here is 
strongly against extension of territory".1 But in August 1870 the Brirae Minister 
of Victoria pressed for some decision, and the Agent-General for the Colony, 
G.P.Verdon, worked behind the scenes in London, so Kimberley was forced to study 
the matter seriously.
Rogers set out the possible alternatives in a revealing minute :
"The only point explicitly raised is the keeping out of foreign powers.
Sir J.McCulloch fhe Victorian Premier]. says nothing of the proposal that 
Australia should take charge. But we must evidently look forward.
Without any dog in the manger feeling I should have thought it desireable 
to occupy these islands from Australia with British prepossessions rather 
than from the US. with American prepossessions, in fact the Course of events 
is forcing us in this direction.
The course of events points to the establishment in Fiji ultimately of 
a community of European origin - dominant in spite of inferiority of numbers - 
not perhaps by virtue of inequality of law, but inherent superiority. This 
problem is to bring about this naturally, peaceably, as speedily as may be 
(speed however not being a main point) and without involving this country 
in expanse or responsibility or quarrels with other powers.
1. I assume that there is a predominant & growing feeling in favour of 
connection with Gt. Britain rather than with any other power among the white 
settlers. But of course any civilized nower may easily buy a quarrel with 
some native chief, and obtain some cession from him on which to found a claim 
to sovereignty. This has to be prevented, and it seems to me that we ought 
to take steps to prevent it.
2. The settiers should be furnished with some sort of law for settling 
disputes & exercising criminal .jurisdiction among themselves A if it practically 
extended to natives so much the better. With^ this they will not remain at 
peace or content.
3. They should remain under the obligation of settling their own affairs 
at their own risk and cost with the natives, if this is not so, they will
be arrogant & quarrelous believing that whatever they do they will be pulled
through•
These being as it seems to me the conditions of the problem, T throw out 
the following suggestions -
1. Agreement with other powers not to obtain sovereignty or assume 
protectorate except at the desire of the white population.
2. Treaty with the native chiefs (1) binding them not to accept sovereignty 
of any other civilized power A (2) giving HM jurisdiction over all cases in vh. 
one of her own subjects is concerned (as in Turkey and China) with power to 
entertain questions bet11 natives if submitted voluntarily or by proper native 
authority to their jurisdiction.
3. Annexation, with Constitution of Crown Colony.
4. Annexation, with arrangement that Govr of Victoria shall till otherwise
1. Ibid. Verdon spoke to Rogers at this stage. But Deal try shows t*at Verdon's 
idea was for a joint protectorate by the Australian colonies, which might be
a stage towards federation. Min. by Dealtry 13.x.1870 on Canterbury to 
CO. 12.viii.1870. CO/309/94.
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determined by HM be ex-officio-Govr of the Islands with the power to 
appoint Lieut. Govr who is to take orders from the Gov** of Vietr* "Tie 
cost of the gov*1' being defrayed by Victoria, and the Oov being guided 
in his instructions to the Islands, by the advice of* his responsible 
ministry.
5. A protectorate is sometimes proposed. I do not quite know what this 
means. I suppose it is an intimation to the world that nobody then must 
assume sovereignty over these islands or make war on them, but that is they 
have any grievance against them they must apply to us, and that we will 
either compel the islanders to make compensation or take up their quarrel, 
and that we will interfere in their private affairs as much as we from time 
to time may think adviseable.
I do not myself very much like this kind of thing.
6. Leaving things to take their course till the whites are sure enough
to be recognised as an independent republic ignoring more or less the natives.
I am disposed to No. 2 at once ft ultimately No. 3# the danger of wh. (No.3) 
is that a knot of speculators get hold of the Local Oov and obtain a support 
wh. for the moment gives an impulse to their^speculation, at the cost of war, 
destruction of natives, ft public expense".
2
Miss Drus says that Rogers really had nothing to suggest. Yet his long minute 
is a classic summary of the complex of attitudes which the Colonial Office brought 
to the discussion, and his personal preference was prophetic of what actually 
followed. Granville shortly was to attempt to revive consular jurisdiction and 
Fiji was eventually made a Crown Colony.
Kimberley considered Roger*s summary on 22 October 1870. It is clear that 
he came to the Colonial Office harbouring no desires for expansion; he greeted 
the news of New Zealand*s annexation of the Bounty Islands with characteristic
V 3
cynicism ("a valuable acquisition!"), and in December 1870 he reminded the
4
department that Fiji was "not under the Colonial Office". Yet it must be 
conceded that he gave considerable thought to Fiji, and he probably did this 
because he wanted to do his duty by the Australian colonies. In this way he 
may have been more indulgent than his collegues in the government. Before he 
he vent to the Colonial Office he wrote:
1. Kin. by Rogers 19.x.1870 on Canterbury to Granville 12.viii.1870. CO/309/94.
2. E.Drus, "The Colonial Office and the Annexation of Fiji", Transaction^ of the 
Royal Historical Society. 4th. ser., XXXIl(l950) p.95.
3. Min. by Kimberley on Bowen to Kimberley 21.viii.1870. <:0/209/217.
4. Min. by Kimberley 7.xii.l870 on Belmore to Kimberley 29*ix.l870. C0/201/559.
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"Whatever may be said in favour of the independence of the Australasian 
colonies it would be a great calamity that they should separate in anger 
from us. Nor can it be denied that their loss would give a shock to our 
influence and reputation. It is difficult to see in what way their 
connection with us can be permanently maintained. But it will be a gain 
for both us^and them, if we can keep up the connection till they become 
stronger".
This attitude may be one of the factors behind Kimberley's sympathetic
consideration of several schemes for Fijian government in the following three
years, which culminated in a forthright recommendation of annexation in 1873.
The proposals from the Inter-Colonial Conference and from Victoria, then, were
not to be dismissed lightly. Kimberley*s reply was considered by Granville and 
2
Gladstone , and the Queen only agreed with his conclusion after expressing fears
3about American annexation.
In his reply to the Victorian proposal, sent on 16 March 1871, Kimberley 
said he would not alter the 1862 decision not to annex. The new Zealand wars 
had made the government afraid that Fiji might have to be occupied by force, and 
as Rogers's minute showed, the idea of protectorate was too vague. Instead of 
* annexation or protectorate, said Kimberley,
"Her Majesty's Government are however ready to give such aid as may be 
in their power through the Consul for the maintainance of order until 
the European community can establish a regular Government, and they are 
considering measures with a view to increase the authority of^the Consul 
over British subjects by conferring upog^magisterial powers".
After sending this, as the Foreign Office was looking into consular Jurisdiction
again, Kimberley warned his department off the subject; he wished "to discourage
5
the notion that the Colonial Office has anything to do with the Fiji Islands".
1. Kimberley*s Journal, May 1870, p. 13.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 8.iii.l871 (copy) and Gladstone to Kimberley 10.iii.l^71, 
Kimberley Papers, A/43 ft A/8b.
3. Ibid. A/40. Ponsonby to Kimberley 12 ft 14.iii.1871.
4. Kimberley to Canterbury 16.iii.1871 (draft). C0/309/94.
5. Note by Kimberley with CO. to FO. 14.iv.1871 (draft) • C0/?0l/563* Cf. win. 
20.vii.1871 on Treas. to CO. ll.vii.1871. C0/20l/567: "The Kijis are not a 
colony ft until they are, the responsibility for dealing with them does not 
rest with the Colonial Office". Tet in 1859 the permanent officials of the
CO. had insisted that the CO. should decide the issue. See Drus, op. cit. p. 87,
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The renewed attempt to achieve consular Jurisdiction came from Granville*
The Colonial Office was informed of this on 1 February 1871, and this time an 
Order in Council actually received the Royal Assent, but was never published*
i
What is not clear is whether Kimberley pressed Granville into action on the 
lines of Herbert's and Rogers's ideas, or whether Granville decided independently 
on the basis of Consul March's reports, and that the knowledge that Granville 
was taking this action enabled Kimberley to answer Victoria as he did. A new
draft Order in Council to apply the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts to Fiji was
%
prepared in February 1871, and this time it was the Colonial Office which made
trouble. Rogers and Holland, throwing back an opinion held by Granville when he
was Colonial Secretary, said the Australian colonies would have to be consulted.^
But Hammond, the permanent Under-secretary in the Foreign Office thought matters
2
were so urgent in Fiji that he wanted to send a warship, so to avoid the delay
of an exchange with the Australian colonies the words were added ’provided that
New South Wales agrees' •
The Colonial Office hurdle lightly side-stepped, the Foreign Office turned to
face the Treasury, and here W.H.Wylde showed a sly touch. The consul in his
magisterial capacity would need clerks, a prison and a gaoler, and the Treasury
3
had asked for an estimate of the cost. Experience in Turkey showed that the
registration fees of 5/- per Briton produced a small surplus in big towns and
a deficit in small ones. Wylde suggested a gentle tactic with Their Lordships:
"Let us get the Order in Council issued and a Gaoler ft Constable appointed 
in the first instance, and let the Consul himself represent the responsibility 
of carrying on the Duties that would devolve upon him without farther 
assistance. The assistance must follow and when once the machinery is 
started the Treasury cannot refuse to sanction the necessary expenditure.^ 
Whereas if we frighten them now we shall come to a deadlock at once".
Thus the Treasury were simply told that the system would be the same as in
1. Holland to Vivian 5.iv.l871. FO/58/124 p. 314.
2. Min. by Hammond 21.iv.1871 on CO. to FO. 14*iv.l871. F0/58/l21 p.66.
3. Treas. to FO. 6.v.1871. F0/58/l24 p. 321.
4. Ibid. Min. by Wylde.
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Turkey and China, and they made no reply. Their memories were Jogged in July,
but they did not answer because Kimberley was looking into a new proposal for
annexation by an Australian colony.'*’ In spite of the Treasury's desire for
postponement, the Order received the Royal assent in September 1871; but to little
purpose because Granville decided not to authorise Consul March to assume
2
magisterial powers. After ten years Col. Smythe's suggestion had been fulfilled 
on paper, but it was never used. Events in the islands had orodueed a new 
situation, and a new Fiji Government was to receive jle facto recognition.
De facto.recognition for the Fiji Government. 1871.
While the Foreign Office was corapleteing the final stages of the consular
jurisdiction muddle in 1871, Kimberley was toying again with the idea of
annexation by an Australian colony. This was the Treasury's excuse for delay.
The new proposals came, not from Victoria, which according to Viscount Canterbury,
was not really interested in Fiji, but from New South Wales, where Lord Belmore
was deluged with Fiji projects in April 1871. A deputation headed by Dr John
Dunmore Lang delivered recommendations on the 25th from a public meeting in 
3
Sydney. Next day a Mr. Leefe from Fiji informed the Governor that the settlers
1. See below
2. What happened is still rather obscure. The draft Order was sent to the Pres, 
of the Council on 24 Aug. 1871 (F0/58/l22 p.42). On the 26th. the Treasury 
suggested postponing the matter as Kimberley was considering a new policy in 
view of the new situation in Fiji. (ibid. p. 44). But on 19 Sept. the FO. 
told the CO. that the Order had received the Royal Assent, though warch would 
not be authorised to act. (FO. to CO. 19.ix.1871. C0/20l/567). When the 
Niger Delta Order in Council was planned in 1872(see below Wylde said 
that the Fiji Order went to the Council, then the Treasury intervened and 
stopped it on the ground of expense. (Min. by Wylde 26.iv. 1872 on CO. to FO.
25.iv.1872. F0/84/1360).
3. Lang called for the annexation of Fiji in Sept. 1870 in a petition to the Legis. 
Council. Although long prominent in the political and religious life of N.S.W., 
he commanded little respect in Whitehall. Rogers called him a "tiresome old 
demagogue", and Kimberley said "Bis last book which I have read is excessively 
Tiresome". In July 1870 Lang published The Coming Event. Or Freedom and 
Independence for the Seven United Provinces of Australia in which he gave as 
one of the main reasons for separation, the "absolute necessity for the erectior 
of a Sovereign and Indepenent Power in the Pacific, in view of the actual 
state of things in the Fiji Islands".
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needed protection, and on the 27th, Charles St. Julian, the Hawaiian representative
suggested a Hawaiian protectorate over Fiji. For a second time, then  ^the Fiji
problem was thrust into Kimberley’s lap by an Australian colony.
Now there were new elements in the argument. Fiji was seen as part of the
wider problem of the Pacific labour traffic, which will be discussed later. The
Sydney Morning Herald compared the Fiji problem with the frontier in South Africa;
they were both problems Hvhich present the spectacle of an English population
without law".^ Herbert began to expect serious calamities in Fiji,
"No doubt", said Knatchbull-Hugessen,"unless ’Protection* is given -ie. 
a settled form of Government established, ^robably our annexation of 
the Fiji Islands would effect this in the most satisfactory way to those 
concerned in the trade of the Islands, many of whom are nritish subjects.
Then, however, comes the question whether we are under a moral obligation 
to protect English traders all over the world by annexing the countries 
with which they establish trade. It is a question partly of moral obligation 
Sfc partly of policy. I believe we have decided not to annex A if nobody else 
does A things are allowed to drift, there will probably be some 'serious 
calamities' before any government is established in the islands". 2
The Sydney proposals reached London in July 1871. A Hawaiian protectorste would
be 'a perfect farce’said Kimberley, but he did not see why New South Wales should
not acquire the sovereignty of Fiji. This wouli be a convenient way for Britain
to avoid taking the responsibility, so although he had refused the earlier request
from Victoria, Kimberley allowed the idea of annexation by an Australian colony
to be revived, with important consequences.
He put the proposition to Granville and Gladstone and told them it was
supported by Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a former settler in Sydney,
4
and by Charles Cooper, the Agent-General for ?Jew South Wales* Kimberley knew
1. Cutting dated 15.ii.1871 in Belmore to Kimberley 22.ii.1871. C0/20l/563.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 31.V.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 22.iii.1871. Ibid.
3. Min. by Kimberley 20.vii.1871 oh Belmore to Kimberley 28.iv. 1871. Ibid.
4. Kimberley to Granville 26.vii.1871 (copy). Gladstone Papers 44224/103.
Charles Cooper worked to bring the first railway to N.S.W. in 1850. He declined 
to form the first ministry under responsible government in 1856, but he was 
Prime Minister of N.S.W. five times between 1856 and 1870,when he came to 
London as Agent-Ceneral.
248
too that Julius Vogel, the New Zealand politician, who ha had seen recently in 
London, was also interested in Fiji.1 Granville feared that the Australians 
would ill-treat the Fijians and he wanted the master discussed in the Cabinet.
But as Kimberley told Gladstone
"we have not hesitated to placeaSe Indians in British N.America under 
the Canadian Government,*and, if responsible government is established 
at the Cape, & the troops are withdrawn from the frontier, the native 
tribes in that country will be left to the control of the local authorities. 
Of course it may be answered that these are not conclusive reasons for 
assuming new responsibilities; but what it the alternative*? If we could 
leave the British settlers in the Fijis entirely to themselves, the case 
would be different but no one I believe proposes total abstinence from all 
interference. On the contrary we are about to give our Consul magisterial 
powers, which will involve us in responsibility & expense without attaining 
the end of providing a settled Government". 2 .
If New South Vales would be willing to annex the islands, Kimberley could see
3 4"no better solution to the problem". The Cabinet agreed, and Kimberley drafted
a despatch to Belmore on 29 July indicating that if the Colony was prepared to
5
undertake the responsibility of governing Fiji the Government would not object. 
Yet this all important paragraph was deleted from the despatch which actually 
went on 10 August. This was because an entirely different complexion had been 
put on the picture by a coup d'etat in Fiji.
A small group of settlers at Levuka had proclaimed a constitutional monarchy
1* Vogel was then Post Master-Gen. of NZ. and had come to London in April 1R71 
to make arrangements for the ill-fated mail steamer line between Auckland and 
San Francisco ^see below p. *** ). He met Kimberley on 27 March. (Mins. by 
Dealtry & Herbert on GPO. to CO. 27.iii.1871. CO/209/225). Herbert later
wrote: "If NSW hangs#back New Zealand will perhaps be glad to undertake the 
Fijis. Mr Vogel seemed to think so". (Min. 18.vii.1871 on Belmore to 
Kimberley 28.iv.1871. C0/20l/563.)
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 26.vii.1871. Gladstone Papers 44224/187.
3. Ibid.
4. Cabinet Minutes, 29.vii*1871. Gladstone Papers, 446^9/85.
5. Kimberley to Belmore 10.viii.1871 (draft crossed out) after Belmore to Kimberley 
28.iv.1871. CO/201/563.
on 5 June 1871* and it was this ’Fiji Government1 which, under various forms*
ruled until 1874. Thakombau was made King, and Ma'afu*s support was won by
leaving him as Governor of Lau and making him Viceroy with a salary of £800.
The Cabinet consisted of five Kuropeans and Thakombau*s brother and son. Sydney
Charles Burt became Premier,1 and George Austin woods the Minister of Interior 
2
Affairs. A new Constitution, which included plenty of high sounding phrases
from the Declaration of Independence, was passed on IB August by a Fijian
3
Legislative Assembly. Hawaii wns acknowledged as the model for this attempt
at constitutional government, and although a few chiefs stood aloof, the Hawaiian
Consul in Sydney, Charles St. Julian, visited Fiji in the summer of 1871, and
told Governor Belmore of New South Wales that he thought the new constitution.
4
would work. Several Australian newspapers were favourable to the new regime,
5and the U.S.A. recognised it. Kdward March, the British Consul, opposed it
and he soon became one of the chief enemies 6f the Fiji Government, which by the
end of 1871 was taken over by Woods, who dominated it until 1872 and who became
one of the most controversial characters of these years.**
1. Burt,an auctioneer in Sydney, went to Fiji as an absconding debtor, but 
Henderson (Hist, of Govt, in Fiji. II, p.l99)saya he was an able man who went 
to Fiji to retrive his fortunes and pay his creditors.
2. Fiji Govt. Gazette ?.vi.l871 in CO. to FO. l.vli.1871. FO/58/121 p.156.
3. Printed Copy in FO/58/122 p. 81.
4. Belmore to Kimberley 6.x.1871. Confidential, (copy) F0Aj8/l22 p.111.
5. Brookes, International Rivalry, p.373.
6. Woods came from a Naval family, but after creditable service he was only Lieut,
when he retired aged 40. He then did marine survey work in the colonies; 
Brewster (p.149-150) says Victoria, Scholefield (p.87) says N.Zealand: probably 
both. Brewster says he was known in the Navy as ’Magnificent George’ aad that 
Thakombau was so impressed he made him a member of the Mbau Royal House. Woods 
told Goodenough (Journal, II, 28.xii.1873) that while he was at Auckland he 
heard that the Germans had designs on Fiji and he made up his mind to save to 
the islands for Britain. A short while after this at Sydney an agent from
Fiji offered him £1,000 to survey the Nanuku nassage in Fiji, but when he 
arrived on 9 April 1871 he found that the authorities could not nay him. He 
was about to return to Sydney when Thakombau asked him to assist in the 
government, because the whites said Woods was ’unconnected with .ii *♦
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The news of the June coup upset Kimberley*s plan for annexation by New
South Wales because it raised the wider question of recognition for the **iji
Government, When Granville heard of the event on 1 July 1871^ he sought the
Law Officers' advice, and as the latter saw no reason for refusing recognition
2
Granville inclined to agree* But the Colonial Office thought otherwise. Herbert 
even wanted the Foreign Office tosuppress the Law Officers' report lest its 
publication in Australia become an embarrassment if Fiji were later annexed; he 
stood by the New South Wales plan. So did Knatchbull-Hug®ssen, who said "It is 
most inadviseable that the future of Fiji should be complicated by indiscreet
j
recognition of the authority of native chiefs who have not an admitted authority 
3
to any extent".
Thus, responsibility for Fiji became more obscure than ever; Foreign Office,
Colonial Office, Treasury, Law Officers, New South Wales - now the new Fiji
Government! Kimberley did not know where to turn*
"This is rather a puzzling matter, b^t I do not think the Colonial 
Office should take the responsibility of deciding it. If the Fijis 
are annexed... it will devolve on the Col: Off: to deal with them, 
but at present they are foreign, and to be dealt with by the Foreign 
Office". 4
It was an awkward dilemma because there was no document to justify expectations 
that New South Wales would accept the bait; Kimberley had simply been told 
privately by Cooper, the Agent-General, that it was possible. This hesitancy 
made Knatchbull-Hug^ssen impatient: "Our ancestors would have accepted the
cession of the islands & laid the foundations of a thrivingi European Colony.
5
We prefer the drifting system...." But, as ever, Kimberley would not be rushed.
He took two months to clear-his mind; in October he recommended the recognition
1. CO. to FO. l.vii.1871. FO/58/121 p.156.
2. FO. to CO. 31.vii.1871 (with the IX)'s report) C0/20l/567.
3. Mins, by Herbert 5th and K-Hugessen 6.viii.lft71. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 7.viii.lR71.
5. Min. by K-Hugessen 7.ix.l871 on Canterbury to Kimberley 14.vii.1871. Cc/BO^/lOO
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of the Fiji ministry as the de facto authority, and he probably did this against
the advice of his department.
The most likely cause of his volte face was an extradordinary statement from
Sir James Martin, the Premier of New South Wales.^ Kimberley had only got as
far as drafting his New South Wales plan, when Martin, in Sydney, informed the
Governor that any such plan would be impossible. The whole outburst was caused
by Kimberley*s reply to Victoria of 16 March 1871 conveying the f'abinet decision
2
not to annex and looking to the establishment of a stable government in Piji. 
There was no precedent, 3aid Martin, for such an invitation to settlers to form 
a government. New South Wales would never annex Fiji, for by doing so she would
V
open up a new field of colonisation for the benefit of Euroneans rather than 
Colonials. It was an imperial question, said Martin, Britain should annex Fiji.
The statement was full of contradictions. Herbert had no difficulty in 
answering it sentence by sentence, and Cooper, the Agent-General who was Martin's 
predecessor as Premier, believed Martin's views were personal. Herbert did not 
want to recognise the Fiji Government. Although he realised that consular 
jurisdiction by Order in Council alone was now impossible, he still pressed for 
the New South Wales plan. It would prevent a foreign or independent government 
in Fiji, and he thought the imperial government might "afford the same facilities 
as in the not dissimilar case of the territory of Basutoland, which on the 
application of the legislature of the Cape of Good Hope has very recently been
1. N.S.W. Cabinet decision of 8.viii.l871 in Belmore to Kimberley Q.viii,1871
00/201/564.
2. See above p. 2+4-.
5. Min. by Herbert 21.x.1871 on despatch cited in fn.l.
annexed by that Colony".^
Kimberley therefore did not completely abandon the New South Wales plan, but
he did not adopt the Law Officers* proposal for outright recognition. He .
preferred a characteristically vague and waiting policy, with the New South
Wales plan left open, and the Fiji Government recognised as the de facto
authority. This was no clear policy to please a Knatchbull-hugessen, but in
an uncertain situation it did not commit the government to any particular
2course, and Legge's recent criticisms are unjust. After reading Herbert's
3
views on 22 October, Kimberley took the matter to the Cabinet. He told Granville
of his idea on the 25th. As Cooper, the Agent-General, pleaded that the New
4
South Wales plan should be kept open, and the Victorian Government clamoured
5
for directions as to its relations with the new Fiji Government, the moment
seemed ripe for announcing Kimberley's policy.
The Cabinet approved it on 27 October^ and passed his draft despatch on the 51
7
31st. Therefore all the Australian governors were informed by circular dated
1. Ibid. An Act annexing Basutoland to the Cape had been passed by the Cape parlt. 
in June 1871, but the previous history of this should have warned Herbert of 
the risks inherent in the N.S.W. plan for Fiji. The significance in the history 
of British policy of the decision to annex Basutoland, which was made (largely 
on Adder ley's advice) by the Derby ministry in Dec. 1867, is discussed by de 
Kiewiet (Colonial Policy & the S.African Republics, pn.222-224). "The 
projected annexation was not simply an attempt to solve a peculiarly 
troublesome frontier difficulty... it was not that the nritish Government, 
properly speaking, would annex Basutoland. It had given one of its colonies 
permission to undertake the annexation with all its attendant burdens'*. This 
indeed had been the intention; the CO. left the way open for the Cape or Natal 
to annex Basutoland. But in 1868 Gov. Wodehouse annexed Basutoland to the 
Crown. Thus the CO. - not a colonial government - became responsible for 
protecting the Basuto from the Boers, which was a cause of political embarrass­
ment for Gladstone's govt, in 1869. The same thing was to be repeated over
the Diamond Fields in 1871. (See below p.2 4^-).
2. Kimberley's careful, middle-of-the-road, and still open policy described here 
surely does not deserve Legge's stricture of being a 'precipitate' decision 
taken after 'lack of serious consideration*, (p.122).
3. Min. by Kimberley 22.x.1871 on Belmore to Kimberley 9.viii.lB71. Co/?Ol/564.
4. Kimberley to Granville 25.x.1871 (copy). Kimberley Papers a/43.
5. Canterbury to Kimberley l.viii.1871. C0/309/l00.
6. Cabinet Minute 27.x. 1871. Gladstone Papers 44639/lH.
7. Kimberley wrote; "for the Cabinet Tues"[the 31st^ j Min. 29.x.1871 on Canterbury 
to Kimberley l.viii.1871. 0(^309/100.
3 November 1871 that they should treat the Fiji ministry as the government
de facto. New South Wales was informed that the way was open still for the
1
colony to annex Fiji. Although Kimberley had tried to keep the Fiji issue out
of the Colonial Office, he ended up by recommending the governments policy on
two occasions. This was in complete contrast to the situation four years later
when the Colonial Office wanted to organise the Western Pacific High Commission
2
itself, but the Foroign Office kept the initiative.
Kidnapping and the Pacific Labour Traffic. 1860-1872.
The Government now had a Fiji policy, but as it rested on the rather slender
chances of the new Fiji Government being a success, it proved little more than
an postponement of decisiod. And between December 1871 and June 1872 there was
a new clamour for decision, as the Fiji question becamenwi$h the much wider
question of kidnapping in the Pacific. In June 1872 the Pacific Islanders
Protection Act was passed to regulate the traffic of Pacific islanders in
British ships. But having recognised the Fiji Government, Britain could not
interfere with the traffic within the Fiji Islands. Therefore mainly on account
of the labour traffic, fresh proposals for annexation were made in 1872.
On 20 September 1871 Bishop Patteson of Melanesia, a man much admired by
Gladstone, was clubbed to death at Nukapu, Santa Cruz Islands, in an act of
3
retaliation following a visit by kidnappers. The news reached London in December
1871. For a decade the Pacific labour traffic had been filling volumes with
4
painstaking case-studies and lengthy memoranda, but regulation of the traffic in 
British ships had been held up since 1862 by the Treasury, just as they had 
prevented consular jurisdiction in Fiji. The Queensland Government made
1. Kimberley to Belmore 3.xi.l871. (draft seen by the Cabinet). C0/20l/564.
2. See below p. 3 3^ 1.
3. Eye witness account in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1872. C0/309/l07.
4. Correspondence with individuals, consuls, governors and departments is gathered 
together in F0/58/ vols. 125-129#
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regulations in 1868 governing the introduction of Polynesians on the plantations 
in the colony, and the Colonial Office carefully watched this system at work. 
Notorious kidnapping cases received mounting publicity, till by 1872 the flood 
of indignation made action imperative. Patteson's murder in 1871 did for
i
Polynesia what Livingstone’s death was to do for Central Africa in 1873.^
Organised indentured immigrant schemes, Indian coolie emigration, and even 
the importation of Pacific Island 'kanakas’ were familiar features in colonial 
history; the introduction of Polynesians and Indians into Fiji was also an 
essential part of Gordon’s policy in Fiji after 1875. •Blackbirding' in the 
Pacific received its great impulse because of a sharp rise in demand for labour 
in the early 1860's as guano from Peru's off-shore islands became a valued 
fertilizer in the development of scientific farming and as the cotton shortage 
induced by the American Civil War caused optimistic planting in Queensland and 
Fiji. For the collection of guano and the cultivation of cotton, Pacific 
islanders were acquired by fair means or foul and transported to Peru, Queensland 
and Fiji.
From all accounts the Peruvian traffic was the most notorious. From I860
until 1863» when British and French pressure caused the Peruvian Government to
prohibit the traffic, many outrageous incidents were reported. In most cases
the islanders were willing to migrate for temporary work, and a scheme operated
by Capt. Henry English of Fanning Island probably represented labour recruiting 
2at its best. The Peruvians went to Easter Island, the Gambier and Line Islands,
3
and were even reported as far west as Samoa. In the Union group islanders were
1. See R.Oliver. The Missionary Factor in East Africa (1953) p.34.
2. English recruited for one or two years from Penryn, Reison, Humfries and Hanger
Islands. lie got the chiefs to agree to his scheme, regular wages were naid,
a Polynesian missionary accompanied the islanders, and they were sent home at 
the end of the contract. English was a staunch opponent of the Peruvians.
Capt. Richards (HMS Hecate).to C.inC.Pacific 8.v.1863 (copy). FO/58/9B p.217. 
Consul Synge (Honolulu) to FO. 22.vii.1863. Ibid. p. 212.
3. Consul Williams (Samoa) to FO. 16.v.1863. FO/58/99 n.307; T.Dunbabin, Slavers
in the South Seas, (1935) p. 251.
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said to have been driven from chapel at the point of the bayonet,^Faster Island
2lost a third of its male population , while at Callao the kidnapper received
from two to three hundred dollars per islander. A British naval1 officer called
the Peruvian traffic"as revolting a description of slave dealing as ever was
3
practised on the West Coast of Africa". The British Government could only tell 
its consuls to the watchful and put pressure on the Peruvian Government.
But already by 1861-1862 Whitehall was looking into British law as it related 
to kidnapping by British subjects in the Pacific, for in 1859 the Syndev ship 
Two Brothers kidnapped four islanders at Samoa. The Attorney-General of New South 
Wales suggested proceedings in the Supreme Court but there was no power to sub­
poena witnesses from outside the colony, so the matter was referred to London, 
where the Law Officers could offer no solution. In 1862 a Bill was drafted to
empower governors to sub-poena witnesses, but the Bill was dropped because the
4
Treasury refused to sanction the cost of prosecutions.
The traffic to Queensland began in 1862. The same Capt. Robert Towns, who
had offered to pay Thakombau*s debt^ in 1859* started a 2,000 acre cotton
plantation near Brisbane, and between 1862 and 1867 he imported 382 New Nebrideans
5
on one to three year contracts, all of whom were sent back. The importation of
islanders into Fiji began about 1864 and by the end of 1869 there were 1,649
recorded immigrants in the group.^ The British Government was constantly reminded 
of this growing traffic, by the French Government,which accused Britons of 
kidnapping, by the Scottish Presbyterians in the New Hebrides, who claimed that
1. Williams to FO. 16.vi.1863. FO/58/99 P. 307.
2. Dunbabin, op. cit. p. 225.
3. Capt. Richards to Synge May 1863 (copy), FO/58/98 p. 217.
4. For this case and a careful analysis of the legal position and the disputes
with the Treasury see O.W.Pamaby, "Aspects of British Policy in the Pacific: 
the 1872 Pacific Islanders Protection Act", Historical Studies Australia and 
New Zealand, vol. 8, No. 29 (1957) PP* 54-65.
5. Memo, by Buckley FO/58/125 PP» 97-112.
6. Ibid.
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abductions caused retaliations on missionaries and traders, and by the Anti-Slave 
and Aborigines Protection Societies, who kept up a steam of letters.
A regular and much abused system of recruiting in British ships for the 
plantations in Fiji and Queensland grew up drawing mainly from the New Hebrides, 
Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands, and despite Queensland*s 1868 regulations it 
became evident that British law did nothing to discourage kidnapping. But a 
solution to this was deferred because of the departmental rivalries in London, 
and because there was no clear cut line of responsibility. The attempt which 
the Treasury frustrated in 1862 seems to have been a Colonial Office initiative.^ 
But many of the complaints went to the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office 
referred alleged cases of kidnapping to that department, which made careful 
investigations of each case. Generally kidnapping was put into the 'slave trade'
category, on which the Foreign Office had a wealth of experience.
2 3The matter became urgent in 1869 after the Latona. Young Australia and
1. Parnaby, op. cit. pp. 56-57.
2. The Rev. James McNair, a Scottish Presbyterian missionary at Anetiura, New 
Hebrides, reported that Capt. Smith of the Latona kidnapped nine men from 
Errcananga in October 1868. He claimed that after saving Smith's life he 
secured a promise from the latter to release the islanders, which he failed 
to keep. {FO/5fl/l26 pp. 90, 137, 139-148, 234). The complaints from Anetium 
went to John Kay, the foreign mission secretary of the Presbyterian Reform
Church, who sent them to Arthur Kinnaird, the M.P. for Perth, who sent them
to the Foreign Office. (Parnaby, op. cit. p. 59).
3. Capt. Hove11 and a Polynesian crewman of the Young Australia were tried for
murder in Sydney, but the counsel for the defence, Sir James Martin, the
Attorney-General, secured a remission of sentence on the technical point that 
the Rotuman witness produced by Thurston, Consul in Fi.ii, had . sworn on a 
translation of the New Testament and not on the whole Bible. (Parnaby, p.6l).
The Young Australia with one to two hundred islanders for Fiji on board 
had reached Api, New Hebrides in October 1868. Three islanders were captured 
there, but in the hold they caused trouble. Finding bows they fired at any 
one in sight, so they were 3hot and thrown overboard. After the ship had 
left Fiji Thurston heard of the story from one of the inlanders and he 
notified the authorities in Sydney, where Capt. Novell and some of the crew 
were arrested. Levinger, the supercargo, was found at Melbourne. (See memo, 
on the case by William Owen, 31.vii.1869. F0/58/l26 pp. 217-224).
Hovell was thought to be Ross Lewin, the most notorious of the kidnappers 
between Fiji and Australia. Formerly a seaman in the R.N., he had served in 
China in the 1840's. While he was a sandal-wood trader with a station on the 
island of Tanna, New Hebrides, he had undertaken to obtain Capt. Towns's first 
Queensland labourers in 1862. After this contract expired he advertised as 
a regular blackbirder in 1867. (Dunbabin, pp. 164-167).
Daphne cases became public. The details of these cases are complex; they were
exhaustively dissected in London, and have recently received critical treatment 
2
by a historian. Their importance lay in the publicity they received, and the
failure of the authorities'to sustain cases against the perpetrators. The
1 3Latona accusation was not supported, but transmitted as it was by Gladstone's
4
friend Kinnaird, it caused the Colonial Office to resurrect the 186? Bill.
There was great opposition in Sydney to the Daphne prosecution. In the Vice-
Admiralty Court the Chief Justice dismissed the charge of slaving brought by
Comdr. Palmer R.N., who was made to pay costs. The Commodore told the Admiralty
that the prosecution had been a mistake, and at first they agreed, however, as
the Foreign Office had approved Thurston's action in the case, and Kinnaird raised
the question in Parliament, Palmer had to be vindicated: his costs were refunded
5
and he was promoted Captain. The result of all this was that by 1870 the 
existing law was clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent kidnapping.
Therefore in April 1870 the Colonial Office re-opened the question of imoerial 
legislation with the Treasury. There was no intention to abolish labour 
recruiting. The Queensland system seemed to show that th^  trade could be 
regulated, and Bishop Patteson himself had said "I do not advocate the suppression
g
but of the regulation of this traffic"• Regulation was prevented by the
1. The Daphne arrived at Levuka in April 1869 with 100 naked Tanna men on 
board. When Thurston and Palmer examined her they found her clearance was 
for Brisbane to Tanna and back, and its Queensland import licence was signed 
in favour of Ross Lewin. Pritchard, the supercargo, was a partner of Lewin's. 
Comdr. Palmer said the ship was rigged out like a Vest African slaver, and he 
attempted to prosecute it in Sydney. See memo, by Vivian 10.ix.1869. FO/58/ 
126 p. 349; Dunbabin, pp. 193-205; C.Palmer, Kidnapping in the South Seas 
(1871) pp. 104-108.
2. Parnaby article cited.
3. F0. to Kinnaird 4.viii.l869 (copy). F0/58/l26 p. 243.
4. Parnaby, 0£. cit. p. 59.
5. 3 Hansard, cc, cols. 1427; Palmer, op. cit. pp. 104-151.
6. Patteson to Gov. Bowen (N.Z.) 4.vii.l870 in Bowen to Kimberley 24.vii.lR70#
co/209/217.
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Treasury's refusal to sanction the cost of prosecutions, so Kimberley decided to
resurrect the 1862 Bill. Reminded after eight years, Their Lordships presumed
that there was no urgency in the matter, and suggested a solution might be
found in the extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Mew South*
Wales.^ Holland insisted that prosecutions should be an imperial charge so
2
Kimberley pressed the Treasury to agree, but he met with refusal.
Kimberley had to tell the Foreign Office in December 1870 that the Treasury
3
decision made action impossible. Millions had been spent on the suppression
of the African slave trade, and H.C.Rothery, the Treasury adviser on the slave 
1
trade, admitted that kidnapping in the Pacific was "slave trading in the largest
4
sense of the termV but imperial funds were still not available for prosecutions.
In an outstanding case of kidnapping in Samoa by a British registered ship
commanded by one of the most notorious Pacific freebooters, the chivalrous 
5
'Bully' Hayes, the Treasury tried to pass the responsibility for the cost of
prosecution to the Australian colonies.^ This attitude infuriated Rogers:
"This is the kind of letter which makes me think that England is ceasing 
to desire the rank of a first class power and had better abandon it. TTere
1. Treas. to CO. 6.ix.l870. C0/20l/560.
2. Ibid. Treas. to CO. 8.xii.l870.
3. Vivian wrote: "The Treasury have taken the same line with the Col. Off. as
with us", on CO. to FO. 29.xii.1870. FV84/1330.
4. Report by Rothery 15.x.1870 in FO. to CO. 7.xii.l870. C0/?0l/560.
5. William Henry Hayes was the greatest and most dashing of the Pacific pirates 
of this period. Fran Cleveland, ,0hio, he was described as tall, powerful, 
pleasant,open-faced, and well-dressed. He did not drink, but late in life he 
took to shooting people when in a temper; he liked poddies and had many wives. 
Between 1858 and 1876 he appeared in most of the main ports of the Pacific, 
Australasia and South-east Asia, and he was a continual embarrassment to the 
Foreign Office feared he might be a British subject. Re was killed in 
1876 by the cook on his ship. (See Dunbabin, op. cit. pp. 225-254 and H.S. 
Cooper, Coral Lands (l88o), II, pp. 59-65.)
In Dec. 1869 Chief Mauga of Pango Pango, Samoa, seized Hayes and handed him 
to Williams, the British Consul. But there was no jail to,keep him until a 
British warship arrived and on 1 April he slipped away. Williams to FO.
5.x.1870. FO/58/118 p. 454.
6. Treas. to CO. 30.xii.1870. C0/20l/560. Although Holland did not like this 
idea, Kimberley's first thought was "might not we ask the Australian colonies^"
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is a great duty attaching to her if it attaches to anybody as the great 
maritime power of the wo^ rld and as the centre from which these obnoxious 
proceedings directly or indirectly proceed, and the Treasury refuse to aid 
in putting down all these abuses for fear of risking a few hundred 
thousand pounds.
This seems to me governing an Flnpire in^the spirit of a subordinate 
department of the Inland Revenue office".
Monsell appealed to Kimberley to get the Cabinet to reverse the decision and
from Wymondham on 14 January 1871 Kimberley ordered a case to be drawn up.
2On the same day Knatchbull-Hugessen was 'installed as Under-Secretary', and 
shortly he, a former Junior lord, joined the denunciations of the Treasury. In' 
a typically agressive minute on 27 March 1871 he presumed the Treasury decision 
was not final
"The matter must have been fully considered by the Cabinet, and the 
whole Government, and not the Treasury alone, will have to bear the 
responsibility of having refused to defray from Imperial funds any 
portion of the expenses incurred in bringing to punishment persons 
guilty of an offence peculiarly repugnant to the public opinion of 
this country". 3
Miss Brookes claims that the Cabinet had decided to meet the matter with imperial
legislation, but record of a Cabinet discussion at this stage has not been 
4
found. Evidently the Treasury was still making trouble because when the
Australian governors were sent a draft Bill on 20 April 1871 making kidnapping
a felony, at the Foreign Office's express request the Australian colonies were
asked if they uould bear the cost of prosecutions. At the same time the British
consuls were warned that the Treasury would not defray the costs of any
prosecutions they brought.
Knatchbull-IIugessen was distressed by the Treasury's apparently successful
retention of the initiative, and he continued to complain. When the Board of
Trade ioined the regrets of the Treasury decision he was all for telling Their
1. Min. by Rogers 2.i.1871 on Treas. to CO. 31 .xii.1870. C0/2Ol/560.
2m Braboume Diary, IV 1870-75, p. 519.
3- Min. by K-hugessen 27.iii.1871 on FO. to CO. 25.iii.1871. C0/20l/567.
4. Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 369. Kimberley merely noted that Granville 
agreed to the circulars for Australia & did not mention the Cabinet.
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Lordships what "everybody outside their office" thought of them.* As the
discussions developed Kimberley again appeared as the Government's redeemer.
The Treasury wanted to foist the responsibility on to the colonies, but the Iav
not.
Officers decided in October 1871 that imperial legislation alone would stop the
growth of a slave trade in the Pacific, The Australian colonies concerned
(except one) agreed to pay the costs of cases in their own courts; New Zealand
volunteered too; so the Foreign Office passed the matter to the Colonial Office
to complete. But they would have none of it, and the Bill was sent back for the
Foreign Office to deal with. It looked as if the familiar game would continue;
but as with Fiji, so now vith the labour traffic regulations, the job fell to
Kimberley, Came the news of Pettcson's death in December 1871, and Herbert told
his chief that the other departments were looking to the Colonial Office for 
2
direction. Armed with a memorandum prepared by Herbert Kimberley told Gladstone
3
that he was considering the matter with Granville,
4
"The real difficulty is Fiji", said Kimberley. It was "not only convenient
5
but necessary for England to look upon the two questions as one", wrote Herbert, 
who had a coherent plan. Regulations were already in operation designed to 
prevent abuses in the labour traffic to Queensland; the Fiji Government should 
be encouraged to adopt the Queensland rules as the condition for formal 
recognition by Britain. It was true that the Treasury were still obstinate, 
but the Australasian colonies had agreed to pay most of the costs of prosecutions.1 
All the imperial government now had to do, said Herbert, was to pass an Act, agree
1. Min. by K-Hugessen on Bd.of T. to CO. 27.vii.XB71. co/201/565.
2. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 12.xii.1871,
3. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 14.xii.1871. They had a conversation on the 13th, and 
Herbert's memo, is dated 15th.
4. Kimberley to Granville I6.xii.1871 (with Herbert's memo.) FR0.30/2P/55 p. 2A7. 
5* Herbert's memo. 15.xii.1871. F0/58/l22 p. 230.
6* NSW and NZ would pay for cases in their courts; Qd would pay where islanders
j  were on their way to that colony; Tas. and W.Anst. said they were not involved,
i and Victoria did not reply.
!1I
I
i
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to pay a few costs, instruct the Admiralty to enforce the Act, and then invite 
the Fiji Government to do the same.
So it was that Kimberley once more did the work which he maintained belonged 
to Granville’s department. He presented the draft of the Pacific Islanders 
Protection Bill to the Cabinet on 22 January 1872* and the Treasury finally 
had to agree to re-imburse naval officers for expenses incurred seizing offenders. ’ 
By March 1872 the Colonial Office had taken the matter over completely, and 
Granville agreed that Knatchbull-Hugessen should shepherd the Bill in the 
Commons.2
After Patteson's murder and the publicity over the Young Australia and Daphne
cases the only political danger to the Bill came from the advocates of complete
3
abolition. Petitions in support of regulation rained in from many quarters,
public meetings were held in Australia, and the colonial newspapers freely offered
Kimberley advice. Most poingant of all was Patteson’s own appeal for imperial
legislation, published a year after his death: "The African Slave Trade was put
down as a thing evil in itself, a disgrace to humanity, and a practical
4
repudiation of Christianity. People did not stop to enquire further". Kimberley 
received a deputation from the Aborigines Protection Society of 8 February 1872, 
questions were asked in Parliament, and it was learnt that the TJ.S.Government also
1. Cabinet minute 22.i.1872. Gladstone Papers 44640/6. The East African Slave 
Trade was also discussed. Gladstone’s note reads: **Feejee Island Slave Trade, 
Bill & Memo to be presented by Kimberley".
2. Kimberley to K-Hugessen 26.vi. 1872 (copy) Brahoume Diary, IV 1870-75, p.588. 
Min. by Kimberley on McArthur Qn. received 6.iii.l872. C0/20l/571.
3. From the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Mayor of Leeds, the 
people of Falmouth, the Australian Methodist Conference, the Glasgow ft Edinburgh 
Synods of the United Presb.Church of Scotland, the Edinburgh Ladies Emancipation 
Society, and from Anthony Trollope. The latter was in Australia, and in his 
Australia and Zew Zealand (1873) there is a long defence of the Queensland 
traffic (I, pp.132-148), but he admits there is kidnapping in the Fiji traffic. 
Cf. Trollope to Kimberley 12.xii.1871. Kimberley Papers a/27^ *
4. Memo, by Patteson 11.1.1871* A & P. 1872, XLIII, p. 8^ 0.
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had a Bill before Congress. The agitation reached its fulfilment on 27 June 
1872 when Kimberley sent the Pacific Island Protection Act to the Australasian 
governors. The imperial and colonial governments then began to anply regulations 
which had first been mooted a decade before.
After producing their Act, however, Gladstone's ministers were not allowed 
to sit back and simply wait for it to produce results, for others besides 
Kimberley and Herbert had realised that the unsolved Fiji question was in­
extricably mixed up in the kidnapping problem. It was logical that suggestions
for annexation should be revived. The Melbourne Age in criticising the Bill
of
had demanded the hoisting the British flag in a number of the Pacific Islands, 
and had asserted that under "titled statesmen of the Carnarvon, Buckingham and 
Kimborley stamp" the Colonial Office was incompetent.* That much maligned 
department did not have to wait long for the inevitable; on 6 March 1872 McArthur 
gave notice of a motion proposing the establishment of a protectorate in Fiji. 
This time there was a definite split in the political leadership of the
Colonial Office. Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote on 13 June, "we have done all we can
\
do by legislation, at hone and in the Colonies to suppress the traffic... Even
then Fiji will be an obstacle and stumbling block in our way... Fiji is drifting 
2
on and on". Kimberley was prepared to agree that now the Act was passed they
should give the Foreign Office some direction as to Fiji; in spite of the decision
over da facto recognition made over seven months before it transpired that
3
Granville had not yet instructed the Consul to do this!
Most embarrassing of all for the Government was the fact that as the KcArthur 
debate approached, it was obvious to Kimberley that Knatchbull-Bugessen, his
1. Cutting dated 4.xi.l871 in Canterbury to Kimberley 23.xi.1871. C0/309/l01.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 13*vi.l872. on Ad. to CO. 10.vi.1872. C0/20l/571.
3. Min. by Herbert on Administrator, NSW. to Kimberley 19*iv.l872. C0/20l/560. 
Brookes, International Rivalry, p. 375 says March heard of the 1871 decisbn 
second-hand from a naval officer in June 1872.
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spokesman in the Commons, favoured annexation. Similarly, Lord Enfield, the
Parliamentary Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, wanted a British protectorate.1
Three days before the debate Knatchbull-Hugesseri wrote,
"The truth is that from the surpassing love of Economy which rules English 
statesmen now-a-days, and from the dread of incurring responsibilities 
which (fortunately for our English colonies today) our forefathers did 
not entertain, we have, wisely or unwisely, let slip the opportunity of • 
acquiring a new colony - or group of Colonies - which would probably have 
cost less than we imagined... this matter will^perhaps be .judged with 
greater accuracy some twenty years hence".
Kimberley was unmoved; he reminded his .junior of the 1871 policy of refusing
annexation, of leaving the door open for the New South Vales plan, and of
according de facto recognition to the Fiji Covemment. Now in June 1872 he
simply told Granville to do what had been decided in November 1871.
The Fiji debate in the house of Commons took place on 25 June 1872 - the day
after Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech. McArthur, in fact, endorsed the new
emphasis which the Conservative leader had given to the colonial empire, i^ji,
he said, was the 'key to Polynesia', and in the interest of the eternal trinity
of the humanitarians - Christianity, Commerce and Liberty - he called for a
3 4protectorate like that on the G0ld Coast. Admiral Erskine , seconding, referred 
to the third Earl Grey’s views on the Gold Coast Protectorate published in 1883, 
Sir Charles Wingfield reminded the House that the French in Tahiti clothed what 
amounted to absolute rule under the veil of a ’protectorate*, and Mr. Eastwick 
mentioned the recent "annexation" of Samoa by the United States.
The last point, strictly inaccurate, though it was, could not have been lost 
on Knatchbull-Hugessen. For that very day, before the debate, Mr. Dealtry, the
1. Memo, by Enfield 27.iii.1872. F0/58/120.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 22.vi.1872 on Administrator, NSW to Kimberley 19.iv.1872 
CO/201/569.
3. See above p.
4. 3 Hansard, ccxii, cols. 192-219. Admiral Erskine had been in touch with the 
Wesleyans in 1870. He had also visited the Fiji Islands in 1849, where he 
had met Calvert and Thakombau. He had impressed the latter with the fire­
power of a British warship, and he had greatly approved,himself, of the work 
of the Wesleyans. See J.E.Erskine, Journal of a Cruise in the islands of the 
Panlflc (1853) PP. 165-279.
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head of the Australasian department, had shown him reports from Washington and 
Samoa that on 17 February 1872 a Samoan chief had ceded the harbour of Pago Pago, 
on the island of Tutuila, to Commander Meade of the TJ.S.S. Tfarrangansett. 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,a Washington newspaper had reported that less than two weeks later 
a German warship had arrived for the same purpose, and its Captain, when told 
of Meade's Treaty, had gasped "It cannot be so".
The basis for these reports will be discussed later. 1 But the possibility 
of German or American intervention in Samoa had long been dreaded by New 
Zealanders, who had tried to forstall it. In February 1872, for instance, the
Colonial Office had considered an application by the New Zealand Government to
* 2assume a protectorate over Samoa. As with the Australian proposals for Fiji this
had been carefully considered in London, and although Kimberley told New Zealand 
that she had quite*enough trouble on her hands with the Maoris, in his private 
minutes to the Office he did not close the door to New Zealand's aspiration. Just 
as the Fiji question was left open for New South Wales or Victoria to act, so 
with Samoa Kimberley wrote "we might wish to change our minds hereafter (perhaps 
in the form of allowing New Zealand to annex some of these islands in the name of 
the British Crown").
1. See below pp. *85. The Pago Pago treaty was not ratified; and the German 
action was from Theodore Weber, The Consul, and was not official.
3. Memo, by the PM. 24.xi. 1871 in Bowen to Kimberley 24.xi. 1871. CO/209/223.
3. Min. by Kimberley 22.ii.1872 on FO. to CO. 16.ii.1872. C0/209/228.
S.Masterman, The Origins of International Rivalry In Samoa ( 1934) pp. 92-93, 
neglects this evidence of Kimberley's wider (private) view, and claims the CO. 
did not consider the matter seriously. But Kimberley crossed out Herbert's 
draft reply to N.Z. giving good reasons for non-intervention in Samoa, because 
he thought that if they changed their minds in the future it would be 
embarrassing to have such good reasons against action on record.
| Kimberley's attitude was consistent wijth the N.S.W. plan for Fiji, aid
also with his frontier policy in South Africa. The latter policy sprang from 
Adderley's policy for Basutoland in 1867, mentioned above p. ***> In May 1871 
Kimberley insisted that if the diamond fields (Griqualand West) were annexed, 
the Cape would have to be responsible for them. But Gov. Barkly repeated the 
| process of the former case, and in Oct. 1871 he annexed Griqualand West to
the Crown, and the Cape refused to take it. See de Kiewiet, British Policy 
the South African Republics, pp. 291-301.
j
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In February 1872 the Colonial Office had also received suspicious reports
of German activity from Viscount Canterbury, the Governor of Victoria. Giving
his opinions about the recognition of the Fiji Government, he said he was worried
lest some other Power, especially Germany, should assume a protectorate over
Fiji. Colour was lent to his concern before he even sealed his despatch on
31 December 1871 when the German warship Nymphe arrived at Melbourne bound for
the South Seas.'*’ Knatchbull-Hugessen knew about this when he read of the Pago
Pago treaty. He had supported the refusal to let New Zealand take Samoa as this
was consistent with the Fiji policy, but on the day of the Fiji debate, after
reading the news from Washington, he wrote: "The Americans are alive to the
advantage to a naval power of having an advance post in the Pacific. They could
2
hardly object after this, to our annexing Fiji, did our policy tend that way".
After this, Knatchbull-Hugessen's strange speech in the debate is more understand­
able.
n ” 3
It was a skillful speech in many ways. He could not let down the regiment,
but bV now he felt very strongly about colonial matters and obviously disagreed 
with the Government’s policy. Therefore sitting high on the fence, he drooped a 
few thoughts about colonial policy. African analogies, he said, were inadmissable;
V
in the case of the territory adjoining the Cape, the Government did not annex 
because it thought that in the interests of Mcivilization, of the British diggers, 
and of the native tribes, and of South Africa itself" that the Cape should govern 
them. On the Gold Coast, the Elmina cession accomplished in 1872 had been 
designed to remove the source of friction caused by the presence on the Coast
1. Canterbury to Kimberley 30.xii.1871. CO/309/lOl.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 25.vi.1872 on FO. to CO. 22.vi.1872. C0/309/l07.
3. A favourite phrase. See Brabouroe Diary, VI 1880-81, p. 909.
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of two Powers. So having begged the question,* Knatchbull-TTugessen turned to
Fiji to sum up the arguments for and against annexation. There was British
settlement and investment in Fiji, the islands would provide a base for commerce
and for the Pacific fleet; but the inhabitants had not expressed a wish for
annexation, and it might’ be costly, as the Maori wars had cost t.20 million. As
for a protectorate, he had "never been able to find out exactly what a
2
protectorate meant". As to colonial policy generally, he wished to make his
position clear: he would not support a policy which made it a rule that whenever
annexation would benefit a place Britain should annex it, but he did not undervalue
colonies, in fact he believed that if anyone laid down a doctrine of non-extension
that person would "sound the first note in their country's retrogression in the
3
scale of nations". For allthese words his real feelings about Fiji were not lost 
on the House; in fact a member immediately claimed that he had conceded the noint 
at issue. It was therefore left to Gladstone to state the Government's view.
The Prime Minister scored points from McArthur, and he deplored the idea of a 
protectorate - "It might be anything or nothing; it was the most shadowy of all
4
relations". He agreed that annexation might be beneficial to Fiji, yet in New 
Zealand the Maori population had declined by about 80,000 in just over thirty years.
1. What he said about S.Africa and Elmina was all quite correct, but these were 
not the analogies appealed to by previous speakers. They had referred to the 
Gold Coast Protectorate, where British officials had more or less administered 
justice over a wide (if vague) area since 1831. (see above pp.
In the light of Earl Grey's book alone, quoted by Erskine (The Colonial Policy 
of Lord John Russell's Administration, 1853)a very plausible case might have 
been possible. In point of fact, however, the Gold Coast Protectorate had grave 
limitations, about with the Colonial Office had been increasingly made aware 
in the 1860's. But K-Hugessen did not deal with this - no doubt wisely - as 
this would have supported the case he disagreed with. As a piece of evasion, 
then, his speech was masterly, but it was not relevant to the points that had 
been made.
2. 3 Hansard ccxii, col. 209.
3. Ibid.col. 211. K-Hugessen took the opportunity to aim a few shafts at the 
Crystal Palace speech. On the idea that there was a party which sunnorted 
colonial separation he said it "only existed in the fertile brains of 
imaginative statesmen who, in order to create a new political programme for their 
own party, found it necessary to misinterpret the policy of their opponents".
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Above all the Government had no real evidence that the Fijians wanted some form 
of control. Gladstone said his policy was:
i
"so far as it is able to lay down an abstract and general rule with 
regard to annexation, he was prepared to say that HMG would not annex 
any territory, great or small, without the well understood and expressed 
wish of the people to be annexed, freely and generously^expressed, and 
authenticated by the best means the case would afford".
2
Fiji did not meet his conditions, and the House agreed by a majority of 68.
Gladstone’s statement was consistent with Kimberley's 1870 policy; the door was
not closed, but decision was postponed. The Government was taking one thing at
3
a time, and they were awaiting the results of the Kidnapping Act.
The decison to sent the Goodenough-Layard Commission. 1873.
The day after the Fiji debate of 1872 the Colonial Office told the Foreign 
Office that it was time Consul March had some instructions. Herbert's idea was 
recommended: that the Consul should not oppose the Fiji Government, but should 
make his recognition conditional upon Fiji's adopting regulations for the labour 
traffic.^
Actually, March's relations with the Fiji Government had become more and more
* 5strained, and the Fijian Premier had even complained to Granville. Throughout
1871 the Consul had continued to send unfavourable reports. On the one hand
British subjects swore allegiance to the new government and considered themselves
beyond British law;^on the other, settlers outside the Levuka area found Thakombau's
rule insufficient for their protection and they formed 'guerilla bands' to defend 
7
themselves. By October 1871 the opposition in Fiji had formed a 'Constitutional
1. Ibid. col. 217. 2. Ayes 84. Hoes 135.
3. Kimberley it Granville in Lords, 24.vi.1872. 3 Hansard, ccxii. col. 81.
4. CO. to FO. 26.yi.1872. FO/58/l33 P. 278.
5. Burt to uranville 10.yii.1871. F0/58/l21 p. 190.
6. March to PO. 27.viii.1871. F0/58/120 p. 179.
7. Ibid. March to FO. 11.x.1871. p. 201.
268
Party*to secure the release of a man arrested by the Government.* By the end of
the year March was getting desperate as British subjects driven from their lands
by resentful Fijians demanded protection, and the Consul himself was ordered at
the point of a pistol off the labour ship Peri. owned by Woods, who was now the
Prime Minister. "I shall be compelled through sheer despair to quit Fiji", he
2
vrote in December 1871.
All was not right with March's attitude to the Fiji Government, but as Wylde
a 3reminded his Foreign Office collegues, the Consul was still without instructions.
Early in 1872 Lord Tenterden reminded Hammond that they had done nothing about
n  4the sort of burlesque constitutional government" in Fiji, but the permanent
Under-secretary was quite out of touch with the situation and the whole question
was postponed until the Kidnapping Act was finished.
In Fiji, meanwhile, the Woods Government met growing opposition in 1872. With
salaries and expenditure running to £20,000, the Government proposed raising a
revenue of £23#000. A loan of £5,000 was procured from one o** the ministers, and
£5 debenture notes wore issued redeemable in two years at 10$ interest. But a
group of settlers calling themselves the 'British Subjects Mutual Protection
Association' informed March that they would pay no taxes, and they were
particularly indignant when the Government created a Fijian Army. Tension was
5
clearly mounting; some of the settlers left, trade declined, and the Government
was temporarily prevented from arresting a planter who murdered a Fijian chief
* ^
by an armed 'Klu Klux Klan1 of settlers. In an effort to improve matters Woods,
the Premier, visited Sydney early in 1872 to raise funds and to persuade the 
Government of the colony to instruct British subjects in Fiji to obey the local
1. Ibid. March to FO. 30.x.1871. p. 226.
2. Ibid. March to FO. 14.xii.1871. p. 251.
3. Mina. 28.x.1871 FC/58/l22 p.189 and 30.xii.1871. F0/58/l20 p.284.
4. Min. by Tenterden '5S.i.l872. FO/58/120.
5. March to FO. 26.i.1872 rO/58/131 p. 34 and 20.iii.1872.P. 82.
6. Woods to Administrator M.S.W. 3.iv.l872 (copy) in K)/58/131 p. 110.
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lavs. A serious crisis was only avoided because John Thurston, the former Consul,
and Robert Swanston, Ma'afu's asviser in Lau, were persuaded (in Woods’s absence)
to join the Government.*
Thurston had been absent from Fiji during the coup* d fetat in 1871 and his
assumption of office in the spring of 1872 gave a temporary boost to the
Government's prestige, although, as Professor Henderson has said, it was to
seriously reduce his own. Yet, whatever criticisms can be made of Thurston for
his activities between 1872 and 1874, and no final assessment can be made here,
there is much evidence to support Robinson's opinion that he was "an honest able
roan, sincerely desirous of promoting and protecting the interests of King Cakobau 
2
and his people", or Gordon's view that he "steadily opposed the wishes of the
3
majority of the whites to exploiter the natives". As Consul in 1869 he had tried
4
to get the Foreign Office to clarify the law about British labour shins. Now 
as Foreign Minister he wrote to Knatchbull-Hugessen saying that the Fiji Government
5
was preparing legislation based on the Kidnapping Act of 1872. Thus he was able 
temporarily to alleviate London's fears, so that at the end of 1872 the British 
Government »was lured into a false sense of security which made it think that d« 
facto recognition and the Kidnapping Act had solved the Fiji problem.
In actual fact Gladstone's House of Commons statement of June 1872 succeeded
1.The date when Thurston joined the Govt, is uncertain. Brewster (p.?4l) says 
19 June 1872; Henderson, (Govt, in Fiji. Ii) says March on p.242 and Fay on
p.282; Derrick, (History, p.214) says May. Woods told Goodenough (Journal, IT, 
28.xii.1875) what happened when he got back to find Thurston a Minister. He said 
Thurston insisted that two members of the Cabinet be dropped and that Swanston ft 
Clarkson be elected instead. But when Woods asked Thurston whether he wanted 
him to resign too, the latter said not.
2. Robinson to Kimberley 27.1.1873, copy in F0/58/l39 P. 152,
3* Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p. 163. Cf. Legge, Britain in pn.07-99.
4. O.W.Pamaby, "The Regulation of Indentured Labour to Fiji 1864-1888", Journal 
of the Polynesian Society, vol. 65, No.l, (march 1936) p. 58.
5. Thurston to K-Hugessen 11.ix. 1872. CO/83/2.
t
in suppressing Fiji as a political issue only until February 1873. Meanwhile
Kimberley reverted to his efforts of keeping Fijian business out of the Colonial
Office,*’ The Admiralty instructed the Squadron in its job of suppressing 
2kidnapping, Granville decided to renove March from the Consulate and appoint
someone, who coming fresh, could carry out the policy of de facto recognition,
3
and who might assist the Fiji Government in suppressing kidnapping.
Neither the progress of the Fiji Government, nor the operation of the
Kidnapping Act gave cause for satisfaction. By November 1872 Kimberley thought
they might have to abolish the traffic in British ships altogether. The American
attempts at regulation failed, Congress dropped its Bill, and Hamilton Fish, the
Secretary of State, showed himself to be more interested in restricting the
migration of Chinese, and cast aspersions on British activities in South-Fast 
4
Asia. There was a growing suspicion that the Fiji Government could not be 
trusted on the matter of labour regulation. In fact, although the issue did not 
become public again in England until Febmary 1873, in the intervening months
Knatchbull-Hugessen and Kimberley kept up a running debate behind the scenes,
1. Min. by Kimberley 11.ix.1872 on FO. to CO. 4.ix.l872. CO/83/2.
2. Holland drafted the instructions, in CO. to Ad. 9.vii.l872. C0/20l/570. The 
Australians then claimed they were denuded of naval defences, but Kimberley 
said it’was reasonable to use the Squadron for suppression in oeacetime.
The establishment of the Australasian Squadron in 1872 was 4 corvettes (Clio. 
Cossack. Blanche. Dido). a sloop (Rosario) and a paddle steamer (Basilisk).
The Commodore deployed all his strength cruising in the islands, and HRS Barrosa
from the China Station covered the western area. A new schooner Ethel was
purchased and sent to Fijian waters, and others were ordered to be built.
(Ad. to CO. 30.x.1872. CO/83/2).
3. Holland also drafted the Consul's instructions, suggesting that recognition 
should be conditional on the Fiji Government's adopting regulations like the 
1868 Queensland act. This was the day a^ter the Commons debate, and Kimberley 
made sure Gladstone saw the draft. (Holland to Hammond 26.vi.1872 with a note 
by Gladstone. F0/58/l33 p. 278-283.)
March had consistently opposed the Fiji Govt., thus his position under the 
new policy was invidious. The situation was further complicated by the fact 
that the Law Officers would not let British subjects shelter behind H’ijian 
citizenship. (Circular to Australian Governors, 14.viii.1872. C0/20l/57l).
Percy Anderson, of the FO slave department, suggested sending H.A.Churchill 
to Fiji. He had retired in Feb. 1872 from being Consul-General in Zanzibar, a 
position with certain parallels to the Fiji situation. (Note in F0/58/l32 p.67) 
4* FO. to CO. 21.xi.1872. CO/83/2.
This debate had two levels: one was the still rather academic one on the
possibility of international rivalry in the Pacific, the other was on the urgent
question of the status of Fiji. On the first, Knatchbull-Hugessen was worried
about the intentions of Germany and the U.S.A# The German warship Nymphe had been
sent out in answer to Bismarck's 1869 promise, and it made the Governor of
Victoria suspicious. Although the German Captain told Julius Vogel,now the Prime
Minister on New Zealand, that Germany had no designs on Samoa or Fiji,^ on reading
of the ship's arrival in Fiji Knatchbull-nugessen suddenly wrote; nServe us right
if Germany annexes Fiji". Kimberley, as ever, was non-commital in face of such
frankness. Why?, he asked. "Because we should have a foreign Power in a position
in the Pacific whence great annoyance might be inflicted upon our Australian
colonies, which position we might h^ve occupied ourselves if we had so inclined",
2
"The Monro Doctrine of the Pacific", mused Kimberley, who was not prepared to
invent such a doctrine himself. In New Zealand Vogel was also worried about
American and German ambitions and also about a possible great Polynesian
confederacy of Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. But Kimberley remained aloof. "I don't
see how we are to interfere unless we are to lay down and enforce the doctrine
that no European of American Power is to interfere in any part of the South
3
Pacific but ourselves". Even so he was not pleased by the exclusiveness of
4
Meade's Pago Pago treaty. The prize for detached academic discussion, however,
must go to Herbert's view of the United States:
"Probably they hope to be master of the Pacific presently but both Canada 
and Australia may be ahead of them a hundred years hence. In the meantime 
the old dog England and her colonial puppies of course growl when anv of the 
mangers which she cannotj-make use of is approached. I see the US. contemplate 
a station in Borneo".
1. Vogel Memo. 9.vi.l872 in Bowen to Kimberley 26.vi.1872. CO/209/225.
2. Mina. 23rd, 24th and 25.vii.1872. on FO. to FCO. 22.vii.1872. 00/201/571.
3. Min. by Kimberley 4.ix.l872 on Vogel Memo, cited above.
4. Min. by Kimberley 22.ix.1872 and CO. to FO. 27.ix.1872 (draft) 0^/209/228.
5. Min. by Herbert 29.x.1872 on Canterbury to Kimberley 7.1x.l872. C0/^09/l05.
For the Americans dn Borneo see K.G.Tregonning, "American activity in N.Borneo, 
1865-1881", Pac. Hist. Rev. (Nov. 1954) xxiii, No. 4, p. ^57.
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Even Knatchbull-Hugessen was not too combative about American activities.
Obviously the Alabama affair made him cynical, a9 he said the U.S.A. "knows that
in the event of her clashing with British interests, the only result will probably
be an amicable arbitration upon terms not unfavourable to herself.^
On Fiji, however, Knatchbull-Hugessen was emphatic. In August 1872 he warned
Kimberley that Gladstone*a hints in the Commons debate would probably encourage
McArthur to get another annexation debate in the 18T5 session. In October Herbert
wanted to give formal recognition to the Fiji Government as it had passed labour
2
regulations based on the British Act. Kimberley agreed to this, but the Foreign
3Office was waiting until the new Consul was appointed. Meanwhile they wanted
Thurston to stop writing to Knatchbull-Hugessen and to use the 'proper channels'.
To the latter this was a policy of barren stonewalling; they might 'postpone' and
'put by', he said, but McArthur had already given notice of a motion calling on
the Government to find out if the Fijians wanted annexation, and they should
prepare to meet this. But Kimberley 'put by' again. Discretion was still the 
*
better part of imperial valour.
Final warning that the problem would soon have to be faced was given in
i A.
February 1873. On 7 February McArthur tabled his motion, on the 18th he began to
stir the waters of the House by asking if the (unanswered) 1870 memorial from Fiji
5
asking for protection had been received, finally, on the 24th, a telegram arrived 
from Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of New South Wales, informing the 
Government that a letter from Thurston was on the way, in Thakombau's name, asking
1. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 30.x.1872.
2. "Could we pretend that a third class Governor with the usual expensive staff of 
incompetent colonial officials would have done as well as Mr. Thurston's 
administration". Min. by Herbert 14.x.1872 on Thurston to K-Fugessen 24.vi.1872 
CO/83/2.
3. Kimberley to Granville 15.x.1872. PR0.30/29/55 P.281 and TO. to CO. 21.x.1872. 
CO/83/2
4. Question received 7.ii.l873. Ibid.
5. 3 Hansard, ccxiv, col. 597. See above p. 240. The FO. did not
send the CO. a copy of the 1870 memorial until 6.iii.l873!
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the British Government if it would entertain an offer of the Fiji Islands** The 
time for a decision in London drew near.
speech
In this way the respite gained by Gladstone's 1872 expired in Febmary 1873.
The Government would have to make up its mind before Thurston's letter a^ -rived,
and before rccArthur's motion was debated, so Kimberley immediately consulted the
Prime Minister. Moreover, Knatchbull-Hugessen's persistent nressure had not been
lost on his seemingly inert chief. Probably Kimberley's non-eommital replies
in 1872 hid a growing agreement with his uncompromising subordinate, for Kimberley
now advised annexation.
As; soon as the Robinson telegram arrived on 24 February, Knatchbull-thigessen,
taking it to be an outright offer, warned that if annexation was refused a hostile
motion would probably be carried in the Conraons. Herbert still opposed annexation,
2
preferring the Hew South Wales plan on the grounds of economy* but Kimberley
straightway urged Gladstone to accept Fiji, so they could cut away the root of the
3
kidnapping problem, Gladstone was non-commital. He agreed that Fiji was a
4
formidable question and he discu sed it with Kimberley and Granville, probably
on 25 or 26 February, when they decided not to answer Thurston's telegram, but to
5
await the letter* Gladstone did not hide his prejudices: "I can give no promise¥
to be party to any arrangement for adding Fiji and all that lies beyond it to the 
care of this overdone and overburdened Government and Empire".^ The Cabinet might
1. Robinson to Kimberley (tg) 20.ii*1873. C0/20l/573. Herrick, History, p.222
says the letter was prompted by the news of McArthur's motion, which was rec'd 
in Fiji on 14.xii.1872. Henderson, Govt, in Fiji. II,pp 344-347, is sure the 
telegram was sent in the expectation that the offer would be rejected; that it 
was part of a plot by Thurston and Woods to confound the opposition and create 
a despotic regime.
2. Min. by Herbert 24.ii.lB73 on the telegram.
3* Kimberley to Gladstone 24.ii.lB73. Gladstone Papers 44225/10.
4* Gladstone to Kimberley 25.ii.lB73. Kimberley Dapers A/8c.
5. Ibid. V 43. Note by Kimberley 27.ii.1873.
6. Ibid. A/8c. Gladstone to Kimberley 26.ii.lB73.
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still prove a difficult hurdle, then, but at least the political leadership of
the Colonial Office had made up its mind. .
Discussion in the Office turned to practical*masters. When it was learnt
in March 1873 that Robinson was assisting Thurston by sending the Commodore to
Fiji, Knatchbull-Hugessen said they would have to make the islands into a Crown
Colony, but Kimberley thought it might be difficult to attune freedom loving
Australian settlers to this.* Herbert was still averse, and when Thurston's
letter arrived on 22 April he questioned its representative character. But
Knatchbull-Hugessen always had a weighty argument: "I do not think we ought to
reject the offer, nor that a rejection would be sustained by the House of Ccrmona
2
or by Public Opinion in this Country". In the Foreign Office Wylde feared that
if they took Fiji, the United States might annex Hawaii. Actually the U.S.
Minister Resident in Honolulu supported annexation and President Grant's
administration was favourable, and it was in 1871 that American officers inspected
3
Pearl Bay as a possible base, but Kimberley's cousin. Major James Wodehouse, the
4
British Consul-General in Hawaii, did not believe this. Lord Fnfield was not
5
put off by the possibility, and he again advised Granville to annex Fiji.
It looked as if a decision could be delayed no longer. Thurston's letter had
to be answered; McArthur's motion was scheduled for 13 May. Kimberley was in
*
favour of annexation, but he knew Gladstone's aversion, therefore he provided
the Prime Minister :ith yet another excuse for delay. Let a commissioner be sent
to Fiji - possibly General Smythe who had gone in 1860, or Sir Andrew Clarke,
£
who had been so useful over the Gold Coast. Gladstone admitted that he was
1. Mins, on Robinson to Kimberley 27.ii.1873. C0/20l/573.
2. Min. by K-Hugessen 24.iv. 1873 on Robinson to Kimberley 20.iii.1873. Ibid. 
Thurston’s letter adressed to Granville, dated 31.i.187^ , referred to McArthur's 
motion and asked if HMG would entertain an offer from Fiji if "its King and 
people, once more, and now through the king's responsible advisers, express a 
desire to place themselves under HM's rule".
3. G.H.Ryden, The Foreign Policy of the U.S. in Relation to Samoa (1933) pp. 42-43.
4. Wodehouse to Granville 30.viii.1872. F0/58/l32 p. 111.
5. Mins. 30.iv.1873 & l.v.1873. F0/58/l39 pp. 295-6.
6. Kimberley to Gladstone 30.iv.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/29.
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neither acquainted with the facts about Fiji, nor did he want to move. But he
had sensed the political importance of the issue, and was "much exercised in mind
about Fiji".* He knew some of his colleges and "the world without." wanted to go
further than he did.
Throughout May 1873 Gladstone and the Cabinet were given all the Fiji papers.
From these Gladstone read of Kimberley's meeting with the Aborigines Protection
Society, which came to support McArthur on 12 May. To them Fiji was a slave trade
problem to which they brought a rich experience in agitation. Sir Bartle Frere
2had gone to Zanzibar in 1872 to get a slave trade treaty, why, they asked, was 
not someone sent to Fiji where the islanders were about to suffer the seme fate 
as the Maoris. Kimberley was unusually expansive. Yes, they were considering 
action; yes, the lesson of Hew Zealand was in mind; and there was another problem, 
he said; the same reasons given for the annexation of Fiji could well apnly to the 
whole of Polynesia - where would the process end?^ Kimberley's evasive policies 
and his non-co^nittal replies to Knatchbull-Hugessen's unreserved declarations had 
disguised, then, a mind increasingly aware of expanding horizons. Kimberley 
was indeed uncertain what to do; but he cannot be accused of ignoring the problem 
of the expanding frontier.
4
Memoranda prepared for the Cabinet by Consul March, now back in London, 
suppdrted the familiar argument that if Britain did not annex, some other Power 
would, he claimed that the islands would be easier to govern than New Zealand as
1. Gladstone to Kimberley 8.v.1873# Kimberley Papers a/8c.
2. In the late 1 8 6 0 the Lay Secretary of the Church Missionary Soc. had watched 
the East African slave trade, and in 1869 the C.M.S. called for a select 
committee which met in 1871. In 1872 Frere was appointed Special Commissioner 
to the Sultan of Zanzibar to get a treaty abolishing the slave trade by sea.
See Oliver, Missionary Factor in East Africa, p. 18-19#
3« Details in Australia & N.Zealand Gazette, 17.v.1873. CO/83/4. Among the 29
signatories were Kinnaird, the Duke of Manchester, Wingfield, Ad. Erskine, 
McArthur, Wm. Fowler MP, McFie and A.W.Young MP.
4. March's Memos: The State of Fiji when he left, 7.v.1873 (F0/58/l35 P. 123);
The U.S. claims, 14.v.1073 (p.176)
Annexation of Fiji, 19.v.1873 (p.184).
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revenue would produce £12,000, civil establishments would cost only. £7,000, and
military needs could be met by four Companies of Marines and two warships from
the Squadron, The Cabinet had all this information before the meeting of 24 May,
but the subject was never discussed, Gladstone and Granville exchanged notes, but
it was ’Too late for Fiji'.^ Gladstone hung back until the very last and he even
2
asked Kimberley to consider an idea of March's that the fiction of a united Piji
should be abandoned, that the rival chiefs should be left to govern their people,
3
and that the British Consul should simply have jurisdiction over British subjects.
But Kimberley refused to go back.
The decision was finally taken in the Cabinet on 7 June 187^  when Kimberley's
4
proposal of a commission was accepted. For Gladstone this was really another 
*
postponement of decision, but one suspects that for Kimberley the result was a
forgone conclusion; he had handled both the Fiji question and Gladstone skillfully.
On 10 June Gladstone s£oke to Commodore Goodenough, the new commodore of the
Squadron, who recorded this impression of the interview:
"The real question therefore is at once removed to recognition or 
annexation & Mr. Gladstone even more than Lord Kimberley said that 
1 must report what wd. be most conducive to law & order and the best 
interests of the people black and white who inhabited, or are to inhabit, 
these islands.
Mr Gladstone spoke seriously of the great disadvantage attending the 
acquisition of new colonies, the great difficulties of governing a country 
at the other end of the world.•••" 5
Three days after this McArthur had to be faced in the House of Commons. Kimberley
tried to persuade him to cancel his motion in view of the Cabinet’s decision,
but the persistent Alderman politely refused,and Kimberley urged Gladstone to
6
explain the new policy to the House. On 13 June 1873 McArthur rose to recite
1. Cabinet Minute 24.v.1873. Gladstone Papers 4464l/l26.
Gledstone^to*Kimberley 29.v.1873. Kimberley Papers A/8c.
4. Cabinet Min. 44641/128. Goodenough heard that 'Fiji was on* next day. 
Goodenough's Journal, 8.vi.l873.
5. Ibid. I, 10.vi.1873.
6. Kimberley to Gladstone 11 & 12.vi. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/49 & 53.
the well known arguments for annexation. It had been unworthy, he said, to 
expect New South Wales to take Fiji, de facto recognition had been a dangerous 
precedent, and it had been discourteous not to reply to the 1870 memorial. 
Referring to Gladstone's 1872 statement, he hoped now to show a well authenticated 
desire for annexation, and with liberal quotations from the Fiji Times, Thurston’s 
letters. Captain Palmer’s book, and the kidnapping cases - and the per+inent fact 
that a quarter of a million pounds had been spent in five years in suppressing 
the iiast African coastal slave trade - he came to his final appeal. It was not 
only a matter of the national interest; it concerned the cause of "liberty, 
civilization, and Christianity" throughout the Pacific, and he appealed to 
Gladstone, a former Colonial Secretary, to accept the sovereignty of, or 
a protectorate over, the Fiji Islands.^
I
Gladstone replied frankly, and he scored debating points as usual.
Annexation was becoming a favourite topic with the House, he said; it might be
the ’chill of age* but he confessed that accessions of territory did not excite
him, and since trade with Fiji was small he did not think the commercial argument
was a good one. The philanthropic argument was Important, but if McArthur's
figures for Fijian church-going were correct, the islands had the highest
proportion of devout believers in Christendom. Gladstone's chief defence was
the expense incurred in the Maori Wars; he refused to commit the same errors in 
2
Fiji. He wanted more information, therefore a commission would inquire and 
report, '/his was all the Government would do at the moment, and it did not 
convince the humanitarians who carried McArthur's motion by a majority of 756."
1. 3 Hansard,ccxvi, cols.934-941. Printed as a booklet, The annexation of Fiji and 
the Pacific Slave Trade (May 1874) by the Aborigines Protection Society.
2. For the importance to Gladstone's view of the controversy with N.Z, over the 
costs of the Maori wars and the withdrawal of the imperial troops, See E.A. 
Benians,"Colonial Self-government,1852-70", Camb.Hist.of Brlt.Emp. II, p.701, 
where he asserts that "out of the Pew Zealand question sprang the new 
imperialist movement."
3. Ayes 86. Noes 50. 3 Hansard,ccxvi,cols.943-9 for Gladstone’s speech.
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What had really happened was that Kimberley had provided, Gladstone with
another excuse for postponing a decision on Fiji, and as the Liberal Government
fell before the Goodenough-Layard report arrived, it was never called upon to
decide. But Kimberley had clearly travelled past his master on Fiji,^ as he
%
would shortly do also on the Kalay States and Ashanti. He had advised annexation
as early as February 1873. Immediately after the 7 June Cabinet he presented
Gladstone with four alternatives: consular jurisdiction, formal recognition of the
2
Fiji Government, protectorate, or annexation, 'Tiese formed the basis of
Goodenough's instructions, but as Gladstone read them he w*s reminded of war,
expense and trouble with the local people elsewhere: "I hope nothing will be done
which will lead us to responsibility inner-^ards - as in New Zealand and in 
3Abyssinia”.
In spite of this warning Goodenough*s instructions, although based on the
four alternatives, really eliminated three of them, leaving a fair impression of
4
Kimberley’s preference. Firstly, consular jurisdiction would be difficult to
justify unless the local government was really incapable, and no arrangement would
be satisfactory unless the labour traffic was regulated. Secondly, if the local 
begovernment was to recognised de, jure it would have to be certain that it was fully 
recognised locally, and it would be unsatisfactory unlevss its labour laws were 
effective as Queensland's. Britain would also require most favoured nation 
treatment for her merchants. Thirdly, the objections to a protectorate were 
"obvious" as this would involve "undefined responsibilities" with limited power
1. After Carnarvon announced the annexation in 1874 Kimberley wrote: "As I expected 
the government have taken, possession of Fiji... I think it would have been 
difficult to avoid taking Fiji", (to Gladstone 4.xi.l874. Gladstone Papers 
44225/154). K-Hugessen wrote in 1874: "it is tolerably certain that we would 
have annexed the islands". Braboume Diary, p.733.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.vi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/54.
3. Gladstone to Kimberley 27.vii.1873. Kimberley Papers a/Rc. The expressions of 
Gladstone’s great reluctance throughout the discussion may be considered beside 
Legge's assertion that "nowhere does he indicate an irrevocable opposition to 
annexation should it prove to only satisfactory solution". Brit, in Fiji.p. 136.
4. Draft after FO. to CO. 5.viii.l873. 00/83/4.
of discharging them. Finally, the fourth alternative was annexation. Here 
Kimberley offered no comment. But a series of practical questions had to he 
answered: was the cession desired, what form of government would be suitable, 
how would the Fijians be represented, what would be the state of the revenues 
and expenses, what was the land system. Final phrases denying any British desire 
for annexation were really face-savers to satisfy triads tone, if the instructions 
were published. Edgar L.Layard, the new Consul, was told by the Foreign Office 
to accord de facto recognition to the Fiji Government, to avoid controversy, and
2
to encourage (with Royal Navy support if necessary) the suppression of kidnapping.
New Zealand*s Samoan schemes. 1871 to 1874.
Although Kimberley had reduced the Fiji case to fairly clear cut proportions
and had made up his mind about it, on the wider question of the frontier in the
South Pacific his ideas were negative. He certainly recognised the problem: both
he and Gladstone told Goodenough that ’taking Fiji might result in our annexing 
3
all Polynesia”, he asked the Aborigines Protection Society in May 1875 where the
4process of annexation would end, and he deferred considering a request for
5annexation from Rotuma until after the Fiji decision. Tn 1874 after Fiji was 
annexed he told Gladstone, "we shall have further pressure for annexation in the 
Pacific",^ referring here to a matter which concerned him during Mg last days at 
the Colonial Office - the re-kindl^ing of Australian interest in New Guinea.
After Moresby’s explorations on the South-east coast of New Guinea in 1875, Herbert
1. In the Commons debate on the Conservative policy, 4.viii.l874, K-Hugessen said 
that Kimberley’s instructions had eliminated three alternatives; "There remained 
then, only annexation, unless we were prepared to abandon altogether any 
interferenece". 5 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 1295.
2. Granville to Layard 29.ix.1873 (draft seen and altered by Kimberley) F0A>8/l35, 
p. 55.
3. Goodenough’s Journal, I, 10.vi.1875.
4. See above p.27$.
5. Min. by Kimberley 23.ii.1873 on Ad. to CO. 19.ii.1873 C0/20l/575.
6. Kimberley to CJladstona 4.ix.l874. Cladstone Paper9 44225/154.
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a former Premier of Queensland, consistently advocated some form of annexation 
to keep out other powersBut Kinberlev took no decision on New Guinea, which, 
along with Fiji, Rotuma and Samoa, was one of the subjects which were left for 
Carnarvon in 1874*
The most serious aspect of the South Pacific frontier problem beside Fiji was 
New Zealand's designs on Samoa* In fact restraint of Julius Vogel, the ^ew 
Zealand Prime Minister, was one of the last acts of the Gladstone Government in 
1374.
The Samoan (Navigator) Islands lie about Latitude 14 South and longitude 171
East, roughly 600 miles north-east of Fiji. From the arrival of John Willing t
the L.M.S. missionary, in 1830 until tho 1850's British influence predominated;
a Consul was appointed in 1845* ^nd Williams's son, John C.Williams, adted as
2
the U.S. Consul from 1839* British missionary influence continued, but trade
in Samoa gradually became dominated by the Hamburg finn of J.O.Godeffroy, which
5
established its copra trade Agency at Apia in 1857#
In 1864 Theodore Weber became Oodeffroy's Agent, as well as Consul for
Hamburg and the North German Confederation, and while building up a remarkably
efficient and widespread commercial empire in the Pacific, it seems that he
began purchasing land in the late 1860's for planting a German colony in Samoa,
The senior partner of Godeffroy's in Hamburg had been a friend of Bismarck's and
official support was said to be forthcoming. The warship Bertha was on its way
to Samoa, when, after it had called at Singapore in 1870, it was recalled because
4of the Franco-Prussian War. German warships returned to the Pacific after the
war, but Bismarck held back from colonial ventures and ordered Weber to cultivate
1. Discussed below pp.
2. Masterman, International Rivalry in Samoa, ‘pp. 59, 29-44, 56.
3, Townshend, Origins of Modem German Colonialism, pp. 40-41,
4, Ibid. p. 67. H.S.Cooper, Coral I/mds. II, pp. 55-58.
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good relations with the Americans in Samoa. ^
The United States interest came from three sources. T^ irstly, Henry Pierce, 
the Minister Resident in Hawaii, advocated the acquisition of bases in the ^acific-
Hawaii in the north, and Samoa (strategically placed on the routes to the isthmus
2 3of Panama) in the South. Secondly, the New York shipping magnate, W.H.Webb,
wanted a coaling station for his trans-Pacific steamer line, and thirdly, some
Californian land speculators invested in Samoa. When Webb failed to get a subsidy
for his steamers from the U.S. Government, Julius Vogel arranged for the New
Zealand Government to subsize the service, and in May 1871 the first mail steamer
4
of the new line reached Auckland from San Francisco. because o** his interest in 
a coaling station in the South Pacific, Webb sent Captain '/akeman to report on 
Samoa. The latter visited the islands in July 1871 and reported, in often-quoted
words, that Pago Pago was the "most perfectly land-locked harbour in the Pacific".
5
he also warned his employer of Weber's plans, and Webb sent this report both to 
the State Department and to Vogel,
Thus, early in 1872, three different streams of national aspirations (albeit 
aspirations fostered in the main by individuals rather than by governments) 
converged on Samoa. In November 1871 the New Zealand Government proposed that 
Samoa be placed under New Zealand, following the precedent of the protectorate 
adjoining the Cape, in order to forstall the U.S.A. and Germany. Kimberley
1. Townshend, op. cit. p. 56.
2. Ryden, U.S. policy in Samoa, p. 49. The author suggests that the U.S. Navy 
Dept, was seriously concerned about Pacific bases in the early 1870's, but that 
Congress was opposed.
3. Ibid. p. 45. William H.Webb had been building ships since the 18R0's, and built
warships for the Union during the Civil War. Interested in +he Pacific guano
business and isthmian transit routes; President of the N.American Shipping Co.
4. Vogel signed the agreement in New York 7.iii.l871. Named the "U.S., N.Z., A
Australia Mail Steamship Line", it provided a 28 day interval service between 
Auckland and San Francisco. N.Z. paid £50,000 for 13 complete services, plus 
free mail transit. (Bowen to Kimberle^ 20.iv.1871. CO/209/221.) It failed,1873.
5. Ryden, op. cit. pp. 50-52.
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refused, but early in 1872 New Zealand sent William Seed to report on Samoa,^
For the United States, Commander Meade (unauthorised by Washington) negotiated
a treaty with Chief Mauga securing exclusive rights to Pago pago harbour as a
2
Naval Base and coaling station. Two weeks after this Weber arrived on the scene
in the warship Nymphe. which was visiting the South Seas, and he protested about
3the Meade treaty. All these aspirations came to nought; the Senate sat on Meade's 
treaty, Downing Street refused Vogel's scheme, and Weber received no surprvrt from 
Bismarck,
The American interests, however, appeared to contemporaries to be more
persistent, for soon after Meade's treaty, James Stewart of the Central Polynesia
Land and Commercial Company of San Francisco bought 300,000 ^cres of land in
4
Samoa for cotton growing. Stewart was entrusted with a petition for the TT.S.
5
Government requesting annexation, and although President Grant refused, in March
1873 he appointed the notorious Colonel Steinberger as Special Commissioner of the
United States President to Samoa, After visiting the islands Steinberger returned
to the U.S.A. in December 1873 to tell Grant that Samoa wanted American protection.
His subsequent activities, and shortlived regime in Samoa as ^ime Minister, his
deportation in a British warship and disavowal by the American Government have
6
been described elsewhere. His importance for the London argument lies in the
1. William Seed, inspector of Customs,‘was sent to Samoa, If.Caledonia and Fiji 
ostensibly to report on prospects for N.Z. trade. (Vogel Memo. 23.xii.1871 in 
Bowen to Kimberley 5.i.1872. CO/209/226.)
2. Ryden, ££. cit. pp. 55-62, makes a careful reconstruction of Meade's orders, 
Webb had sent Wakeman's report to Sec. of State Fish, who received at the same 
time a report of Weber's activities from the U.S.Consul. Fish was generally 
sympathetic to Webb. Three ships of the Pacific Squadron were cruizing in the 
Pacific in 1870-71 to protect American commerce. Meade's orders from the Navy 
Dept, were obscure, but Pierce, the Min-Resident at Honolulu, provided the 
interpretation on which Meade's action in Samoa was based: Tin my view of the 
future domination of the U.States in the North and South ‘Pacific Gcean, it is 
very important that the Navigator islands should be under American control - 
ruling through the native authorities".
3* Ibid. p.70. Cf. Sunday Morning Chronicle. Washington ?.vi.l872 clipping in 
FO. to CO. 22.vi.1872. C0/309'107. This was the news K-Hugessen read before
the Fiji debate. See above p. Z6+-
4. PO. to CO. 21.ii.1873. C0/209/231.
5. Kasterman pp. 114-115 & Ryden pp. 83-84 . 6. Ryden, pp. 85-147,
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excitement his mission caused in New Zealand.
As Steinberger approached Samoa, Sir -Tames Fergussen, the Governor of New
Zealand, informed Kimberley that Vogel, the Prime Minister, again called on the
imperial government to forstall the U.S.A. and Germany in Samoa.^ Both Fermssen
2
and Vogel told Goodenough of their schemes for Samoa and Fiji. Tn the Colonial 
Office, Holland thought that in view of the New South Vales plan for Fiji, this 
New Zealand plan for Samoa was reasonable. But Herbert pointed out that Samoa 
was rather further from New Zealand than Fiji was from Sydney, and that there 
were no British settlers in Samoa. "Mr. Vogel is everything just now", he said, 
"and this is one of his wild schemes". Kimberley (only a few months after the 
long Fiji battle) completely rejected Vogel’s plan.
"I am entirely opposed to the annexation of these islands or meddling in 
their affairs. It might be judicious to obtain a treaty granting equal 
advantages to British subjects trading with the Navigator Islands, but 
the present moment seems unfavourable for such rash actions as might lead 
to a controversy with the United States. Considering the number of the 
points in the world which we have annexed, we cannot object to other 
maritime powers seeking stations of their own. If we multiply our stations 
too much we really weaken ourselves^by multiplying the points open to 
attack beyond our power to defend".
Knatchbull-Hugessen agreed; he preferred Fiji to Samoa, but he oointed out that
5
a flat refusal was hardly consistent with the New South Wales plan for Fiji.
Nevertheless, the refusal went to telegraph on October 14, 1873.
The New Zealanders were not deterred, and two far reaching plans reached the
Colonial Office on 22 December 1873, both supported by Governor Fergussen. Firstly
Vogel insisted that a decision on Fiji in isolation was inadequate; a policy for
all Polynesia was wanted. If there was to be expansion, it should be
%
comprehensive, not a last minute international scramble. Either there should 
be a joint protectorate with Germany, the U.S.A., France and Holland, or Britain
1. Fergussen to Kimberley l.viii.1873. C0/209/230.
2. Goodenough's Journal, I, 29.ix.1873.
3. Min. by Herbert 3.x.1873 on Fergussen to Kimberley l.viii.187^, CO/209/230.
4. Ibid. Min. by Kimberley 9.x.1873.
5. Ibid. Min. by K-Hugessen 10.x.1873.
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should take everything* If this was done, then Vogel pleaded that "local efforts
to maintain peaceful relations with uncivilized races are far more successful
than those directed by a distant power".* To this the Governor (who had just
heard that New South Wales was demanding the annexation of Fiji) added the
pertinent fact that a clash between the Fiji Government and the settlers was
only being prevented by the presence ("anomalous interference") of British
warships. Fergussen drew the imperdal governments attention to Tonga and Samoa,
as well as Fiji, and he suggested government by Residents as in the Indian States,
2
or making the islands provinces of New Zealand. Herbert said Vogel*s ideas were
3
foolish* and ‘impudent', and Kimberley agreed. The second suggestion, from
Mr. Coleman Phillip, an English lawyer who had been involved in the founding of
the Bank of Fiji, was for a sort of Ea3t India Company to secure dominion over the
South Pacific. Herbert thought that this idea was more useful, but Kimberley did
4
not like the look of it. In January 1874 both ideas were put to the Cabinet.
Kimberley sent the New Zealand schemes to Gladstone on 24 January 1874»
5commenting that they were "most extravagent", but on the day before the Cabinet 
considered them, much fuller plans for a chartered company arrived. Governor 
Fergussen still supported Vogel, who had obviously adopted the fillip scheme.
A South Pacific Trading Company would be guaranteed by the New Zealand Government. 
"The ultimate object which I have in view is the establishment of the Polynesian 
islands as one Dominion, like Canada, to be a British dependency".^ Herbert was 
furious; Vogel, he said, was "the most audacious adventurer that perhaps has ever 
held power in a British Colony", and he regretted that the Governor supnorted him*
1. Vogel Memo. 17.x.1873 in Fergussen to Kimberley 22.x.187^ . 00/209/230.
2. Ibid. , 5. Ibid. Mins. 24 ft 28. xii.1873.
4. Mins. 22 & 23.xii.1873 on Fergussen to Kimberley 23.x. 1873. CO/209/230.
5. Kimberley to Gladstone 24.i.1874. Gladstone Papers 44225/138.
6. Vogel Memo. 23.xi.1873 in Oergussen to Kimberley 24.xi*1873. CO/209/230.
7* Ibid* Min. by Herbert 26.i.1874.
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But Fergussen did not like being a governor; as an ex-Tory WP. and Under-secretary
in the India Office he missed parliamentary life,^ and doubtless the visionary
2
Prime Minister added interest to his exile.
The Cabinet considered the replies they would give to New Zealand on 27 
3
January 1874. But the rosults of their discussion are not truly represented in 
the short negative reply which went on 10 February. In view of the political 
situation in England (a week later the Government resigned) the Pacific Trading 
Company scheme was left for the next Government, as was Fiji.
t
The unsent draft certainly declined to extend British power in the Pacific,
but Vogel’s claim that local efforts in relations with aboriginal peoples were
more successful than metropolitan efforts was conceded. The Government was "quite
ready to consider any plan which may be formed in New Zealand for the purpose of
directing 3uch local efforts to the establishment of closer relations with the
4
uncivilized races of Polynesia beyond the limits of the colony". Moreover, this
sober approach to the frontier problem was not Kimberley’s, it came from none
other than Gladstone. He found Vogel’s memorandum "extremely crude",but the idea
about local expertise was "one piece of sound doctrine". "And singular to say",
went on the Prime Minister, "the memorandum seems to partake of the nature of a
retraction as to New Zealand of the contemptuous answer received from (i think)
New South Wales to our observation that they might if they pleased frame for
5
consideration a plan for annexing or governing Fiji". Thus the Prime Minister 
who so objected to imperial involvements, fully supported Vogel’s views about 
’local efforts’, and he was prepared to consider plans. This has prompted on
historian to surmise that had Gladstone not fallen from power Vogel’s Pacific
1. Goodenough's Journal, I, 28.ix.1873.
2. See A.Ross, New Zealand aspirations in the Pacific. (PhD. thesis Cambridge 1049) 
pp. 400-402 for criticism of historians who accept Herbert’s view of Vogel.
3. Cabinet Minute 27.i.1874. Gladstone Papers 44641/255.
4. Kimberley’s addition to second draft after Fergussen to Kimberley 22.x.1^ 73.
co/209/230.
5. Gladstone to Kimberley 24.i. 1874. Quoted in Ross, op. cit. p. 159, fn. 72.
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plans might possibly have been successful,^ just as Kimberley and Khatchbull- 
Hugessen both surmised that they would have annexed Fiji. It may even be that 
Kimberley, having won the lengthy Fiji battle, gave-up on the wider problem of 
the Pacific frontier just as Gladstone became aware of it, in the same way that 
Knatchbull-Hugessen had seemd to capitulate over Ashanti and Fiji just as Kimberley 
took a decided stand# Pioneers or fanatical protagonists frequently give up the 
cause; but often after inspiring others to go much further than they would.
Yet this still-born policy of Gladstone's for the South Pacific was really
2
quite consistent with imperial policy elsewhere# Possibly Gladstone saw in 
Vogel^s scheme a way of avoiding in the Pacific an 'Imperial Factor' which proved 
so costly in South Africa* But it was too late, and this frontier prqblem was 
only another unsettled matter left for Carnarvon to face in February 1874. The 
three themes which have been woven together in this chapter - Fiji, kidnapping 
and expansion - had given increasing trouble to Gladstone's Government, In each 
case a policy was all but formed: the way was paved for the annexation of Fiji, the 
results of the 1872 Kidnapping Act were being watched, expansion by Britain was 
denied, but the door va3 not closed to local action. The Liberal Ministry had 
moved away from the non-interventionist notions of the 1860's. The target of 
Crystal Palace had really disappeared. But the final decisions had not been taken; 
these were left for Disraeli's Government.
1. Ibid. loc. cit.
2. One of London's few consistent policies seems to have been that annexations 
ought to be made by the 'colonial imperialists' who wished expansion on the 
imperial government. Eg. the Cape - Griqualand Vest; Natal - Basutoland; NSW. - 
New Guinea and Fiji. Thus, in this context, fN*Z. - Polynesia* seemed quite 
logical. Ross, p. 159» treats Vogel's expansionist ambitions and the trading 
company scheme separately, and so misses the full force of the Gladstone letter 
he quotes. But both matters reached London together (Dec. 22) and they both 
went to the Cabinet. Gladstone (as noted above) was prepared to listen to plans 
for 'local efforts', and possibly the Trading Company would have fitted this. 
Herbert was favourable at first and Gladstone showed no hostility. When the 
details of the Company scheme arrived, in time for the Cabinet, but after 
Gladstone and Kimberley's exchange of views, Gladstone simply noted: "the 
proposal is more enlarged - a joint stock company". Gladstone Papers, 44641/ 
255.
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Chapter 5#
THE NEW EXPERIMENTS IN THE CPU) COAST. MALAYA AND FIJI,
AND CARNARVON'S PREVENTION OF FURTHER EXPANSION. 1874-76.
Lord Carnarvon became Colonial Secretary in Disraeli’s Government on 21 
February 1874, *wd within a matter of days he was faced with the frontier problems 
for which Kimberley had mooted new policies, but had not made final decisions* Fe 
discovered that in Fiji Commodore Goodenough was obviously biased towards annex­
ation, therefore on 23 February he cautioned the Commissioner by telegram. He 
learnt of Vogel's Pacific dreams and of the activities of President Grant's agent 
in Samoa on 25 February* Next day the telegram announcing Volseley's entry into 
Kuraasi arrived; and also on the 26th Seymour Clarke, having heard of the Pangkor 
Engagement, tried to get a word of approval from Carnarvon for the Selangor Tin 
Company* Therefore after only a week in office Carnarvon was well aware of the 
delicate decisions which faced him concerning the frontier in Vest Africa, Malaya 
and the South Pacific.
Although five years younger than Kimberley, Carnarvon had had much more
experience in colonial affairs. As Parliamentary Under-secretary in the Colonial
Office in Derby's 1858 Government, and Secretary of State from June 1866 to March
1867, he was already acquainted with the three regions over which he was called
to decide. His 1858 memorandum had been a land-mark in the Gold Coast policy. He
had sympathised, on similar moral grounds, with the request for annexation bv
Fiji in 1859* He had been prepared to accept Sarawak from Raja Brooke, and he had
contemplated a South-east Asian empire to be called the 'Borneo Settlements' and
1based on Singapore, as a link between India and Australia. Re had been aware of 
the controversy with the Treasury over the transfer of the Straits Settlements
1. In 1858, according to Memo, by A.S.Green, ?2*ix.l874* FO^S/145 268.
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from India to the Colonial Office; a matter completed by bis successor Buckingham 
in 1867. He was familiar with the Office, familiar with the problems under 
discussion, and now his way was made smoother since Robert Herbert, the Permanent. 
Under-secretary, was a relative and had also been Carnarvon's school friend at 
Eton and his Oxford contemporary.
Carnarvon appeared to have completed his policies for the three areas by 
October 1874 and gained the plaudits of party and the press. But his attention 
was not given equally to each case, and none of the three were so large as the 
South African problem. The Gold Coast policy was treated with urgency, received 
much study, and with keen co-operation from the governor was virtually completed 
by October. The Commission's report from Fiji did not arrive until 10 June 1874 
and as the islands were annexed - without a Cabinet discussion - before the 
autumn, Disraeli's surprised pleasure is understandable. But in the Pacific 
Carnarvon would not move beyond Fiji. Treating the new annexation as an experiment 
in the administration of a Pacific island, he met further problems with the 
Western Pacific High Commission, and instrument which fell short of assuming 
sovereignty and providing government, Malaya received scant attention from 
Carnarvon in 1874. Sir Andrew Clarke's reports on the Pangkor conference were 
not treated urgently, and when the policy of placing Residents to advise certain 
Malay rulers was approved in September 1874, Carnarvon made it clear that he 
regarded the new departure as another experiment. In Perak the experiment 
failed initially, and one suspects that it was only after the murder of the 
Resident in 1875 that Carnarvon gave serious thought to the Malay Peninsula.
Carnarvon's solutions in the Gold Coast, Malaya and Fiji were those which
Kimberley had already considered. There is no evidence that Carnarvon took office
with notions of imperial expansion in mind; his imperialism took the shape of a
0
belief in co-operation between the self-governing colonies and his tenet that
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colonial affairs was the "greatest of all political questions"* was hardly
different from Kimberley’s confession to Gladstone that he took a more sanguine
2
view of "the power and influence of this country than you do".
Yet one senses that Carnarvon was more imaginative than Kimberley, that in 
1874 he handled problems and personalities with more finesse. Perhaps this 
impression is gained simply because Kimberley’s period was one for the realisation 
of the frontier problem and the investigation of possible courses of action. 
Carnarvon took office after the immediate crises had been met, and with the spade­
work done, he was not worn out by its details and could look ahead. Bow he did 
this, and with what effect, must now be examined#
The Gold Coast Protectorate after the Ashanti Var.
Assuming office five days before the arrival of the news of Volseley's entry 
3
of Kumasi, Carnarvon first of all decided he could do nothing but accept the
Ashanti War. Disraeli and the Cabinet wanted to make political capital out of it,
and Carnarvon indeed produced privately an impressive lists of mistakes by the
Gladstone Government, which, he thought, had "run the expedition too fine in 
4
time and men". But Carnarvon warned Disraeli against an attempt to discredit 
the Liberals.
"There is no question in ray mind", he wrote to Disraeli, "that the Ashanti 
have been for a considerable time preparing to invade us and that it has 
been an invasion of the British territory quite as much as of the protect­
orate. I should... prefer to accept the fact of the war and, unless we 
are attacked (which is most unlikely) treat it as a transaction for which  ^
we are not responsible, but which... we are determined to make the best of".
Of the conduct of the military expedition Carnarvon found "more to praise than to
blame", and Wolseley basked in glory, even Glover got a knighthood. Militarily,
1. Carnarvon to K-Hugessen 18.viii.1874 (copy), Carnarvon Papers. PRO.^0/6/44#
P. 145.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 26.xi.1873. Gladstone Papers, 44225/10.
3* Wolseley to Kimberley 5.ii.l874 (tg) rec'd 26.ii.1874. C0/806/a p. 14.
4. Undated memorandum. PRO.30/6/85.
5. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.iii.l874 (copy). PR0.30/6/ll p. 3#
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it had appeared neat, effective and a fitting exercise for Cardwell's re-organised 
War Office.
Wolseley had been determined to get his march to Kumasi, and although the
invasion of Ashanti had not been the "child's play* he expected, and he did not
dictate a new treaty to the Asantehene in his own capital, everything went pretty
much according to the plan which Wolseley had first made in London about July 1073.
The only hitch in his plans was the failure of the African levies; but although
his official despatches continually described them as "utterly useless" in tones
of hurt disappointment, it has already b^en argued that Wolseley did not expect 
1
anything better. In many ways the campaign was a model. It was short, since all
the British troops had to be away by March at the latest because of the rains. In
this way the scandalous loss of life, attributed to the climate, as in 1R64 was
avoided. Administrative arrangements worked smoothly for once, and the senior
Medical Officer (who Cardwell greatly praised) could find no defect in the War
2
Office's support. A field telegraph worked admirably from the front.
At forty Wolseley was the oldest officer in the campaign and his staff, drawn 
for the first time from the Staff College, was composed of some young men of 
brilliantpromise. One rushed home from Canada, uninvited, in order not to miss 
the fray.^ Foremost among them was Colley - "the ablest officer then in our
4
army" - who raced back from the Carpathians and resigned a Professorship at the 
R
Staff College, in order to accompany Wolseley as transport organiser. Pedvers 
Buller was in charge of Intelligence; Lieut. Frederick Maurice, the commander's 
private secretary,received his first experience of fire. By proving that Fnglish 
troops could fight in tropical Africa they laid the bogey of 1064, and military
1. See above p. VJolseley failed to recruit sufficient carriers for his Brit, 
force so one whole Battalion (the 23rd) was not committed and re-embarked.
2. Cardwell to Northcote, quoted in R.Biddulph, Lord Fardwell at the War Office , 
(1904) p. 234.
3. V/.F. (later Lt-Cen. Sir Win.) Butler, Akim-Foo;the History of a Failure. pp.3-9« 
4* Wolseley, Soldier's Life, II, p. 276.
5. T.K.S.Escott, Pillars of the Fmpire. p. 47.
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historians might regard the campaign as a training exercise for an important
\
section of the British military leadership of the late nineteenth century.
Before the British troops arrived on 10 December 1873 all Wolseley could do
was restore British prestige in the Protectorate, making the best use of the
African forces he could raise, and to press forward the preparations for the
reception of the British troops. The Ashanti army began to fall back from tfampon
when Wolseley arrived himself at the beginning of October 1873, so he posted a
detachment of Hausas under Col. Festing to harass their rear. When the Ashantis
hastily crossed the Pra on 29 November, Wolseley's first object was achieved;
had a peace treaty been made then,Gladstone would have V-en satisfied. But
Wolseley received no answer to his terms. Letters addrpssed to the Asantehene on
14 October offering a peace treaty on the condition that the Ashantis left the
Protectorate by 12 November, handed over prisoners, including the German
missionaries, and paid compensation, were not Answered until Wolseley was actually
in Ashanti territory. So Wolseley pressed on with his preparations. As the
Ashantis retreated Col. Festing pursued, and a road was pushed northwards so the
British troops would be able to make haste to the Pra. 'Tie African levies were
organised into irregular units under British officers - "Wood's Regt.",^ "Russell's
2
Regt.", and "Rait*s Artillery" - and they were gradually committed to help 
Festing at the head of the road to the Pra.
All was ready for the invasion of Ashanti at the end of 1873. The British 
troops were to be kept at sea until 1 January 1874* they would then inarch along 
the prepared road, sleeping overnight in prepared camps, so they would be fresh 
to cross the Pra on 15 January. Wolseley had no intention of crushing the Ashanti
1. Commander was later Field-Warshal Sir Evelyn Wood VC.
2. Commander later Lieut-Ceneral Sir Baker Russell.
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nation, which he probably came to regard more highly than his Fante allies.*
A few battles in the Adansi Hills, he thought, would bring the Asantehene suing
for peace.^ The plan involved four lines of advance to cross^rT^ January: the
main force to follow the Prasu-Kumasi road; Captain Glover to operate in the Fast
towards Juaben, and between them Captain Butler to lead a force of Western Akims.
In the West, Captain Dalrymple was to move along the ’Wassaw Path* with a force
3
of Wassaws, Tchufuls and Komraendahs.
On the eve of the attack, just as Wolseley reached the front in late December 
1873# letters from the Asantehene addressed to Rarley claimed that Ashanti had no 
quarrell with the British, that they demanded only the allegiance of Assin and
4
Denkyera. With Lord Gifford’s scouts already 13 miles inside Ashanti territory
>
North of the Pra, Wolseley warned the Asantehene that the invasion was under way.
The terms for peace were now more specific: the release of prisoners, an indemnity
5
of 50,000 oz. of gold dust, and a new treaty to be signed by Wolseley in Kumasi.
The Asantehene was prepared to accept this and he replied by sending the missionary
Johannes Kuehne with a message begging Wolseley to stop, and saying that Amankw Tia
had not been authorised to attack the British forts. But Wolseley demanded all
6the European and African prisoners from the Protectorate, and he pressed his 
advance to Fomana, the Adansi capital. Here he received another letter from 
Kumasi; the remaining missionaries were released (Kofi Kari Kari himself paying 
Adu Bofo his £1000), and Amankwa Tia was ordered to pay the indemnity - now would 
Wolseley stop ?
But the General would not be cheated out of Kumasi. He told the Asantehene 
that he intended to enter the city, it was up to Kofi Kari Kari whether he arrived
1. Wolseley to Biddulph 26.x.1873. Private. Extract in Kimberley Papers. A/22.
2. Ibid. Wolseley to Cardwell 11.xii.1873. Private (copy).
3. Chief of Staff to Glover 31.xii.1873. CO/806/2 p. 97.
4. Kofi Kari Kari to Harley 25 & 26.xi.1873. Ibid. pp. 98-99.
5. Wolseley to Kofi Kari Kari 2.1.1874. Ibid. pp. 103-4.
6. Kofi to Wolseley 9.1.1874 A Wolseley to Kofi 13.i.1874. C0/806/4 P P . 6-7.
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as friend or conquerer. If all the Protectorate prisoners were delivered, half
the indemnity paid, and hostages , including the heir to the Asantehene, the Queen
Mother, and the hairs to the four leading Ashanti kings sent, Wolseley would go
to Kumasi with an escort of 500 men to sign the treaty. Ward says these were
1
impossible conditions; thus the Ashanti decided to stand and fight at Araoafhl. 
Receiving no satisfaction after a halt of four days at Fomana, Wolseley sent an 
ulximatum to Kofi Kari Kari on 29 January 1B74. On the same day the battle began.
The Battle of Araoaful dashed Wolseley’s illusion of ’child's play'. It took 
the Black Watch four hours to take the town and the Ashantis kept up fire from the 
flanks all the time. But by hard fighting Wolseley reached the River Oda on 3 
February. Here messengers from Kumasi confirmed that the.Asantehene accepted the 
General's terms. Nothing, however, would now keep Wolseley from KUrosai; he was in 
no mood to trust the Asantehene, and he was anxious about getting back to the 
coast before the rains began in earnest. He informed Kofi Kari Kari that he would 
wait on the Oda that night for the hostages (and, incidentally, to build a bridge). 
After a stormy night, which drenched his troops, Wolseley waited for two hours of 
daylight on 4 February, and then resumed the attack. At 9 am. the Rifles took 
Odahsu, where they were held up for hours; finally the Black Watch, bagpipes 
playing, burst through the resistance and rushed to Kumasi. At six pm. on 4 
February the weary troops paraded in the Ashanti capital and cheered the Queen. 
Wolseley had achieved his ambition.
He had not fulfilled his mission. The Asantehene had fled and did not answer 
a summons to sign a treaty; like Napoleon at Moscow, Wolseley waited for 
negotiators who did not materialise, while Ashanti messengers were caught sneaking 
arms, vhile Fante allies began looting, and while reports arrived that the rivers 
, on the route back were rising. On the evening of the 5th he decided to destroy
1. Ward, History of the Gold Coast, p. 273**
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m
Kumasi and quit* The Palace was blown up next day, the town was fired, and the 
withdrawal began covered by the 'Black Watch. And only just in time, for the 
bridge over the Oda collapsed before the last British troops had crossed and they 
Y>fid to undress and wade.
The narch to Kumasi had its desired effect. Close on Wolseley's heels 
Glover’s party passed through Kumasi from the North-east on 12 February, and the 
Asantehene decided to accept the General’s terms. Ashanti envoys overtook the 
main British column at Fomana on 13 February, with the first instalment of the 
indemnity. Wolseley sent off his draft treaty (which took its name from the spot) 
and made haste to the coast. By 23 February the last British units had embarked 
for home.
Butler's and Dalrymple’s supporting attacks were less successful; the former 
failed to persuade any of his small force to enter Ashanti territory, and Butler's 
Akims fled before Anoaful, but both diversions drew off some Ashanti forces. 
Captain Glover, in spite of Wolseley’s contention that he was a failure and 
inumerable difficulties, was fairly successful. It will be remembered that 
Glover found that the Eastern districts of the Protectorate would not help him 
against Ashanti until he had suppressed the Awuna and their allies the Akwamu, 
yho had assisted Ashanti in 1869 and were now threatening Ada again. Therefore 
Glover prepared to attack Awuna early in December 1873. Planning to cross the 
Volta from Mlefi and destroy the Awuna towns North of the lagoon, he then intended 
to send Lieut. Goldsworthy, a former Indian officer who had been Glover's right 
hand man at Lagos, southwards to the sea, while he would move North himself 
against Akwamu, and then collect his Akwapim, Krobo and Eastern Akim allies for 
the attack on Ashanti.
However, just as Glover was about to begin his campaign Wolseley ordered him 
to be on the Pra on 15 January. Protesting that with the Awuna and Akwamu
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unsubdued his flank was unsafe, Glover pleaded that given only two days of
successful operations across the Volta he could have a force, flush with victory,
on the Pra by 1 February. But Wolseley insisted that Glover (even with only a
small force) would have to be on the Pra by 15 January, to threaten Juaben, second
town of the Ashanti Confederacy.^ One senses that after all Glover's efforts and
promises of a large force, Wolseley was rather pleased that Glover seemed to have 
2
failed. If this may be true, Glover surprised him, for his protest came only 
after he had accepted V/olseley's order in good part and had submitted his plans 
to cross the Pra on time, and push forward to Juaben, twenty miles North-east of
3
Kumasi. In fact to make sure that Glover would not steal his glory Wolseley
4
ordered him not to move West of Juaben without further orders.
So Glover dropped his Awuna war after shelling some villages on 23 December, 
and concentrated on moving to the Pra. Running the gauntlet part of the way up 
the Volta in canoes, he went via Odumasi (2 January) Akropong (6 January), to 
cross the Pra on 15 January as ordered, although he had only 700 Hausas out of 
his promised force of 16,000. By the end of January he was half way to Juaben 
when he was held up at the River Anum. Here he awaited Wolseley's orders which 
never arrived, so he pressed on. Captain Sartorious crossed the Anum on 2 February 
and Glover, now joined by his re-inforcements from Akim, Akwapim and Krobo, reached 
the deserted town of Juaben. Sending Sartorious ahead to catch Wolseley's column,
m
Glover pushed on through smouldering Kumasi on 12 February. Next day Sartorious 
met V/olseley at Fomana, and Glover followed the General down the road to the 
coast. Augustus Hemming, of the Colonial Office, was right when he wrote, rtCapt. 
Glover seems to have got on wonderfully well, considering the difficulties he has
1. Wolseley to Edmund Wodehouse 31*xii.1873.Private (copy). Gladstone Papers, 
44225/142.
2. See Wolseley to Kimberley l.i.1874. HQ,/806/2 p. 92.
3. Glover replied to the orders on 14 Dec. His 'protest* was dated 28 Dec., and 
was probably his excuse for the small force he now realised would reach the Pra.
4. Chief of Staff to Glover 31.xii.lR73. C0/806/2 p. 97.
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had to contend with".'*'
The new treaty was signed by the Administrator at Cape Coast Castle on 14 
March, after Wolseley had left; known as the Treaty of Fomana it replaced the 
1831 Treaty as the basis of British relations with Ashanti. The Asantehene agreed 
to the indemnity of 50,000 oz. of Cold, and he withdrew some of his forces who 
still lingered in the Western Protectorate. He renounced all allegiance from 
Denkyera, Assin and Akim, and (this was new) from Adansi. He also renounced
any claim to Elmina or to payments by the British ^or the forts. Both sides
V
pledged themselves to keep trade routes open and Ashanti undertook to Ve£p the 
Prasu-Kumasi road in good order. In accordance with Queen Victoria's wish the 
Asantehene said he would try to stop human sacrifices, but this would be difficult
m
for the Ashanti ruler to keep. Otherwise, apart from the final securing of Elmina
and the removal of doubts about Denkyera, Assin and Akim, the only new departure
2
was the inclusion of Adansi, which had requested to join the Protectorate. Here 
was a precendent for the secession of Ashanti States and the break-up of the 
Kingdom. Wolseley had deliberately hastened from the scene to avoid such political 
complications which might have detracted from his success. It was no part of 
British policy to destroy Ashanti. What was wanted, as Gladstone had seen clearly, 
was peaceful relations.
Although Carnarvon decided not to make political capital out of the war, he
wa3 uncertain what to do about the Cold Coast Protectorate. He warned the Cabinet
to be cautious in attacking the Liberals over the war as they would themselves
3
face tricky questions as to future policy on the Gold Coast. In fact Carnarvon 
faced precisely the 3ame dilemma as Kimberley had ,1u3t before the Ashanti invasion 
in 1873* Should they leave the Gold Coast (a solution which Kimberley had rejected
1. Min. by Hemming 7.iii.l874 on Wolseley to Kimberley P.ii.1874. C0/96/lll,
2. Text in Crooks, Records, pp. 521-3.
3. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.iii.l874. PR0.30/6/ll p. 3.
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early in 1873) or remaining, should they strengthen the basis of British rule?
In March 1874 a careful study was made in the Colonial Office. The dilemma was 
clearly stated in April when Mr. Fitzgerald, Editor of the West African Herald, 
suggested a bold, if rather vague, programme of public works, health improvement 
and education.
"It is difficult to see how any half measures with regard to the 
Government of the Protectorate can be raado to suffice", wrote Herbert,
"Unless we directly govern up to the Prah, we can have no guarantee 
against wars and disturbances, I am not at all sure that the annexation 
of the whole Protectornte (which I look upon with horror) is not the only 
cheap and safe alternative to retirement from the coast except perhaps 
one or two naval depots".
"Complete annexation or total abandonment are I fear the only 
alternatives", agreed Lowther, "The former is too ghastly to contemplate, 
the latter too charming of execution. All these tentative half measures 
such as Protectorates etc may do for a time ft I suppose something of the 
kind will have to be attempted until the vulgar prejudice which is now a 
days dignified by the name of ’Public Opinion* veers round to a common 
sense and unsentimental view of the question".
"A very evil choice to have to make", said Carnarvon,^ who sketched the
alternatives for himself in rather more imaginative terms.
"1. Abandonment of the Coast.
Consular Govt on Coast ft resid^ at Coomassie.
2. Transference to a Company.
Tho* formerly done, time passed for this. Practical difficulties 
in creating a monopoly. Abuses wd. grow up ft Govt wd. be held 
responsible.
3. Fanti or other Confedn.
such as Ld. Grey proposed - impracticable.
4. Direct Govt - Anglo-Indian plan - resid^ at Coomassie* Coomassie burnt.
It wd. increase probable obligations ft connections.
5. Actual annex11 ft Govt, of territory". 2
As he weighed these alternatives he received plenty of advice. He 
discussed whether experience in Burma would be helpful with Sir Arthur Hiayre and
3
Col. Yule. Col. Harley, the former Administrator on the Gold Coast, said enough
1. Mins, by Herbert (17th), Lowther (20th) ft Carnarvon 21.lv.1874 on Fitzgerald 
to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874* C0/96/ll4*
2. Undated memo. PRO.30/6/85. A note was added "See 4. form suggested in Fiji". 
3* Remo, on the meeting, undated in PRO.30/6/85.
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sacrifice had been made on behalf of the Fante; they should be taught reliance
in thorough fashion by the abolition of domestic slavery on the coast.^ Bright
2
pleaded for a complete withdrawal, Gladstone for friendship with Ashanti, and
Earl Grey, the former Colonial Secretary, proposed a ’real' protectorate like the
system when the Ionian Islands were under British protection* British territory
on the Gold Coast would still have to be limited to the forts, he said, because
of domestic slavery* Outside of them the aim should be to create African States,
possibly building on the old Fante Confederation idea, Britain would protect
these States, and govern them through a High Commissioner who would exercise
3
authority on behalf of the States.
Gradually it emerged that the small body of opinion interested in Vest
Africa would not support a withdrawal from the coast. In the House of Commons
Mr* Hanbury said on 27 April,
"we ought simply to act the part of policeman there, and let things take 
their natural course, giving th^  people an opportunity of learning the 
arts of peace, and educating them, so that the superior members of their 
race might administer side by side with us". ^
In a long debate on 4 May 1874 Arthur Mills said Britain could not honourably
leave the coast. Knatchbull-Hugessen defended Kimberley's policy, but pleaded
5
that such colonial matters should be beyond party strife - a sentiment which
Carnarvon would heartily endorse. Disraeli told the House, quite truthfully, that
the Government were considering the matter very carefully.
Such public or private expressions of opinion reminded Carnarvon that an
obligation was felt by many peqple towards the Gold Coast. T’his may have helped
him to decide on remaining, but it merely left him asking the same question which
had troubled Kimberley in 18732 what should become of the Protectorate? Here the
1. Harley to Carnarvon ll.iii.1874. CO/806/7 p. 34.
Daily News clipping. 14.iii.1874 in Carnarvon Papers, PRO.30/6/50 pp. 82-4.
5. The Times 14.iii.1874* See Grey's idea embodied in a draft oC a treaty in 
Grey to Carnarvon 13.v.1874. PR0.30/6/44 p.^ 0.
4. 3 Hansard, ccxvix, col. 1212. 5* Ibid. ccxviii, cola. 1592-1604.
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influence of his permanent officials in the Colonial Office must have weighed
heavily. The House of Commons did not become restive until April 1874, but early
in March most penetrating researches into the whole basis of British relations
with, and jurisdiction on, the Cold Coast were conducted by Augustus Hemming and
Edward Fairfield in the Colonial Office, Certain conclusions emerged from their
study which almost certainly were the ma.ior influence behind Carnarvon's policy.
Firstly, the 1865 resolutions (already rejecl/rl by Kimberley) were finally
condemned. Like Knatchbull-Hugessen a year before Hemming called them "vague
and inconclusive", proclaiming as they did that Britain could not vet withdraw,
but fettering the hands of the local government in providing effective rule.*
Secondly, a clear obligation to protect the coast States against Ashanti
emerged, and Cardwell's military policy of 1864 stood condemned alongside the
1865 resolutions. It was realised that no such obligation was written into the
1831 treaty, but apparently there was justification for the coastal African's
belief that the British intended to protect them. Maclean had undermined the
influence of African authority - the Kings and Chiefs - rendering the coast
States less organised to defend themselves. Comparatively secure in Maclean's
lifetime since Ashanti respected him, they were told after the 1863 invasion
that they would receive no help but ammunition and advice. Thus the policy
followed since Cardwell's time had left the States free to provoke Ashanti but
implied that no help would be given them if the latter retaliated; whereas Maclean
had not permitted unjust wars, but he had aided the coast States when there were
attacked. Fairfield insisted that the 1873-74 war did not relieve Britain of the
duty of protection:
"The duty arises from the fact that our presence renders the protectorate 
tribes less able to defend themselves, whilst our peculiar policy has^ 
exposed them to the undying hatred of their most powerful enemies".
1. Memo: Gold Coast, Enquiry of 1865. by A.V.L.Hemming, March 1874* Confid. Print, 
Gold Coast No. 50. C0/806/l2 p. 16.
2. Memo: The Origin and Extent of the British obligation towards the Hative Tribes 
on the"~Gold Coast, by E.Fairfield* 24.iii.1874. G.C.No. 49. CO/806/ll. p. W.
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Thirdy, the scheme of West African administrative federation adopted in 1866 
was found defective. Ord's advocacy of the idea had been based on his West Indian 
experience where there was nothin# like the vague jurisdiction of the Protect­
orate. In placing the Gold Coast under a Govemor-in-Chief four-and-a-half days 
away in Freetown, the Government had been blind to the hazard caused by the 
Protectorate. This made the Gold Coast potentially the most dangerous West 
African settlement. Much depended on the man on the spot, yet he was not the real 
authority; the recent war, the Harley-Hennessy trouble, well illustrated the 
point. *
Fourthly, the biggest single bar to better government on the Gold Coast was 
the existence of domestic slavery. If British rule was to be effective, full 
sovereignty would have to stretch beyond the forts. Successive governments had 
shrunk from this, not solely because of reluctance to take territory, but because 
slavery was illegal in a British possession. Yet a close examination of the 
legal position showed that slavery was very much condoned by British officials 
on the Gold Coast. Domestic slavery was fully recognised in the Protectorate 
and dealt with by the Judicial Assessor, an officer of the Crown, although in 
proven cases of cruelty he had a humanitarian influence. So deeply rooted, 
however, was domestic slavery, comparatively mild though it was - slaves for 
instance could own property - that Fairfield suggested it could not be suddenly 
abolished; anyway, many slaves would not want emancipation. He suggested instead 
regulations designed to end slavery gradually. Importation of foreign slaves 
into the Protectorate should be forbidden, slaves should be able to purchase 
their freed can; pawning of relatives for debt should be stopped, and all children 
might be declared free. Then said Fairfield, "if the slave population did not 
emancipate itself under these miles in three generations we should not be at
1. Hemming memo, C0/806/l2 pp. 9-10.
302
fault".
Probably influenced most by Fairfield, Carnarvon announced the outlines of 
his policy to the House of Lords on 12 May 1874. There would be no withdrawal 
from the Gold Coast, he said* Although no written obligations demanded British 
presence there, there were, in Carnarvon's view, certainly moral ones. Re­
iterating the same views he had propounded as a young Under-secreatary in 1R5B, 
he said:
"A great nation like ours must be sometimes prepared to discharge dis­
agreeable duties; she must consent to bear the burdens which are 
inseparable from her greatness... It is certainly not a desire of 
selfish interests or the ambition of larger empire which bids us remain 
on the West Coast of Africa; it is simply and solely a sense of obligations 
to be redeemed and of duties to be performed'*. ^
In the interest of better government he announced five changes, (l) The Gold
Coast forts and lAgos were to be united into a single Crown Colony on the
model of the Straits Settlements, (2) Better officials would be sought, including
a strong governor; tropical pensions would be paid. (3) Either Elmina or Accra
would be made the new capital, and possibly a hill station, to provide a West
African Simla, would be built. (4)An armed TIausa police force would guard the
roads and present the Fante from molesting Ashanti traders. (5) Domestic slavery
would greatly concern the local government, but Carnarvon promised no sudden
emancipation.
Here then was no dramatic reversal of policy. Carnarvon proposed to retain 
the Protectorate very much as it had existed before the war and to attempt to 
advance civilization there more by influence than by edict. Nevertheless certain 
distinct additions were made in 1874 to this modest programme, which profoundly 
influenced the future of the Gold Coast, and gave the Conservatives in England
1. Memo: Domestic Slavery, the Jurisdiction of the Judicial Assessor and the 
Legal Character and limitation of British Power upon the Gold Coast, by 
Fairfield, 19.iii.1874. C0/806/9 p.22.
2. 3 Hansard, ccxix, cols. 157-168.
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cause for self-congratulation at the end of year. Unbodied in secret instructions
to the governor on 20 and 21 August, they have caused more than one historian to
say that Britain "annexed" the Protectorate.^
Firstly, although no new territory was annexed, the Legislative Council of
the new Gold Coast Colony (i.e. Iagos and the Gold Coast forts) was empowered
2
to legislate for the Protectorate. The Queen was proclaimed the sole authority
in the Gold Coast. The local government, enlarged to the full crown colony
administration, instead of confining itself to .judicial and police functions as
before, would comprehend civil .jurisdiction, health, education, roads, economic
development and the regulation of social life. It would be more correct to say
therefore that the Protectorate was 'annexed administratively* to the Colony.
Secondly, domestic slavery was formally abolished. Although Carnarvon told
Parliament in May that emancipation was impossible, the House of Commons was not
3satisfied and Northcote predicted a "field day" in the House on 29 June, when 
the Hon. Evelyn Ashley, Liberal member for Poole and son of Lord Shaftesbury the 
factory reformer, moved a resolution calling for a firm announcement by the 
government that they would stop slavery on the Gold Coast. The Cabinet met to 
prepare itself for the test on 27 June, and it required all Disraeli's skill in 
the debate to prevent a vote. Ashley pointed to the hypocrisy of the Government's 
position, and claimed that the Protectorate was not annexed simply because they 
were shirking the slavery problem. If the Russians at Khiva and the British at 
Zanzibar put pressure on the local rulers to abolish slavery, how could Britain 
tolerate it on the Gold Coast? Goschen, the former Liberal First Lord, said they 
should rebut the charges of foreigners who said that Britain only abolished 
slavery where it suited her interest. The Prime Minister only persuaded Ashley
1. ” ' 1 "G7-260. J.P.Fage, An Introduction to the History of West
2. Order in Council, 6.viii*1874. Copy in C0/806/l9 p.6. 
3* Northcote to Carnarvon 27.vi. 1874. PRO.30/6/7 p. 23.
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to withdraw his resolution by assuring the House that he for his part hoped that 
slavery would soon be abolished,^
Disraeli was true to his word. It cannot be directly proved from the records 
that he made Carnarvon act in the matter, but on 21 August Governor Strahan was 
told that since the Fante had done little to save themselves in the Ashanti war
m
the Queen was "entitled to require of them a greater degree of deference and
2conformity to the known desires of herself and her people than formerly" •
Carnarvon suggested that the Governor should request the kings and chiefs to
cease importing slaves, draw up rules governing the relations of masters and
slaves, emancipate the badly treated doncos, i.e. foreign slaves, at once on
compensation, and sometime soon to declare all children to be free. Once again
Carnarvon's approach was tentative; he ordered the governor to inquire and report.
Privately he told him to keep it secret, and he hoped that compensation could be
3
avoided as the revenue would be needed for development.
4
But Carnarvon had not bargained on his man. It was Governor George Strahan 
who urged abrupt measures against domestic slavery, so providing the Conservatives 
with an unexpected political windfall, and causing a significant change in African 
society on the Gold Coast. Strahan took only nine days to answer Carnarvon’s 
despatch; he recommended the immediate prohibition of all slave dealing, the 
declaration of freedom for all imported slaves and children, an* the non-recognitioi
c
in the Courts of any rights over personal liberty. In short Strahan proposed the
1* 3 Hansard, ccxx, cols. 607-641.
2. Carnarvon to Strahan 21.viii.1874. Secret. C0/806/l9 p.8.
3. Carnarvon to Strahan 3*ix.l874. Private & Confid. (copy). PR0.3o/6/24 P. 12.
4. Captain George C.Strahan Joined the R.A. in 1857. He was A.D.C. to Gladstone 
when he was High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, 1859, and in Feb. of that 
year he became A.D.C. to Sir Henry Storks, Gladstone's successor, who became 
Gov. of Malta in 1864. Strahan vent to Malta with him and became Chief Sec. 
of Malta 1868-69. He was Colonial Sec, Bahamas, 1869 and Acting-Cov. 1871-73. 
Administrator of Iagos 1873 until appointed Governor of the new Gold Coast 
Colony, June 1874. Gov. of the Windward Islands 1876.
5. Strahan to Carnarvon 19.ix.1874. Secret. G.C. No. 60. CO/806/23.
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ending by Royal Proclamation of slavery as a legal status on the Cold Coast*
Downing Street was taken by surprise, Fairfield being enthusiastic, but Herbert 
cautious. Yet it was not a hasty proposal. Already since 25 June, when he 
arrived on the Gold Coast, Strahan had faced the slavery question. Vhen African 
chiefs appealed to him to recover runaways he made it quite clear that slavery 
was repugnant to the British Government, that he never wished to hear the word 
slave mentioned. The local officials had supported him in this, so in part the 
governor had already been preparing the Gold Coast African for emancipation.
Before the Ashanti Kingdom disintegrated and removed the threat to the Protectorate, 
and while British prestige, gained in the war, lasted, Strahan urged that complete 
abolition was both necessary and possible. As Harley had said, the coastal 
Africans were already sufficiently compensated by being rescued from Ashanti 
slavery. Strahan was quite aware of the dangers in so sweeping a change to the 
African social system; poverty might afflict elderly slaves taken fro© the support 
of their masters, enforcement might become necessary, and probably the idlest 
slaves would demand freedom first and then might form marauding bands. On the 
other hand it was expected that many slaves would elect to stay with their masters 
and emancipation would thus be gradual. In fact, if Carnarvon approved, the 
governor had already called the chiefs to meet him, on 16 October 1874 from the 
west, and on 5 November from the east. To Captain Strahan it was a gamble worth 
taking.^ *
Carnarvon agreed that the stakes were worth playing for. Receiving Strahan's 
despatch on 15 October he lost no time in making up his mind and two days later, 
in the same letter in which he announced the annexation of Fi^ i, h® sought 
Disraeli's permission to take military precautions on the Gold Coast in case
1. Strahan to Carnarvon 20.ix. 1874. Private. PRO.30/6/24 p. 15.
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trouble attended the announcement of abolition.^ Disraeli had complete
confidence in Carnarvon at this stage, and Carnarvon had a remarkable trust in
Captain Strahan. Leaving the final decisions to the governor, he only urged
him not to risk a failure which would dash Britain’s newly won prestige. If the
conferences with the chiefs succeeded, the governor was authorised to proclaim
the immediate prohibition of slave dealing. The timing or the actual abolition
ordinance was left to Strahan’s discretion, Naval support was promised and a
wing of the West India Regiment was retained at the Gold Coast; re-inforcements
2
were held at Sierra Leone. Having passed the real responsibility to Strahan,
the Government proceeded to congratulate itself on the risks it had incurred.
"It is a masterly, indeed admirable performance", wrote Disraeli, "your conduct
3
of your office cannot be too highly praised".
Strahan's conferences with the chiefs were successful and the Proclamations 
were issued without incident. Therefore, although the mild programme announced 
in Nay was no panacea, the gamble of October was regarded in England as a great 
success. One newspaper claimed that such statesmanship had , not been seen in the 
Colonial Office since Earl Grey, that Carnarvon's colonial policy was "spirited
A
and splendid". This was less than .justice to Captain Strahan, whose boldness
gave Disraeli's cautious government the credit of the mafjor reform on the Gold
Coast. Although the governor's action did not end domestic slavery, which still
existed in 1915, when Claridge wrote, it tended to end the internal slave trade
5
and caused domestic slaves to be better treated.*
The. changes of 1874 - the formal abolition of slavery and the inclusion of
1. Carnarvon to Disraeli 17.x.1874. (copy) Carnarvon Papers, PRO.30/6/11 p. 26.
2. Ibid. Carnarvon to Srahan 22.x. 1874. Private (copy) FRO.30/6/24 p. 16.
3. Disraeli to Carnarvon ?6.x.l874. Fardinge, Life of Carnarvon. II, p.79.
4. Northern Echo. 6.1.1875# clipping in HlO.30/6/47 p. 174.
5. Claridge, Cold Coast and Ashanti. II, 183-4.
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the Protectorate in the sphere of the Gold, Coast Colony's laws - did not really
amount to the ’annexation' of the Protectorate, for the assumption of British
sovereignty did not take place until 1901, when Ashanti was also annexed. But
though sovereignty was not taken in 1874, the Crown was made the sole authority
and thus for many purposes Colony and Protectorate were treated as one, and the
general impression was gained that Britain had 'taken over' in the Protectorate.
A missionary wrote: "The Cold Coast is now a Colony and not a Protectorate and
already the more decisive measures of British rule are making themselves felt".^
The way was paved for the eventual inclusion of the Protectorate within the British
dominions, and the Colonial Office admitted, "we are now, particularly in the
Gold Coast, committed to a policy of development and improvement, a policy of
real and earnest efforts to raise the natives of our settlements from the slough
of ignorance and barbarism... The agents of this policy must be among other things,
2
roads and schools...."
In practice this fine sounding policy was slow to be implemented, and in part 
this was because of the British Government's reluctance to go beyond the modest 
changes of 1874. Need for revenue, however, in the new Gold Coast-Lagos colony 
(and also in Sierra Leone) caused the local officials to try the policy of 
'custom house imperialism', and for this reason the Gambia Exchange was revived 
between 1874 and 1876. But Carnarvon was reluctant to face parliamentary oppositio 
opposition and the matter was dropped.
French eagerness to obtain the Gambia had in no way slackened and on 11 April
1874 the French Ambassador approached lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, who
3told him the matter would be considered. The Foreign -Office was quite willing
1. Rev. Penrose to Gen.Secs. 26.iv.1875. Meth. Miss. Soc. Gold Coast Incoming 
1875-76 file.
2. Kin. by Hemming 14.x. 1875 on Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Carnarvon 13.x.
1875. CO/87/106.
3. F0. to CO. 27.iv.1874. C0/87/107.
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to let the matter proceed, but they decided the Colonial Office should decide 
as it would "depend entirely* on the future policy on the Gold Coastthus a 
delay occurred while Carnarvon made up his mind what to do about the Protectorate. 
In this way the West Coast of Africa was, momentarily after the Ashanti war, 
looked at as a whole.
By the end of 1874 the Colonial Office had decided that the Gambia exchange 
would enable them to solve many of their outstanding problems, 'Hie Sierra Leone 
Government was still worried about the French post at Benty on the Mellacourie 
and wanted to extend the sphere of the colonial customs for revenue purposes.
The Gold Coast Government wanted to stop trade, especially in arms, getting to 
Ashanti from Grand Bassam and Assini, and it decided also that the territory 
between Lagoa and the Gold Coast should be brought under British influence.
Glover’s plans for annexing Porto Novo were revived; Fairfield said it would
2
enable Lagos to control the Egba trade and Herbert said it was a "tempting policy",
Carnarvon therefore told Derby that if the exchange was revived and the French
3
gave up their claims South of the River Dembia in return for the Gambia there
would be no bar to a modest expansion of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast for 
4
fiscal purposes, Derby agreed, and although he knew the loss of the Gambia would
be unpopular he said "after Fiji & the Gold Coast we are not likely to be
5
reproached with a policy of colonial surrender".
On 5 March 1875 the Colonial Office made the definite proposal that the
French should give up claims between the Rio Pongo and the River Benin,^ and this
7
was accepted by the Cabinet on 17 April. Derby informed the French Ambassador
1. Memo, by Wyld. 20.iv.1874. F0/27/2226.
2. Mins, by Fairfield & Herbert 25.viii.1874 on Banners to Carnarvon 20.viii.1874
co/147/30.
3. See above pp. 65-70 and maps on pp. +£ + t*7.
4. Carnarvon to Derby 12.xii.1874. (copy). FRO.30/6/8 p. 61.
5. Ibid. p. 64. Derby to Carnarvon 16.xii.1874.
6. CO. to FO. 5-iii*1875. FO/27/2226. Carnarvon to Disraeli 13.iv.1875. Disraeli 
Papers, XII.
7. Min. by Herbert 21.iv. 1875 on FO. to CO. ll.iii.1875. C0/87/l08.
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on 30 April 1875 (a year after the matter had b^en raised) that the British
Government was now prepared to negotiate; but the Foreign Office did not want to
appear too eager. ^ In May Vylde thought that the British sphere should be
extended to include the Niger Delta;"though HM Govt, have no intention of occupying
any portion of the banks of that river" they did not want them to come under the 
2
French, The proposal which was put to the French Government on 23 July 1875 was
for Britain to give up claims North of the Rio Pongo, and for France to surrender
3
claims between the Pongo and the Gaboon. The French Ambassador told Carnarvon
on 27 July that his Government had agreed, and that as the French Assembly was
4
about to rise the matter was published in France. But Disraeli did not want to
risk opposition in Parliament and, against Carnarvon’s advice, the matter was
'5
postponed until the next session of Parliament.
This delay enabled the oppositon in both countries to mobilise. 'Prom August 
1875 to February 1876 the Colonial Office was given evidence of growing opposition, 
from the Gambia merchants, the missionaries, and the Royal Colonial Institute.
On 2 February 1876 Carnarvon saw the newly formed Gambia Committee, and he also
learnt that French officers had been seen at Porto Novo and that it was rumoured
that the King of Porto Novo wished for the French protectorate to be revived.
The Colonial Office staff was eager to exclude the French from the regions 
South of the Pongo as part of the Gold Coast policy. The Ashanti war had brought 
embarrassing publicity and public surprise that so little had been done to develop
1. Min. by Tenterden 29.iv.lB75 ft FO. to Cavard 30.iv.1875.(draft). F>/27/2226.
2. FO. to CO. 15.v.1875. CO/87/108.
3. FO. to Fr. Aabass. 23.viii.1875 (draft). FO/27/2226. The Rio Pongo rather
than the Dembia was suggested by Sir Arthur Kennedy, who said it would be more'
in keeping with the divisions of the African communities.
4. Carnarvon to Disraeli 28.vii.1875. (copy). PR0,30/6/ll. p. 81.
5. Carnarvon to Disraeli 5.viii.l875. Disraeli Papers, XII; "I was anxious if it 
had been practicable to settle it".
6. Manchester Chamber of Commerce to CO* 13.x.1875. C0/87/l08. R.Colonial
Institute to FO. 12.i.1876. F0/27/2227. Gambia missionaries to Gen. Secs.
29.i.1876. Math. Miss. Soc. Gambia Incoming 1868-76 file.
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the West African settlements. Now,said Hemming, an attempt would be made at
development, and the opposition of a few Gambia merchants should not be allowed
to prevent it. Armed with Hemraings memorandum Carnarvon announced the proposal
to the House of Lords on 17 February 1876, when he said the exchange would involve
2
Britain's gaining exclusive rights in the mouth of the Niger.
When he made this speech he was not aware that on 11 February 1876 the
French Ambassador had handed a 'note verbale' asking for certain clarifications
of the British proposal. While the British proposal had envisaged the area North
of the Rio Pongo being left to "1*influence franchise", the area to the South
would be reserved for "1'action de 1'AngleterreH. This was probably a translation
error, but the French said they were prepared to rive up their posts and claims
between the Pongo and the Gaboon and would recognise British .jurisdiction and
influence; however if it was intended that large new areas would shortly be taken
3
under British 'control', further explanations would be required. Derby thought
the British proposal was unambiguous and for some reason the Note was not sent to
the Colonial Office. So Carnarvon's speech disturbed certain French circles, and
shortly after a letter reached the Colonial Office in which a Marseilles merchant,
referring to the speech, said France would never give up her claims at Wyda,
Cotonou and Porto Novo. It was only after receiving this that the Colonial Office
inquired if the French had changed their view, and the Foreign Office forwarded
4the 'note verbale'.
5
"A wonderful mess", was the Colonial Office verdict; they were greatly annoyed 
.with the Foreign Office, who they suggested should find out if the French had
1. Min. by Hemming 14.x.1875 on Manchester Chamber of Commerce letter cited.
2. 3 Hansard, ccvii, cols. 375-384.
3. French Note, . 11.ii.1876. FC/27/227
4. Marseilles merchant to J.F.Hutton, Manchester 21.ii.1876 in CO. to FO. 29.ii.
1876. FO/27/2227.
5. Min. hy Keade 2.iii.l876 on FO. to CO. 1.ill.1876. C0/87/109.
3 U
changed their views forthwith. The result was a French Note on 8 March 1876.
The French Government still agreed to the exchange but sought assurances to
allay the fears of the Marseilles merchants, who feared that French trade would
be exluded if Britain took over the entire coast.^ This cannot be read as a
rejection of the British proposal, but Fairfield’s first reaction was: "This is
2
the end of the matter" ♦ Meade was most reluctant to end the negotiations and 
believed that the French would still agree, but Herbert said they would have to 
make it clear that the Gold Coast Government wished to gain the territory between 
the Gold Coast and Lagos. Carnarvon stood firm on this and insisted that they 
could not go to Parliament to cede the Gambia for anything less.
After two years dilatoriness and a last minute muddle the Gambia exchange 
question was allowed to lapse again, and the best chance of adopting the policy
4
of expanding the Gold Coast customs was lost. Disraeli blamed Carnarvon. Derby
said "the Col. Off. was in a hurry to begin this negotiation, and in a hurry to 
5
break it off". Carnarvon believed the fault lay with the Foreign Office for
not sending him the 11 February note; it was, he said, "solely an error of the
FO... Had this paper been forwarded to the CO. none of the present differences
6could have arisen". It would be more correct to say that the Gambia pressure 
groups and rumour mongers successfully frightened the Colonial Office into not 
going to Parliament without a considerable bargain for the Gambia.
Thus a passive policy prevailed for a time in Nest Africa. One of the Gold 
Coast missionaries began to "wonder at the undecided policy df the Government in
1. Text enclosed in TO. to CO. 10.iii.1876. CO/87/l09.
2. Ibid. Min. by Fairfield 10.iii.1876, but crossed out.
•5. CO. to TO. 15.iii.1876. TO/27/2227.
4. Disraeli to Lady Bradford 26.iv.1876. Buckle, Disraeli, V, p. 475.
5. flin. by Derby on Memo, by C.B.Robertson 21.iv.1876. CO/27/2227.
6. Min. by Carnarvon 14.V.1876 on FO. to CO. 8.V.1876. CO/87/lOO, which goes 
on, "But this cannot & ought not to be stated".
not taking all the Coast", but it was political failure at home which 
hampered the Colonial Office and the local government, which, in spite of 
subsequent attempts to revive the exchange, would never gain the coastline 
between the Gold Coast and Lagos.
The appointment of the first Residents in the Malay States. 1874-75*
Though the news of Kolseley's entry into Kumasi did not reach London until
after Kimberley left office, a report of Clarke’s Pangkor conference, where a
start was made in settling the dissensions of the Malay States, arrived on 24 
2
January, the day on which Gladstone announced the dissolution of Parliament.
Although Clarke had be-mn to apply the policy of resident advisers which had
been suggested by Kimberley, the final approval had to await the new government.
Kimberley telegraphed that no permanent Residents could be appointed until the
3
matter had been considered in London. As the full details of Clarke’s policy
in Malaya did not arrive until the end of March 1874, the Colonial Office did not
consider Malaya until after their major researches into the Gold Coast settlement.
Although the aftermath of the Ashanti war was treated with some urgency, Malay
affairs received somewhat leisurely treatment in 1874.
In part this was because of Sir Andrew Clarke’s methods. Sent out to inquire
and report, he was not a man to await approval before he acted. "My own experience
of the use of Reports does not tend to a high appreciation of their practical
4
value", he once wrote. "To take responsibility, to act first and always to act, 
to write about it afterwards", was his philosophy and these methods were sometimes
1. Rev. Milum to Gen. Secs. Lagos, 18.iv. 1876. Keth. Miss. Soc, Incoming Gold 
Coast 1875-76 file.
2. Clarke to Kimberley 23.i.1874 (Tg). CO/273/75.
3. Ibid. Kimberley to Clarke 24.i.1874* (draft tg).
4. A.Clarke, "The Straits Settlements”, British Rnpire Series. I, p. 450.
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a shock to civil servants.* Fully conscious that his report, which did not
reach London until 30 March 1874 represented a fait accompli far in excess of
his instructions, he was confident in his policy. Possibly since his Gold Coast
solution had been rejected in favour of those of a brilliant commander fourteen
years his junior, Clarke wished to shine in walaya. "I feel T have done a good
stroke”, he had written to his friend Hugh Childers, First Lord of the Admiralty
from 1868 to 1872, "in short, all the people here say that nothing has been done
2
so complete and equal to it since Raffles*s timeH,
After his arrival at Singapore on 3 November 1873, with Kimberley's authority
to investigate and report on suitable forms of intervention, Clarke had very soon
realised the urgency of his problem, especially in Perak. Although the Mantri's
forces and the R.N. flotilla had had some limited success in the Larut River, the
marauders grew bolder off the Perak coast. In the first two weeks of November
1873 junks were attacked almost daily off the bindings, and even off the South
coast of Penang. On 22 November, Anson, the Liuet-Govemor, posted a Sergeant
and 15 Police at the Dindings, but by 13' December the situation was so critical
3
that Anson warned Singapore by telegram. 'That evening, when w.R.M.Read dined
at Government House, the governor discussed Perak with this guest.
Clarke had had a month the consider the problem and his method of Intervention,
4
and he had discussed it with Abu-Bakar, the Maharaja of Johore. Now Read had 
some advice to offer. Read's own financial interests had been more with Selangor,
vjhere in 1866 he had attempted to collect the Klang revenues on a commission
5basis with Tan Kira Ching, and currently he was involved in the Selangor Tin 
venture. But in October 1873 Raja Muda 'Abdu'llah of Perak, vhosea fortunes were
1. Sir G.S.Clarke in Vetch, Life of Clarke, pp. vii xii.
2. Ibid. p. 154.
3. A.Skinner, 'Precis on Perak Affairs', 10.i.1874. CO/809/l p. 147.
4. Cowan, Origins, p. 225.
5. Winstedt, Selangor, p. 19.
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then at their lowest ebb, had visited Singapore and sought Kim Ching's and
Read's help. Read had advised 'Abdu'llah to await the new governor. Kim Ching,
finding the Raja Muda a rather expensive and scandalous quest, sent him away -
but net before receiving a promise that if he succeeded in getting 'Abdu'llah
appointed Sultan he would be granted the revenue farm of larut for ten years.*
If Read was in partnership with Kim Ching, as he had been in the past, in this
venture, it would have given him a significant interest in 'Abdu'llah's case.
Read now asked Governor Clarke if he intended to act quickly in Perak. "I
am ready at a moment's notice if I can get the key to the door", Clarke is said
to have replied; "Give me a fortnight", returned Read, "and I will get it for
you". Read then promptly (according to his own account - others say it was
Kim Ching) drafted a letter from 'Abdu'llah to the governor asking Clarke to act
as 'umpire' in the succession dispute, requesting the protection of the British
flag, and for the appointment of an officer to 'assist and advise* in the
government of Perak. A copy of the letter, signed by 'Abdu'llah, reached
3
Singapore on 9 January 1874.
But Clarke had not waited for Read's key. Piracy did not subside in 
December and the Police at the Dindings said it wss getting worse. On 2 January 
1874 a Police Sergeant was fired upon in Province Wellesley, near the Perak 
border. Events seemed to show that of the four problems in Perak -the succession, 
the Mantri's position in Larut, the Chinese war in Tarut, and piracy on the coast- 
the fourth was the most urgent. But to remove the motive for it the Chinese war 
in Larut would have to stop, therefore Clarke sent W.A.Pickering, the Chinese 
Interpreter, and an important member of the Straits Government, to try to make
1. Enquiry as to the Complicity of Chiefs in the Perak Outrages. 'Precis of 
Evidence' by C.B.Plunket, l.xii.1876. p. 3. A copy enclosed, along with the 
Mss. evidence, in Jervois to Carnarvon 14.xii.1876. CO/273/86.
2. W.H.M.Read, Play ft Politics. Reminiscences of Malaya. By an Old Resident (l90l) 
P. 25.
3. Ibid. pp. 25-26. Precis of Evidence,(p.3) ascribes this to Kim Ching.
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terms with the Chinese Headmen} Arriving at Penang on 3 January 1874 he met the 
Ghee Hin leaders next day and found them eager for neacej they agreed to 
arbitration by the governor,and only requested that Capt. Speedy's attacks on 
behalf of the Kantri should be stopped and that provisions be sent to their 2000 
men in Larut.^
Clarke now had his key and he acted quickly. On 7 January, in a telegram to 
Anson, he ordered a conference at the Island of Pangkor for 14 January. He sent 
Swettenham to Speedy and the Mantri to get a cease-fire, and Major McNair and 
Capt. Dunlop were sent to Perak to see that the pirates surrendered their boats 
at Pangkor, to gather information about the Perak succession problem and the 
Mantri*s position, and to take the Malay chiefs to Pangkor. 'Abdu'llah's letter
3
inspired by Read arrived on 9 January, and two days later Clarke left for
4
Pangkor with Thomas Braddell, and Allan Skinner. Negotiations began on 15 
January and five days later agreements were reached with both Chinese and Malays.
So while Wolseley slowly invaded Ashanti, Clarke made quick work in Perak.
The Chinese settlement was straightforward and satisfactory. Pickering won the 
confidence of the Ghee Hin Headmen who were heartily sick of their war. Bringing 
them to Pangkor on 13 January, he also brought some Hai San leaders who, recently 
victorious, were more uncertain about the proceedings. Nevertheless on 15 January, 
after the Ghee Hins had surrendered their boats, both factions made peace. They 
had no confidence in the Malay rulers, and they even hoped that Britain would 
take the country over completely. By agreements signed on 20 January both sides
would disarm, destroy their stockades and allow a free return to the mines, where
1. William Alexander Pickering lived in Formosa, 1863-70, where he helped the TT.S. 
Government in negotiations with the inhabitants in the South of the Island. 
Appointed Chinese Interpreter to the Straits Government in 1871.
2. Pickering to Governor 8.i. 1874. C0/809/l p. 176.
3. See Cowan. (Origins, p. 230 fn. 22) who discusses differences between Read's 
version and the text signed by 'Abdu'llah.
4. Inspector of Schools in the Straits Government.
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a British commission would supervise the settlement of claims. 'T’he headmen
agreed to allow a British Resident to regulate water supplies for the mines, and
the Sultan of Perak's officers to govern in larut. Finally, the Headmen pledged
surety of ^ 50,000 to keep the peace.^ Dunlop, Swettenham and Pickering were
sent as commissioners to Larut immediately, and Capt. Speedy, the Mantri's private
commander,was appointed provisionally as Assistant-Resident in Larut. The
agreement worked satisfactorily, for after two months hesitation the Chinese
flocked back to Larut. A few Kai Sans who tried to make trouble in July 1874
were deported by the Mantri; by the beginning of 1875 Larut's wartime population
of 4,000 had risen to 33,000, and the towns of Taiping and Kamunting had thriving
2
populations of 4,000 and 5,000 respectively. The eagerness of the Chinese
probably had more to do with this than Speedy's efforts, but the Pangkor settlement
#
in Larut was a success. The Chinese view of the new regime is aptly summed up
in the words which an English traveller heard a few years later: "Empress good-
3
coolie get money; Keep it".
The settlement in Perak proper was more doubtful and caused a disaster. Vhen 
he went to Pangkor Clarke was still confused over the rivalry of Raja Muda 
'Abdu'llah and Sultan Ismail and the status of the Mantri in larut. Allan 
Skinner did his best to find out, but was not able to do much better at un­
ravelling the details of Ismail's election to the Sultanate in 1871 than Irving 
had done in 1872. Irving's report, only the gist of which ever reached London 
until 1874, was favourable to 'Abdu'llah and gave a bad impression of Ismail, 
who Irving had not met. On the other hand both George Campbell and Col. Anson 
at Penang had been biased towards the Mantri, Ismail's chief supporter, and 
unfavourable to 'Andu'llah, and it was this trend which had culminated in the
1. CO/809/l pp. 105-6.
2. Speedy*s first annual report in Clark© to Carnarvon 6.iv.l875. CO/BO9/5 p.07.
3. I.L.Bird, Colden Chersonese (1883) p. 255*
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recognition of the Mantri by Sir Harry Ord in August 1873.^ The impression Clarke
had gained by January 1874# evident in his instructions to Dunlop and McNair, was
that ’Abdu'llah was de jure Sultan and that Ismail reigned de facto. He had heard
that the former was an opium addict and was unpopular with the chiefs because of
his support for the Chee Hin Chinese, and that the latter had powerful support
in the Mantri, the Laksamana, and the up-river chiefs. McNair and Dunlop could
not sort the matter out and merely reported that the Mantri had assumed an
2independent position. Clarke had already realised he might have to confirm 
this. It looks, then, as if Clarke went to Pangkor hoping to confirm Ismail 
as Sultan and regularise the Mantri's position in Larut. ^one of the investigators
- Irving, Skinner, McNair or Dunlop - seemed to have noticed Raja Tusuf or the
35
fact that 'Abdu'llah had appointed him his Ratja Muda.
The Pangkor conference completely reversed Clarke's view. Tie was surprised
A
to find 'Abdu'llah **a man of considerable intelligence", and all the chiefs 
present, except the Mantri, seemd to favour him, whereas the Mantri made a poor 
showing. The latter was reluctant to disarm his Fai San allies, even after the 
Ghee Hins had surrendered their boats, and he was suspected of harbouring 
ambitions to become Sultan himself. He denied this, but he received short shrift 
from Clarke, v/ho blamed his vacillations for the Larut troubles. 'Abdu'llah on 
the other hand was conciliatory to the Mantri; he agreed to confirm his authority 
in Larut if he received in return a written recognition as Sultan. He requested 
a British officer to assist in the government of frmit, as he had already requested 
one for Perak. One by one the chiefs present said they would support 'Abdu'llah 
as Sultan; only the Mantri hedged. It was probably he who complained to Anson
1. Cowan.(Origins. p.234, fn.30) contends that Clarke was aware of this, hut 
disagreed with the action.
2 , Report 1 4 . i . 1874 . C 0 /8 0 9 /l  p.9 9 . 3 .  See above pp. X01-2.0 2 ,
4. Clarke to Kimberley 26.i.1874. 00/273/75.
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soon after and to Birch and Swettenha® in April 1874, when he said that with
'Abdu'llah facing him, and Yusuf and Ismail far off, there had b«en little real
choice at Pangkor.^ Clarke certainly gained the impression that he could regard
2
Ismail's election in 1871 as a temporary expedient.
The Pangkor Engagement, signed 20 January 1874 recognised Raja Kuda 'Abdu'llah 
as Sultan of Perak and Ismail was allowed to retain the title of 'Sultan-Wuda* and 
a pension; Ismail's nominations to the great offices of Perak were confirmed, as 
were the Mantri's powers in Larut. For the future government of perak the idea 
of resident advisers, which had been mooted since the Anson Committee in 1871^  was 
finally to be tried. A British Resident's advice would be asked and acted upon 
in all matters except Malay religion and custom; an Assistant-Resident (Speedy1 
would advise the Mantri in Larut. The salaries of these officers would be a first
charge of the Perak revenues, a civil list would provide allowances for the Sultan, 
Bendahara and Mantri, and the revenues would be collected and regulated by the 
Resident. Finally, to help in the suppression of piracy two contentious
3
territorial matters were settled by a stroke of the pen. The Bindings controversy
was ended with the cession to the Crown of* the mainland area of creeks, and the
4
South bank of the Krean River was also annexed for the same reason. Thus two 
small areas where pirates took refuge were made British territory, and the first 
British Resident in Malaya was formally accepted.
After lesn than three veeks Clarke turned to Selangor. "he urgency of the 
piracy problem lay at the hack of the Pangkor conference? in the same way piracy 
in Selangor made intervention urgent again and provided the excuse for it, for 
piracy ha'i grown to an extent which threatened the security of Malacca's trade.
1. Cowan, Swettenham's Perak Journals, p. 62.
2. Braddell's account dated. 28.i.1874. C0/809/l pp. 191-8.
3. Bee above p. 4. Text in CO/809/l pp. 183-4.
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Pirates, apparently from the Jugra River, attacked the Cape Rachado lighthouse 
in January 1874. There had also been a notorious case of piracy in the Jugra 
in November 1873. Only one from the crew and passengers of a junk had escaped 
with his life, but he was able to identify nine of the perpetrators in Malacca, 
who were imprisoned. This gave Clarke his key to Selangor. Determined to 
suppress piracy he arranged to meet Admiral Shadwell, of the China Station, on 
6 February.
Clarke's plan was to make a show of force before Sultan Abdul-Samad of
Selangor, to deliver the Jugra pirates for punishment, and thmmake the Sultan
suppress piracy under the 1826 Treaty. He left Singapore with McNair and Braddell
on 6 February; while warships blockaded the mouths of the Jungra and the Kiarig,
and J.G.Davidson brought his friend the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din along behind, Clarke
set out for Langat with the formidable support of four raen-of-war. These he left
out of sight while he breakfasted under the muzzles of the Sultan's main fort on
8 February. Several invitatiorsfailed to bring out the Sultan whose sons,
Braddell claimed, feared the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din was about to be made Sultan*;
more probably the force behind had not gone unobserved. FLnally Braddell landed
quietly, sauntered round the town, slipped the Sultan's sentries, and, finding
2
the Sultar; persuaded him to go on board. Next day the governor's entourage 
landed and conferred with Abdul-Samad in the Palace. After making sure that the 
Sultan bore no ill-will towards 'Zia'u'd-din the goverhor sent for the Tengku.
It wa3 Clarke's first sight of him, and the governor seems to have been impressed 
with the effect of the dramatic little encounter on the Sultan, who greeted him 
cheerfully, and then proceeded to explain the Tengku's position in Selangor.
Clarke now felt he had the measure of the .Selangor chiefs. Sultan Abdul-Samad
1. Braddell's Selangor report, 18.ii.1874. C0/R09/l p. 214.
2. Clarke to Childers 11.ii.1874, quoted in Vetch, L fe of Clarke, po. 1S7-R.
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although an opium smoker, appeared quite able to manage affairs hut he was lazy
and never interfered if he was left to enjoy himself. "A rather careless heathen
philosopher", Braddell called him, but one careful enough to hoard $100,000*8
worth of tin. Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din impressed Clarke's party; " a very good fellow..
1I was much taken with him", wrote the A.D.C. Between these two stood the Sultan's 
sons who lived at Langat; Raja Yacob, "a lawless, cruel chief", who was suspected 
of being implicated in the Jugra piracy; Raja Kahar, who Braddell said was even 
worse, but who had Ha certain air of bonhommie", and the Raja Musa, a religious 
man, acquainted with Singapore life, who seemed out of place at tangat, and whom 
Braddell noted as possible material for the succession. Clarke was not put off 
by the Sultan's sons, and on 10 February he got down to business.
The Jugra pirates had murdered some British subjects so the Sultan was 
requested to try them. He agreed and appointed 'Zia'u'd-din for the task. Clarke 
also told the Sultan he must put a atop to piracy and that the British Government 
would assist with warships. Thus Abdul-Samad could no longer brush off the 
piracies with "Oh! those are the affairs of the boys"; when he told his sons to 
listen to Clarke's words the governor was heard in silence. The Sultan had little 
option but to accept the offer. Three men-of-war were left blockading the Jugra, 
another was posted at Langat until the trial was over;, the Sultan was also 
informed of his son Yacob's suspected complicity.
2
After a conference quite as swift as Pangkor, Clarke left Selangor on 12
February. Davidson and McNair remained to ensure that the pirates got a fair
trial. Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din pronounced them guilty on 15 February and execution
followed next day. The Jugra stockades were destroyed and $5,000 compensation
was asked. Finally to underline the new regime the Tengku toured Southern
3
Selangor with British warships.
1. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 160. 2. But with no document to show.
3. McNair & Davidson to Col. Sec. SS. 21.ii.1874. C0/809/l p. 222.
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There is no record of an equivalent to the Pangkor Engagement from the Langat
conference, but probably when the Sultan re-affirmed the Tengku ’Zia’u'd-din*8
position he agreed to a British officer as adviser. By May it was already known
that the Tengku's friend J.G.Davidson was to be the Resident.^ Tater Svettenham
was appointed Assistant-Resident with the particular duty of remaining with the
Sultan at Langat. The execution of the Jugra pirates made a deep impression as
2
the news spread around the rivers of Selangor. Therefore after less than three 
months in Singapore Clarke had, in two swift visits, laid the foundations of the 
so-called 'Resident system', and had made the first steps towards the achievment 
of peace and order in the Vest of the Malay Peninsula.
His reports reached London on 30 March 1874. He had admitted, when he sent
the outline of the Pangkor Engagement, that he had exceeded his instructions, but
3
his action had received a cautious approval frcra the Colonial Office. Vith the
detailed descriptions of the Pangkor and langat conferences he enclosed the
opinions of the Straits officials. Only one of them disagreed about the Residents;
Irving preferred an itinerant official. Braddell thought "the inate superiority
of the ordinary Englishman in his sense of honour and justice, is sufficient to
dominate the inferior character of the Malay",^although he was shortly to learn
that these qualities were not enough. James Birch, the Colonial Secretary who had
intervened in 1871, saw the issues in black and white: "complete annexation" or
"Protectorate, with a British Hesident" were the only alternatives and he supported 
5
the latter.
The matter was not treated urgently in the Colonial Office and Carnarvon only
1. Although Clarke did not report this home until the end of the year, it was known
in London in May. Stanley of Alderley to Carnarvon 10.v.1874. PR0.30/6/21.
2. Birch's Journal of visit to the Peninsula 31.iii.lB74. C0/809/l p. 265.
3. Mins. Cox (3rd) Herbert (^ th) and Carnarvon 6.iii.l874 on Clarke to Kimberley
26.i.1874. CO/273/75.
4. CO/8O9/1 p. 246. 5. Ibid. p. 247.
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stated an opinion after a motion of censure had been attempted in the House of 
Lords. The head of the Eastern Department, Charles Cox, who usually endorsed 
documents on the day of receipt, took a week to study the material before offering 
comment. He was impressed by Clarke's achievment, although he foresaw, 
prophetically, the dangers involved.
"It appears to me", he wrote on 6 April 1874, "tl*itSir A.C. deserves the 
greatest credit for having brought all these disturbing elements to agree 
to the proposed arrangement. I do not see why it is not to work well.
At the same time we must not keep out of sight that from some unforseen 
cause we may possibly be called upon to take steps to prevent some 
attempted violation of the Agreement, or to enforce an adherence to some 
of its provisions. I do not think it is likely so long as the Residents 
shall act^judiciously avoiding as much as possible interference in minor 
matters".
Herbert was equally pleased, and more optimistic:
"I do not think we shall be dangerously compromised in any way. Ve are 
now obliged to interfere frequently on the Coast to prevent piracy A 
as English enterprise makes its way into the interior we shall almost 
certainly have to follow it to redress outrages on Englishmen unless we 
adopt Sir A Clarke's preventative policy whicd^may be expected to give 
the best prospect of avoiding complications".
But not everybody was so pleased. On 19 May Lord Stanley of Alderley, a former
resident in the Straits, attempted to censure the Government in the House of 
3Lords. He did not think that Clarke had been long enough in the East to 
understand what he was doing. It was all a plot, he said, of the Singapore 
Government to enter into "equivocal and entangling engagements". It would lead 
to invasion and conquest of the whole Peninsula, possibly another campaign like 
the Ashanti war. The Residents had powers, he said (very truly), which would 
make them the virtual rulers of the States; moreover the very title 'Resident' 
was in Netherlands India akin to that of governor, and in British India it was 
associated with annexation. Later events were to prove Lord Stanley right, but 
he did not commend his case to the House either by his inaudibility, or by
1. Min. by Cox 6.iv.l874 on Clarke to Kimberley 24.ii.1874. CO/27^/75.
2. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 2.v.1874.
3. 3 Hansard, ccxix, cols. 467-473.
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producing an array of skeletons from the cupboard, TTe criticised the transfer
of the Straits from India to the Colonial Office in 1867, Ord*s building of
Government House in 1870, the Selangor Incident of 1871, and he repeated some
accusations made in 1873 that Ord had accepted valuable presents from Malay
rulers.^ " Carnarvon defended British intervention and the use of Residents;
Kimberley deplored Stanley’s sudden complaints about events which had happened
years before, and he pointed out that they could hardly ignore between thirty and
forty cases of murder by pirates* Two days later both Carnarvon and Kimberley
2
rose to defend Sir Harry Ord*
Stanley failed to get his way, but he probably forced Carnarvon to make some
preliminary decision as to the Malay States* On the day after the attempted
motion of censure the Secretary of State ordered a general approval of the Pangkor
3
and Langat conferences* A despatch was sent on 29 May, but in a private letter 
he cautioned Clarke:
HPeace and order, the revival of trade and the suppression of piracy must 
conduce the English interests: and I am certainlv not disposed to quarrel 
with an extension of English influence rightly and fairly developed.•• 
we are entering upon new ground with relations of a some’bat delicate 
nature. This history of the Indian ’Residents* is too recent and marked 
not to serve to throw light upon similar appointments in the Peninsula..* 
we become through them much more closely connected than heretofore with 
things and persons and political combinations that may easily lead us 
further than we now intend to go. This new phase therefore of colonial 
policy needs very careful watching - and 1 think more by those on the 
spot, where there is far greater power^of immediate control, than by 
the Secretary of State in London**.
Although Clarke had exceeded his instructions, he was now, along with a caution,
g’ven a wide local discretion. Carnarvon realised a major change or course had
been made, but he made it clear that it should be treated as an experiment.
1. It was thought in the CO. that Sir Benson Maxwell, former Chief Justice in
Singapore and a great opponent of Ord*s, was behind Lord Stanley.
2. 3 Hansard, ccxix, cols. 597-600.
3. Min. by Carnarvon 20.v.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 24.ii.1874* CO/273/75.
4. Carnarvon to Clarke 27.v.1874. Private, (copy)* PR0.30/6/40 p.2.
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While the Colonial Office trod thus cautiously, Clarke turned his attention
to the territory between Selangor and Malacca where trouble centred on the
Linggi River. The Linggi had not attraced quite as much attention as the Perak
and Selangor rivers in previous years, but the s^me elements for trouble -
Chinese miners and rival Malay rulers - vere present. Ord had encountered both
the rivalry of the Dato’Xlana and Dato’Bandar of Sungei Ujong after the latter
had harboured Raja Mahdi on his way back to Selangor in 1872, and the rivalry
of the Dato’Klana and the ruler of Rembau for the territory between the Rembau
and the Linggi above the fork. On his visit to Sungei Ujong Ord had probably
prevented the Selangor war from spreading.^
On 3 December 1872 the Dato'Klana had died and he was succeeded by his nephew,
who had been acting for him, Syid *Abdu'r*-Rahman, a chief of Sumatran descent
2
who was unpopular in Sungei Ujong. Put he was better known to the British
officials as he had often lived in Malacca, and in March 1873 when he was elected
3
Dato’Klana he was apparently ’recognised* by the Straits Government. Dato’Bandar
Tunggal appears to have regarded Dato’Klana ’Abdu'r-Rahman with particular
resentment, and as traffic on the Linggi was still interrupted by these internal
troubles in Sungei Ujong in 1874* Clarke determined to clear the river.
An agreement on the Linggi was signed on 21 April 1874 when the Dato’Klana of
4
Sungei Ujong and the Dato’Muda of Linggi visited Singapore. The new Dato’Klana 
bound himself to govern on principles of justice and equality, to protect the 
Linggi river traffic, to give up offenders who escaped from the Colony. The 
agreement also provided that Hthe Station, District or Settlement of Sempang 
as far as Pennatang Passir shall be placed under the control, order, and direction
1. See above p. nl- 2. Gullick, Sungei Udong. p. 34.
3. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. PR0.30/6/40 p.21. This was probably by the
Lieut-Gov. of Malacca, not by Ord. See Braddell Memo p. 29.
4. Ruler of the Bugis settlers from Riouw who left Rembau in the eighteenth 
century and received land near Bukit Tiga. Wilkinson, ’Sungei Ujong’, JSBRAS. 
No. 83 (1921) p. 139.
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of the British Government"In return for these obligations by the Dato'Klana 
and surety for $50,000 the "moral and material guarantee and projection of the
British Government" was granted to maintain the independence and security of
2
Sungei Ujong.
Clarke’s actual plans for the Linggi are obscure as the April agreement looks
much more like a mere paper pledge than the Pangkor Engagement or the I^ngat
3
conference; one critic said it was "like a bond gone mad"* Possibly it was
designed to sweeten the Dato’Klana before a crucial conference of all parties
concerned in the Linggi rivalries* The ruler of Rembau, or Dato'Perba, who had
recently been contending for power with a rival, had built a stockade on the
river at Bukit Tiga. He had also asked the Straits Government for recognition,
so Clarke saw on opportunity for getting rid of the stockade. The Dato’Bandar
was again threatening the Dato'Klana, so Clarke decided to follow the latter back
to the Linggi and hold a conference to pacify the river. Captain Shaw R.N., the
Lieut-Govemor of Malacca, held preliminary conversations in Malacca at the end
of April. He got the Dato'Klana of Sungei Ujong and the Dato’Perba of” Rembau
to agree to a conference with Clarke at the mouth of the Linggi on 2 May 1874. Tn
4
the meantime the Dato'Perba promised to destroy the Bukit Tiga stockade. About
the same time Shaw saw Dato'Bandar Tunggal, who promised not to interfere with the
5
Dato'Klana's new responsibilities on the Linggi.
Clarke arrived to unlock his third door to the Malay States on 2 May, attended 
by Braddell and Shaw and the usual force of warships. But this time the key did 
not turn smoothly. The Dato'Perba of Rembau neither destroyed his stockade nor 
came to the conference. As he pleaded sickness, a new venue, at Sempang, was
1. Winstedt, "The Negri Sembilan", JMPRA5* XII, Pt. 3, (1934) p. 71*
2. Ibid. loc. cit. Cf. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 165* Clarke alluded vaguely 
to this meeting in a private letter dated 23.iv.1874* PR0.30/6/40 p.l.
3. P.B.Maxwell, Our Malay Conquests fl878), P» 38.
4. Clarke to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. CO/809/l p* 257. , ■ *
5. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/4O p. 21.
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offered for 5 May; but still he refused. Therefore, as the Dato'Klana, who had
accepted responsibility for the safety of the river, pleaded his inability to
deal with the stockades, Clarke decided to give him active support. The British
party destroyed the stockades at Bukit Tiga and left the Dato'Klana to build
police posts on the river in this area. This had the desirable effect and a few
weeks later the Dato'Perba of Rembau went to Singapore to make his peace with the
governor.^ The Dato'Klana was thus left in charge of the Linggi River with the
moral support of the Straits Government.
That Clarke had failed to secure a third 'Pangkor' did not escape Carnarvon.
But when the Linggi report was received in the Colonial Office in July 1874 ;
it was approved and the lack of a concrete agreement caused no anxiety. "In the
present state of the country", wrote Carnarvon, "perhaps we may for a while at
2least dispense with the engagements wh. A.C: failed to secure". After this for
the remainder of 1874 there was little news from the Malay States. Clarke said
nothing about whom he was appointing as Residents, apart from Speedy in Taint.
But as Disraeli had placed complete confidence in Carnarvon in the Cold Coast and
Fiji matters, which had attracted much more publicity in England, Carnarvon had
no reason to hold back with the new Malay States policy. On 10 August 1874 he
sent the telegram authorising Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of Hew South
3
>.?ales, to annex Fiji. On 21 August he instructed Governor Strahan, of the new 
Gold Coast Colony, to inquire and report on a scheme for abolishing domestic 
slavery in the Protectorate. Ho one imagines that when Robert Meade, the Assistant 
Under-secretary, suggested on 29 August that they might write to Clarke on the 
general situation in the Malay States, Carnarvon was quite ready to give approval 
for the new policy in what he must have regarded as the least urgent o^ the three
1. Clarke to Carnarvon 29.vi.1874. Private, PRO.30/6/40 p. 3.
2. Min. by Carnarvon 20.vii.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 8.v.1874. 00^27^/75.
3. See below p. 3H-
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casesAccordingly authority for the provisional appointment of Residents in
2
Perak and Selangor was sent on 4 September 1874*
After this the Colonial Office had little to say on the subject* Clarke was
3told not to overwork hinself, and as he was appointed a member of the Viceroy 
of India’s Council early in 1875* final decisions as to the choice of Residents, 
and the investigation of Malay debt-slavery, were left to his successor, Sir 
William Jervois* However, while attention in London was diverted to moire pressing 
problems, events did not stand still in Malaya. Difficulties were encountered 
in Perak and armed intervention became necessary in Sungei TTjong.
When James V/.W.Birch and Prank Swettenham visited Perak in April 1874 they
discovered how ignorant they were about the succession conflict in Perak, and
how superficial had been the Pangkor Engagement* Birch had already applied for
the post of Resident in Perak, but he was not appointed until November 1874*
Ismail, Yusuf and the ’up-river' chiefs had been absent from the Pangkor conference
but even those who had attended were already dissatisfied at its results. One of
the chiefs - probably the Mantri or the Laksamana - had told Col* Anson shortly
4
after the conference that he did not really know what the governor intended.
The Laksamana and others held meetings in which they averred that the British
intended to take the whole of Perak, as they had the Dindings. In February
’Abdu'llah asked Mr. Dukes, a Penang lawyer, if the Dindings clause of the pangkor
Engagement could be rescinded, and the Mantri is said to have paid 12,000 to
another lawyer, Mr. B.C.Woods, to take the matter to Parliament and get the Pangkor
5
Engagement cancelled.
1. Mins, by Meade 29th, & Carnarvon 30.viii.1874 on Clarke to Carnarvon 27.vi.1874 
CO/273/76.
2. Carnarvon to Clarke 4.1x.l874. C0/809/l p. 266.
3. Swettenham, Footprints, p. 47: "Sir Andrew's whole time was devoted to Malay 
affairs”.
4. Anson, About Myself and Others, p. 322.
5* Precis of Evidence p. 4.
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6
Birch's April journey,through larut, over the pass the Kuala Kangsa and
down the Perak river, gave him a foretaste of troubles ahead. The whole question
of Yusuf was discovered, and Swettenham, puzzled that Irving and Skinner had
ignored him, was impressed by his intelligently expressed claims. More ominous
was the general impression abroad that Clarke had "appointed** 'Abdu'llah as
Sultan, for Clarke maintained that the chiefs had freely elected him.^ Ismail
still retained the Regalia and treated Birch discourteously. When Swettenham
went back in June to persuade Ismail and Yusuf to meet Clarke at Penang the
2
former Sultan refused. In fact in October 1874 Ismail, Yusuf and the Mantri
3
met Mr. Woods to arrange for a deputation to visit England. Therefore by the 
time Birch became Resident in November the Perak rulers had already determined 
to undermine the Pangkor Engagement, and although 'Abdu'llah had been warned by 
Braddell not to farm the Perak revenues with°¥^e governor's consent, he had 
already farmed the Customs to a Chinese for 26,000.
Birch faced a formidable, if not impossible task, but he tackled it with his 
customary zeal and haste. The Chinese was told that the Customs farm could not 
be recognised. After visiting 'Abdu'llah, Ismail and the Mantri he published the 
Pangkor Engagement by proclamation. So far as Birch was concerned the Malay 
customs of Perak were a hinderance to his plans and could be d-isregarded; after 
establishing his Residency at Banda Bahru early in 1875 he went ahead with plans 
to unify the revenues and the local courts. Impatient with the chiefs, he treated 
Sultan '.Abdu'llah with contempt. In fact there is evidence that Sir Andrew' Clarke 
was not altogether pleased with Birch's methods. He told Anson: "I am very much 
annoyed with Birch, and the head-over-heels way in which he does things: he and 
I will come to sorrow yet, if he does not mind. He has made a regular mull of the
1. Cowan, Swettenham*s Perak Journals, pp. 57-62. 2. Ibid. op. 7d-92.
3. Clarke to Carnarvon 4.xi.l874. Private. PR0.^0/6/40 p. 13#
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(tax} farms <5b does not seem to have impressed either the Sultan or the ex*-Sultan
t
very favourably"•
Yet Birch was being frustrated by Both sides of the Malay struggle; Ismail
would not surrender the Regalia, and 'Abdu'llah wrote secretly to him urging him
not to do so. When Birch wrote his first report he realised that for all his
police stations and plans for administration the basic troubles of Perak were 
2
far from solved. With Ismail outside the Pangkor settlement, and 'Abdu'llah 
now regretting its implications, the chances of turning Perak proper into as 
prospering an area as Larut were remote. Governor Jervois arrived in Singapore 
to find active opposition to the British intervention in Perak.
Clarke's settlement on the Linggi was also short-lived, because just as he had 
failed to grasp the real situation in Perak, 30 in Sungei TTjong he had committed
himself to a weak and unpopular Dato'Klana without understanding the twenty year
3old de facto relationship of the two rulers in the State. In spite of his 
assurance to Shaw in April 1874 the Danto'Bandar continued to oppose the Dato' 
Klana's authority, and the problem came to ligh* again in July 1 7^4 when Raja 
Mahdi and Raja Mahmud again disturbed the peace of Selangor. Clarke immediatelv 
supported the Tengku 'Zia'u'd-din, and Raja Mahdi shortly gave himself up in 
Singapore. Raja Mahmud, however, escaped to join the Dato'Bandar of Sungei TTjong, 
who began once more to threaten the Dato'Klana. When the latter requested a
British Resident and wished to fly a British flag over his house at Ampangan
4
"so as to be under the protection of the Great Governor", the Dato'Bandar 
threatened his life.
War once more seeming imminent between .the two rivals in Sungei TTjong, and 
with the Chnnese miners at Rasa likely to take sides as they had done in Perak,
1. Anson, op. cit. p. 323. 2. Birch to Col. Sec. SS. 2.iv 1875. 00/809/*) p . 125
3. See above p.
4. Dato'Klana to Shaw 24.ix. 1874. C0/809/5 p. 64.
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Clarke sent Pickering on 4 October 1874 to mediate in the Malay dispute and to
keep the Chinese out of it. Pickering got a written assurance from the Dato*
Bandar that he would not attack the Dato'Klana but the tension was obvious. Still
confused over the relationships of the Sungei Ujong chiefs Clarke sent Swettenham
to discover what he could from Sultan Abdul-Samad of Selangor; and t^en to visit
the Dato'Bandar. Thus, at this late hour, the governor discovered that the
Dato'Bandar had a share in the revenues of Sungei Ujong and he claimed that he
should always be consulted by the Dato'Klana.^ Clarke sent Pickering back on
30 October to get the Dato'Bandar to sign the 21 April Linggi Agreement, and to
invite him to Singapore. 'low the Dato'Bandar refused point-blank; claiming that
he was independent, he shut himself up in his stockades at Kapayang where he
felt safe from the interfering British. That he was thoroughly hostile now was
gathered by Swettenham, who was greeted with the words, "What! another European!
2
You travel about my country as if it were your own".
When the Dato'Klana decided to force the issue his effort was such a miserable
failure that Clarke was forced to intervene with British troops. 'Hie Dato'Klana
with a force of 400 captured the forts at Rasa and Rahang on 16 November, but at
Kapayang next day the Dato'Bandar stood firm. Most of the Dato'Klana's force
ran away; Pickering had to rescue his. While the Dato'Bandar recovered Rasa and
Rahang Pickering wrote desperately for help: "The Tunku Klana is a cur, but we
3
don't like to leave him... we are surrounded here...." A small detachment of 
troops left Malacca immediately, Clarke went to Lukut as soon as he heard the 
news, and there Capt. Tatham R.A. landed a force of 180 marines, sailors, police 
and English infantry from Singapore. Pickering recovered Rasa with the Malacca 
detachment on 23 November. After reconnaissance parties were fired on from
1. See above p. n%. Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xii.1874. CO/809/5 p. 32.
2. Vetch, Life of Clarke, p. 167.
3. Ibid. p. 168.
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Kapayang on the 28th, surrender terms were offered, and when the time limit
expired the forts were taken (they were deserted) and destroyed on 30 November.
Thus Clarke finally had to force the door of Sungei TJr1ong.^ Fe left Capt.
Dunlop, of the Singapore Police, to arrange a settlement, and went himsel^ to
make sure that Sultan Abdul-Samad of Selangor would not shelter Rada Mahmud and
Da to* Bandar Tunggal as they fled before the British troops. With Swettenham there
to keep him to his word the Sultan refused to harbour the fugitives, who gave
themselves up in December. Most of the British expedition retired from Sungei
Ujong early in December 1874, and having lost only one blue-dacket it had
survived well in the Malayan interior, which made Clarke rather pleased with his 
2
little foray. Capt. Tatham was appointed Resident in Sungei F.jong with a
detachment of 50 men to help keep order. Pickering disarmed the Chinese miners,
ten to eleven thousand of whom were found in the Rasa area, and he persuaded them
to sign an agreement according to which leases,, royalties, water supplies for the
mines, and trading boat licences would be regulated by the Resident. Mining
resumed by the middle of December 1874 and traffic flowed down the Linggi once
again. So Clarke made good his failure of May, even if the intervention had been
slightly more impromptu than Pangkor and Langat. The news caused no exoite^ent
in London; Meade only commented perversely that he wished the Dato ’Bandar Tunggal
3
were in the Dato'Klaus*s position - **he really seems to be made of good stuff”.
By the time Sir William Jervois arrived in Singapore on 8 May 1875 attention 
had turned again to Perak, where events were coming to a head. Moreover, because 
of a request from the Straits Settlements Association in London Clarke stayed 
behind for a few days to discuss urgent problems with his successor. He did not 
leave until 26 May, and Anson believed this meeting was a blunder, as he claimed
1. He could probably have opened it peaceably, as on 30 Oct. a messenger reached 
Singapore from the Dato'Bandar with powers to negotiate,
2. Clarke to Carnarvon 15.xii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 21#
3. Min. by Meade 11.ii.1875 on Clarke to Carnarvon 29.xii.1874. C0/?7B/76.
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there was professional jealousy between the two R.E. officers.* Certainly Jervois
s
was the senior officer, and he disagreed Significantly with Clarke over future
policy. Their discussions no doubt ranged widely over the question of Residents,
because Jervois had been instructed by Carnarvon to inquire and report on the
2whole situation so that final decisions could be made on the appointments. His
attention was also drawn (but not until after Clarice left Singapore! to Malay
debt-slavery, which had figured in Speedy's report on larut. Carnarvon had made
a successful gamble in starting to abolish domestic slavery in the Gold Coast; it
was logical that he should desire "the abatement of a practice so cruel and 
3
impolitic" in Malaya. Jervois was authorised to correspond with the Sultans to
test their feelings on the possibility of ending debt-slavery.
Inevitably Clarke and Jervois must have been most concerned with Perak, Clarke
had recently waited 36 hours at Pangkor to see Sultan 'Abdullah, who had not
turned up. When Jervois arrived at Singapore a deputation from ’Abdu’llah was
4present in the city complaining about Birch, but they received no sympathy from 
either Clarke or Jervois. Not long after Jervois arrived a letter came from 
Birch, dated 13 May, indicating thet ’Abdu’llah was set upon breaking the Pangkor 
Engagement. Birch called the Sultan a "vain little idiot" who was quite unfit to 
rule; the Resident believed most of the people in Perak would support Ismail.
Thus, from the start of his governorship, it was obvious to Jervois that all 
was not well with the Pangkor settlement or with the Resident experiment in Perak. 
As soon as Clarke left, Jervois reported to Carnarvon "there i3 not that ’holy 
calm* reigning in the Peninsula which the Pangkor treaty is generally supposed
1. Anson (About Myself, p. 323) said they had both held the post of Insp-Gen. of 
Fortifications at the War Office. Anson was quite wrong here. Clarke had been 
Director of Works at the Admiralty 1864-73 and was not Tnsp-Gen, of Fort?*. until 
1882-86. Jervois had been Assist, (later Deputy) Insp-Gen* of Forts, at the 
WO., 1856-75.
2. Carnarvon to Jervois 8.iv.l875. C0/809/5 p. 89.
3. Ibid. 25.V.1875. p. 119.
4. Precis of Evidence p. 12.
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to have inaugurated**And if Clarke had supported *Abdu*llah, but was not very 
satisfied with Birch, it is probable that even before Clarke left, Jervois 
decided to support Birch and to reconsider the question of Ismail. Fere was the 
ground for disagreement between the two generals* When Clarke said farewell to 
Anson at Penang he said, **Jervois has plunged into the native states head-over- 
heeis**.2
The new governor outlined his plans for Perak privately to Carnarvon on 10
July 1875* ,Abdu*llah, he said, was useless, the Rajas still levied their own
taxes on the river, the Straits Government had already advanced about £15,000 to
Perak, and debt-slavery and Malay-Chinese rivalry further darkened the picture.
**It appears to me that the Residential System, which implies advice as 
distinguished from control, is not calculated to meet the requirements 
either present or future of the case. The Sultan and Rajahs... are our 
obstacle to any just and enlightened system of government... we should, 
as opportunity offers, take possession of those States... This may be done 
without shedding blood, without opposition from the people,,except Sultans 
and Rajahs who profit by the present state of things**.
Jervois proposed pensioning off the troublesome Rajas and ruling perak indirectly
through men,presumably like the Tengku fZia*u*d-din of Selangor, **who would
virtually become British officers and would be associated with the British
official element only so far as necessary to supplement the native element**. Time
seemed ripe for this in Perak; revenue would be adequate, it would benefit the
4
State, and the cause of humanity and freedom.
One suspects that Carnarvon was forced to do his first serious thinking
5
about the Malay Peninsula when he received this. In 1874, while he had treated 
the Fiji and Gold Coast matters urgently and worked hard to conclude his policy, 
he had left the Malay States to the permanent staff and had tended to tfeat the
1. Jervois to Carnarvon 29.v. 1875. Private. TOO.350/6/40 p.22
2. Anson, op. cit. p. 324.
3. Jervois to Carnarvon 10.vii.1875* Private. PR0.30/6/40 p. 28.
4. Ibid.
5* On 1 Sept. 1875 he called for a map of the Peninsula and for tabulated 
memoranda giving details of each state. C0/273/80.
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Peninsula and the Residents as a matter for leisurely experiment. Now Jervois
suggested something much more akin to the outright Fiji annexation or the
legislative control of the Gold Coast Protectorate. Tn fact one could almost
say that, without realising it, Jervois seemed to appeal to the Gold Coast and
Fiji cases. The existence of slavery in the former and 'undefined serfdom' in
the latter had moved Carnarvon to take up a position of moral responsibility in
both cases. He had thought that the time was ripe on the Gold Coast to extend
some British control and to undermine slavery. Therefore he realised the logic
of Jervois's policy for Perak. But new action in the area was distasteful to
him because of his preoccupations elsewhere. Admitting to Lord Salisbury, then
at the India Office, on 3 September 1875 that he did not feel very favourable to
the idea of converting influence and protection to direct sovereignty, he said:
"The time must come for this and probably soon: but it may cost money, 
and is likely to need military reinforcements, and my hands are extra­
ordinarily full of very heavy work now. Moreover I shall probably be 
obliged to annex Zululand... and I am beset on all sides with applications 
to take N.Guinea. I therefore much desire to keep the existing system 
in the Malay^Peninsula for a time at all events: and I think that it can 
be done”.
Salisbury agreed, because annexations in Malaya might alarm other Eastern States,
and complicate relations with Burma, Siam and China. Worse still it might "raise
to a fever heat the war passions of the Anglo-Indians". It might be possible in 
2
a years time".
Yet only a week later, on 13 September 1875, Carnarvon realised that Jervois
was already embarking on the new policy. In July the governor had visited the
East Coast of the Peninsula and tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Bendahara
3of Pahang to accept a Resident. Be also announced that he expected Yusuf and
Ismail would shortly ask the British Government to take over Perak. "Everything
1. Carnarvon to Salisbury3.ix.1875- Private. PR0.30/6/10 p. 20.
Ibid. p. 21. Salisbury to Carnarvon 5.ix.l875.
3. Jervois to Carnarvon 7.viii*1875* Confid. CO/809/6 p.9. Rec’d in CO. 13 Sept.
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seems tending to render it inevitable that Perak must become part of the British 
Dominions - and that, without coating a penny or firing a shot”.^  Writing from 
Balmoral the same day Carnarvon, while agreeing with Jervois that his policy 
might become necessary, warned him that in view of the situation in Rur^a and
China, and the fact the public opinion had only just realised the novelty of the
2
new Residents, the new policy was not to be attempted. The warning was too late. 
The first information to reach London after the report of Jervois's September 
visit to Perak was the dramatic telegram of 4 Wovember 1875 announcing the 
murder of James Birch, the Resident.
Jervois had decided, probablv in April 1875 while Clarke was still in Singapore
that the best solution was ”to declare Perak British territory, and govern it
accordingly”. But since this would mean British law and British ciMzenship for
the Malays, he now decided on the cheaper and simpler system of governing the
country by British officers in the name of the Sultan. Instead of advising, as
envisaged by Clarke at Pangkor, the Resident would deliberately control the State.
The new officer would be styled 'Queen's Commissioner1, and a Malay Council should
3
give the Malay rulers an interest and a part in the Covernroent. In the first 
two weeks of September Jervois had toured Perak with a large party of officials to 
persuade the rulers to accept his plan, but although Raja Tusuf agreed, Ismail 
and 'Abdu'llah would not answer.
1. Jervois to Carnarvon 7.viii.l875* Private. PRO.30/6/40 p. 30.
2. Carnarvon to Jervois 13.ix.1875. Private (copy) Ibid. p. 29* Cowan, Origins, 
p. 291» suggests that Carnarvon received the 10 July letter at Balmoral and 
replied to it immediately. But he was not so fast as this. The 10 July letter 
probably caused his request for the CO. staff to produce details, and his 
reference to Salisbury. And as Jervois seamed only to throw it out as a 
suggestion Carnarvon did not bother to answer it right away; in fact, as has 
been argued, he saw the logic of it. It was the 7 August letter (which doubt!esi 
came with the despatches of the same date, which were received in 13 Sept.) 
which alarmed Carnarvon. He su-denly realised that Jervois was going ahead 
with the plan; hence the urgent letter from Balmoral.
3. Jervois to Carnarvon 16.1.1875* C0/809/6 p. 33-4*
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In view of events in Perak, of which Jervois wag not aware, this was not
surprising. A movement was afoot in Perak to get rid of Birch and oust the
British. Although Jervois was not aware of the plot, his parly sensed the unrest.
"There seems to be only one opinion among the Malays of any sense, and that is
that very little would lead to a quarrel now", wrote Swettenhea.* But no one
realised that Sultan 'Abdu'llah was so incensed with Birch that he planned to
unite with Ismail to remove him. Birch had threatened 'Abdu'llah with deposition
2
in June 1875 if he continued to frustrate the new revenue system, and the Sultan's
debt-8lave3, usually women, were continually taking refuge in the Residency. On
21 July 1875 'Abdu'llah had called a meeting at Durian Sabatang, at which all the
Perak chiefs except Yusuf were represented. They discussed the failure of their
deputation to Sinagpore, and they were told that Ismail was prepared to join a
plot to get rid of Birch. Maharaja Lela of Passir Salak volunteered to kill the
Resident. For a few days beginning 24 August 'Abdu'llah held a seance in which,
professing to possessed of spirits, he predicted Birch's death within a month.
On the very day that Jervois was at Blanja in September, the "antri was secretly
3
informing Ismail of the preparations. Birch heard several rumours of the plan 
but disregarded them, and the governor returned to Singapore.
Ismail refused to accept the Jervois plan. He wanted nothing to do with the 
Pangkor Engagement, and said the former relations between Perak and the East 
India Company had been adequate. ’Abdu'llah was given fifteen days to consult his 
advisers, but Birch thought he would never agree and he asked the governor for 
troops and a gunboat. Raja Yusuf and Raja Idris accepted the plan and received 
the first instalments of their pensions, but 'Abdu'llah held out. Jervois ordered 
Birch to make a final effort to persuade him on 30 September 1875. Hie Resident
1. Cowan, Swettenham*s Journals, p. 96.
2. Precis of Evidence, p. 12.
3. All the information about the plot depends on the evidence taken afterwards, 
and therefore it is all second-hand.
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was given two drafts; one was for 'Abdu'llah to sign indicating his agreement 
with the plan, the other was an offer of the Sultanate to Yusuf should the first 
fail. Birch did not have to use the threat because next day Raja Idris brought
i
’Abdu'llah's acceptance. But Birch was not finished with the Sultan; he tried to
get 'Abdu'llah's signature on proclamations appointing British officers as Judges
in Perak and giving them power to collect and administer the revenues. 'Abdu'llah
hesitated, and only gave in after being threatened with the second letter. On
3 October the signed copies of the proclamations were delivered, and Svettenhsm
took them to Singapore for printing. He returned on 26 October with the printed
notices, and also a proclamation by the governor dated 15 October 1075#
Birch immediately posted the notices at Banda Bahru with great ceremony,’ and
on 28 October he sent Swettenham up river with copies, while he went down river
himself. On the same day 'Abdu'llah held a meeting at Durian Saba tang at which
it was agreed that Lela should kill Birch at Passir Salak. The Resident was
warned next day, but he went on confidently saying, "if one Mr. Birch is killed,
ten Mr. Birches will take his place".^ On the 31st the Sultan sent Lela a ^ris
as the authority for the act. Birch reached Passir Salak on the evening of 1
November, and he was murdered while bathing shortly after 8 am. next morning.
Lieut. Abbott, his companion, who had gone shooting across the river managed to
get back to the Residency at Banda Bahru. Svettenhara, returning from up the Perak
river two days later noted great excitement at Blanja on the 4th. He was told
what had happened, and, refusing to land, he slipped down the river covered by
2
the mists to reach the Residency on the 5th. There the survivors were joined 
by Capt. Innes with 60 British regulars from Penang. The force tried to take 
Passir Salak on 7 November but they were stopped by one of Tula's stockades a 
few miles from the Residency and Innes was killed. At this noint the governor
1. Precis of Evidence, p. 25*
2. Swettenh^m, Footprints. pp. 57-60.
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appeared on the scene. There was some unrest in Selangor at the same time, 
and more trouble in the States adjoining Malacca. Therefore fearing a general 
rising in the Malay Peninsula Jervois decided to occupy Perak by force.
Birch's murder wrecked the Jervois plan, and nearly wrecked its authoife
career. The day after he signed the proclamation, which Birch and Bwettenham
were posting, along with their notices of administrative changes, Jervois had
written a long account of his new policy for Carnarvon.^ Shortly after he
completed this, Caranrvon's urgent letter from Balmoral arrived; but the governor
thought it was too late to go back. So he defended his action in a private letter
saying that if the advice of the Resident was really followed he would have,
practically, to become the ruler of the State. If the advice was not followed
there were two alternatives: withdrawal or movement forward, but if they retired
it would leave the causes which led up to intervention to operate once again.
Alternatively steps could be taken to enforce the Resident's advice; this was
2
the basis of the Jervois plan.
When Carnarvon heard of Birch's murder on 4 November 1875, this explanation 
was still in the post. He was ignorant both of the plan and its defence, let alon
the cause of the murder. So when he received a demand for 1,000 troops with
artillery from India, three companies of regulars from Hong Fong, in addition 
to the English Battalion stationed in the Straits, he was naturally shocked at 
the scale of Jervois's military action. A week after the news of the murder he 
was still ignorant of its cause; a series of urgent telegrams produced no
explanation from Jervois who had gone to Perak. There was still no answer on
12 November when he explained his military requirements. Already he had 750 
infantry and 80 artillery from the Straits garrison in the field. Ma.lor-Oeneral
1. Jervois to Carnarvon 16.x.1875. CO/809/6 p. 28.
2. Jervois to Carnarvon 18.x. 1875. Private PRO.30/6/40 p. 32.
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Francis Colbome, the Commander-in-Chief, Hong Kong and the Straits, was bringing
300 regulars from Hong Kong; Jervois also requested 2 Battalions and a mountain
battery from India. He planned to inarch one party through Larut, over the pass
to Kuala Kangsa and down the Perak River; the second force would drive up river
from the Residency. Still ignorant of the political background Salisbury, the
Secretary of State for India, said, "A more unsatisfactory explanation of a war
I never read", and he was reluctant to let the 2 Battalions leave India; "Perak
can, if need be, be recaptured: a panic in India might be irreparable".^ The
final blow came when the cable between Madras and Penang broke down. Carnarvon
still had no explanation from Jervois; now telegrams would have to go by steamer
from Ceylon or Rangoon.
It was not until 22 November, nearly three weeks after the murder, that
Jervois's despatches, written before the event, arrived. Carnarvon took the
matter immediately to the Cabinet, who read that Jervois had heard that some of
the Perak chiefs wanted the British to govern Perak, so he had gone ahead with his
2
plan. Carnarvon seized on this as "The cause of the war". Next day telegraphic
communication was opened with Singapore via Siberia, and a telegram dated the
18th (via Ceylon) brought the governor's long awaited explanations. He said
his policy was universally approved in the Straits and he demanded now a show of
force. On 24 November the G vemrnent learnt of a successful assault by Capt.
Dunlop at Passir Salak and of the recovery of Birch's belongings. They also
learnt that although 'Abdu'llah had expressed his loyalty, some of his advisers
were implicated, and the Jervois feared a general rising. Moreover, he suggested
annexing all the territory between the Perak and Krean rivers and holding it by 
3force.
1. Two letters Salisbury to Canarvon 13.xi.1875 & Nov.1875. PR0.30/6/l0 pp.30-31.
2. Note on Jervois to Carnarvon 18.x.1875. PR0.30/6/40 p. 32.
3. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 18.xiil875. CO/809/6 p. 64.
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The Cabinet must have been furious. Gathome Hardy, the Secretary of State
for War, said Jervois's conduct "has been outrageous. I question whether you
will not have to recall him".^ Carnarvon consulted Disraeli the same day, and
sent a telegram of censure. British troop3, he said, were not to be used for
either annexation of the maintainance of Residents. If the Residents were not
acceptable on the original basis as advisers, they might have to be withdrawn.
"Neither annexation not government of the country by British officers in the
2
name of the Sultan can be allowed". Jervois, however, persisted in sending
telegrams defending his policy, so on 10 December 1875 a very severe despatch of
3
censure condemned his "grave errors of policy and action". It is true that all
the governor's military requirements were granted, but Carnarvon held him
accountable for his actions, and warned him that the decisions on the settlement
would be made at home.
An occupation, rather than a campaign, is the best description of the Perak
expedition of 1875* 'Abdu'llah and the Laksamana professed loyalty, but Lela
fled to join Ismail at Blanja. Militarily therefore Jervois's object was to
pursue the fugitives and occupy upper Perak, To this end an excessive force
4
was used, which failed in its first object and hated the second. Vaj-General 
Colbome left Bandar Bahru on 8 December with 300 men from Kong Kong assisted 
by naval units. They reached Blanja by water on 13 December, to find that Tsmail 
had fled to Kinta. This meant a difficult overland inarch and when Kinta ^ as 
reached after a few skirmishes on the 17th, Ismail was still uncaptured. 
Brigadier-General John Ross led the Indian force, consisting of the Buffs, the 1st 
Ghurkas, a mountain battery, a company of Bengal Sappers, and some signallers.
1. Hardy to Carnarvon 25.xi.1875* Private. PR0.30/6/12.
2. Carnarvon to Jervois (tg) 25.xi.1875. CO/809/6 p. 74*
3. Ibid. Carnarvon to Jervois 10.xii.1875.
4. See account of Brig. Ross's attitude in "Needs Explaining" in *7.G.Scott, Cursed 
Luck. Ross, who had served in Afghanistan, hated the jungle, and said "they 
had all been sent out on policemen's work; that it was an insult to the service' 
p. 184.
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They set off up the Iarut River on 29 November, crossed over to Kuala Kangsa, 
whence a belated party was sent to join Colbome at Blanja* On 4 January 1^76 
they disarmed the trouble nest of Kota lama, where the Brigade Major was killed.
A third force landed from Pangkor to subdue the Perak coast if necessary. But 
the final pursuit of Lela and Ismail was carried out by police and irregulars, 
with the co-operation of other Malay Sultans and the Siamese Government.
Ismail surrendered with the Regalia to the Raja of Kedah in March 1876. Lela 
was captured by the agents of the Maharaja of Johore in July. Shortly afterwards 
•Abdu'llah'a part in the conspiracy was discovered. After much soul searching in 
the legal department of the Colonial Office^ " Lela and the immediate murderers of 
Birch were hanged; * Abdu’llah was deported to the Seychelles and Ismail lived in 
exile in Johore, where he died in 1889.
2
Carnarvon was quite satisfied by the conduct of the military operations, which
3
cost under £100,000 and were eventually paid for out of the Perak revenues.
Inevitably the expedition invited comparisons with Volseley’s campaign against
Ashanti in 1874. But Jervois insisted that there was no analogy with the ^ arch
to Kumasi or the earlier expedition by Napier in Abyssinia. Tn Perak the emphasis
was on occupation to prevent a recurrence of trouble; the former cases had been
4
designed to strike a blow and retire. General Colbome went further, and
5
considered that his task had been much harder than VTolseley’s. And while Volseley
and Clover had been covered in glory, Colbome’s appointment had been disliked by
6 7Carnarvon from the start, and Brig. Ross was reprimanded for hanging a Malay.
1. See memo, by Malcolm 26.x.1876 after Jervois to Carnarvon 4.iv.l876. CO/273/85,
2. Carnarvon to Jervois l.ii.1876. C0/809/6 p. 279.
3. P.Sadka, "The Journal of Sir Hugh Low,Perak, 1877", JMBRAS. XXVII, Pt. 4, (1954) 
P. 31.
4. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 28.xii.1875. CO/8O9/6 p. 123.
5. Anson, About Myself, p. 332.
6. Carnarvon to Stanley 12.xi. 1875. Private. PRO.30/6/17 p. 142.
7. Cowan, Swettenham’s Perak Journals, p. 127, fn. 121.
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The political settlement of Perak after the war was a complete reversal for
Jervois. He adhered consistently to his policy to the end, however, and when he
received Carnarvon's harsh despatch of censure, he claimed th^t it was unjust,
that his plan had been the logical outcome of the Resident policy which Carnarvon
had approved.^ In February 1876 he pressed Carnarvon to announce the Government's
new policy. He continued to condemn any idea of a British withdrawal from Perak
or a return to government by advice. In a full reply to Carnarvon's censure he
obstinately stuck to his position and informed Carnarvon that he had misunderstood
2
both the situation in Perak and the very policy he had approved. Carnarvon was
justifiably furious to receive a despatch which amounted almost to an attact on
his honesty. "I am afraid I must characterise this despatch as one of the least
satisfactory that I have ever received since I have been connected with the office.
It unquestionably has the merit of cleverness; but it is unscrupulous in argument,
3
unbecoming in tone, and very disingenuous in character". The document in the 
Colonial Office file i3 peppered with indignant comments.
Yet Carnarvon was, on his own part, being obstinate. He seemed more concerned 
to establish that Jervois had started to annex Perak, rather than to face the real 
limitations of government by advice. The Permanent staff of the Colonial Office 
were noticeably more indulgent to Jervois, since they were not personally 
insulted. Meade in particular was prepared to see Jervois's viewpoint. The 
censure had been outspoken, so a very deferential reply was hardly to be expected 
from the governor. Moreover, Sir Andrew Clarke had sent only seven despatches on 
Perak between Pangkor and Jervois's arrival; this had led them all to believe that 
government by advice was working well. Pangkor had been based on the assumption 
that advice would be readily sought; the Colonial Office had been quite ignorant
1. Jervois to Carnarvon (tg) 15.1.1876. CO/809/6 p. 188.
2. Jervois to Carnarvon 10.ii.1876. CO/273/83.
3. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 22.iii.1876. See Cowan, Origins. pp. ^01-304 for a 
careful discussion of the Camarvon-Jorvois controversy.
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of the forces at work in Perak to combat this. "I think it not improbable", wrote
Heade, "that annexation may be the ultimate result, but I see no reason why it
should take place for some time to come".* Herbert partly excused Jervois as an
army officer not used to Colonial work. Jervois was told to take no action*
After this the Malay policy once again received more leisurely treatment.
Carnarvon finally sent his decision on 1 June 1876. Annexation was forbidden;
troops were not to be used to impose Residents on an unwilling population.
Carnarvon did not consider that the Residents had been given a fair trial. T'he
name of 'Resident1 would remain, and they would confine themselves to advice.
However, Jervois's Malay Council was acceptable and could be tried. "It should be
our policy to find and train some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and
enlightenment to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government and to render
some effective assistance in the government of the country", was the rather vague
2
conclusion Carnarvon came to. The choice of a new Sultan of Perak was left to 
Jervois.
The governor now bowed before his superiors. When he reported his actions in
accordance with Carnarvon's instructions on 19 August 1876 he brought "a laggard
3
controversy to a graceful end". Carnarvon forgave him, and Jervois admitted
it 4that he had stepped beyond proper bounds".
¥
Jervois was undoubtedly rash and wrong to persist in his policy a^ter 
Carnarvon's warning and he was insubordinate in his persistence. But Carnarvon was 
not without blame. There is no evidence that he gave to Malay affairs the same 
urgent detailed study - the reading and summarizing of memoranda and books, the 
carefully recorded interviews with individuals and deputations - vhich he gave 
to Fiji and the Cold Coast. He was quite ignorant, as were roost of the Straits
1, Min, by Meade 21.iii.1876 on Jervois to Carnarvon 10.ii.1876. CO/273/R3.
2. Carnarvon to Jervois l.vi.1876. Confid. Print Ksatem 17a. p. 112. cd/fcor/?.
3* Kin. by Koebuck 28.ix. 1876 on Jervois to Carnarvon 19.viii.1876. 00^27^/84.
4* Carnarvon to Jervois 17.ix. 1876 & Jervois to Carnarvon 30.xi.1876. Private.
PR0.30/6/40 p. 31 & 33.
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officials until 1874-76, of the real forces at work in perak. He refused to 
recognise that in Perak there was no Tengku 'Zia'u’d-din or Maharaja Abu-Bakar 
to rely on. Thus a Resident had either to govern or be superfluous. On the 
other hand the Jervois plan was in accord with both Kimberley’s and Carnarvon’s 
basic policy of finding a way of achieving order on the frontier by sorae method 
which fell short of the extension of British sovereignty. Fiji was only annexed 
after ten years of investigation into the possibility of consular jurisdiction or 
government by one of the Australasian colonies. The Gold Coast Protectorate was 
deliberately excluded from the territorial dominions of the Grown and Ashanti 
was neither annexed not provided with a Resident. There were really no insuperable 
obstacles to annexation and occupation in these frontier regions at this time 
except for the basic and legitimate reluctance of Whitehall. Jervois’s policy 
was consistent with the Colonial Office’s in that he recoiled from annexation 
and his system of indirect rule had some affinity to Carnarvon's system of dealing 
with the Gold Coast Protectorate. The ’Queen’s Commissioners' might have ended 
up as rather grandly titled District Commissioners. However, Birch was an 
unfortunate instrument, 'Abdu'llah an insincere participant, and Jervois an . 
unscrupulous advocate of the plan. But the system of government by the advice 
of the Residents as it was eventually to be evolved by men such as Sir Hugh Low, 
which lies beyond the scope of this present discussion,* bore many marks of 
affinity to the Jervois plan.
9
9
The annexation of Fiji. 1874.
New3 from Fiji had been scanty and discouraging in 1873 while the British 
Government was making up its mind about sending the Good enough- Layard Commission 
Edvard March, the troublesome British Consul, left suddenly because of illness
1. See Introduction to Low’s Journal by E.Sadka.
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on 23 January 1873* so for nearly a year, in the crucial before before Commodore
Good enough* 8 arrival, there vras only a temporary British respresentative in Fiji.
Yet the most significant thing which Goodenough found at the end of the year
was that British intervention alone had kept the peace in 1873* After the
confidential request from Thurston to Governor Robinson in December 1872^ a
2
warship from Australia had been maintained continually at Fiji and intervention
3
by naval officers amounted, said Goodenough, to a "virtual Protectorate".
In two incidents the presence of the Royal Navy had prevented fighting. The 
first took place in March 1873 when members of the British Subjects Mutual 
Protection Society decided they would take revenge themselves on Viti Levu 
mountain tribes who murdered the Bums family in the Wba River region. Here a 
clash with government troops was only avoided by the presence, at Thurston*s 
request, of Capt. Chapman of HMS Dido, who took the ringleaders to Levuka under
4
arrest, whence they were deported to Australia. The Captain’s actions embarrassed
both the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London, but Gladstone later told
5
Goodenough that he had no doubt that Chapman was right. Thurston had turned to
the British commander because British policy had not made his position in the
Fiji Government easy. Kimberly had announced de facto recognition, but Granville 
had not told the Consul to do this, and the Law Officers had decided that Fijian 
citizenship did not put British subjects outside British law. It was Kimberley's 
circular announcing this which had prompted Thurston’s request to the Governor of 
New South Wales for a ship, and at the same time he had told Robinson that Britain 
should be consistent; either she should concede that Fiji was an independent
1. Thurston to Robinson 20.xii.1872 in Robinson to Kimberley 27.1.1873. C0/201/573
2. Ad. to CO. 18.iii.1873. CO/83/3# HMS Dido was already at Levuka in Jan. 1873 
indicating that Robinson complied with Thurston's request immediately.
3. Goodenough & Layard to Kimberley 13.ii.1874. Confid. CO/808/2 p. 60.
4. Chapman to Stirling 29.iii.1873 in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.lR73. GO/83/3.
5* Hins. on Ad. to CO. 14.vi. 1873. Ibid. and Ad. to FO. 14.iv. 1873. F0/*>8/l40 p.39
and Goodenough's Journal, I, 10.vi.1873.
6. Circular to Australasian governors 14.viii.1872 (copy) in F0/58/l40.
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State, or she should annex it.^ He probably felt inhibited by Kimberley's
circular at the time of the Kba rebellion, but decided he must maintain the
governments authority. Capt. Chapman was the only vay out, and Thurston promised
2
him that if the ringleaders were removed the case against them would be dropped,.
Undoubtedly Thurston and Chapman between them prevented a serious incident.
But this could not save the Fiji Government. By July 1873 it was clear that
the 1871 Constitution had broken down. The Legislative Assembly outvoted the
Government on its finacial policy in Fay 1873# but although the Ministers offered
3
to resign Thakombau dissolved the Assembly and kept his ministers. He told
Commodore Stirling in July "I retain the ministers because I believe that under
4their guidance Fiji will prosper*♦ Tension intensified when the Government
announced that a new Assembly would be elected by all Fijians, and the settler
opposition decided to fight the Fijian franchise. Therefore the election was
postponed, and Thurston drew up a new constitution. Matters were so uncertain
that the Commodore left HMS Blanche (Capt. Simpson) at Levuka, and appointed its
paymaster, Lieut. Nettle ton, as acting Consul.
The second incident took place in September 1873, and again it was the presence
of a British ship which kept the peace. Revenue authorised by the Assembly expired
at the end of August, but the Government continued to levy taxes. A demonstration
against this was made by a German merchant, Hedeman, who, encouraged by G.Hennings
the German Consul, forcibly withdrew goods from the bonded warehouse without paying
duty* When the Government tried to arrest the perpetrator, a clerk named Schule,
Hennings appealed to Nettleton, who turned to Capt. Simpson. At first the Captain
warned all British subjects, government or opposition, not to use arms, but
1. Thurston to Robinson 20.xii.1872 in Robinson to Kimberley 27.1.1873. 00/201/573
2* Thurston to Chapman 19.iii.1873 in Ad. to CO. 14.vi.1873. CO/83/3.
3. Derrick, History, pp. 229-230.
4..Stirling to Ad. 13.viii.1873. This first reached to CO. via F0. to C0.10.xi. 
1873. co/83/4; the Ad. did not send it on until 4.xii.!873. CO^/3.
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Thurston satisfied him of the Justice of the Government*g case, and he got
Simpson to sign a proclamation warning British subjects not to resist the 'Fiji
Government. The height of the crisis came on 3 September 1873 as the Fijian
army concentrated its reserves at Thakombau’s house, and the Germans fortified
themselves in Hederaan#s store. The Government was determined to arrest Schule.
Simpson held aloof saying it concerned the Germans not the British, but Lieut.
Nettleton, the acting British Consul, took the law into his own hands and Simpson
later admitted that he prevented bloodshed. In naval uniform he entered Fedeman’s
store, where the defenders were drunk, and he arrested the clerk. Simpson was
infuriated, but he took the prisoner on board the Blanche, and although he refused
Thurston's request for Royal Marines to patrol Levuka that night, launches were
held ready for action. The crisis passed and Thurston skillfully gained Simpson's
support, by placing his resignation a3 Chief Secretary in the Captain’s hands, to
be accepted if written charges were made against him. As none were made , Simpson
published on 8 September 1873, his support for lawful arrests by the Government,
and he handed over the prisoner Schule to the Government.^ f!hus Thurston prevented
Simpson from gaining the initiative while successfully using the Royal Navy to
2
keep the peace. Perhaps Simpson had a restraining influence on Thurston; Brower,
3
the American Consul believed he prevented bloodshed in "^ iji.
The affair of the Germans caused a panic in New South Wales, which was Just
1* Derrick's account of the Hedeman affair (History pp. 223-4) is based upon 
Nettleton to Granville 8.ix.lS73 & 26.ix. 1873. FO/58/135 P P . 253 A 288.
The CO. heard via Robinson to Kimberley 6.x. 1873. C0/20l/574, with a clipping
from the Fiji Times. K-Hugessen wrote on this (26.xi.1873) "not much like 
peaceful annexation - probably they will have killed each other before we settle 
upon this policy, in wh. case there will be no one left to annex". A much 
fuller account, including Simpson’s correspondence with Thurston was received 
in London in 1874. Simpson to Stirling (extracts) 29.xii.1873. ro/808/2 p.47-
58.
2. Derrick, History, p. 234. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.1873. Private (copy^  
PRO.30/6/44 P .  4.
3. Goodenough*8 Journal, II, 25.xi.1873.
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what the German Consul wanted.^ The Government called on the Governor to
telegraph Kimberley that Fiji was bordering on anarchy and to request immediate
2annexation as foreign intervention would be a calamity* The last point really
had little relevance at this time, and Herbert remarked, in London, that since
British subjects were involved on both sides of the 'anarchy* intervention would
be difficult* But he admitted that Hit would no doubt be awkward if both Fiji
and the Navigators (Samoa) passed into ownership which could prevent our
3
steamers coaling*** For Kimberley, who, as argued above, had already made up
his mind in favour of annexation, the Redeman affair was further evidence to
support his view* He admitted to the still reluctant Gladstone: "I take a more
4
sanguine view I confess of the power and energy of this country than you do**.
But Gladstone*s Government had postponed all action until Goodenough and Layard
had reported; they took no further decision on Fiji, which, like the Gold Coast
and the Malay States, was left to Carnarvon.
In the Fiji Islands themselves government rested more and more on Hurston's
shoulders* A measure of Thakombau’s dependence on him was evident during one of
the meetings with the commission when on matters of money or land the king said,
5
”It is all understood by Fr. Thurston”. VThen he heard about the appointment of 
the commission in September 1873 he regretted that it was not really an answer to 
the letter of 31 January, but he promised to assist the commissioners.^ But 
he had sent the letter at a time of particular difficulty. After his successes
1. The alarm in N.S.W. was deliberately created by G .Hennings, the German Consul 
in Fiji, who informed Simpson, after the latter had announced his support for 
Thurston, that he was sending a fast vessel to Sydney to report that two 
Englishmen had armed 1,000 Fijians. (Hennings to Simpson 6.X.1873. C0/808/2 
p. 58)* The Fiji Times article which had alarmed Sydney has the same,date,
6.x.1873.
2. Robinson to Kimberley(tg) 15.xi.1873. C0/20l/574,
3. Min. by Herbert 15.xi.1873 on telegram.
4* Kimberley to Gladstone 26.xi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/10.
5. Goodenough & Layard to Kimberley 19.iii.1874. C0/808/2 p. 75.
6. Thurston to Robinson 25.ix.1873 in Robinson to Kimberley 22.xi. 1873# C0/20l/574
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in the Mba and Hedeman affairs, with the Assembly dismissed, and after winning
Simpson’s docile support, Thurston was in a stronger position, and it is suggested
that he imagined himself as a despotic ruler.^ Certainly at the end of September
1873 a new constitution was circulated secretly among the chiefs, which provided
for an Assembly of nominated Chiefs with a minority of elected Europeans, a Cabinet 
*
of three, and a Privy Council consisting of the Cabinet, the Government and a
chief from each province. Through this Thurstor\ would be able to check the
settlers. For some reason he sent a copy to Simpson, who persuaded him to hold
2
it over until the commission arrived, and it took Ooodenough only a few days
3
to make up his mind to stop it.
This brief account of events in Fiji in 1873 shows quite clearly that when 
Goodenough arrived at the end of the year things had greatly changed since the 
letter of January and Kimberley’s instructions to the commission.
Commodore Goodenough reached Levuka on 17 November 1873* Although his Journal 
provides a detailed picture of his five months in the islands, it is difficult 
to gain a reliable account since so much evidence is heresay, and both Thurston 
and Thakombau made contradictory statements at different times. The one certain 
thing is that even before Layard arrived Goodenough very quickly decided in favour 
of annexation.
He was so shocked at what he found that he felt bound to interfere. Prisoners 
taken by the Government in its Mba campaign were about to be hired out to planters 
so Goodenough warned British subjects that he would regard such hiring as acts of
4
slavery under British law. He found that while the Government was alienated fro® 
the settlers, Thurston and Thakorabau did not seem enthusiastic for annexation, and
1. Henderson, History of Govt, in Fiji. II, p. 347.
2. Derrick, History, p. 237* The proposed constitution was published in the 
Sydney doming Herald, 4.xi. 16573, copy in F0/58/l53 p. 319.
3. See his resolution in Goodenough’s Journal, II, 22.xi. 16573.
4. Notice by Goodenough 10.xii.1873. CO/808/2 p. 40.
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1
were intent on pressing forward with the constitution. Apparentlv the letter !
of 31 January 1873 had really meant: "Do you require or intend to annex us,
1
because your interference is a hindrance to us and if your intentions were decided
we could get on"*^ Thurston was ’rather a puzzle1 to the Commodore, but he was
"full of the most extravagent ideas about his own position and... one of the
2
greatest boresM he had ever met. Goodenough was determined to prevent the
new constitution and after a long argument with Thurston on 26 November he asked
the Chief Secretary what would happen when the R.N. left Fiji. Thurston said he
was confident in his government’s strength to enforce order, but Goodenough
warned him that if English subjects used a Fijian force to co-erce other settlers j
3
he would take them to court in Sydney. On 12 December Thurston "came some way j
4
down the tree" and assured Goodenough that he was a supporter of annexation. The 
Commodore had already become one himself, since about two weeks after his arrival 
he told Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that he could “see no way out
5
of the muddle but annexation".
From the outset, therefore, Goodenough decided on annexation and his activities
in Fiji were designed to achieve this, ouch action formed no part of his
instructions, but it was fully in keeping with his character. Professor Ward
severely criticises the commission claiming that both members were unqualified
for their task.^ This requires some revision. Miss Drus suggests that Layard,
the Consul, was probably chosen carefully as he had experience both in Hew Zealand
7
and South Africa. lie was also an experienced lawyer, but Goodenough noted "I see
1. Goodenough to Goschen 18.xi.1873. Private (copy). FRO.30/6/44 p.2. Henderson, 
(Hist, of Govt, in Fiji. II,p.347) developes on this view of Goodenough’s and
suggests the Jan. letter was part of a plot by Thurston to achieve despotic
power, that the letter was sent in the belief that it would be refused. This 
view, however, neglects that in January 1873 the Government’s prestige was low.
2. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii*1873. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p. 4.
3. Goodenough's Journal, II, 26.xi.1873.
4. Ibid. 12.xii.1873.
5. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.l873. Private (copy). PR0.30/6/44 p. 4.
6. J.M.Ward, British Policy in the South Pacific, pp. 249-50.
7. E.Drus, "Colonial Office and Annexation of Fiji", op. cit. p. 103, fn. 11.
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that I shall have to tell Layard what to do in everything'*. ^ However he seemed
to respect 'old Layard' as he genially called him. In the case of Goodenough
Ward's strictures are unjustified. Kimberley had first thought of appointing
special commissioners and suggested General Smythe or Sir Andrew Clarke; Sir
Arthur Gordon, then Governor of Mauritius, also offered to go* But this seemed
too ostentatious, and as Goodenough was appointed Senior Haval Officer of the
Australian station in April 1873 he was an ideal person. A son of the Dean of
Wells, he had been seen at prayer just before the assault on Canton in 1857, so he
was a man who would appeal to McArthur and Gladstone; a Captain who taught
teetotalism to his crew, he would not easily be swayed by the gin-sodden residents
of Levuka, who were those most opposed to the Fiji Covemment; a mission to the
United States during the Civil War, and an appointment as naval attache visiting
the major European powers in 1871-73, had given him experience of a semi-diplomatic 
2nature. In fact for a noval officer Goodenough was a man of singularly vide
cultural intersts, being well read in works on social problems and accomplished
3
at languages. His library on HMS Pearl contained four hundred volumes, and his
4
reading list while in the South Pacific was formidable*
Ward also accused Goodenough of "lack of political astuteness*, yet the
Commodore's appreciation of Ma'afu's position in the Lau group indicates that he
5
had a sense of the political realities of the islands, and someone who saw him at
1. Goodenough's Journal, III, 4*i*1874,
2. For details of his early career see Mrs. V.G.Goodenough's, Memoir & Journal of 
Commodofe Goodenough (1876). This is excellent for his career and gathers 
interesting comments from his contemporaries. However, all the political 
matters are omitted, and it necessary to go for them to the 6 volume Mss. 
Journal (some of which is printed in the'Confidential Prints in the PRO.)
See also A.Stanley, In Hero or jam. James Graham Goodenough. A Sermon, 16.1.1876. 
The preacher accompanied HMS Pearl to Fiji.
3. Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p. 116.
4. He records finishing books by Macaulay, Trollope, Livingstone, Buckle, Darwin, 
Gladstone, Carlyle, Froude and Voltaire.
5. Commission's Report, CO/808/3 p. 15#
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work in Fiji said the Chiefs had "implicit trust in the Commodore".^ Moreover,
before leaving Tx>ndon he visited the missionary headquarters, which must have
commended him to McArthur, who, if he did not meet the Commodore personally, must
have influenced him indirectly through the Wesleyan Missionary Society. And the
Rev. Langham, head of the Wesleyans in Fiji, who, as a believer in Fiji for the
Fijians was by no means an annexationist, wrote of Goodenough and layard:
2
"Unquestionably they are the men for the work...." The most noticeable trait
in Goodenough's character was hia self-discipline and inflexible devotion to
duty. Capt. Moresby admired his "fine scientific and sailor-like qualities, his
3
promptitude, his iron nerve", and if some of his men might have irreverently
called him 'holy Joe', an Australian acquaintance remarked on his "resolution
and fixedness of purpose". It is only in ths light of such views of his
character that Goodenough's actions in Fiji be judged. Just before writing his
4
report he admitted that he had seen annexation as "a positive duty".
Having decided, then, that annexation was the only solution to Fiji's problems
the Commodore went about achieving it with his usual resolution. He told
Goschen that if a crisis accurred he would hoist the British flag beside Fiji's
5
"as a Protectorate for a time" , and he would make the Government submit all its
acts to the foreign consuls. He told Thakombau and Thurston on 22 December 1873
that when Layard arrived they would call a public meeting to find out if the chiefs
6
and people desired annexation". Reluctantly agreeing to such a meeting Thakombau 
now said he wished to keep the islands; the letter of Januray 1873 "was an 
invitation to come and talk about it". Thurston was probably nearer the truth
i
when he said "You must know, Commodore Goodenough, that this question was put at
1. Mrs. Goodenough, Memoir, p. 117.
2. Langham to McArthur 13. ii. 1873 (copy) in Chess on to Carnarvon 8. v. 1874. CO/83/5.
3. J.Mores by, New Guinea and Polynesia (1876) p. 278.
4. Mrs. Goodenough, Memoir, p. 117.
5. Goodenough to Goschen 2,xii.l873. Private (copy). H*c#3o/6/44 P.4*
6* 1st. Progress Report 13.ii*1874. C0/808/2 p. 60.
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a time of great difficulty"
Layard did not arrive until 1 January 1874» so this gave Goodenough six weeks
to tour the islands and talk to the settlers. Re found them so opposed to the
1
Government that he reported privately, "I have consequently had the disagreeable
task of keeping the contending sides asunder in this quarrelsome... little place
which is full of idle penniless people on the one hand and rather highhanded
2
government men on the other". He decided that annexation by either Hew South
Wales or New Zealand would be objectionable and thought that Fiji should be made
a Crown Colony under a politico-military officer with North-West Frontier 
3
experience. Layard agreed with the Commodore when he arrived and privately he 
urged annexation in a letter to Wylde:
"for God's sake let there be no delay after our report is sent it,
or I shall not be able to restrain these folk, and they will one 
side or the.other draw blood. If it is 'nay1, nothing can stop 
a fight". 4
The commission began its self-appointed task of securing annexation in January
1874 by publishing their intentions. They announced, in language which Goodenough
5
admitted "looks babyish" , that they were "two chiefs" come to enquire whether 
the Fijians wanted annexation, that their object was the peace and welfare of Fiji. 
But their intentions were unmistakeable:
"It is no new thing for England to govern Islands like Fiji. She owns 
and governs in several parts of the world a great number of similar 
Islands to Fiji, and it will be very easy for her to govern Fiji, and 
preserve its peace, and promote the welfare and prosperity of its people.
But England will never take Fiji by force or stealth if the king and 
chiefs do not wish to give it... 
i But there is one matter to be considered by the king and chiefs of 
Fiji, they must know that the number of Foreigners in Fiji will greatly 
increase from year to year* as well as their property, and their residence 
in Fiji will causa* or create, great intricacies, and for these reasons
1. Goodenough to Ad. 14.1.1874. c^pv in F0/58/l42 p. 371.
2* Goodenough to Milne 27.xii.1873. Private (extract). PRO.30/6/44 p. 11.
3. Abstract of letters to Goschen in Hunt to Carnarvon 22.V.1874. Ibid. p.20.
4. Layard to Vylde 14.1.1874. Private. F0/5e/l39 p. 0^.
5. Goodenough's Journal, III, 14.i.l874.
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the king and chiefs must think and study well over the matter, whether 
they will be able to conduct their^government in the future, under more 
difficult circumstances, Or not".
Like Clarke in Malaya, Goodenough had been sent to inquire and report, but Tike
Clarke at Pengkor, and during the same week, he had decided to solve the problem
and report afterwards. He tried, in fact, to persuade the chiefs to accept
annexation.
This was not easy. The commission's first Progress Report (13 February 1874)
indicated that after their meeting with Thurston, Ma'afu and Thakombau on 26
January they thought a request for annexation might follow soon. Hut Goodenough
would not agree to the salaries and position demanded by Thakombau and the chiefs,
and the second Progress Report (19 March 1874) announced the rejection of
annexation. The crucial meetings,when the Fijian chiefs gathered to consider
whether to accept annexation, took place in the early days of March 1^ 74. Once
again the evidence is conflised and contradictory, but the P.ev. ^.Langham told
Goodenough on 1 March that he suspected that Thurston and the Government were
2
scheming against annexation. Apparently on the 2nd Thurston told four leading
chiefs, "openly I have said that I am in favour of annexation, but you know that
3
I am not and that I can keep the government going". Goodenough was told that on
the 3rd the Ministers spoke against annexation and that Thakombau lost his temper 
4
with them and said "I will send for the Commodore tomorrow morning, and give the
5
country to Britain". The commissioners attended on the 5th, and when the chiefs
1. Correspondence between Commission and Chiefs, published by Thurston 12.1.1874. 
F0/58/l39 P*33. This is the letter on which Ward seems to have based his 
criticisms. In the FO. Tenterden wrote, 10.iii.1874: "I thought that layard 
and Goodenough were to inquire and report not invite a plebiscite for annexation 
Herbert said the same in the CO. and Lowther said they would have to bear this 
strong bias in mind when they saw the report.
2. Goodenough's Journal, III, l.iii.1874*
3. Statement by Langham, Journal, IV, 29*ix.1874.
4. Statement by Moore, Journal, III, 3.iii.l874.
5. Statement by Swanston, Journal, III, ll.iii.1874.
356
I
wanted to know their position in a British colony, Layard explained the system
in Ceylon. Ma'afu advocated annexation and Thakombau seemed disposed to accept,
but that night some of the chiefs, and possibly Thurston and Woods, caused him
to change his mind. On 6 March annexation was formally rejected, the Government
resigned, and Thurston was asked to assume the government himself.^ Thurston's
actions are not easy to explain. Professor Henderson believed that he was
motivated by vanity and personal ambition to be the despotic ruler of Fiji.
2
But Sir Arthur Gordon's Judgement on Thurston should not be despised, and it
should be pointed out that Goodenough certainly appeared to be forcing the pace
with Thakombau, while he placed the interests of the settlers very high. In his
first argument with Thurston the Commodore said the British Government "had a
paramount duty to perform to English residents, that was the raison d'etre of
3
being here at all". Yet it hard to avoid the conclusion that for some reason 
Thurston did not want annexation at this stage, and had deceived the commissioners. 
He had a week of acrimonious correspondence with Layard while Goodenough went off 
to assist a steamer aground at Kandavu. When the Commodore returned he told 
Swans ton on 11 March that he had "tried to believe in Thurston's straightforwardness 
but have not been able to do so, I am convinced of the contrary now from all that
4
he has done". The Commodore, therefore, decided to defeat Thurston: "we forbid
Mr Thurston accepting office. Should he persist we then remove him for a while to
5
his plantation... It is the wily way". He began secret negotiation with Thakombau
1. 2nd Progress Report 19.iii.1674, with memo, on meeting (based on the Journal) 
C0/806/2 pp. 74-78.
2. See above p. 2.61.
3. Goodenough's Journal, II, 26.xi.1873.
4. Journal, III, ll.iii.1874.
5. Ibid. 12-.iii.1874. Cf. Henderson.(Hist, of >;ovt. in Fiji. II, p.A78) : "The 
truth would appear to be that, at this stage of his career, he [Thurston).was 
not the kind of man who should have been entrusted with supreme power. The 
moral qualities of his nature were too liable to be overborne by vanity and 
vindictiveness, and also by anxiety for his own advancement and aggrandisement".
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through Lieut. Oliver R.M. and Marshall Moore, and on 14 March 1874 he heard that
Thakombau was willing to ask the chiefs to reconsider the matter.* Me met
Thakombau on the 17th and next day, after a tense meeting with Thurston, accepted
2
"the disclaimer of had intention" which the latter made. He shortly heard
(although he did not believe it) that Thurston was trying to get the chiefs to
withdraw their refusal of annexation. Put Thurston was true to his word, and
Goodenough wrote, "That liar is a good deal cleverer than I am, having the native
3
chiefs, at his back".
Thus Goodenough's patience and persistence were rewarded. On 20 March 1874
the commission accepted provisionally the cession of ^iji to Great Britain.
Important conditions were attached, which would be unaccepteble in London, for
Thakombau offered "the Government of the Islands, but not the soil or the Fijian
4
people", but the commission had taken a big unauthorised step and they accepted.
Goodenough was sure he had done right and wrote, "now I must work heart and soul
to get the Govt, to take the islands or all will be worse than before, a great 
5deal worse".
The new situation in Fiji at the end of 1873 and Goodenough's early bias in 
favour of annexation was obvious to Carnarvon all along. Although he was genuinely 
interested in the colonial empire, he was by no means pleased with the Commodore's 
efforts. After seeing his private letters to Goschen, he consulted "Derby at the 
Foreign Office^ and telegraphed to the Governor of r.’ev South Wales to warn 
Goodenough that hoisting the flag as a protectorate would complicate matters, and
1. Journal, II, 14.iii.1874.
2. Ibid. 18.iii.1874. 3. Ibid. 19.iii.1874.
4. Goodenough & Layard to Carnarvon 20.iii.1874. CO/83/5,
5. Journal, III, 21.iii.1874,
6. Carnarvon to Derby 23.ii,1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/8 p. 10.
353
that no steps should be taken until the hone Government considered the matter.^
Kiss Drus suggests that Goodenough may have received this bef re the 20 March
2cession and ignored it, but this is most unlikely* Carnarvon told a deputation
of the Aboriginies Protection Society, who saw him on 6 March 1374 to give their
views on the Gold Coast and Fiji policies, that he was awaiting the Commission's
report, but he made the significant statement that annexation for Fiji would not
3necessarily solve the labour traffic in the South Seas* Thus at this early stage, 
even before he had decided about Fiji, he had realised the problem which he would 
later meet with the Western Pacific High Commission*
The first Progress Report indicating that the commissioners favoured a crown 
colony in Fiji reached the Colonial Office on 7 April 1374» and caused Holland to
4
say that they were not dealing with the instructions. But even greater shocks
were in store, for next day, on 8 April, the telegram arrived announcing the
5
preliminary cession of 20 March 1874* The matter was immediately prepared for 
the Cabinet and Carnarvon warned Disraeli that the time approached for a decision 
on Fiji.^
The picture began to look as it had in Gladstone’s day: Colonial Secretary 
telling Prime Minister the natter was urgent, commissioner's report being made 
the excuse for delay; then on 14 April the redoubtable McArthur calling attention 
in the Commons to newspaper reports of the 20 March cession* Carnarvon hedged 
when he reported to the Lords on 20 April by saying that he had no official 
confirmation and that the commissioners appeared to have disobeyed their orders.
He agreed, as had Gladstone and Kimberley before, that Mew Zealand experience
1. Carnarvon to Robinson(tg) 23.ii.1374 (copy) FO/58/142 p. 323.
2. Drus, op. cit. p. 105, fn. 4. The letter from the Gov. of N.S.W. with the 
substance of the telegram is pasted in the Journal, III, at 6.iv.lB74.
Goodenough told Carnarvon it arrived after the cession (Private 18.iv.1374, 
PR0.30/6/44 p. 18) and judging by his character it is unlikely he lied to the
Sec. of State, specially when the Gov.of N.S.V. knew all about it.
3* The Times. 7.iii.l874* clipping in CO/83/5.
4. Ibid. Goodenough & Layard to Carnarvon 13*ii*1374, and minutes.
5. Ad. to PO. 8.iv.l874. with telegram. FO/58/1444 p. 448.
6. Carnarvon to Disraeli 11.iv.1874. Private (copy). PR0.^0/6/ll p. 9.
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would be born in mind.*
The Good enough-!^ ) yard report did not arrive until 10 June 1874 and Carnarvon
revealed no opinions until then. But in the Colonial Office there was hostility
to the preliminary cession* When they heard that the debts of the Fiji Government
2
amounted to £87,145* 9• 2. , one member of the Office thought the whole affair
was an intrigue by Thurston who was holding °ut for better terras* Holland was
especially hostile, and when Herbert read the terms of the cession he saw Britain
left with "apparently little more than the high privilege of governing at the
3cost of this country". Still silent in May, Carnarvon agreed it was a "difficult 
question", but he insisted on awaiting the report.^ On 18 May Robinson
5
telegramed to say that the Government of Hew South Wales demanded annexation.
By the end of May 1874 the question became so urgent in London, with conflicting
opinions being pressed from all sides, that Carnarvon wrote to Goodenough saying
the Progress Reports and the 20 March cession made him await the full report with
"increased anxiety".^
When it arrived, the Report was accompanied by a private letter. Aside from
the usual arguments on the commercial possibilities of Fiji, its position for
trans-Pacific steamer lines, its strategic position for suppressing kidnapping,
Goodenough said that the lawlessness of the British settlers pointed to annexation.
If Consuls like Jones had had magisterial powers years before a well-ordered
7
white community might have grown up, but now it was too late. The actual report 
was a somewhat unsystematic document, but bearing in mind the commissioners * aim 
(their own version of it) it dealt with most of the problems which a new crown
1. 3 Hansard, ccxvii, cols. 544-5 ft 809-810.
2m Financial Report by Thos. Horton (Manager of Fiji Bank) ft Carl Sahl(German
Consul-Gen in Sydney I6.iii.1874. C0/808/l p.9.
3. Min. by Herbert on Goodenough ft Layard to Carnarvon 20.iii.1874. CO/83/5.
4» Ibid. Min* by Carnarvon 6.v*1874.
5. Robinson to Carnarvon (tg) 18.v.1874. C0/808/2 p. 103.
6. Carnarvon to Goodenough ft Layard 22.v.1874. Ibid. pp. 103-4.
7. Goodenough to Carnarvon 18.iv. 1874. Private. PRO.30/6/44 P. 17.
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colony administration would have to meet, although Goodenough later expressed
his dissatisfaction with it.* A short history of the recent government was not
hostile to Thurston; indeed it said that when he came to power in 1872 he had
the confidence of everybody. Where the commissioners quarrelled with Thurston
was on the realities of politics in Fiji. Thurston,they said, believed in a
theoretical unity in the islands with Thakombau governing through his ministers
in the interests of the Fijians. The commissioners, while sympathetic,to the
theory, found that in practice the Fijians did not appreciate the ministers’
efforts. They summarised recent history in Fiji as follows:
"A native chief has been raised to supreme power, by the white population.
In working a constitution under him the latter have found themselves, as 
a matter of fact the disposers of the interests of the natives. A Ministry 
which at first rested on the support of the whites, has, by raising an armed 
force, felt it possible to make itself independent of them, and has sought 
to govern the country on the theory of preserving native interests and 
treating whites as aliens. In the coursepOf two years they have spent 
about £124,000 and are £87,000 in debt".
If Fiji were not annexed, the report went on, the Consul would have to receive
magisterial powers and R.NVvessels would have to be employed to nurge the labour
traffic of abuses, but this would amount to a protectorate and a "Protectorate
3
of an undefined and inconvenient character". Since there was an almost unanimous 
demand for annexation Fiji should be made a crown colony on the Ceylon or 
Singapore model. Here was a clearly stated conclusion; the rest of the report 
concerned all the various problems - financial, administrative -which would have 
to be solved. In the same mail as the Report came despatches from the nearby
i
British colonies; Premier Parkes of Hew South Vales supported annexation because
of Fiji’s commercial and strategic position and from a vague fear of foreign 
4
intervention, and Governor Fergussen of Hew Zealand reminded Carnarvon that the
1. Re-reading it 15 Sept. 1874 he wrote; "It is too staccato ft does not suffic­
iently show my own opinion for my own justification?. Journal, IV, 15.ix.1874.
2. Goodenough ft Layard Report, 13.iv.1874. CO/808/3 p.4.
3# Ibid. p.6.
4. Robinson to Carnarvon 10.iv.1874. i C0/20l/577.
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Fiji Banking and Commercial Company, which had lent money to the Fiji Government, 
was a New Zealand concern.*
As Carnarvon did not announce the Conservative Government’s policy until 
he spoke to the House of Lords on 17 July 1874, and since he kept silent in 
public until then, it is impossible to discover when he really made up his mind 
over Fiji. He was perturbed by Goodenough’s activities but he seemed to put off 
a decision until after the Report arrived. Yet he told a strong deputation
from the "Fiji Committee" and the Aborigines Protection Society which he saw on
2
4 July 1874 that the whole question of annexations was being considered as the
"waste places of the earth were being filled up", but he had no comprehensive
policy of annexations; each case would be judged on its merits..
His undated memoranda indicate that it was after this deputation that Camarvor
4
seriously formulated his policy. On 6 July he told Disraeli’s secretary that a
5Cabinet decision was urgent, and on the 9th he sent Derby, Salisbury and 
Disraeli the draft of a telegram for Governor Robinson of New South *Tales 
instructing him to visit Fiji, tell the inhabitants that the preliminary cession 
with its conditions could not be accepted, and to find out of an unconditional 
cession was possible. The telegram was not actually sent until 10 August, but 
clearly it was early in July that Carnarvon made up his mind to accept Fiji if 
it was offered without conditions. Interviewing people acquainted with the
g
islands, and reading up on the subject for the past months, he had satisfied
1. Fergussen to Carnarvon 13.iv.1874. 00/ 808/2 p. 184.
2. Including McArthur, and his brother Alexander; others MP's, Dixon, Young, Salt, 
Jenkins, Kinnaird, Corry; some colonial representatives; and Rev. W.B.Boyce 
Gen. Secretary of the Wesleyan nissionary Society.
3* The Times. 4.vii.l874.
4. In the Carnarvon Papers,(PRO.30/6/5l), some jottings about the discussion with 
the deputation, possibly made during the meeting, serve roughly to date these 
notes, which were obviously also used in drafting his speech in the Lords.
5. Carnarvon to Corry 6.vii.l874. Disraeil Papers, XII.
6. He summarised Goodenough’s letters to the Admiralty, and Layard *s to the FO.
He Interviewed naval men like Stirling, Goodenough’s predecessor, and he read 
books like Seeoann’s Viti and Britton’s Fiji in 1870 - a collection of articles 
from the Sydeny Morning Herald. He also made his own summary of the Report.
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himself that there were good reasons for annexation:
"I. Convenient depot from wh. to exercise police supervision.
2. English settlers - English capital - English crime - wanted an English 
Government... chaos in prospect.
3. Kidnapping.
4. A convenient stepping stone.
5* Objection by Australians to foreign neighbours.
6. Desire of Aust and NZ for them to become British.
7. H. of C.
8. Probably ultimately paying - like other group of islands like 
Bahamas etc etc wh. do just pay even with their Assemblies. But 
if governed as Crown Colony it may pay better.
9. Tolerably healthy.
10. Although it does not: wholejkidnapping area it does fonn centre of 
it - and where employed".
He also scribbled - "But not a question of money. Mission of England. A spirit
2
of adventure fill up waste places of earth". Moreover lie was assured of the
general assistance of Hew South Wales,and Hew Zealand specifically offered to 
3
govern Fiji. Carnarvon possibily thought the annexation of Fiji could be made
into an act of imperial co-operation.
The decision was made public when Carnarvon presented the Commission’s Report
in the House of Lords on 17 July 1874. He announced that the Government could
not decline the offer of cession; that a Crown Colony "of rather a severe type"
was the only system of government that could be entertained. His speech wa3
delivered with a curious modesty and its theme was reminiscent of his speech on
the Gold Coast policy.
"I am loathe to use words which seem too strong for the occasion and 
therefore I hardly like to say that England has a mission to extend her 
policy of colonization in this part of the world, but at all events it 
does seem to me that there is an indirect duty which lies upon us, as far 
as we can, to take under our protection a place into which English capital 
has overflowed, in which English settlers are resident, in which, it must 
be added, English lawlessness is going on, and in which the establishment 
of English institutions has been unsuccessfully attempted...." ^
1. Memoranda H10.30/6/51 p. 23 (back) & 24.
2. Ibid. back of p.22.
3. Robinson to Carnarvon 14*v.l874. PRO.30/6/25 p.59. Ferguss®n to Carnarvon
13.iv.1874. CO/209/232. Herbert at first wrote on the latter (ll.vi.1874),
"Yes, Hew Zealand might be able to govern Fiji better and more cheaply than 
this country could".
4. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 185.
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Here was a touch of the grandeur of "that greatest of all political questions - 
the unity and maintainance of the Empire1* y e t  Carnarvon insisted that the case 
had been judged solely on its merits and should not be linked with his Gold Coast 
speech on 12 May. Kimberley made a non-committal speech for the Liberals, but 
could hardly have objected to a policy which was virtually his own. Granville
2was not so enthusiastic, fearing "a leap into the dark at a very long distanceH.
McArthur was listening to Carnarvon's statement and he returned to the Commons
chamber greatly excited. On 4 August 1874 he moved the House to support the
decision to send Robinson to Fiji and so doing he gave Gladstone the onportunity
to make a final onslaught at annexation. The Goodenough-Leyard Report, he said,
was one of the most chaotic public documents he had ever seen - even if his
understanding of it was not particularly thorough. It spoke of the Fijian as
being in a relation of "undefined serfdom" to the chiefs; what was this but
another napie for slavery? The question of Thakombau's debts, which, as everyone
had now forgotten, was at the bottom of the Fiji involvement, might bring the
country to the threshold of another Alabama crisis with the U.S.A. "I see
disagreeable and distorted phantoms stalking across the stage of this House. T
see new Votes in the Estimates - new Votes for future wars in Fiji - new Votes
for future engagements - a reproduction in aggravated form of all we have had to
3lament in New Zealand". McArthur, his motions, his pamphlet, and his "sadly 
deluded philanthropy" did not escape his party leader's scorn. Kn^tehbull-Uugessen 
reminded the House of Kimberley's four alternatives, and said that since three 
had failed annexation alone remained. The Gold Coast policy was alluded to by
cafe of ti-a.
many of the speakers and one pointed to the apparent paradox that in theAGold Coast 
it was pleaded that they could not retreat from commitments on the coast: here
1. Carnarvon to K-Hugessen 18.viii.l074» (copy). PRO.30/6/44 p.145.
2. 3 Hansard, ccxxi, col. 197.
3. Ibid.col. 1287.
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there was no commitment, but the House was asked to enter one. One member 
wanted to leave the "Methodists and cannibals" to settle matters between 
themselves.
Disraeli noted the tone of the debate and no doubt remembered his difficult
moments over the Gold Coast policy. The Cabinet was pre-occupied with internal
ruptions over the Public Worship Bill and Disraeli was not happy at the idea
of the imperial Treasury guaranteeing the initial expenses of Crown Colony
government in Fiji. Thus first a Cabinet meeting, then the whole question
was "indefinitely postponed". Carnarvon protested on 7 August 1874 and complained
that "after all, the matter resolved itself into one of confidence in the
judgment of the Minister who is responsible",'*’ so Disraeli told him he would
2leave Fiji "entirely in your hands".
As soon as he received this assurance from the Prime Minister Carnarvon
sent the telegram which had been drafted in July before the Lords debate.
Disraeli was out of humour at this time after the tiring Parliamentary session
and the Cabinet troubles, and he was out of town. As with other matters he
placed complete trust at this stage in Carnarvon. Nevertheless he must have
been rather startled with Carnarvon's speed with Fiji. The telegram was sent to
Robinson*a3 30on as Disraeli's letter was received, and by the time the Frjjne
Minister was back in London for the autumn Cabinets Fiji was annexed.
Sir Hercules Robinson reached Fiji on 23 September. He found there was still
some opposition to the cession, but he evidently made an excellent impression
on the chiefs; where Goodenough had been diffident and kept offering help and
asking Thakombau if he had any questions, Sir Hercules was masterly and 'chief- 
3
like'. , Ke had a frank discussion with Thakombau on board HMS Dido on 25
1. Carnarvon to Disraeli 7.viii.l874* Disraeli Papers, XII.
2. Disraeli to Carnarvon 8.viii.l374, quoted in Hardinge, Life of Carnarvon.
II, p.74.
3. See account of overheard conversation in David Wilkinson to Hutchins 22.x.1874 
(copy) in PRO.30/6/25 p. 75.
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September, who said HIf matters remain as they are Fiji will become like a piece
of driftwood in the sea and be picked up by the first passer by".* The Kin#
consulted his council, and on 28 September offered the islands unconditionally
to the governor. The Deed of Cession was signed on 30 September 1874, Fiji vas
proclaimed a Crown Colony on 10 October, and Thakombau symbolized the passing of
the old regime in Fiji by presenting his favourite war club to Queen Victoria.
Carnarvon was able to report the successful annexation of Fiji to Disraeli
in the same letter as he requested permission to go ahead with the abolition
2
of slavery on the Gold Coast. Disraeli was impressed; "He seems very busy
3
annexing provinces to the finpire"... "Carnarvon seems to be distinguishing himself?
Kimberley and Knatchbull-Hugessen both seemed pleased; it was a3 if their own
4
prophesies had been fulfilled, and even Gladstone promised to stop making trouble
when he learnt that his friend Sir Arthur Cordon had accepted the governorship,
as he drew a "strong distinction between the policy of annexation and the execution
5
of that policy when determined on". Carnarvon was delighted with Robinson’s 
successful visit to Fiji - "It is like a dream"
Carnarvon refuses Rotuma. Samoa and New Guinea.
After deciding on the annexation of Fiji, Carnarvon turned to settle the other
outstanding questions concerning the South Pacific. Rotuma islanders had asked 
7
for annexation, New Zealand still covetted Samoa, Australians were looking
1. Robinson to Carnarvon 3.x.1874. CO/83/5.
2. Carnarvon to Disraeli 6.x. PR0.30/6/ll p. 26.
3. To Lady Bradford 18.x.1874 & Lady Chesterfield 20.x*1874. Zetland, The Tatters 
of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and lady Chesterfield. I# pp.
4* Kimberley to Gladstone 4.xi.l874. Gladstone Papers 44225/1*54. Braboume 
Diary pp. 732-733.
5. Gordon to Carnarvon l.xill874. Private. PRO.30/6/39.
6. Carnarvon to Disraeli 27.x.1874. Disraeli Papers XTI.
7. A request from the Wesleyan Rev. John Osborne (5.viii.l8T2) that the chiefs 
feahed the French and wished Britain to take possession was in Ad. to CO.
19.ii. 1873 (CO/201/575)* Kimberley out off the decision until after Fiji was 
settled, and later said they should consider it along with the Thurston letter 
of Jan. 1873, but this w*s not done. Herbert reminded Carnarvon in Oct. 1^ 74.
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anxiously at New Guinea, Vogel continued to press for the Chartered Company, but
although after the Ooodenough-Layard Report Carnarvon had seemed anxious to
complete the annexation of Fiji, he opposed further annexations In the Pacific.
"For the present at least I think we may leave Rotuma beyond the limits of the
Empire", he wrote, "the day may come when it and possibly other islands may be
included but this is hardly yet".* Indeed, if Rotuma was included in the Fiji
Islands he thought it might alarm people as a ’new annexation*• Future expansion
in the Pacific, then, was not ruled out, but for the present Carnarvon regarded
Fiji as a trial case of administration of a Pacific island,
A few days after the Rotuma decision Herbert suggested that Carnarvon should
answer all schemes of the Vogel type by saying:
"the establishment of a separate Colonial Government in Fiji will 
afford HMG increased facilities for considering requirements of 
this country & British subjects in the Pacific, and for the present 
you are not prepared to decide for or against any particular schemes 
for the development of British influence among the islands".^
Yet if Herbert personally disliked Vogel and agreed in principle that a halt
should be called for a time to annexation in the Pacific while experience was
gained in Fiji, he was still interested in Samoa and New Guinea and the idea of
the Chartered Company. He said the New Guinea question might be solved by such
a company, and if Vogel’s desire for New Zealand’s control over Samoa was not
seriously entertained in London, it is evident that the American interest in
Samoa gradually convinced Herbert that there must be some value in the group.
Therefore neither the Trading Company schema nor Samoa were rejected out of hand
in 1874. It was not until August when, after sending Robinson to Thakombau,
Carnarvon decided that Fiji would be enough for the time being.
The fall of Gladstone’s Government had caused Vogel’s scheme for the South
1.*Min. by Carnarvon l.xi.1874 on FO. to CO. 21.iii.lB73. CO/83/3.
2. Min. by Herbert 7.xi.l874 on Ferguasen to Carnarvon 24.vi. 1874. CO/209/232.
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Pacific chartered company to be dropped in mid-stream. Gladstone's own slightly
favourable reception of the idea was not intimated to the New Zealanders, so
Vogelfa plan was yet another of the problems confronting Carnarvon in his first
days of office. He was given the papers concerning both Samoa and the Trading
Company on 25 February 1874, when he also read of Col. Steinbergers first visit
to Samoa and the fact that he returned to the U.S.A. with a petition from the
foreign residents requesting an American protectorate. But Goodenough, who had
called at Samoa on his way to Fiji,^ had played-down the Steinberger visit and
the idea of an American protectorate; he believed the Americans were only
2
interested in Pago Pago harbour. Herbert also thought it unlikely that the 
Americans would assume a protectorate, but if they created a precedent for 
responsibilities so far from home, he had the impression that Samoa was a better 
bargain than Fiji. And "as it is not likely that we shall take possession in 
any form of the Navigators Islands, we may be well satisfied to sea the Americans 
there"
Herbert's attitude to the proposed chartered company is difficult to define.
When he showed Carnarvon the unsent draft of 6 February which embodied Gladstone's
and Kimberley's views, he said he thought Vogel was advocating "a very speculative
4
and audacious policy". Tet on other occasions he was attracted to the idea 
of the company. Carnarvon trod very cautiously: "Visionary - dangerous - open
5
to peculation & corruption etc", he noted. The despatch with Gladstone's views 
said the Government was prepared to consider a chartered company and agreed that 
if it was approved it would be based in Australasia.^ Carnarvon sent a much 
more guarded despatch. He objected to the intended monopoly, to the obvious
1. .Goodenough's Journal, I, 6 to 8.xi.l873.
2. Goodenough to Admiralty 14.xi.1873 in Ad. to CO. 20.ii.1874. CO/83/5.
3. Min. by Herbert 25.ii.1874 on FO. to CO. 21.11.1874. C0/209/233.
4. Memo, by Herbert 25.ii.1874 on Fergussen to Kimberley 24.xi.1873. C0/200/?30.
5. Memo. 26.ii.1874. Carnarvon Papers. PRO.30/6/51 P.3.
6. Draft by Herbert 6.11.1874 on Fergussen to Kimberley 24.xi.1873. CO/209/230.
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political ambitions of the company to build great dominions like India and
Canada.* These objections were included in the reply to Vogel's memorandum
of 23 November 1873# which was finally sent on 5 March 1874. Gladstone's
invitation to send further details remained? Carnarvon said the British Government
could not resist the creation of new settlements "within a reasonable distance
of the Australasian colonies", but since foreign powers were involved in the
commerce of the islands too, great caution was needed. Herbert's hand can surely
be detected in the final paragraph: HI need not inquire how far the term
neighbouring is applicable to such distances as the interval between the islands
«2
and New Zealand or Australia. Vogel's scheme,then, was not rejected, but he
received no encouragement to rash action. Carnarvon probably handled Vogel with
more finesse than Kimberley did. Both Samoa and the ■trading Company were
quietly put off once again until after the Fiji decision.
Yet Samoa still seemed to hold some fascination for the Colonial Office.
When they read a copy of Steinberger's report to President Grant in June 1874,
Herbert wrote, HI believe there is no doubt that this is a better group of
3
Islands than Fiji". In fact, when it became evident that Congress would not 
accept the petition for American protection he wondered "whether we should not 
(if a Colonial Government is established in Fiji) acquire the harbour". Lowther 
suggested they should make the Fiji decision an opportunity for considering a
4
general policy for the South Pacific. The nearest approach to a general policy 
for the area, however, was in fact Vogel's plan for a chartered company, and in 
August 1874 Carnarvon decided that he had too much trouble on his hands in Fiji 
and that Vogel's company would only complicate matters at this stage. Carnarvon's 
general policy was embodied in the Western Pacific High Commission which fell 
short of Vogel's dreams, but did gain the letter's approval.
1. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 26.ii.1874. 2. Ibid. Draft by Herbert 5.iii.l°74.
3. Win. by Herbert 12.vi.1874 on TO. to CO. 2.vi.l074. C0/209/233.
4. Mins, by Herbert & Lowther 22.vi.1874. on FO. to CO. 19.vi.1874. Ibid.
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Vogel did not slacken in his advocacy of the company and possibly he alarmed 
the Colonial Office. When in May 1874 details arrived of a Bill embodying bis 
scheme before the New Zealand Parliament, Herbert wrote, "Mr. Vogel*s 
unscrupulousness and Sir J. Fergussen's pliability threaten us with a more 
awkward difficulty than we have in Fiji".^ Vogel had been quite frank. He 
looked to a mighty federated empire with irrisistible world-wide naval power, 
and he saw Dew Zealand as the natural metropolis of Polynesia. Since Great 
Britain would not move towards this (even though force of circumstance might 
force her to take Fiji) Vogel considered what New Zealand might do, "It seems 
to me", he wrote on 5 February 1874, "that New Zealand may earn for reluctant
Great Britain - without committing her to responsibilities she fears - a grand
2
island Dominion". To this end the New Zealand Government made an agreement
with Frederick Whitaker, a New Zealand financier who was also Chairman of the
Fiji Banking & Commercial Company, to form a joint stock company,with capital
of £1 million and headquarters in Auckland,to carry on business of merchants,
shipowners, planters, producers, manufacturers, brokers, agents, insurers,
bankers, and money lenders in the Pacific Islands, New Zealand and Great Britain.
The political motive was not mentioned in the Bill before the colonial Parliament,
but as Herbert did not fail to realise Vogel saw New Zealand in a "metropolitan
3
position in the Pacific". The same motive was obviously behind the creation
of the Fiji Bank,and the New Zealand offer to administer Fiji on the argument
that she was better fitted by proximity, racial experience and financial 
4
involvement.
Vogel’s frankness and persistence did not commend him to Whitehall. Lowther
5
said his scheme should be promptly 'snuffed out', and Herbert thought New
1. Win. by Herbert 17.v. 1874 on Fergussen to Kimberley 12.iii.1874. C0/20Q/232.
2. Vogel Memo. 5.ii.l874 in Fergussen to Kimberley 11.ii.1874. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Min. by Herbert 17.v*1874* 4* See above p,X%.
5. Min. by Lowther 18.v. 1874. on Fergussen to Kimberley ll.iii.1874 cited.
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Zealand’s answer to the despatch of 5 March was • impertinent’ • * In it the charge
of monopoly was answered by the remark that other colonies were at liberty to
subsidize similar companies. British enterprise in the Pacific, it went on,
could not be repressed; Britain should not check New Zealand because it was more
enterprising than the jealous Australian colonies. By the time Carnarvon read
this Robinson had already been sent to Fiji. The Colonial Secretary decided that
the problems of administration there were going to be too big to be complicated
2
by the new set of problems which the Trading Company would create. Therefore 
he wrote privately to the Marquis of Normanby, Fergussen’s successor as Governor
f
of New Zealand, telling him not to encourage Vogel, that Fiji was now an
3
additional reason for not going ahead with the chartered company. At the end
of 1874 Samoa was also taken from New Zealand’s hands and negotiations were
4
transferred to Berlin.
While the New Zealanders were looking far and wide over the South Pacific 
with particularly long glances at Samoa, the Australians were showing renewed 
excitement about New Guinea and also began to cast their eyes on the Pacific 
Islands. Therefore after annexing Fiji, and quieting the New Zealanders over 
Samoa and the company, Carnarvon had to formulate a policy in the even more 
tricky case of New Guinea.
o
The Dutch claimed West New Guinea up to the line of Meridian 141 , but the 
South-eastern end of the island had been surveyed by the Royal Navy. The
1. Min. by Herbert ll.vii.1874 on Fergussen to Carnarvon ft.v.1874. Secret. C0/209/ 
232. From the tone of the despatch Herbert suspected it was Vogel’s work.
2. Ibid. Min. by Carnarvon 28.viii.1874 <3k Carnarvon to Fergussen 4.ix.l874. (draft;
3. Carnarvon to Normanby 20.viii.1874* Rrivate ft Confid. (copy). PR0.30.6/25 P» 30.
4. A Vogel memo* 22.vi.1874 re-iterating New Zealand’s ambitions to beat the 
Americans to Samoa and expressing fears of Germany was given the reply that 
Fiji was to be a trial case in the Pacific. (Fergussen to Carnarvon 24.vi. 1874 
ft Carnarvon to Fergussen 11.xi.1874 (draft). CO/209/233)* In Dec. 1874 von 
Bulow gave assurances that Germany was not officially interested in Samoa.
Ibid. FO. to CO. 18.xii.1874.
i
371
Admiralty had begun its survey's in Torres Strait in 1842 when this route was
used increasingly by ships plying between New South Wales and India and China.
Between 1845 and 1850 Captain’s Blackwood of HMS Fly# Yule of HMS Bramble and
Owen Stanley of HMS Rattlesnake had charted parts of the coast of South-east
New Guinea.* In 1846 Yule of the Bramble ran up the Onion Jack, taking formal
possession(in the vague, informal, R.N. way) of the South-east coast of the 
2
island. As shipping through the Straits increased and pearl fisheries developed
the Queensland Government founded a settlement at Somerset,near Cape York, in
1864 with Imperial and Colonial financial help. The post was founded to police
Torres Strait and assist ships in distress, although some optimists thought it
3would become another Singapore.
Before Disraeli's 1874 government there had been four abortive schemes to 
colonise East New Quinea. The first began in the spring of 1867, when, after 
a public lecture in Sydney, a New Guinea Company began to organise a ’Pioneer 
Expedition' to trade with the Papuans, explore the island and to pave the way 
for land purchases and settlement. The company urged the imperial government 
to confirm Yule’s informal annexation and it asked for imperial grants to pay 
for some scientists and teachers in New Guinea. No material support was forth­
coming from Henry Parkes, the Premier of New South Wales, who passed the matter
4
to the home government with a vague blessing.
In the Colonial Office Rogers deplored the stated aim of the company to 
drag the imperial government into more colonization. With Australia crying out 
for labour he thought it insane to throw lives and money into new tropical 
territory. Frederick Elliot threw the whole weight of his Colonial Office
1. Nemo, by Capt. Frederick Evans, Admiralty Hydrographer, 2.vii.l875* C0/808/ll 
p. 3•
2. Extract from Bramble’s log, 16.iv.1846 in Capt. Richards to Dealtry l .^vlii. 
1867. CO/201/542.
3. Koresby, New Guinea, p. 11.
4# Gov. Young to Buckingham 31-V.1867 & 22.vi.1867. C0/20l/542.
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experience against the scheme:
"For the last 27 years it has fallen to my lot, in one capacity or 
another, to see every important question about new colonies or 
acquisition of Native Lands, and... this Department has always 
steadily resisted the monstrous doctrine that private persons 
can buy vast tracts of country from helpless ^Natives for a bottle 
or two of rum and a few coats and trousers**.
Rogers for no immediately apparent reason thought a German colony in New
2
Guinea would be a good idea. Sir Charles Adderley agreed that help should
no be given to the Sydney venture, but he said they should not give an opinion
on the general question; "who shall say that New Guinea shall not be settled, or
3
that the Australian English should not settle it?** Buckingham agreed with 
Elliot and told the Australians what he also told those connected with similar 
projects in West Africa and Malaya: he was not concerned with travellers and 
explorers, but he could sanction no settlement, settlers should expect no 
protection and that th©y°ge{? no confirmation of land titles.^
The second New Guinea scheme took shape in March 1869 when J.A.Campbell 
formed a Trading Company to settle the interior of the island. He urged Sir 
Henry Keppel, commander of the China Station,to annex New Guinea. The Admiral 
supported the idea, suggesting to the Admiralty that Chinese immigrants could
5
be taken from Hong Kong, but the Foreign Office refused.
The third attempt was the ill-fated Maria expedition which wa3 wrecked off 
the Great Barrier Reef in February 1872. Seventy young men of Sydney formed the 
New Guinea Prospecting Association at the end of 1871. Being ignorant of ships, 
let alone exploration and settlement, their efforts ended in disaster.
The fourth period of interest came in 1873-4 after Captain Moresby*s
v , ■ - ■ ■ , ■ . ■ ■ ■ I
1. Ibid. Min. by Elliot 13.viii.1867 on Toung to Buckingham 22.vi.1867.
Ibid. Min. by Rogers 3.viii.l867 on Young to Buckingham Bl#v.l867.
3. Ibid. Min. by Adderley 13.iii.1867 on desp. of 22 June cited.
4. Ibid. Buckingham to Young 14.ix. 1867 (dr^ ft).
5. FO. memo, on N.G. in PO. to CO. 26.vi.1875. C0/808/l0 pp. 27-28.
6. Belmore to Kimberley 29.xii.1871. 00/20l/565. Cf. D.C.Gordon, The Australasia 
Frontier in New Guinea. 1870-1885 (1951) PP. 83-87.
373
discoveries, and the foundation of the first missionary settlements. In January 
1873 the Rev. William Wyatt Gill, of the L.M.S., reported to the Colonial 
Treasurer of New South Wales that the first South Sea Island teachers had been 
located on the South-east of New Guinea in November 1872.^ This missionary 
hoped, privately, that Great Britain would forstall the Germans, who were
already interested in the area. German missionaries had begun work in I855,
2but Godeffroy did not build its depot in New Britain until 1875. Gill believed
that one day Australia would take New Guinea, but that the time was not yet 
3
ripe. Another writer, named Rendall, reminded Kimberley in September 1873 of
Moresby's acquisitions; he had apparently asked Palmerston at an earlier period
to annex both Fiji and New Guinea, now he called on the Liberals to deny the
4
criticisms in the Crystal Palace speech. A few days after he received this 
Kimberley was confronted with the plans of Col. James Scott of Melbourne, who 
wanted to know what the Government would do with the territory annexed by 
Moresby. Would they confirm the purchase of 10,000 acres from the Papuans, and 
the privilege of selecting 10,000 acres to be paid for to the British Government 
at a price to be fixed in consideration of the risks he would incur? Herbert's 
only comment was, "Scoundrels*. Kimberley thought they had better find out
5
what Moresby had taken.
It is important to be clear that Moresby's discoveries were actually quite 
modest, but as his official report did not reach the Colonial Office until 
April 1874 exaggerated reports were allowed to circulate in Australia and England. 
Moresby was ordered to Torres ^trait to check kidnapping in September 1872. He
1. R.Lovett, The History of the London Missionary Society (1899)* I* p. 442.
2. Townshend, Origins of German Colonialism, p. 41.
3. Rev. Gill to G.A.Lloyd 28.i.1873 in Robinson to Carnarvon. Confid. 7.ix.l874,
co/ace/io p. 16.
4. Rendall to Kimberley 17.ix.1873. C0/20l/576.
5. Bowen to Kimberley 12.viii.1873. C0/309/ll0 4 Scott to Carnarvon 26.vi.1874.
C0/80^15 p. 26.
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reached Somerset in January 1873 and finding no kidnapping to 'check he decided
to go exploring in Mew Guinea, about which rumours had been flying in Sydney
before he left. There was talk of Russian or Italian intervention and an
expedition was said to be planning in San Francisco.* The boundary of the
Australian Station fell short of Mew Guinea by 15 miles, but Moresby claimed
later he had permission to visit Mew Guinea. The Eastern limit of his cruise
o
was fixed at Meridian 148 but he had authority to pass this should it be
necessary. Moresby decided to act on his own initiative. Reaching the TTsbome
River in February 1873 he chartered Port Moresby, which he named after his 
2
father, and in April he discovered that certain land formerly thought to be
part of the mainland constituted a series of islands. These he charted and
took possession of and he called the seaway between the China Strait, which he
3
thought would make a shorter route to China. Back at Sydney in July 1873 he
4
was reprimanded by Commodore Stirling, who apparently "cared nothing at all for 
5
hydrography”. This was all quite clearly understood in 1874, but in September 
1873 all the Colonial Office gathered was that in a private letter to the 
Admiralty hydrographer Moresby had spoken of #good harbours1, 1fertile land*,
g
•friendly natives* and •gold*. The Standard reported on 1 October 1873 that 
Moresby had annexed all his discoveries.
In the autumn of 1873 the Colonial Office only had the vaguest of pictures 
of Moresby’s exploits. Holland saw that it was obvious he had not annexed the 
whole island and he doubted whether they should recopnise what he had. Herbert 
on the other hand as a former Premier of Queensland was alive to Mew Guinea’s ,
1. Horseby, New Guinea, p. 168.
2. Moresby, Two Admirals (1909) P. 264.
3. Moresby, New Guinea, pp. 142-230.
4. Stirling to Admiralty 13.x.1873 (copy). C0/20l/578 rec’d in CO. 2o.iv.1874.
5. Good enough's Journal, I, 13.x. 1873. Goodenough was more sympathetic to 
Moresby, who he thought was ’tactless*; but he allowed Moresby to explore 
the North-east coast of New Guinea on his way home in 1874.
6. Ad. to CO. 15.ix.1873. C0/20l/575.
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importance to Australia. He was the one person in the Colonial Office who 
consistently advocated getting the South-east co*st before anyone else, and 
between 1873 and 1875 he produced ingenious scheme after ingenious scheme to this 
end. He said Moresby had done right, "otherwise, another power might have 
stepped in and taken the part most valuable ft nearest to Australia, leaving us
1
the part which we are less likely to require, the western end of the main island".
But nothing was done in 1873; although Kimberley supported annexation in the
case of Fiji, on the whole he deplored annexations in the Pacific. When he
tried to reconcile Gladstone about the annexation of Fiji in 1874, he admitted
that "the worst is we shall have pressure for further annexations in the Pacific",
2
and he cited the Australian clamour for New Guinea.
The New Guinea question was placed squarely before Carnarvon in March 1874
by Francis Labilliere, an Australian lawyer living in London. He had had some
discussions on New Guinea with men like Yule of the Bramble in the summer of
1873. and judging by the phrases used in his letter to Carnarvon he probably
knew the contents of Moresby's letters to the Admiralty. Realising that the
Gladstone- Government would probably rebuff him he had waited. >Tow in 1874 he
wrote to Disraeli and Carnarvon placing New Guinea in the context of Britain's
frontier in the tropics:
"good or bad, we cannot help having to do with [the Papuans)...for 
they must henceforth effect British interests much more than the 
Ashantees and the Fijians".
He said the Papuans should not be left to their own fate after what had happened
in Fiji. Annexation by Britain was their best hope and this would also be best
for imperial and colonial interests as New Guinea was a potential menace to
Australia. Even if the Government wished to adhere to the policy of non-extension
1. Min. by Herbert 15.X.1873 on Ad. to CO. 14.x.1873. co/309/111.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 4.xi.l874. Gladstone Papers 44225/154.
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Labilliere claimed that New Guinea was a good case for making an exception.
"Our most prosperous Colonies never exhibited to firat explorers such evidence 
of richness as New Guinea has displayed.
This was the strongest case for New Guniea yet made, and by this time the 
Admiralty had received Moresby’s official report. Deal try was able to borrow 
a copy for the Colonial Office. Herbert made Carnarvon quite clear as to his 
attitude:
"This is a much more important question to the Australian Colonies & 
to the Empire than that of the annexation of Fiji. The great wealth 
and extent of new Guinea and its close proximity to Australia render 
the question of its ownership a somewhat pressing one. I do not think 
there is any hope of our being able to keep clear of interference with 
Mew Cuinea. The brutalities of our traders must demand our frequent 
presence whenever they commence operations on its coasts. I do not at 
all anticipate that the occupation of New Guinea if judiciously entered 
upon need be very costly. If a settlement (which might in the first 
instance be a penal establishment for Australia) were made on the south 
eastern & healthy part of the coast, & our ships employed to control & 
regulate trading operations, we should probably spend much less than by 
letting matters drift until we have to interfere, 9t probably fight, on 
a larger scale". 2
How like Knatchbull-Hngessen this minute reads! Herbert suggested that they
3
should sound the opinions of the Australasian governors and Carnarvon agreed.
The replies were discourageing. The colonial governments vaguely endorsed
British expansion, but offered no help; to Hew Zealanders Hew Guinea was
4of secondary importance beside Polynesia, South Australia had no suggestions,
i
Western Australia was generally favourable but its governor did not think any 
Australian colony would take on the administration, and Governor Bowen of 
Victoria said the climate was not suitable for white settlement. Australians 
were interested in land, but Bowen agreed with Derby that Britain had ’black 
subjects enough*. As the Dutch claimed West New Guinea he was reminded of the
1. labilliere to Carnarvon 26.iii.1874. C0/808./l0 pp. 1-^ . He said that he also 
sent a copy to Disraeli.
2. Minute, by Herbert 3.iv.l874. C0/234/34.
3. Circular to Australasian Governors 17.iv.1874 . 00^808/10 p.4.
4. Fergussen to Carnarvon 2.vii.l874. 00^209/232.
5. C0/80S/10 p.6.
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Gold Coast troubles. Dutch settlements. in New Guinea might one day be a thorn
in the side^Slimina. Then the Dutch would have to he induced to give them up,
so that *New Guinea* would be as bad as *old Guinea*, and the Papuans would be
more formidable than the Ashantis.^ "
The most important answer came from New South T,rales. Henry Parkes, the
Premier, expressed the typical Australian view of expansion* Enclosing the
2
Rev* Gill*s 1873 letter with the German warning , he said there was no country
with such attractions as New Guinea, and that if it was colonized by foreigners
it would be an embarrassment to Australia, Sir Hercules Robinson (writing just
before he set off for Fiji) agreed that the annexation of New Guinea would be
popular, that Australia would benefit without having any expense, but he poured
scorn on the whole idea, Within 10 degrees of the equator New Guinea would
never be a home of white settlement; there was not even a white missionary* At
best it could become a Java or a Ceylon, He saw little likelihood of foreign
occupation, as any Power wanting naval bases would find more convenient islands,
and Britain could not stop this, "It is scarcely to be anticipated that Great
3
Britain will annex every available spot in the South Pacific"• Tn London
Herbert took up the cudgels again on behalf of the New Uuinea proposal. Searching
hard for a way out he disagreed heartily with Robinson,
"Perhaps Mr, Vogel's Polynesia Company might be developed into one in 
which all the Australasian colonies should unite for Colonization in 
Oceana generally,,. Sir H,Robinson does not surficiently appreciate 
the evil that will probably result from some European power claiming 
and annexing all non-Dutch New tminea. This is one of the dilemmas 
of Empire. The outcry will be loud when a Foreign Flag is hoisted ^
80 miles from Queensland. To hoist that of England need not be costly".
By the time Queensland replied to Carnarvon's inquiry in 1875 the New
1. Ibid. p. 10. Bowen to Carnarvon l.ix.X874»
2. See above p. ^73.
3. Robinson to Carnarvon 7.ix.l874, Confid. with Parkes Memo. 27.vii.1874.
00/201/577.
Ibid. Min. by Herbert 4*xi.lS74.
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Cuinea fever was also mounting in England. Queenslanders had little real
interest in New Guinea, but they were generally favourable to annexation. It
was felt that if Britain held back Germany, Italy, France, perhaps even Russia
or the U.S.A., might go ahead. By the time this view reached London even the
eager Herbert was getting exasperated by the Australian attitude.
"The prevailing idea of Australian statesmen appears to be that their 
country must perish if any Foreign Power hoists its flag within a week's 
steaming power of the shores of the great island continent; and that it 
is the duty of the British taxpayer to defray all the charges of the 
premature occupation of a country unsuited for white labourers. While 
the Australian taxpayer, who is much better able to pay, reaps the 
» commercial profit of the enterprise. But we are steadily drifting 
on this further annexation". *
Herbert was at a loss what to suggest. Clearly he wanted to keep the foreigners
off the South-east coast of New Guinea, but he did not want another administration
like Fiji to pay for.
Three days after Herbert wrote Carnarvon met a deputation from the Royal
Colonial Institute. Agreeing with many of their views, he reminded them what
had already been undertaken in the Gold Coast and Fiji and he pleaded for "some 
2
breathing time". His coolness was supported by the Admiralty hydrographer's
report, which was the fullest of all the Government papers on New Guinea. After
researches into the Dutch and French explorations it rejected Moresby's quick
route to Chin0 and the idea of docile Papuans. Herbert suggested another way
out. The securing of the coastline in the narrowest part of Torres Strait was
the most urgent matter. He suggested that the navy should make a careful survey
Of the coast opposite Cape York, "as it would seem desirable to secure the best
situation in that part, without prejudice to the question whether or not more
3
extended annexatior^ ahould take place". The idea was put to the foreign Office
on 6 August 1875» where Derby took the same attitude as Herbert. He had written
1, Min. by Herbert 26.iv.1875 on Gov. Cairns to Carnarvon 22.ii.1875. CO/2^4/^5.
The Times. 3.V.1875. P.6.
3. Min. by Herbert ll.vii.1875, CO/2O1/58O mi Memo, in Ad. to CO. 0.vii.lR75 
CO/808/11 p. 1-6.
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in July, "I don't like the notion of letting foreigners come so near to us. We
shall want New Guinea some day ourselves".^
Thus in 1875 the New Guinea question grew formidable, with expeditions being
planned in London, Sydney and Melbourne. In Sydney the veteran colonist, William
Macleay, organised a fruitless expedition. Col. Scott in Melbourne announced 
*
that he had already written to Bismarck and next would try Marshal MacMahon or
the Russian Emperor. In England a quasi-military expeditionary force was
organised by the New Guinea Colonization Association. On top of all this
Premier Roberston of New South Wales began to play the part of an Australian
2Vogel, A deputation led by the inevitable Dr. Lang had called on him on 19 May
1875 to support the Macleay expedition. Robertson had other ideas. Referring
back to the Australian answer to Kimberley's New South Wales plan for Fiji.* he
said that like Fiji, New Guinea was an imperial question. He ^ad not expected
Fiji to be annexed, let alone be provided with a Sir Arthur Gordon, but now that
the British Government had taken the plunge it could easily expand the duties
of the Governor of Fiji and make him Governor-General for all Polynesia. The
imperial government, he said, "having launched into the thing might as well deal
3
with the whole of Polynesia". And these were not simply the effusions of a
colonial politician to quieten a strong delegation; they were intended for the
Secretary of State. In a minute of 31 May 1875 Robertson wrote:
wKy coll^ues and myself venture respectfully to offer our opinion that
on many grounds it would be desirable in the highest interests of. 
civilization that Great Britain should, with as little delay as 
possible, take possession not only of the magnificent island of New 
Guinea, but of the islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and the chain 
if islands to the north-east and east of New Guinea from Bougainville 
of the Solomon Group, the group of the New Hebrides, including Kspiritu 
Santo, Mallicolo and Sandwich, with smaller adjacent islands, and the 
Marshall, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, to all of which the traffic from
1. Derby to Carnarvon 19.vii.1875* Private. Carnarvon Papers. PRO.30/6/8 p. 71.
2. See above p. 2-4-1.
3. Account of delegation in Sydney Morning Herald. 20.iv.1875#
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the port of Sydney extends*
It appears to us that a more extended domain over these waters on 
the part of the British Empire would be not only consistent with the 
maritime supremacy of England but would conduce much to the tranquility 
and peace of the Australian colonies.•• The question is wholly an 
Imperial one and it seems to us to regard it in any other light would 
neither conduce^to the satisfaction of the colonies, nor to the dignity 
of the Empire1*.
This was probably more than even Herbert bargained for, but throughout the 
summer of 1875 he kept reminding Carnarvon that a decision would have to be 
made about 'hoisting the British flag*.
In October 1875, when Col. Scott's threats arrived, Herbert thought it .lust 
possible that the man might interest a foreign Power, He therefore proposed an 
announcement of British 'paramountcy'. He suggested that a public despatch 
should be sent to Australia putting on record that
"the labours ft explorations of British officers ft men of science as well 
as other British subjects constitute a priority of claim which no 
unfriendly power could ignore; and that while the positive annexation 
of new Guinea to England... must be a question for very serious 
consideration... HMG can have no hesitation in saying that they could 
not recognize any pretension o^the part of any other Power to assume 
the sovereignty of the island".
Carnarvon said he would consult the Cabinet.
A few days after this on 10 October 1875, and presumably before Carnarvon
had done anything about it, the plans of the New Guinea Colonization Association
arrived. An expeditionary force under military discipline was envisaged, its
members to be recruited under the Volunteer Act as the 'New Guinea Volunteers'.
, Some of its officers were to be made J.P.*s under the ^iji Government. The 
association presented itself as a humanitarian venture, and claimed that the
Macleay expedition from Sydney (which actually failed) might lead to colonization 
*
like that in Fiji. The venture had influential support - the l>uke of Manchester. 
Stanley of Alderley, McArthur, Kinnaird, James Young WP. and Col. "orren MP. - it
1. Memo, in Kobinson to Carnarvon 3.vi.l875. C0/So8/l5 p.50.
2. Min. by Herbert 3.x.1875 on Scott to Carnarvon Q.vii.1875. C0/3oP/ll^.
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claimed too that both the East India Company and Hudson's Bay Company had
started on land less fertile then New Guinea.
The Colonial Office was* ?lak an in by what William Malcolm, the new third
Assistant under-secretary, called "a varnish of piety on the prospectus", which
did not conceal the real object which was "simply land jobbing speculation".*
It turned out that Lieut. Robert Armit R.N., the commander of the proposed
expedition had been dismissed his ship for insubordination, and the Admiralty
2
had received subsequent complaints about dishonoured bills. Malcolm made the
first serious study in the Colonial Office of the New Guinea question. His
conclusions were decisive: (l) as a place for colonization New Guinea was
valueless, (2) the commerce of Torres Strait was already securely protected by
the Somerset Settlement, (3) Moresby's route to China was unproven, and (4) there
was no reason to suppose that any foreign Power contemplated annexing Hew
Guinea. The association, therefore, received no encouragement from Carnarvon,
and it was further discredited when it was known to have been apnroached by
3
people who wanted guns run into the Philippines. Carnarvon decided it was a 
"filibustering expedition"; he told a Cabinet collogue that "at present I am 
prepared to resist the cry for annexation ft to get over the difficulties by 
other means".^
Hia'other means ' was the Western Pacific High Commission, which will be
discussed shortly. It probably fell short of what Herbert wanted, for one of
his many ideas was that Vogel's proposed Trading Company might be mad* into a
scheme for inter-colonial government in the Pacific Islands. But Vogel's reply
to this suggestion in November 1875 was unenthusiastic. True, the ever ingenious
New Zealander drew up a paper plan, but he admitted that New Zealand was
1. Win. by Malcolm 25.x.1875 on N.G.Assoc, to Carnarvon 9.x.1875. CO/2OI/58O.
f 2. Ad. to Co. 5.xi.l875. Ibid.
3. Carnarvon to N.G. Assoc. 30.X.1875. C0/808/l5 p.85.
4. Carnarvon to Cairns 30.x. 1875. Private (copy). PR0.30/6/6 p. 32.
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interested least of all in New Guinea, and he did not think an inter-colonial 
conference on the subject would be any use** Carnarvon’s answer to the English 
venture had already been given to the Colonization Association. TTis answer to 
the Australian colonies went to New South Wales on 8 December 1875*
2
In many ways it was more skillful than Kimberley's despatch on Fiji*
Carnarvon said (and in the main the colonial press accepted) what Kimberley had
wanted to say over Fiji, and also to the settlers in Natal and the Cape over
Basutoland and the diamond fields: 'It is in your interest - you pay*. "It is
simply impossible either for me to admit”, Carnarvon told the Australians, "or
to persuade the English people that the Australian Colonies have no special
interest in the annexation of New Guinea and that the responsibility of the
measure rests exclusively with the Imperial Government”. The only ground he
could see for hasty action was foreign annexation, but the U.S.A. did not look
like wavering from her traditional policy, and Germany had said she wanted no
colonies. It was unlikely that any other power would take New Guinea without
3
reference to Britain.
So Carnarvon successfully resisted New Guinea, as he had Rotuma and Samoa, 
but Herbert was not at all satisfied. When there was a French scare in 1876 he 
said they should not postpone annexation of the shore facing Cape York. Yet even 
Herbert had to admit "I feel at a loss for any really constructive suggestion”.
He realised the paradox of his position; ”if we delay annexation, the very 
serious risk is run of an almost immediate collision with Australia. If we are 
too hasty in annexing, we stimulate a rush of people to an almost uninhabitable
4
country, and saddle this Government with very heavy expense”. But Carnarvon's 
decision stood for a few years. The annexation of New Guinea had to ^ ait until
Queensland took the law into its own hands in 1883, and Bismarck entered the
1. Vogel to Herbert 18.X.1875. C0/209/234. 2. See above p.zsa-J.
3. Carnarvon to Robinson 8.xii.l875. C0/808/l5 pp. 93-4.
4. Min. by Herbert 24.vii.1876 on FO. to CO. 21.vii.1875. C0/20l/582.
lists in 1884.1
384
The origin of the Western Pacific High Commission.
Although Carnarvon successfully resisted the cry of further annexations in 
the Pacific, he did not ignore the need for some f oan of extended jurisdiction 
in the area. He realised that the annexation of Fiji would tend to increase 
the interest of nritish subjects in the region and it might encourage the labour 
traffic. Even before the annexation of Fiji he began to study methods of meeting
V
this problem, therefore a final word is necessary about his "other meansH.
The Kidnapping Act of 1872 did not immediately purge the labour traffic of 
its abuses. Kidnapping by British subjects became a felony, the transport of
2
islanders in British ships and their importation into the colonies were regulated. 
But an important branch of the trade, the importation of islanders into Fiji, 
and their movement from island to island within Fiji where uritish planters 
hired them, was largely untouched, It is true that uonsul March developed his 
own informal system of; licences, and the Fiji viovemment under Thurston attempted 
to copy the British Act, but Whitehall was not certain whether the Fiji 
trovemment was to be relied upon in this. This was one of the arguments for 
annexation: Fiji as a focus for the traffic, yet beyond British jurisdiction, 
was a weakening factor in the 1872 Act.
But outside Fiji the Act also had limitations. One of the worst kidnapping 
cases, the Carl massacre, only received publicity in England after the Act, 
and as the leading perpetrators escaped the death penalty for technical reasons
1. See M.G.Jacobs, 'Bismarck and the annexation of new Guinea', Historical Studies 
Australia and New Zealand, vol. 5, Ho.17 (Nov. 195l) P* 14.
2. See above p.
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the whole case appeared to detract from the usefulness of the Act.* Therefore,
early in 1873 the L.M.S. "startled, horrified and hurniliated"by the evidence,
suggested that the Royal Navy be given wider powers. Nothing was done in 1873
as Kimberley wished to test the 1872 Act, and if Fiji was annexed he knew they
whole situation would change.
Thus regulation of the labour traffic was yet another of the problems which
carried over into Carnarvon's period. In his first week at the Colonial uffiee
a kidnapping case achieved some publicity so on 26 Kebruary 1874 Carnarvon
2
warned Herbert that he would like to talk the matter over. Throughout 1874
it is evident that both the Foreign and Colonial Uffices realised they would
have to formulate some policy to cover the actions of "British subjects in the
South Pacific, and Carnarvon thought that measures would be necessary even if
3
Fiji was not annexed. He told a large deputation from the Aborigines Protection 
Society, which came to discuss the Cold Coast and Fiji on 6 March 1874 that he
1. The Carl*8 owner, James Patrick Murray, a former Medical Officer of health of 
Sandhurst, Victoria, escaped punishment by furnishing evidence for the Crown. 
The master and mate were sentenced to death, but this was commuted to life 
imprisonment as they had been taking Murray*s orders. The Carl had sailed 
from Sydney early in 1871 and reached Fiji in June. There, apparently, Murray 
decided to go ’blackbirding’. From the N.Hebrides they went to the Solomons 
collecting groups of islanders, but some warlike men from Bougainville did not 
mix with the others in the hold. Fights began among the islanders and there 
were attempts to fire the ship. No one spoke the Bougainvillers language, all 
efforts to calm the human cargo failed, so Murray panicked and about 20 Sept. 
1871 the "Carl Massacre" took place. The crew sat firing into the hold until 
the islanders were subdued; about 70 were killed and their bodies thrown into 
the sea; 20 wounded but still living were also thrown overboard. Murray is 
said to have sung ’Marching through Georgia* during the firing. The Carl *s 
hold was then whitewashed and HMS Rosario found nothing amiss when she 
boarded the ship on 17 Nov. Murray’s agent in Fiji for the hiring of the 
labourers was none other than G.A.Woods, Thakombau’s minister. Nothing was 
suspected until Consul March found seme unwilling islanders aboard, one with
a gunshot wound. As a result a Court of Inquiry was held on HMS Cossack on 
22 May 1872 and Hurrayd story came out.
(See account of Court of Inquiry in March to Granville 27,v*1872. Sessional 
Papers House of Lords, XV, p. 227; account of the trial in Sydney Morning 
Herald. 2.xii.l872 clipping in C0/20l/570; statement in the Commons by 
K-Hugessen, The Times. 26.ii.1873; and Dunbabin, Slavers in the S.Seas, pp. 
210-218).
2. Min. 26.ii.1874 on Daily Telegraph clipping of 24.ii.1874 in C0/309/ll2.
3. Carnarvon to Derby 27.vii.1874 (copy). FRO.30/6/8 p. 38.
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did not think the annexation of Fiji would solve the kidnapping question.* At
a conversation on 9 April 1874 Sir William Stawell suggested that an officer
2
should travel on every labour ship to guard the welfare of the islanders. 
Sometime before June 1874 Carnarvon made a note that when the Ooodenough-Layard 
Report arrived some new arrangements might have to be made.
The Goodenough-Layard Report, received on 10 June 1874, not only confirmed 
this impression, but it advocated a definite plan. Paragraph 38 might be seen 
as the origin of the western Pacific High Commission.
“We think that the commission of the Lovemor of Fiji should give him 
* authority over the persons and acts of British subjects in the New 
Hebrides and the Solomon Islands, or the islands of the Pacific south 
of the equator and west of meridian of 168° West longitude (exceut New 
Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands, which are under the French flag).
This would be^very satisfactory to Englishmen living in these islands, 
who would then be able to refer their disputes to the courts of Fiji, 
and would be able to register vessels and take out licences to carry 
labourers in a regular way, whereas they are now doing so either by 
stealth or through the fiction of a French flag and registers obtained 
from New Caledonia.•• The formation of a centre of law and order could 
not fail to have a good influence in this part of the S.Seas, where^the 
number of adventurers in various pursuits is yearly increasing".
After this Carnarvon suggested that Wylde of the Foreign Office might draw up
5
an Order in Council along these lines, but Wylde postponed consideration of the
deployment of consular resources in the South Pacific until after Carnarvon made
up his mind on Fiji.^ When this was decided and annexation accomplished in
October 1874 a new Pacific Islanders Protection Bill was prepared to extend
the 1872 Act to Fiji. But, as Goodenough frequently insisted, this would not
7
be enough since British ships were evading the law by flying French colours.
Gradually the idea grew that there should" be an official with authority over
1. See above p. 35?.
2. Kano. PRO.30/6/51 p.4.
3. Ibid. p. 14 undated.
4. 357808/3 p.10
5. Carnarvon to Derby 27.viii.1874. Private. PRO.30/6/8 p. 38.
6. Memo, by Wylde 27.vii.1874. F0/58/145 P. 174.
7. Ad. to CO. 28.xii.1874. CO/83/5.
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British subjects throughout the islands of the South Pacific. A correspondent
in the Sydney Morning Herald suggested in September 1874 that a Consular Officer
should cruise among the islands, and there was talk in London of appointing
Layard to do something like this when he left Fiji.^
The suggestion that the Governor of Fiji should be made Consul for the
adjacent areas, on the analogy of North Borneo, - the suggestion which was
acted upon af^er three years of departmental wrangling - was first made by
2
Herbert on 6 November 1874. On the same day Sir Arthur Gordon had talked with
3
Herbert in the Colonial Office. Gordon was not offered the governorship of
Fiji until 27 November 1874, but he , had been in correspondence with Carnarvon
4as early as 23 uctober and his name had been used in connection with Fiji as 
5
early as June. There was no mention of consular authority in these letters,
but Gordon later claimed that he certainly expected wider authority when he
accepted. He said that when his appointment was first discussed it was suggested
that the Governor of Fiji should have some relations with the "wild tribes in
his vicinity but beyond his jurisdiction", as did the governors at the Cape,
6
the wold Coast and the Straits Settlements. There is no evidence that Gordon
made the suggestion about the Consul, but Herbert's note on the same day as
7
vjordon's visit may be more than a coincidence. The idea was put to the Foreign
Office on 11 November 1874, and although Wylde did not like it, Derby showed
8
an open mind and was prepared to listen to "any proposal on this matter".
1. CO. to FO. ll.xi.1874. FO/58/145 p. 336 & Mins, by Wylde 2.i.l875 and Derby
7.1.1875.
2. Mins, by Herbert 6.xi.l874 on Robinson to Carnarvon(tg) 4.xi.l874. CO/83/5.
3. Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p.16.
4. Carnarvon to Gordon 23.x.1874. Private (copy). FR0.30/6/39 p.48.
5. Herbert to Gordon 5.vi.l874 quoted in J.K.Chaptaan, The Career of Arthur 
Hamilton Gordon. 1st Lord Stanmore to 1875 (PhD. thesfs London 1954) p.440
6* Gordon to Carnarvon 17.ii.1875 Private. PRO.30/6/39 p.69.
7. Bourke,* the Parliamentary Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, said on 26 Feb. 
1875 that he had heard the Cabinet had appointed Gordon Consul-General, but 
Derby denied it. Mins. 26 4 27.ii.1875-on CO. to FO. 12.1.1875. F0/58/l48.
8. Min. by Derby 7.1.1875 on CO. to FO. 11.xi.1875. FO/58/145 P. 412.
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Here, then, was the basis of the Western Pacific High Commission but it
was not achieved until after a lengthy battle between the two departments. The
Colonial Office a definite proposal on 12 January 1875. Anxious to ensure that
there would be no "conflict of principle or practice" in the South Pacific, they
suggested that the Governor of Fiji should be Consul-General for at least Samoa,
Tonga and the New Hebrides.^ Wylde did not like the idea and Tenterden wanted
2
to postpone the discussion. But a plan was worked out by Herbert, Wylde and
Bourke at two conferences before 5 March 1875. The plan was that Gordon would
be- 'High Commissioner' with authority and jurisdiction in cases concerning
British subjects, but where foreign nationals were concerned (i.e. Europeans
■*
and Americans) he would refer cases to the British Consul in New Caledonia.
The Foreign Office embodied their views in a letter on 11 March, but Instead 
of the title High Commissioner they wanted to called the Governor 'Special
4
Commissioner'•
1 This agreement of March 1875 represents a victory for the Foreign Office
viewpoint. However much they regretted the 'double allegiance' they would not
let Gordon have full consular authority, and Herbert although he disliked this,
said they would have to agree. He noted, prophetically, however, that
"As a consequence I can only anticipate a great increase of 
labour for both Departments, resulting* in comparative failure 
to protect the Islanders".
He feared that British prestige would be weakened, but he promised that the
Colonial Office would endeavour "to prevent as far as possible the failure of
5that undertaking in which the annexation of Fiji has been the first step". One 
point he stood firm on was the title 'High Commissioner', and Carnarvon told
1. CO. to FO. 12.i.1875. CO/808/12 p.8.
2. Mina, by Wylde 14.1.1875 & Tenterden 9.ii.187S. FO/58/148 op. 109 ft 114.
3. Note by Herbert 5.111.1875 on draft 0. in C. CO/83/8 ft Min. by BrnrrVe,
6.iii.l875. PO/58/148.
4. FO. to CO. ll.iii.1875. 00/808/12 p. 26.
5. Min. by Herbert 14.iii,1875 CO/83/8 on TO. to CO. ll.iii.1875 C0/80$/l2 p.26.
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the Foreign Office he regretted the division of responsibility, but he agreed
to an Order in Council in their terms.^
Having achieved their victory over the authority of the Consul at New
Caledonia, the Foreign Office climbed down. What they really feared vas that
the High Commission vould appear to other Powers to be the first step towards
more annexations in the Pacific. Tenterden said foreign States would be
justified in this view, Hbut the Colonial Office will not intend annexation £
2
the F.O. will for some years be able to repudiate the idea". As the High
Commission would save the Foreign Office the need for providing consuls outside
New Caledonia they decided to "leave the Col^ * Office to carry out their own
3
policy in their own way".
This wrangle over the High Commission seems to have been a strictly private 
affair between the two departments; Carnarvon did not take the new Pacific
4
Islanders Protection bill to the Cabinet. In fact when the new Bill was first
i
presented to Parliament on 16 March 1875 there was no mention of the High
Commission. Carnarvon did not come out into the open until 29 April 1875#
5
when he had to satisfy the deputation who wanted him to annex New Guinea. He 
agreed with their views about kidnapping but warned them it would be "impossible 
to appropriate every territory and every island". Instead, he said a clause 
would be inserted in the new Pacific Islanders Protection Bill to make the 
Governor of Fiji into a High Commissioner with consular authority in the area, 
and he would be "commander of these tribes".** Since the Admiralty assured him 
that technically the north and south-east shores of new Guinea were washed by 
the Pacific Ocean, he was able to include these much debated regions within the
1. CO. to TO. 22.iii.1875. C0/8O8/l2 p.33
2. Min. by Lister, TO/58/148 p.168.
3. Ibid. p. 165. Min. by Wylde 24.iii.1875.
4. Carnarvon to Cairns (.Lord Chancellor).9.iii. 1875. Private (cooy). PR0.30/6/6 p 
p. 7.
5. See above p.111. *
6. The Times. 3.V.1875* Carnarvon’s meaning for this unusual phrase is not clear.
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High Commissioner*8 jurisdiction.^
The High Commission policy did not please the Treasury, which had been the
main cause of britain*s slackness about kidnapping for over ten years. W.H.Smith,
the Parliamentary Undersecretary of the Treasury, wrote privately to Carnarvon
on 1 May 1875 asking him to put off the insertion of the new clause into the
2bill Has it does not recommend itself to us". But Carnarvon was insistent:
HThe suppression of kidnapping and the protection of English subjects from 
kidnapping is really as much a part of national policy as the suppression 
of the slave trade and the notion that we were lukewarm on such a question 
would be much more damaging than the few hundred pounds spent on the
establishment of a Consular Court in the Pacific"* ^
Therefore when the new Pacific Islanders Protection Act became law on 4 August
1875 Fiji was included in the Australasian colonies and a new Clause Six
provided the basis for the High Commission. The Crown was empowered to "exercise
power and jurisdiction oyer Her subjects within any island and places in the
Pacific Ocean not being within HM dominions, nor within the jurisdiction of any
civilized power, in the same and as ample a manner as if such power and
jurisdiction had been acquired by the cession or conquest of territory". By
Order in Council the High Commissioner could be vested with consular authority
4 5and jurisdiction in his own courts. The order was not passed until 1877.
Sovereignty would not be acquired in the area of the High Commission, and
the Act did not derogate from the rights of the Pacific islanders, but Sir
Julius Vogel, who was in London (and who dined with Carnarvon on the night
before the New Guinea deputation)^ realised what Carnarvon had done. The High
Commission, he said, was "an admirable compromise between that taking possession
1. Min. by Herbert 28.iv.1875 C0/20l/580 on Ad. to CO. 24.iv.1875. CO/808/lO p.20.
2. Smith to Carnarvon l.v.1875. Private. PR0.30/6/17 p. 17.
Ibid. p. 15 Carnarvon to Smith 2.v. 1875*
4. 38 * 39 Viet. cap. 51.
5. See below p.
6. Carnarvon Memo. 28.iv.l875« PR0.30/6/47. This record says they talked about 
telegraphs.
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of the other islands which I have advocated and that leaving them to grow into
lawless communities which on all sides has been admitted an evil".^ Like the
new administration in the Gold Coast Protectorate and the Residents in the
Malay States it was an experiment in providing order and jurisdiction without
assuming sovereignty. And Vogel knew what would happen. Just as Herbert had
at one time suggested that the alternatives on the Cold Coast were withdrawal
or complete annexation, as Jervois had seen that a Resident in Malaya could
only control or be an ornament, so Vogel saw the Western Pacific High Commission
as "the means to tentatively and gradually establish British sway in Polynesia
without undertaking at the commencement responsibilities which might frighten
2
those who look with dread upon an enlargement of her colonial possessions**• 
Vogel, of course,could not resist sending along a few ideas to hasten this 
process, but Herbert a3 usual resisted them. Even so, he appreciated the logic 
of Vogel*s views.
If the Colonial Office's attitude of the mid-1870's is fairly represented
by the views of the Permanent Under-secretary, that view is remarkably close
to Vogel's. Herbert asserted a view of British paramountcy, of the impossibility
of recognizing foreign intervention in the area, but he also believed that the
time for further annexation had not cane. His view of policy in the Pacific
reads very like Kimberley's explanation to Gladstone of his view of the ttalay
3
Peninsula in September 1873.
"Further annexation will come at the proper time", wrote Herbert on 
5 May 1875» "but to tell the world (Germany, United States, France 
etc.) that we now contemplate it would be to defeat the object and 
prevent us from quietly acquiring paramount influence among the 
islands".
1. Vogel to Carnarvon 4.v.1875. Private. FRO.30/6/47 p.216.
2. Ibid.
3. See above p. *■<>£-101.
4. Min. by Herbert 5.v. 1875 on Vogel's draft amendments to the Carnarvon 
clause. PRO.30/6/47 p. 225.
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Carnarvon's 'other means' in the South Pacific, then, were thoroughly in 
keeping with his policy in West Africa and Malaya. What the impatient 
memorialists and deputations did not realise was that the apparently obstinate 
Colonial Office often had the 'same ends' in view. The real difference of 
opinion was unually over timing rather than aim. After the changes of 1874 
Carnarvon asked for a breathing space, for a time of consolidation and 
reappraisal to observe the workings of the modest, but in the long run far 
reaching, experiments being made in the Gold Coast, Malaya and Fiji.
i
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Conelugion.
'PARAMOUNTCY* AND 'EXPERIMENT* OW THE FRONTIER IN THE TROPICS.
Prom the point of view of the regional historian many subjects have been 
dropped in mid-air, as it were, in this thesis. The origins of systems of 
government have been examined but it has been impossible to follow their 
development. However, it is worthwhile to pause and take stock of the situation 
about 1876 from the point of view of British policy and to try to answer certain 
questions. What did the changes in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific 
amount to? Why were certain devices tried while others were rejected? Is it 
true to say that a forward movement had begun? To answer these it is necessary 
in the first instance to be clear what alternatives faced the Colonial .Office.
Then the nature of the solutions which were adopted may be discussed*
By 1873 events in the frontier regions, and publicity at home, had posed the 
general question of withdrawal or advance. Both extremes, however, were rejected. 
It Us true that Fiji was annexed, but in the context of the debate over the South 
Pacific this was an experiment which fell short of widespread annexations in the 
islands. Both Kimberley and Carnarvon sought some way for keeping order and 
stabilizing the frontier which fell short of further assumption of British 
sovereignty. In their search they considered five alternatives: extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, Residents, Chartered Companies, Protectorates, and the idea of 
•paramount power'. Each requires a brief discussion*
The alternative which was usually considered first was extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. This was a well tried expedient by 1870. "It is impossible", wrote 
Sir Henry Jenkyns in 1902, "to submit British subjects to non-Christian lav or to 
trust to the justice of local courts, and therefore either crimes committed by 
British subjects must be left unpunished or power must be taken for the British
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Government to punish them".^ Thus, as a recent writer puts it, "The discrepancy
in the evolution of Western and Eastern legal systems was bridged by means of
2
capitulation treaties". Since the seventeenth century representatives of the
Levant Company received certain judicial rights over British subjects in the
Ottoman Eknpire in this way. However, in practice the Turkish capitulations were
difficult to enforce and in the nineteenth century doubts were cast on the legality
of these arrangements. As a result the first Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1843)
defined the powers acquired by the Crown outside British dominions "by Treaty,
Capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means", to be the same
as that exercised in Crown Colonies which had been gained by cession or conquest.
At the same time doubts that had arisen in the 1842 Select Co^ nnittee on West
Africa about the jurisdiction exercised by George Maclean on the Gold Coast were
removed (from an English point of view) by the West Africa and Falkland Islands
Act (1843) and the Gold Coast Order in council(1844)*^
Fiji raised new problems and for ten years after 1861 a method of applying
the system to Fiji was half-heartedly attempted. In this period, for diplomatic
purposes non-Christian States, or States outside the "International family" were
divided into "Eastern Countries" and "barbarous communities". The former (e.g.
the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan and Siam) although non-Christian were undoubtedly
sovereign States, therefore extra-territorial jurisdiction was sought by treaty.
Of the latter, W.E.Hall wrote in 1894, "It is impossible to regard an island in
the South Seas or a kingdom in the interior of Africa as having the necessary
5marks of a State". Gladstone disliked such distinctions; announcing the 
Goodenough-Iayard Commission for Fiji in 1873, he pleaded for "the same measure 
of justice for ourselves and other people".^ And a modem lawyer (1926) has
1. H.L.Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Soas (1902) p»/4^ *
2. G .Schwarzenberger. Power Politics (1951') P. 35.
3. 6 & 7 Viet. c.94. 4. 6 A 7 Viet. c.13. 0. in C. 3.ix.l844.
5. W.E.Hall, A Treatise on the Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown (1894)130
6. 3 Hansard, ccxvi, col. 945.
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asserted that "there has been a persistent preponderence of jurisdic opinion in
favour of the proposition that lands in the possession of any backward peoples
who are politically organised ought not to be regarded as if they belonged to no
one".^ But in the case of Fiji there was no single authority with which to make
a treaty and as jurisdiction could notbe based on sufferance a Bill was drafted to
overcome the difficulty. But the Treasury took fright fearing a gradual increase
of responsibility and expense. Although in 1871, after ten years, Granville got
the royal assent to Consular Jurisdiction in Fiji, it was never used as
circumstances changed.
In the same year suggestions were made for extending the extra-territorial
jurisdiction of the Straits Settlements courts over British subjects caught in
the colonies for offences in the Mslay States. The proposal was unexceptionable
and was acted on in 1874, but Thomas Braddell the Attorney-General in Singapore,
had gone further and wondered if the Colonial Office "might feel inclined to
encourage the extension of the powers of legislation by giving to the legislature
2
of the Colony authority... to legislate for matters beyond the Colony*. The
writer must have referred to criminal not political matters but his idea was 
3rejected. However, a similar idea was adopted on the Gold Coast in 1874 where 
the Legislative Council of the Colony could make laws for the Protectorate.
The only cases where the solution of extra-territorial jurisdiction was 
adopted were in the Niger Delta in 1872 and in Tonga and Samoa in 1879. In the 
Niger Delta the Foreign Office did not wish to disturb the status quo and 
considerably limited the powers of intervention of the Consul. The reason for 
extra-territorial jurisdiction was technical. British traders in the Oil Rivers 
employed a number of Africais from the British West African Settlements, who, when
1. M.F.Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory (1926) t>.20.
2. Report by Braddell 10.iv.1871 in Anson to Kimberley 12.V.1871. CO/27^/47#
3. Ibid. Note by Holland, the Legal Adviser.
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they were convicted for petty crimes in the Delta •Courts of Equity', often
appealed to the British Courts in the Cold Coast who overruled the Delta Courts.
Thuathe Foreign Office determined to reconstruct the Delta Courts of Equity, which
were converted into Consular Courts by Order in Council of 21 February 1872.* Tn
this case jurisdiction which had been exercised by "sufferance” was regularised
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts in the Old Calabar, Bonny, Cazneroons, New
Calabar, Brass, Upobo. Nun and Benin Rivers.
In Samoa and Tonga exclusive jurisdiction over British subjects was given by
treaty in 1878-9 and was exercised by Deputy Commissioners under the Vestern
2
Pacific High Commission. Thus, although extra-territorial jurisdiction played a 
part in British policy in the frontier zones, it did not prove an adequate method 
of securing order.
The second suggestion was that of Residents. 'Jhe practice of appointing 
Residents as political agents to the courts of Indian Princes was well Vnown. The 
flelboume Age suggested in 1869 that the Colonial 0ffice9^ °U* govern Fiji through
3
a Resident, and Julius Vogel suggested in 1873 that if Samoa was not made a
province of New Zealand, it and other Pacific Islands might be governed by an
4
officer like the "Residents at Native Courts in India". In West Africa Sir
Arthur Kennedy suggested a •Resident Agent* with somewhat different functions
5 6 7should be sent to Ashanti, and both Kimberley in 1873 and Carnarvon in 1874
revived the idea. When Commander Glover governed Lagos he suggested, at various
times, 'Residents* or 'Agents 1 at Abeokuta and Porto Novo. In 1872 there was
talk of appointing a • Political Agent' in the Mellacourie River area north of
1. Hertslet's, Treaties. XIII, p. 50.
2. Ibid. XV, p.334 for Samoa and p.396 for Tonga.
3. The Age, ll.xii.1869 cutting in Canterbury to Granville 2.1.1870. CO/309/73.
4. Fergussen to Kimberley 22.x.1873. C0/209/230.
5. Kennedy to Kimberley 16.xii.1871. CO/96/89.
6. Kimberley to Wolseley 10.ix. 1873 (draft) C0/96/l08.
7. Memo, on the Gold Coast alternatives. PRO.30/6/85.
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Sierra Leone,^ and Professor Blyden wanted an Agent appointed in the interior 
2
at Fouta Djalon. After the Ashanti War in 1874 Carnarvon considered appointing 
Residents in the wold Coast Protectorate States, but it was suggested that the 
"degraded habits" of the kings precluded this, although Capt. Brackenbury
*5
suggested that an itinerant officer should visit the kings and hold Durbars.
In the case of the Palsy States the suggestion of Residents was adopted.
First mooted in 1871 by the Anson Committee and advocated more persistently by 
George Campbell, the Ceylon official who acted as Lieut-Governor of Penang from 
March 1872 to May 1873, this suggestion apparently appealed to Kimberley. The 
same week in vhich he decided to intervene in Perak he interviewed Campbell. But 
when Sir Andrew Clarke went to Singapore in 1873 with Kimberley’s famous suggestion 
of a Resident, it was almost certainly an adviser that was in the Secretary of 
State’s mind, rather than an officer who would control the government of the 
state. Therefore, although accepted in a single case in 1874, Residents were no 
panacea to stabilize the frontier.
The third suggestion, and this was completely rejected at this stage, was for 
Chartered Companies. A large portion of the British empire had been acquired by 
the seventeenth century companies, and after 1882 vast areas would come under 
the sway of the modem companies, but Hudson's Bay Company had only recently, 
in 1869# surrendered its territorial rights, and the government was reluctant to 
allow new companies. The Selangor Tin Company’s request in 1873 to be allowed to 
use its own troops in Malaya had been quickly refused. Various New Guinea 
companies had been refused any government help or encouragement after 1867. 
Carnarvon considered transferring the Gold Coast to a company in 1874, but
1. win. by Hemming 28.ix.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley l.ix.1872. 00/267/316 ft 
min. by K-Hugessen 4.iii*1873 on P-Fennessy to Kimberley 10.ii.1873. C0/?67/ 
320.
2. E.Blyden, "Report on the Timbo Expedition, 1873" in Harley to Kimberley 
22.V.1873. CO/267/320.
3. undated Memo. PRO.30/6/85.
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he decided there were "Practical difficulties in creating a monopoly. Abuses wd.  ^
grow up ft Govt. wd. be held responsible"**
The most coherent plan for a company was Vogelfs South Pacific Trading Company
and here it was Gladstone, whose government in 1881 chartered the Worth Borneo
2
Company, who was faintly interested. But Carnarvon found the scheme "Visionary -
dangerous - open to peculation & corruption etc." and he let the matter drop. As
yet, therefore, the chartered company was not regarded as a suitable instrument
in frontier regions
Host commonly advocated was the fourth suggestion, a Protectorate. This
requires some discussion, and the discussion is complicated by the fact that
•protectorate' as understood by modern international lawyers was only defined after
the Berlin Vest Africa conference of 1884-5, when protectorates in West Africa 
3
were recognised. Before the 1880*3 such protectorates as existed in these 
regions were ignored by the international lawyers. Although Twiss in 1861 found 
the name Protected State inadequate and he distinguished between "Protected
Independent States", such as the Ionian Islands under Britain, and "Protected
4
Dependent States", like the Princely States of India, he made no mention of the 
much publicised contemporary Gold Coast Protectorate.
Recent writer testify to the vagueness of the term. Just as Carnarvon said in
1874 that questions about annexation should be decided on their merits, so say the
5
international lawyers, one must regard protectorates. Hall in 1894 said the
1. Undated Memo. PRO.30/6/85•
2. In the period covered by this thesis C.L.Woses, the TT.S. Consul in Brunei, 
"ushered in a preposterous incident, out of which was to emerge the British 
North Borneo Company". He obtained the cession of a large tract of land and 
another American received the title of Raja of Ambong and Marudu. K.G. 
Tregonning, "American activity in N.Borneo 1865-1881", Pacific Fist. Review. 
XXIII, No. 4 (Not. 1954) P.357.
3. Gen. Act of the Berlin Conference, 26.ii.1885, A ft P. xlvii, pn. 107-117.
Art.,34 refres to the notification of new possessions and protectorates.
4. Twiss, The Law of Nations (1861), pp. 26-35
5. E.g. H.lAuterpracht, in 8th edition (1955) of L.Oppenheim, International Taw.
I, P. 192,
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word had "different meanings in different circumstances and in the mouths of 
different persons".^ A modem definition is:
"A point arises when a weak State surrenders itself by treaty to the 
protection of a strong State in such a way that it transfers the management 
of all its more important international affairs to the protecting State. 
Through such a treaty an international union is called into existence 
between the two States* and the relation between them is called protectorate* 
The protecting State is internationally superior to the protected State: and 
the latter has with the loss of the management of its more important 
international affairs lost its full sovereignty* and is henceforth only a 
half sovereign state. It is, however* a conception which* like suzerainty* 
lacks exact legal precision, and its real meaning depends very much upon
the special case. Generally speaking* protectorate* may, again like
suzerainty* be called a kind of international guardianship. • • Great 
Britain exercises a protectorate over a number of 'protected States* in 
Asia, but their international status is not clear. They must be distinguished 
in any case from the protectorates over African tribes* acquired by treaty 
with the chiefs of those tribes.2 These 'protectorates' posess no inter­
national status whatsoever".
The three types of protectorate of the international lawyers* then* might be
called (l) the •real* protectorate of a European or Christian State over another
(like the Ionian Islands under Britain), (2) the 'Oriental* protectorate, or "the
protectorate of members of the Family of Nations exercises over such non-Christian
States as are outside that family", and (3) the 'African or South Sea'
protectorate where treaties are made not with the head of a sovereign State but
4
with "heads of tribal communities"; this is sometimes called a colonial 
protectorate and is associated with *backward territories'.
Believing* apparently, that there were no authorities in late nineteenth 
century Africa or Polynesia capable of making internationally valid agreements, 
lawyers like Hall have taken the attitude: "It is little short of ridiculous to
apply the principles of European international law with prudish exactness to the
5
savages of the Santa Cruz Islands". This view is not unchallenged. Gladstone 
could speak in 1873 of equal justice for all, and Lindley (1926) found it
1. Gall* Treatise, p. 204.
2. Iauterpracht's Oppenheim (1955) I» PP. 192-6.
3. Oppenheim (1905 edition) I* p. 281. 4. Ibid. loc. cit.
5. Hall* Treatise, p. 235.
400
"difficult to see how, having regard to the universality of the practice of 
grounding a colonial protectorate upon an agreement with the local authorities, 
and to the importance attached by the European Powers to these agreements in their 
relations inter se, the requirement for such an agreement can be regarded other­
wise than as a rule of law".^ On the whole,though, from an international point 
of view, protectorates were, firstlynot recognised in the three areas in the 
1870'8; secondly, when they were recognised at a later period, they were seen as 
"nothing else than steps taken to excluded other Powers from occupying the
respective territories. They give, like discovery, an inchoate title, and are
2
preparations and precursors of future occupations".
However silent international law might have been about protectorates, this
did not prevent fl.P.'s, officials, naval officers and rulers from using the word
freely in the 1860*8 and 1870*s. The term Protectorate was applied on the Gold
Coast to an undefined area running inland from the coast for about *>0 miles and
extending about 300 miles along it, where British extra-territorial jurisdiction
and also jurisdiction over Africans was exercised. After the first Kesidents
were appointed in Selangor to advise the rulers of the State, the Attomey-
ueneral of the Straits Settlements approved the confirmation of a tin concession
which included a phrase saying that the British government had "assumed a
3
protectorate over the State of Selangor", and the head of the Eastern Department
4
of the Colonial Office accepted the idea that Britain was the "protecting power". 
Similarly, without providing a definition the agitators for the annexation of Fiji 
always said that the alternative was a protectorate over the islands, as Thakoobau 
was said to desire this. Here was another variation on the word, for in 1855 
Thakombau had said "1 do not give the land. I only want them to be here to protect
1. Lindley, The Acquisition of Backward Territory, p. 176.
2. Oppenheim (1905) I, p. 281.
3. Braddell to Agent of the Malay Pen. (E.India) Tin Mining Co. 10.iii.1875 in 
Clarke to Carnarvon 18.iii.1875. CO/809/5 p. 94.
4. Ibid. Min. by Cox 28.iv.1875. (in CO/273/79).
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me",* and in 1874, after refusing to cede the islands to Goodenough, he changed 
his mind and agreed to "cede the country to England. .. but it must be understood
2
that he was giving only the Government of the country, not his men, or his earth". 
Here was the notion of protectorate from one who sought protection. Good enough 
produced yet another version when he said the presence of British warships and 
the intervention of naval officers in disputes constituted a "virtual protect— 
orate". If disorder had broken out when he was in Fiji, Goodenough had planned
3
to hoise the Union Jack "as a Protectorate for a time". These illustrations
serve to show that in popular parlance, as well as in law, the* word had very
little precise meaning in the 1870*3.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the vagueness was a useful aeaet.
But in the early 1870’s protectorate was very unpopular in Whitehall. Discussing
its possibility in Fiji Rogers wrote in 1870,
"A protectorate is sometimes proposed. I do not quite know what this means.
I suppose it is an intimation to the world that nobody then must assume 
sovereignty over the islands or make war on them - but if they have a 
grievance against them they.must apply to us... I do not myself very much 
like this kind of thing".
In 1871 Knatchbull-ttugessen said a protectorate was "a very absurd as well as a
5
curious state of affairs", and in the 1872 Fiji debate he said he had "never
been able to find out exactly what a protectorate meant".^ Gladstone : said: "It
might be anything or nothing: it was the most shadowy of all relations; it might
7involve almost all the responsibilities of government". In 1873 Kimberley made
g
it clear that whatever happened he would not "adopt a Protectorate in Fiji", and
1. Quoted in Brookes, International Rivalry, pp. 234-235.
2. Goodenough*a Journal, 20.iii.1874.
3. Goodenough to Goschen 2.xii.l873. Private (copy). FR0.30/6/44 p.4.
4. Min. by Rogers 19.x.1870 on Canterbury to Granville 12.viii.1870. CO/^09/94.
5. Min. by K-Hugessen 17.iv. 1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley ?9.iii.l871. C0/267/310.
6. 3 Hansard, ccxii, col. 209.
7. Ibid. col. 215.
8. To a deputation 12.V.1873. Clipping from Australia & Wew Zealand Gasette.
17.v.1873 in CO/83/4.
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in Goodenough's instructions the idea was dismissed quickly - "it would be
impossible... undefined responsibilities, with limited powers of discharging them?*
In the 1870*8, then, it was the vagueness of protectorate which made the
authorities shun it. Although In the case of the Cold Coast the long standing
title of Protectorate was to be retained, Kimberley had determined (before the
Ashanti war wrecked the scheme) to define "the power and obligations of the
2Protecting State... and the obligations of the natives towards us". While, the
Gold Coast Protectorate was retained in 1874, and the idea of Britain as the
•protecting power* in Malaya was accepted, protectorate, on the whole, was
regarded as an unsatisfactory way of stabilizing the frontier.
The fifth alternative lay in the catch phrase 'paramount power', which was
increasingly adopted at this time. This presupposes the existence or creation
of a 'sphere of influence' within which such paramountcy is recognised or claimed.
It is, said Lindley, "the step preceding the establishment of Colonial
3
Protectorate in the modern process of territorial acquisition". This was the
most attractive of the alternatives in 1874•
Probably the most famous case of a challenge to British paramountcy was the
declaration of the German protectorate over Angra Pequena in 1884. "If there had
been any apprehension", wrote Edward Fairfield, "of an annexation of this Coast
by a power not concerned in the promotion of South African policy, Great Britain
4
as the paramount power, would have taken possession of it long ago". This 
attitude can also be seen in the 1870's. In fact the attractiveness of the 
notion can be judged from the following definition (1894):
1. First draft in Confid. Memo. 10.vi.1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/45. Final 
draft in FO. to CO. 5.viii.l873. CO/83/4. Scholefield's assertion (The
Pacific, p. 90) that "The Colonial Office itself had expressed a preference 
for a protectorate", is quite wrong.
2. Min. by Kimberley on McArthur Qn. rac'd 18.iii.1873. C0/96/l04.
3. Lindley, Acquisition of Backward Territories, p. 207.
4. Quoted in de. Kiewiet, Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 314.
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"The term 'sphere of influence* is one to which no very definite meaning 
is as yet attached. Perhaps in its indefiniteness consists its inter­
national value. It indicates the regiois which geographically are adjacent 
to, or politically group themselves with, possessions or protectorates, 
but which have not actually been so reduced into control, that the minimum 
of the powers which are implied in a protectorate can be exercised with 
tolerable regularity. It represents an understanding which enables a state 
to reserve to itself a right of excluding other European powers from 
territories that are of importance to it politically as affording means 
of future expansion and preventing civilized neigbours from occupying 
a dominant military position... the phrase 'sphere of influence' taken 
by itself rather implies a moral claim than a true right... before long 
spheres Of influence^are destined to be merged into some unorganised form 
of protectorate".
Thus, after Kimberley had decided to intervene in the Malay States, and had been
further stirred by the rumoured threat of a German protectorate, he wrote to
Gladstone, "we are the paramount power in the Peninsula... it would be a serious
2
matter if any other European power were to obtain a footing in the Peninsula".
Similarly, new annexations other than Fiji were refused in the South Pacific
because, as Herbert wrote in 1875, "Further annexation will come at the proper
time, but to tell the world (Germany, United States, France etc) that we now
contemplate it would be to defeat the object and prevent us from acquiring
3
paramount influence among the islands".
In West Africa the notion of paramountcy was not so explicitly stated, but it
was nevertheless implied. Thus the recognition of spheres of influence to avoid
international friction lay behind the Anglo-Dutch partition of the Gold Coast in
1868 and the attempted Anglo-French partition at the Rio Pongo from 1869 to 1876.
The Foreign Office regarded Britain as the paramount power in the Niger Delta and
4
they were anxious to keep the French out. it is important to remwiber that
5
Kimberley resisted all ideas of expansion into the West African interior, and
Carnarvon rejected the opportunity of annexations on the Gold Coast and in Ashanti
1. Hall, Treatise, pp. 228-9.
2. Kimberley to Gladstone 10.ix. 1873. Gladstone Papers 44225/105.
3. Min. by Herbert 5.V.1875 on Vogel to Carnarvon A.v.1875. PRO.^o/6/47 P. 216.
4. FO. to CO. 15.V.1875. C0/87/l08.
5. E.g. Min. 5.xii.l873 on Blyden to Kimberley 22.X.1873, (C0/267/324) where he 
deprecates the idea of "taking charge of the western Soudan".
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in 1874. But along the coast itself British policy was directed to establishing 
a form of British paramountcy between the Gold Coast and lAgos mainly for fiscal 
reasons.
In other parts of West Africa also the idea of spheres of influence seemed to
have an appeal for the Colonial Office. The Liberian Government was regarded as
a nuisance and Knatchbull-Hugessen wrote in 1871: "the suggested acquisition by
Germany wd. be a general benefit".* Similarly with the rivers north of Sierra
Leone Kimberley wrote in 1872 "we ought not to have a dog-in-the-manger-policy.
Either we should take steps to open the trade of these rivers ourselves, or we
2
should let the French do so". In the 1860*8 there had been hopes that Britain
could withdraw from Vest Africa completely, but between 1870 and 1874 the dream 
3
faded. Knatchbull-Hugessen began to express the view:
"England has sown the seeds of civilization and Christianity upon these 
coasts, 8a whether for the furtherance of these great objects, or for the 
mere development of the resources of the country evidently teeming with 
underdeveloped wealth, her continual presence^and action is most desirable 
in the interests of W.Africa and the world".
The idea gained ground, and events conspired to strengthen it, that Britain was
on the West African coast to stay; but not at the expense of clashes with
European powers.
Thus in the decade before the *scramble* of the 1880's a feeling of British 
paramountcy in certain spheres in West Africa, South-East Asia and the South 
Pacific was becoming evident. Referring to the treaties in Vest Africa made 
between 1868 and 1875 Lindley admitted that "many treaties, especially among the 
early ones, contain no direct reference to the sovereignty or protectorate of 
the European contacting Power, although they comprise provisions which imply some
1. Min. 27.1.1871 on Kennedy to Kimberley 28.xii.1870. 00/267^07.
2. Min. 8.x.1872 on P-Henneasy to Kimberley l.ix.1872. CO/267/316.
3. Min. by Herbert 30.vi.1871 (on Kennedy to Kimberley S.vi.1871. CO/267/31l) s 
"This is a dream... which it is useless to indulge in".
4. Min. by K-Hugessen 3.x.1872 on P-Hennessy to Kimberley l.ix.1872. CO/267/316.
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kind of paramountcy on the part of that Power".*' In the Malay Peninsula and the 
South Pacific an explicit paramountcy was (confidentially) claimed* Thus the 
vaguest of the five alternatives was accepted* No ready-made institutional 
framework existed for stabilizing the frontier so the Colonial Office decided 
to experiment in each area* As Carnarvon said, each case was .judged on its 
merits; yet as has been shown, the experiments were part of a wider whole.
The nature of the changes of 1873-76 therefore emerges* They were experiments 
in the administration of tropical dependencies* Moreover, they were limited 
experiments. Carnarvon would not consent to annexations beyond Fi,ji, he refused 
to extend the Residents to more than three of the Malay States and he trod very 
carefully in the Gold Coast. Further generalisation would be rash since the 
degree of British responsibility varied from Carnarvon's crown colony of "rather 
a severe type" in Fiji to the very timid policy subsequently followed in the Cold 
Coast and Lagos. At most it can be said that the policy adopted by the British 
Government represented the minimum fulfillment of responsibilities unwillingly 
incurred. This may be best illustrated by a brief summary of subsequent 
developments.
In West Africa the climatic conditions meant that British administration 
developed more slowly than elsewhere* In spite of the promise of Strahan's 
efforts and Disraeli's premature congratulation of Carnarvon, very little was 
done on the Gold Coast. The limits of neither the Colony nor the Protector*te 
were defined. Government confined itself to keeping the peace, exercising 
jurisdiction and building a few roads. An armed constabulary was created and 
where it was stationed the officer in charge combined his duties with that of 
Civil Commandant under the title of District Commissioner. At other places 
there were civilian D.C.'s but they were confined to the coast. Chiefs continued
1. Lindley, Acquisition of Backward Territory, p. 185.
406
to be magistrates in their own courts, and by the ineffective Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinances of 1878 and 1885 they were given powers to compel their people to 
build roads and thus they became petty administrative officials. This was 
regarded as the cheapest way of getting the job done. The Colonial Off ice* s plans 
for better administration were not fulfilled. In spite of tropical pensions the 
highest quality of British administrator was not attracted; the educated Africans 
were deliberately avoided after the experience of the Fante Confederacy, and the 
chiefs were in fact given powers which they had not possessed before - all of 
which hardly augured for success. The conclusion of a recent authority is that,
’’Despite the increased resources gained as a result of [the 1874 changes} ... 
the Colonial Office was still reluctant to accept the responsibility for 
the territory, and the physical and climatic difficulties alone made 
complete dominion over the Gold Coast unthinkable* The re-organisation 
after 1873 seemed to augur a period of vigorous and decisive action.
But the real exercise of jurisdiction in the Protectorate continued to 
be halting and tentative”. ^
This very limited policy was challenged in the 1880*8. Merchant interests 
criticised the neglect of economic development, Sydney Webb and John Anderson, 
then two young Colonial Office clerks, questioned the value of an expensive 
establishment which failed to produce social and economic advance for the 
African, and in 1&30 Governor Ussher, the administrator dismissed in 187? by 
Pope-Hennessy, wished to extend direct rule by District Commissioners in the 
interior of the Protectorate. But the Colonial Office refused and it wa« not 
until 1901 that the Protectorate was formally annexed to the Colony and its 
limits defined.^
Similarly a vacillating policy was adopted towards Ashanti. Although 
Gladstone and Kimberley had not intended to smash the Ashanti kingdom in 1875, 
Wolseley's campaign had had this effect. In 1874-75 ft number of tributaries 
seceded fran Kumasi. The Asantehene, Kofi Kari Kari, was deposed for domestic
1. F. Wolf son, British Relations with the Gold Coast, p. 360.
2. Gold Coast Order in Council, 21.ix.1901. London Gazette. 1.x.1901. p. 6380.
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reasons. Both Kimberley and Carnarvon had contemplated appointing a British
Resident at Kumasi, but this was not done; and although ineffective efforts were
made by Gold Coast officials at mediation between Ashanti and her rebellious
tributaries, the Gold Coast Government adopted a policy of neutrality. Thus
Osai Hensa, the new Asantehene, began rebuilding the Ashanti Confederacy with
the defeat of Juaben in 1875*
The British attitude has been severely criticised.
MThe policy of the Gold Coast Government towards Ashanti from 1874 to 1890 
was utterly timorous and vacillating, and the fruits of the campaign of 
1874 was completely lost in an incredibly short time... The two bases of 
its policy were a misunderstanding of the position of the Asantehene, and 
a determination never again to be involved in an Ashanti War... The 
Government... wanted the Asantehene to be strong enough to keep all 
Ashanti in order, but to be weak anough not to be^a danger to the Colony.
Two contradictory aims naturally led to chaos".
Although further suggestions of a British Resident at Kumasi were at first
resisted, disorder within Ashanti, disputes about fugitives, and the expansion
of Germany and France wrought a change in British policy. In 1891 the Governor
attempted to send a Resident to Ashanti, and in 1895 Governor V.R.Mnxwell arrived
with an ultimatum to Ashanti to accept a British Resident. When this was refused
the Asantehene was forced to submission by a military expedition, a Resident was
appointed, and Asantehene Prempeh was deported. The questionable methods used in
this caused fierce resentment, and when in 1900 the governor demanded the
2
surrender of the Golden Stool, revolt broke out in a few days. The governor
narrowly excaped with his life in Kumasi and as a result Ashanti was subjugated
and annexed by Britain, while the territory to the north was placed under a 
3
Commissioner.
The final assumption of British control appears less smooth than it was in
1. Ward, History of the Gold Coast, pp. 282-3.
2. Ibid. pp. 301-303.
3. Ashanti Order in Council, 26.ix.1901. bondon Gazette 1.x.1901, p. 6 8^2, & 
Northern Territories Order, 26.ix.18 Ibid. p.6381.
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Malays, and this was in part due to the fact that, for all Carnarvon's moral 
scruples in 1874, the government was for a long time extremely reluctant to take 
new territory, accept nev responsibilities or provide effective administration and 
development.
Expansion was also gradual at Lagos and in the Niger Delta. Various small 
additions were made to the Lagos Protectorate, and the governor successfully 
mediated in the disputes of the Yoruba hinterland in 1886, the year when Lagos 
was again separated from the Cold Coast Colony. But the area was by no means 
settled and when the Egbas and Ijebus closed the trade routes to Ibadan and Oyo, 
the situation was reminiscent of Clover's day. Sir Gilbert Carter, the governor 
from 1890 to 1896, was able to do what Glover had always planned. A British 
Resident was forced on Ijebu Ode in 1892, in the following year one was appointed 
at Ibadan, and in 1897 the Yoruba country was attached to Lagos as a Protectorate. 
Carter said that he had in fact carried out Glover's policy.^
In the Niger Delta the British Government was content to maintain the status 
quo after the creation of extra-territorial jurisdiction in 1872. Even after the 
recognition of a British sphere of interest at the Berlin Conference, an^  the 
declaration of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885, no effective administration 
was attempted for several years. Not until the deportation of JaJa in 1887, the 
setting up of an administration under a Comissioner and Consul-General at Old 
Calabar in 1891, and the creation of the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893, was 
effective government begun. This process culminated in the capture of Benin in 
1897.
Meanwhile, significant developments took place up the Niger. The Lokoja 
Consulate of 1866-69 had been short lived, but in 1877 Goldie Taubman (Sir George 
Goldie) visited the Niger and shortly united the British companies into the 
United African Company. In 1884, by treaties, he gained control of the Niger and
1. E.Glover, Life of Glover, p. 98.
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he bought out the rival French concern. Chartered in 1886 as the Royal Niger
Company Goldie's enterprise established administration on the niger and Benue
Rivers, which in 1900 came under the control of the Crown as the Protectorate of
Northern Nigeria with Lugard as High Commissioner.
Thus three elements united to form modem Nigeria: Lagos and the Yoruba
hinterland, the Delta based on the influence of Palmerston's Bights consulate,
and the Niger interior opened up by the Royal Niger Company. The Colonial Office
took over the Niger Coast Protectorate , which, when certain of the company
territory was added in 1900, was termed Southern Nigeria. In 1906 Lagos and
its Protectorate were added to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern
Nigeria. Lugard became Governor of both Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1912
and two years later wa3 the first Governor-General of the united government of the
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria**
In Malaya a system of government by advice to what were theoretically
sovereign independent Sultans was attempted, but in time this became a system of
firm British control. But when Carnarvon approved Sir Andrew Clarke's policy
2in 1874 he said the experiment "needs very careful watching", and although he 
realised the logic of Jervois's annexation suggestion in 1875, he refused to 
sanction it. He failed to see that the Resident system had had a sufficient trial, 
and therefore he said the experiment should go on.
"Whatever may be the ultimate policy which it may be necessary to adopt 
in the Malay Peninsula it is clearly our object to make the best of 
existing materials, and with this in view it should be our present policy 
to find and train up some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and 
enlightenment to appreciate the advantages of a civilized government and 
to render some effectual assistance in the government of the country.
It is in my opinion, undesirable that the British officers should 
interfere more frequently or to a greater extent than is necessary in the 
minor details of government. Their special objects should be, the main- 
tainance of peace and law, the initiation of a sound system of taxation, 
with the consequent development of the resources of the country, and the
1. See A.Burns, A History of Nigeria (1948) chapters XII to XIX.
2. Carnarvon to Clarke 27.V.1874. Private (copy). PRO.30/6/40 p.2.
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supervision of the collection of the revenue, so as to ensure the 
receipt of funds necessary to carry out the principal engagements 
of the Government, and to pay for the cost of the British officers^ 
and whatever establishments may be necessary to support them".
As Swettenham said this was "surely an impossible task... the Malay States were
to be wheeled into line, everything was to be done on the most approved principles,
and one white man was to do it, but the means to secure this very desirable end
2
were not mentioned". Thus men like Sir Hugh Low, the Resident in Perak from
1877 to 1889* virtually reversed the Pangkor Engagement. Instead of the Sultan
ruling with the advice of the Resident, the Resident ruled with the advice of the
3
leading Malays and others. In the words of a recent writer, wa form of British
control grew up in each of the States under British protection which was at
variance with the constitutional theory as set out in the Treaties and the Colonial
Office policy directives. Direct Government by the Resident was cloaked in the
forms of advice, and the Malay Rulers surrendered their actual power into the
4
hands of British officers and administrative officials".
In the 1880's this system was gradually extended after Governor Veld urged 
expansion, and Herbert in the Colonial Office suggested the consolidation of 
Britain's position. The responsibility of protecting Johore was formally accepted 
in 1885 when Maharaja Abu-Bakar, who went to London to get assurances from the 
Colonial Office that his State would not be annexed, signed a new treaty. Two 
years later Pahang made a similar treaty, but i^  1888 Bendahara Wan-Ahmad was 
forced to accept the Resident system. The States in the Malacca hint**rland were 
gradually consolidated undter British supervision. Firstly, in 1886 Jelebu was 
linked with Sungei Ujong under one Resident; secondly, in 1889 Tampin, Rembau and 
the Sri Menanti Confederation became the Negri Sembilan also with a British
1. Carnarvon to Jervois l.vi.1876. Co/£0?/7. p. 112.
2. F. A.Swettenham, British Malaya (1948 edition) pp. 217-218.
3. E.Sadka, 'The Journal of Sir Hugh Low'^ JMBRAS. XXVII, (1954) p.?4.
4. Cowan, Origins of British Political Control, p. 2R8.
1
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Resident; finally, in 1895 both groups joined under the title of wegri Semhllan 
and asked for a single Resident. In the next-year the administrative union known 
as the Federated Malay States was launched, in which the rulers of Perak, Selangor, 
Pahang and the Negri Sembilan agreed to centralize their administrations under a 
Resident-General at Kuala Lumpur, who was placed under the general supervision of 
a High Commissioner, the Governor of the Straits Settlements. In this way British 
control in the South of the Peninsula was consolidated, with Johore retaining 
her separate status.
In the northern Malay States which were tributary to Siam British control was 
delayed because of conflicting interests in the Foreign and Colonial Offices.
While the Colonial Office, prompted by Singapore, pursued the policy of 
•paramountcy' in the Peninsula, the Foreign Office was guided by the policy of 
maintaining Siam's independence as a buffer State between British Burma and the 
French in Cambodia* The Anglo-Siamese Convention of 1897 represented a victory
t
for the Foreign Office viewpoint, and committed Britain to strengthen Siam's hold 
over the Malay tributaries. However, the 1902 Declaration, whereby British 
•Advisers' were to be appointed in Kelantan and Trengganu by the Siamese 
Government who would still receive a portion of the revenues, represents a 
Colonial Office initiative and a compromise which opened the door for further 
British encroachment. In 1909, by Treaty with Siam, the northern boundary of 
British Malaya was finally drawn, and Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were 
•transferred' to Britain and they later accepted British protection by treaty. 
Paradoxically, Johore, always the closest Malay State to the British, was the last 
to accept advice and it always retained a difference in name, as the official 
accepted in 1914 was called General Adviser.^
Twentieth century Malaya, therefore, consisted of three elements; the colony 
of the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and the unfederated States.
1. See E.Thio, British Policy in the Malav^Peninsula. 1880-1909. (PhD. thesis 
London, 1856).
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Annexations on the Peninsula did not follow as Jervois predicted, and real 
British control was based on the fiction of advice which was coined at Pangkor 
in 1874.
In the South Pacific, after taking Fiji, Carnarvon refused Rotuma, Samoa 
and flew Guinea. "It is impossible to appropriate every territory and every 
island.•• it is only reasonable to ask some breathing time before we are required 
to act on a large scale, to do something quite as difficult to organise and 
control as either Fiji or the West Coast of Africa"*^ Although annexed, Fiji 
was an experiment.
That it also became a landmark in British colonial administration is to the
credit not so much of Carnarvon as Sir Arthur Gordon, governor from 1875 to 1880.
For all his faults Gordon had a remarkably comprehensive picture of his aims in
Fiji, although he demanded an independence akin to that of the Malay Residents.
"For God’s sake, don't try and govern Fiji in detail from Downing Street...", he
wrote to Carnarvon,"I am confident that, if left alone, I can and shall succeed,
but you cannot conceive how differently many questions look where one is able to
2
judge them on the spot from what they did in London". Tn fact Gordon unwittingly
confronted Carnarvon with the latter*s own idea - that Fiji was an experiment.
"The line of policy adopted by Great Britain in her treatment of the 
natives of Fiji is watched with interest and anxiety by the inhabitants
of other groups in the South Seas, and on its success or failure will
depend to a great extent the sentiments, whether of confident friendship 
or of fear and distrust, with which the already acknowledged power of 
the Queen will be regarded throughout the Pacific". ^
In Fiji Gordon inaugurated a remarkable experiment in what could be called
•Indirect Rule’,, not as a cheap expedient, like the Native Jurisdiction Ordinances
on the Gold Coast, but as an expensive experiment in the preservation and
development of an indigenous society. He thought that development in the interest
1. To New Guinea deputation, 29.iv. 1875. The Times, ^.v.1875* u.6.
2. Gordon to Carnarvon 2.vii.l875. Private. PRO.50/6/39 p.78.
3. Gordon to Carnarvon 26.ix.1876. Gordon, Fiji Records. II, p.161.
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of the white settlers alone would be simple; development in the interest of Fiji 
as a whole he realised would be costly, and as he told Carnarvon, "it is the 
natives who are the people - whose interests we have to consider".^ Therefore, 
he had continual conflicts with the Colonial Office over expenditure.
Gordon's attitude was well illustrated in his land, local government and 
taxation policies. He insisted that the bulk of the land should be retained for 
the Fijians in spite of legal arguments that the settlers* land titles should 
be examined in court without reference to questions of ethics and general policy. 
His successful advocacy ensured that about 80%> of the land was retained for the 
Fijians. Similarly* his local government system was designed to retain the chiefs 
in authority; chiefs of suitable rank were placed over each province, district 
and village. District and Provincial councils were created and resolutions from 
an annual Great Council of Chiefs formed, in some cases, the basis of legislation 
in the Legislative Council of the colony. Fijian stipendary magistrates were 
given similar powers over their people as the European counterparts had over the 
settlers. While these policies were designed to preserve Fijian rights and 
institutions, the taxation policy fostered the economic potential o^ the people.
2
The system was likened to the Dutch Culture System, which Gordon undoubtedly studied.
The cash poll tax was abolished; instead the Legislative Council assessed the
payments due from the provinces, the Government invited tenders for the purchase
of the Fijians' crops at fixed prices, and would also advise which crops were
best from the market viewpoint. The Fijians were left to raise enough produce to
meet their assessment. Thurston, who one writer claims was the originator of 
3
the scheme, said the Fijian got the maximum price for his produce in order to
4
pay his minimum tax assessment, and he also kept the surplus.
1. Gordon to Carnarvon 24.xii.1875. Private. FR0.30/6/39 p.86.
2. Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p. 196 8: 457. There were rumours before the system 
started that the Culture System was to be introduced.
3. J.Ki1lington, The Career of Sir John Thurston, p.54.
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Gordon's aim was to "seize, if possible, the spirit in which native
institutions have been framed, and endeavour so to work them as to develop to
the utmost the latent capacities of the people for the management of their own
affairs".^ In a speech in 1876 he told Fijians, "You are not a conquered people,
but Great Britain has joined you to her in order that peace might be established
2
in the country, and for the welfare of all alike". His greatest .weakness was
finance; apart from an initial grant of £100,000 and some loans, money was not
forthcoming from Britain, and rapid increase of his revenue by economic
development by Australians and New Zealanders would destroy his policy of
gradual development. Therefore, as Gordon wished to prevent the Fijians from
becoming the plantation labourers of the settlers, and Polynesian labour from
elsewhere was increasingly difficult to recruit, he sought indentured immigrants
from India who first arrived in 1879. Gordon was familiar with the system of
Indian immigration in Trinidad and Mauritius, and* it has been suggested that he
3
went to Fiji with the idea in view from the beginning. At all events the Indians
4
became a "human subsidy" for his experiment, and thus created what may yet
5
prove to be the most serious threat to his aims. Nevertheless Gordon's
6
achievment in Fiji was a lasting one and may well have been influential elsewhere.
Although the Colonial Office disliked his haughtiness and had the measure of his
7
faults, and Lowther felt once that it was "high time he got a snub", he had a
staunch defender in Herbert; and Carnarvon's verdict on leaving office was: "It
0
has been, to my mind, a great experiment".
1. Gordon, Fiji Records. I, p.198. 2. Ibid. p. 390.
3. 1 .M.Cumpston, "Sir Arthur Gordon and the Introduction of Indians into the 
Pacific: The West Indian System in Fiji", Pacific Hist. Rev.XXv (Nov 1956), 
pp. 375-376.
4. Legge, Britain in Fiji, p. 268.
5. Population,(1956 Report): Fijians - 148,134. Indians:- 169,403.
6. Legge, p. 156. Sir William MacGregor, Gordon's chief medical officer, was 
later Governor of N.Guinea 1888-98, and Lagos 1899-1904.
7. Min. by Lowther l.ii.1878 on Gordon to Carnarvon 30.xi.1877. CO/83/lA.
8. Carnarvon to Gordon 27.viii.1878. Gordon, Fiji Records. p.165.
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Beyond Fiji Carnarvon refuse to move. "We cannot in fact undertake
annexations in all parts of the world", he said,^ and Gordon was specifically
2
ordered not to extend British annexation or protectorate. Carnarvon's answer
to problems in this region was the Western Pacific High Commission, which was
intended to provide jurisdiction over British subjects only. The men on the spot,
however, interpreted this more liberally; Alfred Mauds lay, who Gordon sent home
in 1877 to hasten the issue of the commission, said the aim was "the extension
of British influence in these lands, and the prevention of their annexation by
any other power**, and Gordon claimed that before he left England in 1875 Herbert
4
had said he should quietly secure the annexation of Samoa and Tonga to Fiji,
These aims were frustrated. Germany was not checked in Samoa and Hew Guinea,
nor were the United States in Samoa, and the French were not excluded from the
New Hebrides. While Maudslay*® plan envisaged Deputy Commissioners at Tonga,
Samoa, the New Hebrides and the Solomons with jurisdiction in the islands around,
when the Order in Council was issued in 1877 D.C.’s were only appointed at Tonga
S
and Samoa to exercise jurisdiction over British subjects ; foreigners and 
islanders were outside their jurisdiction.
In the long run, however, the Western Pacific High Commission provided a 
ubiquitous instrument for British supervision in the Pacific, The 1877 Order 
gave the commission jurisdiction over British subjects in Tonga, Samoa, Rotuma, 
Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, the Louisiade Archipelago, and the 
Union, Phoenix, Gilbert, Ellice, Marshall, Caroline and Solomon Islands.^ Although 
Gordon later said that the High Commission kept order less effectively than
1. Min. by Carnarvon 21.V.1877 on Robinson to Carnarvon (tg) 19.V.1877. C0/85/l5,
2. Carnarvon to Gordon 29.ix.1877 (draft) CO/83/l5«
3. Maudslay to Gordon ll.xii.1876. Gordon, Fiji Records. II, p*241.
4« Ibid. I, pp. 407-8.
5, A third D.C. was appointed in 1881 to visit N.Britain, N.Ireland and the north 
coast of Eastern N.Guinea.
6. Order in Council 13.viii.1877. Hertslet’s, Treaties, XIV, pp. 871-911,
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previously when the Royal Navy did things Min its own way", in 1893 certain
1
jurisdiction over foreigners and islanders was added, and when gradually
British political control spread the High Commissioner was available to give
general supervision. Extra-territorial jurisdiction treaties were made with
Samoa and Tonga in 1878-9. Papua became a Protectorate in 1885 and was annexed 
2
in 1888. A joint Anglo-French naval commission was created in 1887 to
supervise the new Hebrides, where a B.C. was appointed in 1902, and the
Condominium was inaugurated in 1906. Protectorates were assumed over the Gilbert
and Ellice Islands in 1892 and the Solomons in 1893. Finally Tonga signed a
Protectorate treaty in 1900, and Vogel's Samoan ambition was realised in 1914.
"Samoa was to New Zealand. •• what New Guinea was to Australia, an irredenta in
which the honour of the people was involved, and which they hastened to redeem".^
Over most of these accessions the High Commissioner had a general sunervision
but since he was also the Governor of Fiji his control was remote and frequent
4
suggestions were made for the separation of the High Commission from Suva. A 
writer in 1919 criticised Britain’s conglomeration of possessions in the South 
Pacific:
"the lack of of cohesion or uniformity in the organs of government, or 
any general policy tending to weld them together. In Fiji we have a 
Crown Colony with some measure of representative government; in Tonga 
a quaint protectorate with a British resident; in Cook a dependency of 
New Zealand with a representative native government and a resident; in 
Papua a "territory" administered by the Commonwealth of Australia; in 
the New Hebrides a condominium with a medley of jurisdictions; and over 
the Western Pacific generally the High Commissioner, who is also Governor 
of Fiji, holds sway and exercises it chiefly through a number of depnties".5
Thus, although Carnarvon’s new official eventually supervised an empire far wider
1. Pacific 0. in C. 1893, Ibid.XH. p.570.
2. The Commonwealth of Australia took over the government in 1906.
3. Scholefield, The Pacific, p.178.
4. Apart from the years 1880-82, when Cordon was High Commissioner and Governor of 
New Zealand, the High Commissioner was always Gov. of Fiji, until 1952 when the 
posts were separated and the H.Q. of the Commission moved to the Solomons,
5. Scholefield, p.301.
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than that envisaged in 1875 and 1877, he never had the authority and initiative 
which Gordon had anticipated when he sailed from England in 1875.
In view of the conscious limitations of Carnarvon’s policies and the gradual 
nature of the growth of British influence in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Malaya 
and the South Pacific, it is not possible to say simply that 1874 saw the 
beginning of the forward movement. It is true that the Pangkor Engagement, the 
annexation of Fiji and the Ashanti war were major landmarks from the point of 
view of local history, but in the broader context it has been seen that the 
British Government was reluctant to move and exercised considerable restraint.
The logical outcome of intervention was not unrealised; iCimberley saw that 
expansion from Lagos might involve wide responsibilities in the west African 
interior, and he told Gladstone he expected further annexation cries in the 
Pacific. Carnarvon saw that annexation might follow in Malaya, and after the 
Ashanti war there were limited attempts to pain territory east and west of the 
Gold Coast. But Carnarvon definitely wished to draw the line after the Gold
t
Coast-Lagos colony, the Residents in Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong, and the 
new colony in Fiji. There was a marked lull before expansion was resumed in 
these areas in the 1880’s, when additional factors were involved. Instead of 
viewing the changes of 1874 as the beginning of the forward movement, it is 
more useful to see British policy as a reaction to certain individual situations 
and the pursuit of limited objectives.
The experiments of 1874 were not the work of great and famous empire 
builders either in Whitehall or on the frontiers. In London, Kimberley was 
painstaking and conscientious, so he studied the problems and did not try to 
ignore them, but he was reluctant to move. In each case he went through several
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months of great uncertainty before a combination of Knatchbu11-Ruges sen*s 
persistence, public opinion and the urgency of the issues caused him to make 
up his mind in favour of action. Even so, although he determined quite firmly 
on intervention, he was still uncertain what final form it should take. Carnarvon 
coming when when the ground had been prepared showed considerable imagination 
and flexibility in 1874 in face of the work of officers who acted first and 
reported afterwards, but as his problems multiplied and South African affairs 
came to dominate the Colonial Office, Carnarvon seemed to loose his touch. His 
handling of Jervois in Malaya and the Gambia Exchange question was less success­
ful than his original launching of the three experiments.
With Whitehall so generally reluctant, with the exception of Knatchbull- 
Hugessen and Herbert, the main impetus for change came from the men on the 
spot. A large responsibility for the changes rests upon them, since intervention 
involved taking sides in local disputes. In West Africa the Fante and the 
Protectorate peoples were assisted against Ashanti, in Malaya ’Abdu'llah of 
Perak was upheld against Ismail and Tengku 'Zia'u’d-din of Selangor against 
Raja Mahdi and his friends, and in Fiji the pretensions of Thakombau were 
usually favoured rather than Ma’afu's. The historical situation determined this 
choice in the Gold Coast, but in Malaya it depended very much upon the judgment 
of Irving and Braddell, the men who tried to unravel the local details, and they 
did not agree on what they found.
Because such a choice was made British intervention was usually resisted, 
and the Colonial Office often came to feel that it had "backed the wrong horse". 
Officers in the Gold Coast continually expressed disgust at the military failing 
of the Fante, in Malaya Jervois contemplated turning to Ismail as Sultan of 
Perak in preference to ’Abdu'llah, in Sungei Ujong Dan to* Bandar Tunggal was 
regarded as more valiant than the Dato'Klana to whom the Government was committed,
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and in Fiji Ma’afu always excited more admiration than Thakombau. This choice 
was always very significant for the local history, and must have given a 
characteristic imprint to the British presence.
From Whitehall’s point of view, however, the local choices were less 
important than the methods of intervention. Thus, this thesis, as well as 
being an interpretation of the policies of 1870-76, has also invloved a study 
of origins. Firstly, the Colonial Office interest in the three tropical areas 
intensified. Secondly, important ideas such as the use of Chartered Companies 
and ’Indirect Rule’ were aired. Thirdly, certain international preliminaries 
to the period of greater rivalry in the 1880*s occurred.
The Colonial Office consolidated certain new spheres of responsibility. 
Although the Fpreign Office retained the initiative in the Niger Delta, in 
relations with Siam, and for a time relations with foreigners in the South 
Pacific, on the whole the Colonial Office was left with a free hand in the three 
areas, it decided the Gambia question as the Foreign Office believed that the 
Gold Coast policy would be the determining factor. It was left with the 
supervision of the Malay States, except where its activities might conflict with 
Siamese relations, and Kimberley, who decided to intervene in 1873, retained his 
interest and even from the India Office he influenced Malayan policy.* In the 
South Pacific the High Commissioner, the Governor of Fiji, was gradually given 
supervision of various later acretions, and the Judicial Commissioner was always 
the Chief Justice of Fiji.
The Colonial Office also slightly changed its ground in this period and 
admitted theoretically that trade should be encouraged, if only to create 
revenue. Buckingham, Granville, and Kimberley had kept aloof from enterprises 
like the Selangor Tin Company; the Polynesia Company in Fiji was frustrated by
1. See E.Thio, British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, p.316.
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Thurston, and various New Guinea ventures were firmly discouraged. But after 
the Ashanti war and the appointment of the Malay Residents the idea of economic
i
development in West Africa and Malaya was accepted, and in Fiji this was 
Gordon's only solution to his financial difficulties.
The ideas about Chartered Companies and 'Indirect Rule' presage the period 
of greater expansion in the last quarter of the century. Gladstone received 
Vogel's idea of the South Pacific Company not unfavourably, and Carnarvon 
evidently had the East India Company in mind when he considered his new policy 
on the Gold Coast, when he also interviewed some administrators from India and 
Burma.* At the end of the period Goldie's arrival in the Niger was the first 
step towards the Royal Niger Company* 'Indirect Rule* is a loosely used concept 
which cannot be analysed here, but a recent writer on Gordon's administration 
in Fiji writes: "These principles of native administration approximated closely
to those subsequently developed by Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron in Nigeria
2
and by Cameron in Tanganyika - the principles of Indirect Rule". An American
writer on Malaya said that there "indirect rule is substantially an offshoot of
3
the fact that the Malay States... have remained protected States". Thus direct 
government by Resident was clothed in the fiction of advice; but noting how 
Jervois advocated annexation in 1875 but then recoiled and decided to control
still indirectly through Queen's Commissioners, Person coneluded: "In other
4
words indirect rule is a cheap means of transition to annexation". This compares 
with the reasons for the Native Jurisdiction Ordinances on the Gold Coast, but 
is in complete contrast to Gordon's desire in Fiji.
Later international rivalries are foreshadowed in the period 1870-76 in two 
ways. Firstly, the rivalry of Franca was encountered in West Africa, in the
1. PRO.30/6/85. "Query a Company? See Act 1870 quoted in Annual Register 
XXIII confirming all conquests of the E.India Co. in India".
2. Legge, Britain in Fiji, p.165.
3. R.Emerson, Malaysia, p.54. 4. Ibid. p.126, fh. 20.
rivers north of Sierra Leone, and the rivalry of the IT.S.A. and Germany was
encountered in the Pacific especially in Samoa. There were even rumours of
German intervention in West Africa (Liberia) and Malaya. The alarmists were
nearly always the men on the spot, such as Sir Arthur Kennedy, W.H.M.Read, or
Julius Vogel, and just as1?he crises of the mid-1880*s when British policy was
determined, in the main, by factors of European diplomacy, so in the early
1870’s the British Government was on the whole complacent about foreign rivalry
in the tropics.^ The exception to this was Kimberley’s action in Malaya and
2in future years he referred to the rumoured ’German scare * of 1873 •
Secondly* ):he extension of e^tra-territorial jurisdiction, the development
of techniques of expansion which fell short of sovereignty but nevertheless
implied a vague paramountcy, provided the basis for succession assertion of
British spheres of influence at a later date. British paramountcy in Malaya
was staunchly defended until the 1909 northern boundary was achieved, Britain's
position in the Niger Delta was cherished by the Foreign Office, especially
by W.H.Wylde of the Slave Department. It is true that Australians and New
Zealanders had a source of grievance over itew Guinea and Samoa; but, then, the
treatment of the German land claims in Fiji after annexation was one of
3
Bismarck’s excuses for pique with Britain.
The crises which directed Kimberley attention to West Africa, Malaya and th 
South Pacific in 1870 to 1873, and the policies pursued by Carnarvon in 1874 to 
1876, while being an important stage in the growth of British control in the 
tropics, cannot be signalized as the vital stage in this process. The period
1. See Kimberley’s Min. on the French in West Africa 28.V.1873 on VO* to CO. 
22.V.1873* C0/96/l07; & Malcolm’s Memo, on N.Guinea 25.x.1875. C0/808/l4.
2. Sept. 1881; "Bismarck used to be the bugbear, and was believed to have an 
eye on Selangor”,
April 1885: "I mention Germany because some years ago the Germans were 
intriging in Selangore, now under our protection”.
Quoted in E.Thio ; op.cit. pp. 9 & 316.
3. A.J.P.Taylor, Germany's First Bid for Colonies (1938) p. 32.
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should rather be viewed as one when the Colonial Office began to realise the 
problem of the British frontier in the tropics and began to weigh the 
alternatives which it faced• The frontier in the tropics was not a central 
issue of British policy, although a few crises reached the headlines, and while 
a vague conviction of British paramountcy was finnly held, it was decided that 
before further territory could be taken certain experiments were necessary.
*
i
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